JUDGMENT Waliullah, J. - This is an application in revision u/s 115 C. P. C. on behalf of the Plaintiffs. It is directed against the order of the learned District Judge passed in revision regarding the matter of the court-fee which arose in the Court of the first instance. The relevant facts and cricumstances may be briefly set out here. 2. On the 7th July 1934 an agreement was entered into between one Haji Taj Mohammad and Tara Mohan Day, who is Defendant No. 1 in the present suit, for the sale of one of the two houses and a room of another house belonging to Haji Taj Mohammad. The sale price agreed between the parties was fixed at Rs. 5,000. It appears that on the 13th October, 1934, Tara Mohan Day filed suit No. 91 of 1934 for specific performance of the agreement for sale dated 7th July, 1934. He impleaded Haji Taj Mohammad as the sole Defendant. The suit was valued at Rs. 5,000. While this suit was pending, it appears that on 30th January 1935, the four sons of Haji Taj Mohammad filed another suit, Suit No. 11 of 1935 against Tara Mohan Day and Taj Mohammad. They sought a declaration that 4/5ths share in the two houses mentioned in the agreement for sale dated 7th July, 1934 belonged to them and this suit was valued at about Rs. 9,000. On the 23rd September, 1935 one of the four sons of Taj Mohammad, namely Abdul Rahim, died and thereupon his sons were brought upon the record as his legal representatives. Finally on 21st March, 1936 the learned Civil Judge decreed Suit No. 91 of 1934 in favour of Tara Mohan Day and dismissed Suit No. 11 of 1935 instituted by the sons of Haji Taj Mohammad. It appears that appeals filed against these decrees were unsuccessful and both these decrees became final. Thereafter, on 15th January, 1934 Suit No. 13 of 1944 was iustituted by three of the sons of Abdul Rahim, in substance for the following reliefs: (a) A declaration may be made that the Plaintiffs are owners in possession of 3/25ths share in the two houses mentioned in Schedule B of the plaint. Thereafter, on 15th January, 1934 Suit No. 13 of 1944 was iustituted by three of the sons of Abdul Rahim, in substance for the following reliefs: (a) A declaration may be made that the Plaintiffs are owners in possession of 3/25ths share in the two houses mentioned in Schedule B of the plaint. This was to be on the footing that the decree passed in Suit No. 11 of 1935 against the four sons of Haji Taj Mohammad dated the 21st March 1936 was null and void against the Plaintiffs. This relief was valued at Rs. 1278-15-4. (b) Tara Mohan Day, Defendant No. 1, be permanently restrained from getting the sale deed effected in his favour in virtue of the decree for specific performance obtained by him in Suit No. 91 of 1934. This relief was valued at Rs. 50. 3. The Defendants contested the suit on various grounds includiug the question with regard to the insufficiency of the court fee paid. Issue No. 5 was framed by the learned Munsif with regard to the Defendants' objection regarding the court fee paid by the Plaintiffs. The learned Munsif, on the 14th April, 1944, decided issue No. 5 of the suit in favour of the Plaintiffs and held that the court-fee paid was sufficient. On the 13th May 1944, however, the Chief Inspector of Stamps submitted a report to the effect that there was a deficiency in court-fee paid to the extent of Rs. 637-8. On the l0th July 1944 the learned Munsif finally decided the objection raised by the Chief Inspector of Stamps. In effect he held that the view taken by him in the order passed on the 14th April 1944, was correct and in this view of the matter he dismissed the objections raised by the Chief Inspector of Stamps. Against this order the Chief Inspector of Stamps went up in revision to the learned District Judge u/s 6-B of the amended Court-fees Act. The learned District Judge partly allowed the application in revision and modified the order passed by the learned Munsif. Against the order passed by the learned District Judge the Plaintiffs have come up in revision to this Court. The learned District Judge partly allowed the application in revision and modified the order passed by the learned Munsif. Against the order passed by the learned District Judge the Plaintiffs have come up in revision to this Court. A preliminary objection has been raised by the opposite-parties to the effect that no revision lies against the order of the learned District Judge inasmuch as there is no 'Case decided' so far by the Court below. Learned Counsel have referred to the Full Bench decision of this Court in Gupta Co. v. Kirpa Ram Brothers (1934) 3 A W R 677, where it was held'. A mere decision as to the amount of the court-fees payable does not amount to a "case decided" nor it is necessarily an irregularity in procedure or illegality or refusal to exercise jurisdiction. No revision therefore, lies to the High Court from an order of the Court below, calling upon the Plaintiffs to make good the deficiency in the amount of court-fee paid by him. 4. Learned Counsel for the applicants has strongly contended that after the decision by the Full Bench in the year 1934, the Court Fees Act has itself undergone substantial changes by reason of the amending acts passed in the years 1936 to 1938. It is contended that by reason of the recent amendments the situations of an application in revision like the present one is completely altered. u/s 6-A of the Court-fees Act, as amended, it is provided that a Plaintiff when called upon to make good a deficiency in court-fee may appeal against such order as if it were an order appealable u/s 104 of the C.P. C. Similarly it is provided by Section 6-B that if the order of the Court with regard to the objection raised by the Chief Inspector of Stamps be at variance with the opinion of the officer he may, within three months from the date of receipt of such order, file an application in revision in the Court to which the appeal lies from a decree in the suit....in which such order has been passed. 5. These provisions, so it is contended, have affected a fundamental change in the position, as it stood, at the time when the Full Bench decision was given. 5. These provisions, so it is contended, have affected a fundamental change in the position, as it stood, at the time when the Full Bench decision was given. The learned Counsel for the applicants has further invited my attention to a decision of two learned Judges of this Court in Mohir Kunwnr v. Kesri Chandra 1941 A W R (HC) 188, where at page 191, the learned Judges have made this observation: We also think that to far as the question of court-fee is concerned "the case has been decided" within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of CPC but it is not necessary to express any final opinion upon these contentious. 6. This is of course not a final opinion and must be treated as an obiter dictum. Learned Counsel has also referred to the case of Ramkhelawan Sahu Vs. Bir Surendra Sahi and Others, AIR 1938 Patna 22 , decided by a Full Bench of the Patna High Court. This ruling was followed by a Bench of two learned Judges of the Patna High Court Ramautar Sao Vs. Ram Gobind Sao and Others, AIR 1942 Patna 60 . It is contended that the view taken by the Patna High Court in these two cases supports the contention of the learned Counsel for the applicants. Reference has also being made to the case of Ratnavelu Pillai and Another Vs. Varadaraja Pillai and Another, AIR 1942 Mad 585 , where a learned single Judge of the Madras High Court appears to have adopted the same view. I need not however consider these authorities at any length here. Reference has also being made to the case of Ratnavelu Pillai and Another Vs. Varadaraja Pillai and Another, AIR 1942 Mad 585 , where a learned single Judge of the Madras High Court appears to have adopted the same view. I need not however consider these authorities at any length here. In view of the amendments introduced into the Court-fees Act by Sections 6-A and 6-B it seems to me as at present advised, that the position is now fundamentally altered and what was not open even to a mere application in revision in 1934 has now become subject a right of appeal by one party u/s 6-A and subject to a right of revision by the other party u/s 6-B. It seems to me, therefore, difficult to hold that the nature of the order sought to be challenged by means of this application is such that it should be held not to amount to a "case decided" within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of CPC learned Counsel for the opposite-parties have, in the course of their arguments laid particular emphasis upon the expression "no appeal shall lie from such order" in Section 6-B. Obviously this expression excludes the right of an "appeal" against the order passed by the learned District Judge in the present case, it does not, however, in reality affect the right of revision. Similar expressions are to be found in some other acts passed by the U. P. Legislature and inspite of such provisions it has been held by this Court in several cases that the right of a party to make an application in revision to this Court u/s 115 of the Code of CPC remains uneffected thereby. In view of the above I would overrule the preliminary objection. With regard to the merits of the application, learned council for the applicants has strongly contended in the first instance that the learned District Judge has no jurisdiction to entertain an application in revision filed on behalf of the Chief Inspector of Stamps. In view of the above I would overrule the preliminary objection. With regard to the merits of the application, learned council for the applicants has strongly contended in the first instance that the learned District Judge has no jurisdiction to entertain an application in revision filed on behalf of the Chief Inspector of Stamps. The contention of the learned Counsel, in substance, is that inasmuch as the learned Munsif had already decided the question of deficiency in court-fee under Sub-clause 4 of Section 5, in deciding issue No 5 before the Chief inspector of Stamps raised the question of the deficiency in court -fee by means of his report dated 13th May, 1944, there could, in law, be no order passed by the learned Munsif such as is concemplated by Sub-Section 3 of Section 6. The contention of the learned Counsel is that it is only against an order passed under Sub-Section 3 of Section 6 of the Court-fees Act that the Chief Inspector of Stamps is given the remedy by means of an application in revision u/s 6-B. Learned Counsel has further contended that the order of the learned Munsif dated 10th July, 1944, did not purport to be an order under Sub-Section 3 of Section 6 and, therefore, in any view of the matter if was not subject to a right of revenue u/s 6 B. I have carefully listened to all that the learned Counsel had to urge with reference to his ingenious arguments based upon the sequence of the two Sub-Sections 3 and 4 and the phraseology used in Section 6-3 of the Court-fees Act. I have heard learned Counsel for the opposite-parties as well. It seems to me, however, that, in substance, though not in from the order of the learned Munsif passed on the 10th July, 1944, was an order passed on the question of deficiency raised by the Chief Inspector of Stamps and this order was undonbtedly at variance with the opinion of the officer who had raised the question of deficiency in court-fee. It follows therefore, that the revision filed on behalf of the Chief Inspector of Stamps in the Court of the learned District Judge was fully competent and there was no defect in the jurisdiction of the learned Judge in entertaining the revision and disposing of it. It follows therefore, that the revision filed on behalf of the Chief Inspector of Stamps in the Court of the learned District Judge was fully competent and there was no defect in the jurisdiction of the learned Judge in entertaining the revision and disposing of it. I may mention, in passing, that there is no dispute now with regard to the amount of court-fee paid regarding relief 'A' of the plaint. Both the Courts below have held that the court-fee paid is sufficient regarding that relief and there is no application in revision challenging that order of the learned Judge before me. The only question which I have to consider and decide is whether the amount of court-fee paid regarding relief 'B' of the plaint is or is not in accordance with law. Relief 'B' as it stands is to my mind, rather vague. It is couched in a language which could be easily interpreted to refer to the whole of the property comprised in Suit No. 91 of 1934, that is, the suit for specific performance filed by Tara Mohan Day against Taj Mohammad. That suit related to one complete house and also a room of the other house. The valuation of both these items of property was fixed by Tara Mohan Day, the Plaintiff, at Rs. 5,000. Under Sub-Section 2 of Section 7 -(IV-A) the Plaintiffs would, therefore, have to pay the court-fee calculated according to 1/5th of the value of one complete house and one room of the other house. The learned District Judge has also held that this provision of the Court Fees Act is applicable to the facts of the present case. The question, however, remains as to the value of the subject matter of the claim referred to in relief B. With regard to this matter, however, it seems to me that the learned Judge has confused the property involved in Suit No. 11 of 1935, with the property involved in suit No. 91 of 1934. As mentioned above already, suit No. 91 of 1934 related only to one of the two houses plus one room in the other house; whereas, in Suit No. 11 of 1935, a 4/5th share in both the houses was involved. As mentioned above already, suit No. 91 of 1934 related only to one of the two houses plus one room in the other house; whereas, in Suit No. 11 of 1935, a 4/5th share in both the houses was involved. In view of the phraseology in which relief B is couched at present it is obvious that the Plaintiffs must pay court-fee on one-fifth of the total value of the subject matter of Suit No. 91 of 1934, that is on Rs. 1000. 7. Learned Counsel for the applicants has invited my attention to the application filed by the Plaintiffs on the 12th March 1945 after the decision of the revision by the learned District Judge on the 19th February 1945 In this application the Plaintiff's endeavoured to explain what they actually meant by the language employed in drafting relief B of the plaint. In the end it was specifically prayed that certain amendments of relief B might be allowed at that stage and thereafter calculation of court-fee be made. This application does not appear to have been disposed of by the Court of the first instance till now. It appears that certain pleas were taken by the Plaintiffs the mselves for seeking adjournment of the proceedings in the Court of the learned Munsif and thus the Court has not, as yet, passed any order with regard to the amendments sought by means of this application. The learned Counsel at one stage endeavoured to persuade me to allow him here to effect the amendments in relief B as is stands at present, but this request obviously could not be entertained inasmuch as the matter has not yet received the attention of the Court of first instance. Learned Counsel has, in this connection, referred me to the case of Mohri Kunwar v. Keshri Chandra 1941 A W R (HC) 188, in which, in somewhat similar circumstances, a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court held that a suitor had a right to amend his plaint in any manner be likes and so far as his amendments prayed for are not contrary to law or are likely to lead to injustice they should be granted. There is no doubt that the learned Munsif will consider this application and while so doing will bear in mind the observations of the learned Judges of this Court in the abovementioned case. There is no doubt that the learned Munsif will consider this application and while so doing will bear in mind the observations of the learned Judges of this Court in the abovementioned case. If and when he allows the amendments sought to be effected, no doubt the requsite court-fee will have to be calculated in the light of the amendments effected. In case of the amendments being allowed the basis of the calculation would obviously be l/5th of 3/25th of 5,000. 8. I accordingly allow this application in part to the extent indicated above. I make no order as to costs of this Court.