Judgement Appeal (No. 26 of 1945) from a judgment and decree of the High Court (August 29, 1941) which affirmed a judgment and decree of the Court of the First Civil Judge of Saharanpur, District Saharanpur (January 10, 1938). The following facts are taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The parties in the action out of which this appeal arose were Hindus subject to the Mitakshara law of the Benares School, and this appeal involved the con struction of the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929 (II. of 1929) which is hereinafter referred to as " the Act." The Act was not expressed to come into operation on a particular day. It received the assent of the Governor General on February 21, 1929, and under the provisions of s. 5 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (X. of 1897) it came into operation immediately on the expiration of February 20, 1929. The description and preamble of the Act made it clear that the object of the Act was to alter the order of succession of certain persons therein mentioned, namely, a sons daughter, daughters daughter, sister, and sisters son, and to rank them as heirs in the specified order of succession next after a fathers father and before a fathers brother. The Act thus amended the old order of succession in Hindu law by introducing certain persons as heirs who had no such place according to the ordinary interpretation of Mitakshara law. The Act was one of the several measures enacted during recent times, in a reformative spirit, with a view to bringing the ancient rules of Hindu succession into conformity with what are regarded as the changing conditions and sentiments of present-day Hindu society. It therefore selected certain relatives and gave them a preferential place in the order of succession, irrespective of their sex, over more remote relatives, on the ground that, judged by the pure test of blood relationship to the deceased owner, they were nearer heirs than those superseded by the provisions of the Act. It therefore selected certain relatives and gave them a preferential place in the order of succession, irrespective of their sex, over more remote relatives, on the ground that, judged by the pure test of blood relationship to the deceased owner, they were nearer heirs than those superseded by the provisions of the Act. The question for determination in this appeal was whether, on a true construction of the Act, it applied only to the case of a Hindu male dying intestate on or after February 21, 1929 (the date of its operation), or whether it also applied to the case of such a male dying intestate before that date, if he was succeeded by a female heir who died after that date. The genealogical table relating to the parties her in the case was as follows KANHIYA LAL | | | Sant Lal Chaman Devi Shambhu Nath (wife)(d. July, = 1936) | Sabz Kali (Defendant No. 3) Respondent No. 4 | Raj Kali (Defendant No. 1) Respondent No. 2 | Anar Kali (Plaintiff) Respondent No. 1 | Lilavati (Defendant No. 2) Respondent No. 3 | Dharam Das (d. 1922) succeeded | Sumer Chand by mother | Shankar Lal | Dwarka Dass | | | | | | | | Tota Ram Tota Ram Kundan Lal Baru Mall (adopted son) | | | | | | | Shugan Chand Mst. Raji Duni Chand Qabul Gobind (Defndant (Defendant No. Chand Prasad No. 8) widow 4) Appellant (Defendant (Defendant of Ram No. 1) No. 6) No. 5) Swarup, son Appellant Appellant of Kundan No. 3 No. 2 Lal, died pending proceedings, representative s are appellants | Uggar Son (Defendant No. 7) Respondent No. 3 The facts giving rise to this litigation were as follows. There was a partition by means of an arbitration award between Shambhu Nath, Ganpat Rai, Shankar Lal and Dwarka Dass. At that time Kanihya Lal and Sant Lal appear to have been dead. Under the award Shambhu Nath received as his share a certain set of property and a half share in another set of property. On Shambhu Naths death, his only surviving son, Dharam Das, succeeded to his properties, Sumer Chand having pre-deceased Shambhu Nath. Dharam Das died in 1922, before the date of the Act, leaving neither a widow nor descendants. His mother, Mst. Chaman Devi, succeeded him as his heir, taking a Hindu widos estate. On Shambhu Naths death, his only surviving son, Dharam Das, succeeded to his properties, Sumer Chand having pre-deceased Shambhu Nath. Dharam Das died in 1922, before the date of the Act, leaving neither a widow nor descendants. His mother, Mst. Chaman Devi, succeeded him as his heir, taking a Hindu widos estate. He also left four sisters, Msts. Sabz Kali, Raj Kali, Anar Kali and Lilavati. Chaman Devi died in July, 1936 (after the date of the Act), when the succession to the estate of Dharam Das opened. Anar Kali, respondent No. 1, one of Dharam Dass sisters, instituted the present suit in the Court of the Civil Judge of Saharanpur, against her sisters (respondents 2, 3 and 4) and the present appellants and Ugger Sen (Respondent No. 5), her brothers collaterals, together with Mst. Raji, the widow of one of such collaterals. In her plaint she alleged that Dharam Das was the last full owner of the plaint properties and that on his death his mother, Chaman Devi, took a widows estate, and that on her death in July, 1936, her daughters (respondents 1-4), as sisters of Dharam Das, became heirs to his estate under the provisions of the Act and entered into proprietary possession of the properties in the plaint. She claimed that she had a one-fourth share in the first set of properties and a one-eighth share in the other set of properties on the ground that, in those properties, she and her sisters were the owners only of one-half; defendants Nos. 4-8 being owners of the other half. She also claimed partition of her share in both the sets of properties. The plaintiffs sisters (defendants 1, 2 and 3) filed separate written statements admitting the claims of the plaintiff and praying that their respective shares might also be partitioned on payment of court fees. The contesting defendants Nos. 4-8 filed a joint written statement denying that the plaintiff or her sisters were the heirs, and stating that they themselves were the owners of the property. They claimed that they had succeeded to the property as the heirs for Dharam Das, who had died before the Act came into force, and the Act having no retrospective effect did not apply to the parties to the suit. They claimed that they had succeeded to the property as the heirs for Dharam Das, who had died before the Act came into force, and the Act having no retrospective effect did not apply to the parties to the suit. Six issues were framed, of which the following alone was now material Whether the plaintiff and defendants 1-3 or defendants 4-6 are the heirs of Dharam Das. Before the trial judge it was admitted that succession to the properties in question opened on the death of Chaman Devi. On January 10, 1938, the learned trial judge delivered judgment, holding that Dharam Das was the last owner of the properties in suit and that the full Bench decision, Rajpali Kunwar v. Sarju Rat (1) applied to the case, consequently the Act applied and the sisters of Dharam Das were the owners of the property in preference to the contesting defendants. He decreed the plaintiffs claim for partition, and ordered that the three sisters of the plaintiff, defendants 1-3, should also get their respective shares on the payment of the necessary court fee. The suit was thus decreed with costs, and a decree dated January 10, 1938, was accordingly drawn up. From that decree, defendants 4, 5 and 6 (the present appellants) appealed to the High Court at Allahabad. Pending the disposal of the appeal, Mst. Raji died, and on October 15, 1939, the present appellants were brought on the record as her legal heirs. The only point raised in that appeal related to the application of the Act to the present case. On August 29, 1941, the High Court (Allsop and Verma JJ.) delivered judgment, holding that the suit was covered by the full Bench decision, Rajpali Kunwar v. Sarju Rat (( 1936) I, L, R. 58 A. 1041.), and that there were full Bench decisions of several of the other High Courts to the same effect. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs. A decree followed on August 29, 1941. From that decree the appellants now appealed to His Majesty in Council. 1946. June 3. Rewcastle K.C. and Ralph Parikh for the appellants. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs. A decree followed on August 29, 1941. From that decree the appellants now appealed to His Majesty in Council. 1946. June 3. Rewcastle K.C. and Ralph Parikh for the appellants. It is common ground that under the Mitakshara law as it existed in 1928 the collaterals would have inherited the property in preference to the sister, and the sole question in this appeal is whether in the circumstances of this case that order of succession has been altered by the passing of the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929. The question is, whether on the true construction of the Act, it applies only to the case of a Hindu male dying intestate on or after February 21, 1929, when the Act came into force, or whether it also applies in the case of a Hindu male dying intestate before the Act came into operation and succeeded by a female heir who died after that date. [The Act of 1929 was read and reference made to Musammat Sahodra v. Ram Babu (( 1942) L. R. 69 I. A. 145,155.).] The same question of the interpretation of this Act has been considered many times in India, and there are a number of Full Bench decisions all against the contention of the appellants here Rajpali Kunwar v. Sarju Rat (( 1936) I. L, R. 58 A, 1041, 1046- 7.), Pokhan Dusadh v. Mst. Manoa (( 1936) I. L. R. 16 Pat. 215.), Lakshmi v. Anantharama (4). The Full Bench cases say that the crucial point is when the succession opened. The question has been decided the other way by less exalted tribunals in India. It is submitted that under the ordinary rules of interpretation and construction this Act cannot be given any retrospective effect. The ordinary rule is that retrospective effect cannot be given to an Act unless it is necessary by its express language or by necessary implication so to construe it, and there is nothing of that nature here. The words in the preamble " male "dying intestate" are not applicable .to the case of a man who is already dead at that time ; that language alone means something which is going to bring the Act into operation, not something which has happened in the past. If the courts below are right the Act does have a limited retrospective effect. If the courts below are right the Act does have a limited retrospective effect. It was held below that because succession opened after the Act came into operation there was no retrospective effect. It is submitted that there was. [Reference was made to Mullas Principles of Hindu Law, 7th ed., p.225, para. 207.] Gavarammal v. Manikammal (( 1933) I. L. R. 57 M 718.) was in the appellants favour, but it has since been overruled b}7 the Full Bench decision in Lakshmi v. Anantharama (I. L. R. [ 1937] M. 948.). The Act of 1929 has no application to the succession to a Hindu male who died intestate before the passing of the Act and does not apply to the present case, in which the succession is governed by the Mitakshara law and is not affected by the Act of 1929. The decision in Rajpali Kunwar v. Sarju Rai (2) is erroneous. Ralph Parikh followed. The opening of succession only operates when you get one full owner being succeeded by another full owner, so the respondents cannot succeed on the opening of the succession, and the Full Bench cases which are based on the opening of succession are inapplicable in this case. Moniram Kolita v. Kerry Kolitany (( 1880) L. R. 7 I. A. 115, 154.) says that “the “succession does not open to the heirs of the husband until " the termination of the widows estate” but according to Mulla the test is when the Hindu dies Mullas Principles of Hindu Law, 7th ed., para. 169. The only reasonable way to construe this Act is to consider when the Hindu male dies intestate. If he dies before the Act has come into effect then it does not apply to his heirs. Sir Thomas Strangman K.C., Wallach and Jayakar for respondents Nos. 1, 3 and 4. Admittedly, if the Act did not apply the appellants, as agnates, would be entitled to succeed to the property, so the only question is whether it does apply or not. It applies to cases of succession arising after the Act came into force, and it is submitted that in this case, and in all other cases where females come in, the question of succession arises only when the succession opens—here on the death of the female. It applies to cases of succession arising after the Act came into force, and it is submitted that in this case, and in all other cases where females come in, the question of succession arises only when the succession opens—here on the death of the female. It was said in Janaki Ammal v. Narayanasami Aiyer (( 1916) L. R. 43 I. A. 207, 209.) that " the law as to the situation of the reversionary " heirs is also in substance quite clear ; there is, as stated, no " vesting as at the date of the husbands death, and it follows " that the questions of who is the nearest reversionary heir or " what is the class of reversionary heirs fall to be settled at " the date of the expiry of the ownership for life or lives." Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Subbammal (( 1915) L. R. 42 I, A. 125, 128.) stated that u under " the Hindu law the death of the female owner opens the " inheritance to the reversioners, and the one most nearly “related at the time to the last full owner becomes entitled to “possession. In her lifetime, however, the reversionary right " is a mere possibility or spes successionis." In Mst. Sahodra v. Ram Babu (L. R. 69 I. A. 145.) the facts were precisely the same as in the present case, but the question now at issue was never raised in India or before the Board. [Reference was also made to the Full Bench cases cited by counsel for the appellants, and also to Shakuntla Devi v. Kaushalya Devi (( 1935) I. L. R. 17 Lah. 356, 363.).] Rajpali Kunwar v. Sarju Rai (I. L, R. 58 A. 1041.) and the other Full Bench decisions to the same effect were rightly decided, and the Act of 1929 is applicable in this case and the judgments and decrees of the courts in India are correct. Rewcastle K.C. replied. July 9. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by MR. M. R. JAYAKAR, who stated the facts set out above and continued On the question at issue in this case relating to the application of the Act to the present case, there is, as the High Court judgment observes, a series of Full Bench decisions of Indian High Courts covering this exact point. M. R. JAYAKAR, who stated the facts set out above and continued On the question at issue in this case relating to the application of the Act to the present case, there is, as the High Court judgment observes, a series of Full Bench decisions of Indian High Courts covering this exact point. These have been reviewed in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court in Rajpali Kunwar v. Sarju Rat (( 1936) I. L. R. 58 A. 1041,1046- 48.). It is therefore unnecessary for their Lordships to go over the same ground again. It will be sufficient to observe that their Lordships are in complete agreement with the views of the learned Chief Justice in that case, that, during the lifetime of the widow, the reversioners in Hindu law have no vested interest in the estate, but have a mere spes successionis or a chance of succession, which is a purely contingent right which may or may not accrue, that the succession would not open out until the widow died, and that the person who would be the next reversioner at that time would succeed to the estate and the alteration in the rule of the Hindu law brought about by the Act would then be in full force. In the argument before their Lordships reliance was placed on the words "dying intestate " in the Act as connoting the future tense, but their Lordships agree with the view of the Lahore High Court in Shrimati Shakuntla Devi v. Kaushalya Devi (( 1935) I. L. R. 17 Lah. 356, 357.) that the words are a mere description of the status of the deceased and have no reference, and are not intended to have any reference, to the time of the death of a Hindu male. The expression merely means " in the case of intestacy of " a Hindu male." To place this interpretation on the Act is not to give a retrospective effect to its provisions, the material point of time being the date when the succession opens, namely, the death of the widow. On the position of reversioners in Hindu law, opinions have been expressed by this Board from time to time, with which the views of the learned Chief Justice in Rajpali Kunwar v. Sarju Rai (( 1936) I. L. R. 58 A. 1041,1046- 48.) mentioned above, are in agreement. On the position of reversioners in Hindu law, opinions have been expressed by this Board from time to time, with which the views of the learned Chief Justice in Rajpali Kunwar v. Sarju Rai (( 1936) I. L. R. 58 A. 1041,1046- 48.) mentioned above, are in agreement. It was said, for instance, that, until the termination of the widows estate, it is impossible to say who are the persons who will be entitled to succeed as heirs to her husband, Katama Natchiar v. Rajah of Shivagunga (( 1863) 9 Moo. I.A. 539, 106.). The succession does not open to the heirs of the husband until the termination of the widows estate. On its termination the property descends to those who would have been the heirs of the husband if he had lived up to, and died at the moment of, her death Moniram Kolita v. Kerry Kolitany (( 1880) L. R. 7 I. A. 115, 154.). There is no vesting as at the date of the husbands death, and it follows that the questions of who is the nearest reversionary heir or what is the class of reversionary heirs, fall to be settled at the date of the expiry of the ownership for life or lives Janaki Ammal and Narayanasami Aiyer (( 1916) L. R. 43 I. A. 207,209.). The death of a Hindu female owner opens the inheritance to the reversioners, and the one most nearly related at the time to the last full owner becomes entitled to possession. In her lifetime, however, the reversionary right is a mere possibility, or spes successionis, but this possibility is common to them all, for it cannot be predicated who would be the nearest reversioner at the time of her death. The Indian law, however, permits the institution of suits in the lifetime of the female owner to remove a common apprehended injury to the interests of all the reversioners, presumptive and contingent alike, Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Subbammal (( 1915) L. R. 42 I. A. 125, 128, 129.). The Indian law, however, permits the institution of suits in the lifetime of the female owner to remove a common apprehended injury to the interests of all the reversioners, presumptive and contingent alike, Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Subbammal (( 1915) L. R. 42 I. A. 125, 128, 129.). The reversioner Js rights during the lifetime of the female heir are merely of a protective character and nothing more, and whenever action is taken by the presumptive reversioner, it is in a representative capacity and on behalf of all the reversioners, and not on the footing that the person taking the action is in fact the next reversioner at the date of the suit. The decisions of Indian High Courts, on which the High Court has relied in this case, proceed on these principles and cover the precise point raised in this appeal. For these reasons, their Lordships are of opinion that the judgment appealed from is right and ought to be affirmed, and this appeal ought to be dismissed with costs, and they will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly.