JUDGMENT Khundkar, J. - A preliminary objection has been taken to this application on the ground that the verification of the petition is defective. It is pointed out, in the first instance, that Kali Charan Banerjee who verified the petition is not the Petitioner, although he describes himself as such. It is next objected that under Rule 8 of Chapter VII of the Original Side Rules of this Court there should be an affidavit proving his fitness to verify the petition. This objection has been pressed by Mr. Banerjee, who appears for the Respondent, and Mr. Sen, who appears for the applicant, has suggested that I should allow a fresh verification of the petition to be made. He informs me that if this is permitted the Petitioner, Mr. A. K. Fazlul Huq, himself would verify the petition. If such a course were permitted a question might arise as to whether this application was maintainable. The application itself was presented on July 15, 1946, and at that date it certainly lay. Were the verification now to be amended it might be argued that the application did not become a competent application until this was done, and it could then be said that as this application was not made until after July 15, 1946, it did not lie. I have here indicated the nature of the preliminary objection and its possible consequences, but I do not propose to deal with this objection as I desire to dispose of this application upon its merits. On May 24, 1945, a decree was pronounced by me in a suit (Manindra Nath Banerjee v. A.K. Fazlul Huq) in which the Plaintiff was seeking to recover arrears of rent, and also the ejectment of the Defendant in respect of a certain house. The parties came to terms in that suit, and the decree passed by me was upon the basis of a compromise then entered into. At the time when that decree was made the relationship of the parties as landlord and tenant was governed by the Calcutta House Rent Control Order of 1943. Subsequently this order was amended more than once. Two of these amendments are of importance in relation to the present case. One of these came into effect on August 28, 1945, and another on June 15, 1946. Subsequently this order was amended more than once. Two of these amendments are of importance in relation to the present case. One of these came into effect on August 28, 1945, and another on June 15, 1946. It is necessary to set out the provisions of paragraph 9B (3) of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order, 1943, as it stood on July 15, 1946, after these two amendments and when the present application was filed. Where a decree or order for the recovery of possession of any house has been made on or before the 29th day of August, 1945, on the ground that the tenant in possession of such house is not entitled to the benefit of paragraph 9 by reason off Ms non-compliance with the provision of this Order as to the payment or deposit of rent due by him in respect of such house, or where any such decree or order has been made with the consent of the parties on or before the said date in any suit or proceeding in which the said ground was taken by the landlord for the eviction of such tenant from such house but in either case the possession of such house has not been recovered from the tenant- (a) all proceedings for delivery of possession in execution of such decree order shall be stayed in the case where such decree or order has been made with the consent of the parties until the loth day of July 1946 and in other cases until the 29th day of September, 1945, or where any application has been made under el. (b) of this sub-paragraph until the date of disposal of such application; and (b) the Court by which the decree or order was made shall set aside the decree or order if- (i) any application is made in that behalf by the judgment-debtor in the case of a decree or order made with the consent of the parties not later than the said day and in the case of other decrees or orders not later than the said 29th day of September, 1945. 2. 2. The decree made by me on May 24, 1945, was governed by this provision because it was a decree made by consent in a suit in which the landlord had taken as a ground for eviction of the tenant the failure of the tenant to pay or deposit the rent in compliance with the provisions of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order, 1943. In the present application I am asked to set aside the decree made by me under the amended provisions above-quoted. The Calcutta House Rent Control Order of 1943 ceased to have any operation on September 30, 1946, when all orders made under the Defence of India Act and the Defence of India Rules lapsed. On October I, 1946, an Ordinance came into effect, called the Calcutta Rent Ordinance, 1946, which may be regarded as having taken the place for all practical purposes of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order, 1943. With regard to the proceedings taken under the last-mentioned Order, and which were pending when the present Ordinance came into existence, these are sought to be saved by sec. 26 of this Ordinance. That section reads as follows: Any proceedings commenced under the provision of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order, 1943, or of the Bengal House Rent Control Order, 1942, or of the Bengal Hotels and Lodging Houses Control Order, 1942, shall on the said orders ceasing to be in operation, be continued and be, as far as may be, deemed to have been commenced under the corresponding provision of this Ordinance and any appointment made under any of the Orders shall for the purposes of the said proceedings be deemed to have been made under this Ordinance as if this Ordinance was in operation when the said proceedings were commenced or such appointment was made. 3. Under this section the present application shall be continued and may be deemed to have been commenced under the corresponding provision of this Ordinance. The only provision contained in the Ordinance which corresponds, so far as the present matter is concerned, with the amended provisions of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order, 1943, set out above is contained in sec. Under this section the present application shall be continued and may be deemed to have been commenced under the corresponding provision of this Ordinance. The only provision contained in the Ordinance which corresponds, so far as the present matter is concerned, with the amended provisions of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order, 1943, set out above is contained in sec. 17 of the Ordinance which is in the following terms: Where any decree or order for the recovery of possession of any premises has been made, but the possession of such premises has not been recovered before the date of commencement of that Ordinance by the execution of such decree or order, the Court by which the decree or order was made may, if it is of the opinion that the decree or order would not have been made if this Ordinance had been in operation at the date of the making of the decree or order, rescind or vary the decree or order in such manner as the Court may think fit for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this Ordinance. 4. So far as the present matter is concerned I am vested by this section with power to rescind or vary the decree made by me on May 24, 1945. 5. But there is a condition attaching to the exercise of that power. I must be of opinion that the decree made by me would not have been made if on May 24, 1945, when that decree was pronounced, the present Ordinance had been in operation. In other words, I have now to search the present Ordinance for the purpose of seeing whether it contains Anything which, had it been in force on May 24, 1945, would have stood in the way of my pronouncing that decree. For such a bar, Mr. Sen who appears in support of the application, has referred me to sec. 14. In other words, I have now to search the present Ordinance for the purpose of seeing whether it contains Anything which, had it been in force on May 24, 1945, would have stood in the way of my pronouncing that decree. For such a bar, Mr. Sen who appears in support of the application, has referred me to sec. 14. It is necessary to set out the language of the whole of that section: 14 (1) No suit or proceeding by a landlord against a tenant in possession of any premises for eviction of such tenant therefrom, in which non-compliance with the provisions of this Ordinance as to payment or deposit of rent due by such tenant in respect of such premises to the full extent allowable by this Ordinance within the time specified in that behalf in this Ordinance has been taken as a ground for such eviction, shall be entertained by any Court unless the landlord has been permitted by the Controller by an order in writing under sub-sec. (2) to institute such suit or proceeding and has produced before such Court proof that such permission has been granted. (2) A landlord desiring to obtain from the Controller any order referred to in sub-sec. (1) permitting him to institute a suit or proceeding referred to in that sub-section against any tenant in possession of any premises for evicting such tenant therefrom, shall apply in writing to the Controller in that behalf, and if, on receipt of such application, the Controller, after giving the tenant in possession of the premises an opportunity of showing cause against the application and considering all the circumstances of the case, is satisfied that there has been no such non-compliance with the provisions of this Ordinance as to the payment or deposit of rent due by such tenant in respect of such premises, or that reasonable grounds exist for such noncompliance and if the tenant has paid the landlord or has deposited in the manner in which a deposit of rent is required to be made under sub-sec. (1) of sec. (1) of sec. 16 the rent allowable by this Ordinance in arrear before an order under this sub-section is made, the Controller shall, after recording his reasons in writing, make an order rejecting the application, but, if the Controller is not so satisfied or if the tenant has not be paid or deposited the rent allowable by this Ordinance in arrear, the Controller shall, after recording his reasons in writing, make the order applied for. 6. It is to be seen that the above provisions create what may be described as a removable bar to the filing of a suit or proceeding by a landlord against a tenant for eviction. Mr. Sen's contention is that if we imagine this Ordinance to have been in existence when Manindra Nath Banerjee brought his suit against A. K. Fazlul Huq, then the bar would have stood in his way and the decree made by me on May 24, 1945, could not have been made and that attracts the operation of sec. 17 and, therefore, I am bound at the present time to rescind that decree. It requires only a moment's consideration to realise that such a result is illogical and anomalous. On May 24, 1945, the bar referred to in sub-sec. (I) of sec. 14 of the present Ordinance which is removable in the manner indicated in sub-sec. (2) was not removed, for the simple reason that at that time, as the law then stood, there was no such bar. It cannot, in my judgment, be said that there is no escape from the literal effect of sec. 17 read with sec. 14. As I have stated above, sec. 17 vests in me a discretion to rescind the decree because the language is, The Court by which the decree or order was made may, if it is of the opinion that the decree or order would not have been made if this Ordinance had been in operation at the date of the making of the decree or order, rescind or vary the decree or order in such manner as the Court may think fit for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this Ordinance. 7. The language of this section is, in my judgment, not mandatory but enabling. Mr. 7. The language of this section is, in my judgment, not mandatory but enabling. Mr. Sen has contended that the language is mandatory, but I think that argument can be disposed of by comparing the language of sec. 17 with the amended provisions of the Calcutta, House Rent Control Order, 1943, which I have quoted above. The words in (a) of (3) of 9B of that Order are: All proceedings for delivery of possession and execution of such decree and order shall be stayed, and the words of (b) of (3) of 9B are: The Court toy which the decree or order was made shall set aside the decree or order. 8. The earlier provision gave the Court no discretion but the present sec. 17 leaves the Court free to rescind or vary its own earlier decree or not to do so. 9. Regard being had to all the circumstances in this case, I am not prepared to set aside the decree which I made on May 24, 1945, and which, as already stated, was passed upon the basis of a compromise freely entered into by the Defendant with the Plaintiff. 10. This application is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.