ORDER Waliullah, J. - This is an application in revision under s. 115, Civil P.C., on behalf of the plaintiffs. It is directed against the order of the learned District Judge passed in revision regarding the matter of the court-fee which arose in the Court of the first instance. The relevant facts and circumstances may be briefly set out here. 2. On 7-7-1934 an agreement was entered into between one Haji Taj Mohammad and Tara Mohan Day, who is defendant 1 in the present suit, for the sale of one of the two houses and a room of another house belonging to Haji Taj Mohammad. The sale price agreed between the parties was fixed at RS. 5000. It appears that on 13-10-1934, Tara Mohan Day filed suit No. 91 of 1934, for specific performance of the agreement for sale dated 7-7-1934. He impleaded Haji Taj Mohammad as the sole defendant. The suit was valued at RS. 6000. "While this suit was pending, it appears that on 30-1-1935, the four sons of Haji Taj Mohammad filed another suit, suit No. 11 of 1935 against Tara Mohan Day and Taj Mohammad. They sought a declaration thas 4/5ths share in the two houses mentioned in the agreement for sale dated 7-7-1934, belonged to them and this suit was valued at about RS. 9000. On 23-9-1935, one of the four sons of Taj Mohammad, namely, Abdul Rahim, died and thereupon his sons were brought upon the record as his legal representatives. Finally on 21-3-1936, the learned Civil Judge decreed Suit NO. 91 of 1934 in favour of Tara Mohan Day and dismissed Suit No. 11 of 1935 instituted by the sons of Haji Taj Mohammad. It appears that appeals filed against these decrees were unsuccessful and both these ' decrees became final. Thereafter, on 15-1-1934, Suit NO. 13 of 1944 was instituted by three of the sons of Abdul Rahim, in substance for the following reliefs : (a) A declaration may be made that the plaintiffs are owners in possession of 3/25ths share in the two houses mentioned in Sch. B of the plaint. This was to be on the footing that the decree passed in Suit NO. 11 of 1935 against the four sons of Haji Taj Mohammad dated 21 3-1936 was null and void against the plaintiffs. This relief was valued at Rs. 1278-15-4. B of the plaint. This was to be on the footing that the decree passed in Suit NO. 11 of 1935 against the four sons of Haji Taj Mohammad dated 21 3-1936 was null and void against the plaintiffs. This relief was valued at Rs. 1278-15-4. (b) Tara Mohan Day, defendant 1, be permanently restrained from getting the sale-deed effected in his favour in virtue of the decree for specific performance obtained by him in Suit NO. 91 of 1934. This relief was valued at RS. 50. 3. The defendants contested the suit on various grounds including the question with regard to the insufficiency of the court-fee paid. Issue No. 5 was framed by the learned Munsif with regard to the defendants' objection regarding the court-fee paid by the plaintiffs. The learned Munsif, on 14-4-1944, decided issue No. 5 of the suit in favour of the plaintiffs and held that the court-fee paid was sufficient. On 13-5-1944, however, the Chief Inspector of Stamps submitted a report to the effect that there was a deficiency in court-fee paid to the extent of RS. 687-8-0. On 10 7-1944 the learned Munsif finally decided the objection raised by the Chief Inspector of Stamps. In effect he held that the view taken by him in the order passed on 14 4-1944 was correct and in this view of the matter he dismissed the objections raised by the Chief Inspector of Stamps. Against this order the Chief Inspector of Stamps went up in revision to the learned District Judge under S. 6-B, Amended Court-fees Act. The learned District Judge partly allowed the application in revision and modified the order passed by the learned Munsif. Against the order passed by the learned District Judge the plaintiffs have come up in revision to this Court. A preliminary objection has been raised by the opposite parties to the effect that no revision lies against the order of the learned District Judge inasmuch as there is no 'case decided' so far by the Court below. Learned counsel have referred to the Full Bench decision of this Court in Gupta and Co. Vs. Kripa Ram Brothers where it was held : A mere decision as to the amount of the court-fee payable does not amount to a "case decided" nor is it necessarily an irregularity in procedure or illegality or refusal to exercise jurisdiction. Learned counsel have referred to the Full Bench decision of this Court in Gupta and Co. Vs. Kripa Ram Brothers where it was held : A mere decision as to the amount of the court-fee payable does not amount to a "case decided" nor is it necessarily an irregularity in procedure or illegality or refusal to exercise jurisdiction. No revision, therefore, lies to the High Court from an order of the Court below calling upon the plaintiffs to make good the deficiency in the amount of court-fee paid by him. 4. Learned counsel for the applicants has strongly contended that after the decision by the Full Bench in the year 1934, the Court-fees Act has itself undergone substantial changes by reason of the amending Acts passed in the years 1936 to 1938. It is contended that by reason of the recent amendments the situation of an application in revision like the present one is completely altered. Under S.6-A, Court-fees Act, as amended, it is provided that a plaintiff when called upon to make good a deficiency in court, fee may appeal against such order as if it were an order appeasable under s, 104, Civil P.C. Similarly, it is provided by S. 6 B that if the order of the Court with regard to the objection raised by the Chief Inspector of Stamps be at variance with the opinion of the officer he may, within three months from the date of receipt of such order, file an application in revision in the Court to which the appeal lies from a decree in the suit in which such order has been passed. These provisions, so it is contended, have effected a fundamental change in the position, as it stood, at the time when the Full Bench decision was given. The learned counsel for the applicants has further invited my attention to a decision of two learned Judges of this Court in Mt. Mohri Kunwar Vs. B. Keshri Chandra, AIR 1941 All 298 where at p. 881, the learned Judges have made this observation: We also think that so far as the question of court-fee is concerned "the case has been decided" within the meaning of S. 115, Civil P.C., but it is not necessary to express any final opinion upon these contentions. This is of course not a final opinion and must be treated as an obiter dictum. This is of course not a final opinion and must be treated as an obiter dictum. Learned counsel has also referred to the case in Ramkhelawan Sahu Vs. Bir Surendra Sahi and Others, AIR 1938 Patna 22 Ramkhelawao Sahu v. Smendra Sahi decided by a Full Bench of the Patna High Court. This ruling was followed by a Banch of two learned Judges of the Patna High Court in, Ramautar Sao Vs. Ram Gobind Sao and Others, AIR 1942 Patna 60 Ramautar Sao v. Ramgobind Sao It is contended that the view taken by the Patna High Court in these two cases supports the contention of the learned counsel for the applicants. Reference has also been made to the case in Ratnavelu Pillai and Another Vs. Varadaraja Pillai and Another, AIR 1942 Mad 585 Ratnavelu Pillai v. Yaradaraja where a learned single Judge of the Madras High Court appears to have adopted the same view. I need not however consider these authorities at any length here. In view of the amendments introduced into the Court-fees Act by S. 6-A and S. 6-B it seems to me, as at present advised, that the position is now fundamentally altered and what was not open even to a mere application in revision in 1934 has now become subject to a right of appeal by one party under S. 6-A and subject to a right of revision by the other party under S.6-B. It seems to me, there fore, difficult to hold that the nature of the order sought to be challenged by means of this application is such that it should be held not to amount to a "case decided" within the meaning of s. 115, Civil P.C. Learned counsel for the opposite parties have, is the course of their arguments, laid particular emphasis upon the expression "no appeal shall lie from such order" in S. 6-B. Obviously this expression excludes the right of an "appeal" against the order passed by the learned District Judge in the present case. It does not, however, in reality affect the right of revision. It does not, however, in reality affect the right of revision. Similar expressions are to be found in some other acts passed by the U.P. Legislature and in spite of such provisions it has teen held by this Court in several cases that the right of a party to make an application in revision to this Court under S. 115, Civil P.C., remains unaffected thereby. In view of the above I would overrule the preliminary objection. 5. With regard to the merits of the application, learned counsel for the applicants has strongly contended in the first instance that the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain an application in revision filed on behalf of the Chief Inspector of Stamps The contention of the learned counsel, in substance, is that inasmuch as the learned Munsif had already decided the question of deficiency in court-fee under sub cl. 4 of s. 6, in deciding issue 5, before the Chief Inspector of Stamps raised the question of the deficiency in court-fee by means of his report dated 13-5-1944, there could, in law, be no order passed by the learned Munsif such as is contemplated by sub-s. (3) of s. 6. The contention of the learned counsel is that it is only against an order passed under sub-s. (3) of s. 6, Court-fees Act, that the Chief Inspector of Stamps is given the remedy by means of an application in revision under S. 6-B. Learned counsel has further contended that the order of the learned Munsif dated 10-7-1944, did not purport to be an order under sub-s. (3) of S. 6 and, therefore, in any view of the matter it was not subject to a right of revision under S. 6-B. I have carefully listened to all that the learned counsel had to, urge with reference to his ingenious arguments based upon the sequence of the two sub-Ss. (3) and (4) and the phraseology used in S. 6-B, Court-fees Act. I have heard learned counsel for the opposite parties as well. It seems to me, however, that, in substance, though not in form the order of the learned Munsif passed on 10-7-1944, was an order passed on the question of deficiency raised by the Chief Inspector of Stamps and this order was undoubtedly at variance with the opinion of the officer who had raised the question of deficiency in court-fee. It seems to me, however, that, in substance, though not in form the order of the learned Munsif passed on 10-7-1944, was an order passed on the question of deficiency raised by the Chief Inspector of Stamps and this order was undoubtedly at variance with the opinion of the officer who had raised the question of deficiency in court-fee. It follows, therefore, that the revision filed on behalf of the Chief Inspector of Stamps in the Court of the learned District Judge was fully competent and there was no defect in the jurisdiction of the learned Judge in entertaining the revision and disposing of it. 6. I may mention, in passing that there is no dispute now with regard to the amount of court-fee paid regarding relief 'A' of the plaint. Both the Courts below have held that the court-fee paid is sufficient regarding that relief and there is no application in revision challenging that order of the learned Judge before me. The only question which I have to consider and decide is whether the amount of court-fee paid regarding relief 'B' of the plaint is or is not in accordance with law. Relief 'B' as it stands is, to my mind, rather vague. It is couched in a language which could be easily interpreted to refer to the whole of the property comprised in Suit No. 91 of 1934, that is, the suit for specific performance filed by Tara Mohan Day against Taj Mohammad. That suit related to one complete house and also a room of the other house. The valuation of both these items of property was fixed by Tara Mohan Day, the plaintiff, at Rs. 5000. Under sub-s. (2) of s. 7 (IV.A) the plaintiffs would, therefore, have to pay the court-fee calculated according to 1/5th of the value of one complete house and one room of the other house. The learned District Judge has also held that this provision of the Court-fees Act is applicable to the facts of the present case. The question, however, remains as to the value of the subject-matter of the claim referred to in relief B. With regard to this matter, however, it seems to me that the learned Judge has confused the property involved in Suit No. 11 of 1935, with the property involved in Suit No. 91 of 1934. The question, however, remains as to the value of the subject-matter of the claim referred to in relief B. With regard to this matter, however, it seems to me that the learned Judge has confused the property involved in Suit No. 11 of 1935, with the property involved in Suit No. 91 of 1934. As mentioned above already suit No. 91 of 1934, related only to one of the two houses plus one room in the other blouse whereas, in Suit No. 11 of 1935, a 4/5th share in both the houses was involved. In view of the phraseology in which relief B is couched at present it is obvious that the plaintiffs must pay court-fee on one fifth of the total value of the subject-matter of suit No. 91 of 1934, that is, on Rs. 1000. 7. Learned counsel for the applicants has invited my attention to the application filed by the plaintiffs on 1231945, after the decision of the revision by the learned District Judge on 19-2-1945. In this application the plaintiffs endeavored to explain what they actually meant by the language employed in drafting relief B of the plaint. In the end it was specifically prayed that certain amendments of relief B might be allowed at that stage and thereafter calculation of court-fee be made. This application does not appear to have been disposed of by the Court of the first instance till now. It appears that certain pleas were taken by the plaintiffs themselves for seeking adjournment of the proceedings in the Court of the learned Munsif and thus the Court has not, as yet, assed any order with regard to the amendments sought by means of this application. The learned counsel at one stage endeavored to persuade me to allow him here to effect the amendments in relief B as it stands at present, but this request obviously could not be entertained inasmuch as the matter has not yet received the attention of the Court of first in stance. Learned counsel has, in this connection, referred me to the case in Mt. Mohri Kunwar Vs. Learned counsel has, in this connection, referred me to the case in Mt. Mohri Kunwar Vs. B. Keshri Chandra, AIR 1941 All 298 Mohri Kunwar v. Kesri Chandra, in which, in somewhat similar circumstances, a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court held that a suitor had a right to amend his plaint in any manner he likes and so far as his amendments prayed for are not contrary to law or are likely to lead to injustice they should be granted. There is no doubt that the learned Munsif will consider this application and while so doing will bear in mind the observations of the learned Judges of this Court in the abovementioned case. If and when he allows the amendments sought to be effected, no doubt the requisite court-fee will have to be calculated in the light of the amendments effected. In case of the amendments being allowed the basis of the calculation would obviously be 1/5th of 3/25th of 5,000. 8. I accordingly allow this application in part to the extent indicated above. I make no order as to costs of this Court.