JUDGMENT Clough, J. - This is an appeal from an order of the learned Subordinate Judge of Dinajpur made on the 24th April, 1944, in Execution Case No. 126 of 1936. In 1927, the Respondent before us filed a suit against a large number of persons, including the six Appellants or persons whose interests are now represented by them, for arrears of darpatni rent. The suit was decreed and in execution of that decree the darpatni was sold, and was bought by the Respondent, the decree-holder. Thereafter, in 1932, the Respondent filed another suit for recovery of rent due in respect of the same tenure for the period from the date of the decree in the first suit until the sale. That suit was in its turn decreed against some 60 Defendants, including the Appellants or persons whose interest they represent. The order appealed from is an order made in the course of proceedings taken to execute the last-mentioned decree. 2. In 1934, certain proceedings were taken to execute the decree; they are not before us, and it has not been suggested that they have any relevancy to the matters we have to consider. Thereafter, the Respondent, the decree-holder, on the 2nd October, 1936, applied for execution against all the judgment-debtors; this was marked Execution Case No. 126 of 1936. By his application the decree-holder did not seek to execute against the tenure or holding-it had already been bought by him in execution of the decree made in the 1927 suit-but against other property of the judgment-debtor; there was also a prayer for personal execution. The relief sought is set out at p. 10 of the Paper Book as follows: It is prayed that the entire amount together with interest and costs in court, claimed in the execution case, may be realised. It is prayed that after service of notice on the guardian of the minor money may be realised by the auction sale of the movables of the judgment-debtors. If the money be not realised thereby, then it is prayed that the same may be realised by arresting the major judgment-debtors. If the amount be not realised thereby, then it may be realised by attachment and Bale of the properties of the judgment-debtors. 3. If the money be not realised thereby, then it is prayed that the same may be realised by arresting the major judgment-debtors. If the amount be not realised thereby, then it may be realised by attachment and Bale of the properties of the judgment-debtors. 3. We are told, though it does not appear from the Paper Book, that the application included a schedule of properties sought to be taken in execution. 4. After the execution case had been instituted there followed a long period when all proceedings were stayed consequent upon proceedings taken by some or perhaps all of the judgment-debtors under the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. Eventually the application to the. Debt Settlement Board was rejected and the stay order was vacated. During the currency of the stay, however, the Bengal Tenancy Act was amended by the introduction of sec. 168A. 5. In February, 1943, several of the judgment-debtors-we are told, 22 in number- including Abdur Rahaman Mondal, one of the Appellants before us, but not including any of the other five Appellants or any person whose interest they now represent, filed three objections: Some at any rate of these objectors had been served with notice under Or. 21, r. 22 of the Civil Procedure Code. They purported to show cause why the decree should not be executed against them, and amongst other grounds taken they in each case raised two contentions which went to the root of the execution itself : these may be summarised as follows: (a) The Execution case was not maintainable inasmuch as the debt had been determined by a Debt Settlement Board under the B. A. D. Act. (b) Personal execution and execution by attachment and sale of any property other than the tenure or holding was barred by sec. 168A of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Involved in this second contention were questions whether the decree in the former suit, the suit of 1927 was a money decree, or a rent decree; whether all the darputni tenants had been made parties to that suit; and whether as a result of the purchase by the Plaintiff at the Court sale the term of the tenancy had expired so as to bring the case within the proviso to sec. 168A. 6. No notice of these objections was served on any party other than the decree-holder. 168A. 6. No notice of these objections was served on any party other than the decree-holder. The cases were marked respectively as numbers 13, I5 and 17 of 1943 and by consent of the parties concerned they were heard together and made the subject of one order. After contest all points were decided in favour of the decree holder and on the 27th November, 1943, the learned Subordinate Judge by his Order No. 53 dismissed the miscellaneous cases with costs. None of the judgment-debtors appealed from that order. 7. Between the 27th November, 1943, and 3rd January, 1944, four Orders Nos. 54, 55, 56 and 57 which will have to be referred to again later, were made in the execution case. These have not been printed in the Paper Book, but the record of the execution case is in Court, and we have been referred to the order-sheet for the terms of these four orders. On the 5th January, 1944, six judgment-debtors who are the Appellants before us filed an objection to the execution; it was marked Miscellaneous Case No. 1 of 1944. By this they sought to agitate the same two questions going to the root of the execution which have been tried out and decided on the objections filed by the 22 judgment-debtors in 1943 and disposed of by the learned Subordinate Judge on 27th November, 1943, by his Order No. 53 already mentioned. The learned Subordinate Judge was of opinion that the decision arrived at in Miscellaneous cases Nos. 13, I5 and 17 of 1943 operated as res judicata and on 24th April, 1944, he dismissed the Appellant's objections in Miscellaneous Case No. 1 of 1944 on that ground without hearing the application on its merits. 8. We have already mentioned that Abdur Rahaman Mondal who is Appellant No. 2 before us was a party to one of the objections disposed of on 27th November, 1943. Beyond question on general principles of res judicata which apply Abdur Rahaman cannot be allowed to raise again questions which were decided against him on that occasion, or raise now any further question which he might and ought to have litigated then. In the circumstances in our view the learned Judge's decision in so far as it applies to Abdur Rahaman is correct-; nor has any argument to the contrary been seriously advanced. In the circumstances in our view the learned Judge's decision in so far as it applies to Abdur Rahaman is correct-; nor has any argument to the contrary been seriously advanced. Abdur Rahaman's appeal must in any event be dismissed. He is concluded by the decision in the previous proceedings to which he was a party and the execution proceedings in so far as they are proceedings against him will not be affected by any order we make on the appeal of the other five Appellants. 9. In our view, the appeal of the Appellants Abdul Karim Mondal, Abbasali Mondal, Azizur Rahaman Mondal, Abdul Jabbar Mondal and Meheruddin Mondal succeeds. 10. The decree-holder has contended that the Appellants should have objected before, and not having done so their objection cannot be heard now. The question is, before what? 11. A judgment-debtor, so long as execution proceedings are pending against him, is entitled to take such objection as he is advised; and an objection properly taken must be heard and determined on its merits unless there is shown to exist some bar which will make a trial, on the merits unnecessary; a bar will be the consequence of some present circumstances, or of some event which has happened: res judicata gives rise to one such bar, the event in that case being the adjudication. 12. In this appeal res judicata is the only bar alleged on behalf of the decree-holder. 13. In the first place the adjudication relied on by him, is that embodied in Order No. 57 of the learned Subordinate Judge made on 27th November, 1943, already referred to, by which the three objection Cases Nos. 13 of 1943, I5 of 1943 and 17 of 1943 were disposed of. In the alternative the. decree-holder relies on one or other of the Orders Nos. 54 to 57 inclusive which we have already mentioned. 14. The first of these two arguments is itself presented from two different and alternative standpoints: (a) That the five Appellants being parties to the suit and to the execution proceedings are bound in any event whether or not the objectors in Cases Nos. 13, 15 and 17 of 1943 are to be regarded as having litigated in a representative capacity. (b) That the objectors in Cases Nos. 13, 15 and 17 litigated in a representative capacity, and the general principles found in Explanation VI to sec. 13, 15 and 17 of 1943 are to be regarded as having litigated in a representative capacity. (b) That the objectors in Cases Nos. 13, 15 and 17 litigated in a representative capacity, and the general principles found in Explanation VI to sec. 11, CPC apply. 15. Execution proceedings are proceedings in a suit; and no doubt just as the general principles of res judicata apply to orders passed at different stages of the same suit like principles will apply of execution proceedings; and when a matter which directly and substantially arises for decision in execution proceedings is heard and decided, the decision will be final and binding between the parties to it and will operate as res judicata at a subsequent stage of the same execution proceedings. But the decision will only bind those persons who were actually or at least constructively the parties who litigated the question, for otherwise the issue has not been decided already between the same parties or between parties under whom they claim. The circumstance that a particular judgment-debtor who was a Defendant in the suit has been, together with a number of others, made the object of one execution case instituted by the decree-holder is not of itself enough to result in his being bound by the decision on an objection filed by some other judgment-debtor who is in like case, when he is not a party to the objection or to the miscellaneous case under sec. 47, C. P. C, which results. The principle is the same as that which applies when one only of several parties to a suit is served with notice of an interlocutory application in the suit in the course of which an issue is decided; that decision is not res judicata against those parties to the suit who were not made parties to the application. They are not bound by a decision arrived at not in their presence. In our judgment, in the absence of special circumstances the same principle applies in the case of execution proceedings when an objection taken by one of several judgment-debtors is decided on notice to the decree-holder only. 16. In our view the argument that the objectors in Cases Nos. In our judgment, in the absence of special circumstances the same principle applies in the case of execution proceedings when an objection taken by one of several judgment-debtors is decided on notice to the decree-holder only. 16. In our view the argument that the objectors in Cases Nos. 13, 15 and 17 of 1943, litigated the questions then raised by them in a representative capacity and in doing so represented the five Appellants with whom we are now concerned, is without foundation. The principle sought to be involved is that embodied in Explanation VI to sec. 11, C. P. C, which is in these terms: Where persons litigale bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under. the persons so litigating. 17. Assuming that what the objectors were doing can be described as litigating in respect of a private right which they had in common with the Appellants, or assuming that the principles which apply to litigation in respect of such rights apply at all to the case of an objection (taken in execution proceedings) which is of such a nature that it is not personal only to the objector but goes to the root of the execution itself, there is no representative capacity unless the claim is made not on behalf of the objector only but on behalf also of other persons concerned. The Explanation VI itself makes this clear. A person who claims a right for himself which happens to be common to him and others is not within the principle. This has been pointed out by Devadoss, J., in the case of Kumarandy Kudumban v. Venkatasubramania Aiyar (1926) 52 Mad. L J 641 at p, 615: It is not necessary that in order to attract the provisions of explanation VI the suit should be a representative suit, for if it is a representative suit under Order I, rule 8 no question can arise as to the binding nature of the decision in such suit, nor is it necessary that the party should be sued in a representative capacity. Bat the person litigating must put forward a right common to him and others not only on his behalf bat on behalf of the others as well. Bat the person litigating must put forward a right common to him and others not only on his behalf bat on behalf of the others as well. If be simply pats forward a right alleged to be common to him and others that would not make him a representative of the others. 18. It may be doubted whether a person can be regarded as claiming a right on behalf of others unless it is done in the course of proceedings where the right of those others can be established and declared and given effect to; and it is doubtful whether an objector in execution proceedings even if in form he puts forward a case for other judgment-debtors who are not parties, can be regarded as doing anything for them; but be that as it may, whether a claim is in fact made for others depends not on any form of words but on the substance of the proceeding-it must be clearly made for others if it is to he so construed. In the execution case with which we are concerned, where the mode in which the assistance of the Court was required was the sale of various items of the judgment-debtors' individual property and the arrest and detention of certain judgment-debtors it is doubtful whether there was any room for any one judgment-debtor to litigate for any one but himself a private right claimed in common by himself and others; or that he would be doing so if, purporting to claim for others also, he attacked the decree or the execution proceeding as a whole, as the case may be. 19. In the facts of the case, however, it is not necessary to go further into this aspect of the matter. The petitions of objection filed in Cases Nos. 13, I5 and 17 of 1943 have not been printed in the Paper Book, but they are to be found in the record which is in Court, and the learned Advocates for the parties have supplied us with translations. From these it appears quite clearly that the objectors were seeking to protect themselves, and only themselves from the threatened execution: each was seeking to protect his own property and his own person; in doing so he used arguments-used a shield-which if available at all was available to all. From these it appears quite clearly that the objectors were seeking to protect themselves, and only themselves from the threatened execution: each was seeking to protect his own property and his own person; in doing so he used arguments-used a shield-which if available at all was available to all. But in doing so he was seeking to protect himself and his property-he was not trying to protect them. In our judgment, there is no circumstance which justifies a conclusion that he acted in any interest other than his own. That the suit had been a suit for rent is not such a circumstance: true, there was a joint and several liability to pay rent, but this had resulted in a decree for the full amount being passed against all, and the liability of each was the liability created by the decree. On behalf of the decree-holder an inference of representative character was sought to be drawn from the circumstance said to exist that had the objection taken in Cases Nos. 13, I5 and 17 of 1943 succeeded, the whole execution-case would have been dismissed. It is said that that is the result when an objection taken by one judgment-debtor which goes to the root of the execution succeeds. If that is so it seems to us that it is not because the objector in making his objection represents all judgment-debtors, but because when a point fatal to the execution is established in the presence of the decree-holder, the Court on general principles will act on what has already been brought to its notice, and will dismiss the case without calling on the other side. 20. If it could be said that the objectors in Cases Nos. 13, I5 and 17 of 1943 litigated in a representative capacity, the question would remain whether the litigation was conducted bond fide: The learned Subordinate Judge has held that it was and no doubt the proceedings were not mala fide. But Devadoss, J., in Kumarandy Kudumban v. Venkatasubramania Aiyar (1926) 52 Mad. 641 at p. 645 has observed that the word. Bona fide' in Explanation 6 of Section 11 C. P. C. could only apply to litigation where every attempt is made to bring all the persons interested before the Court. 21. But Devadoss, J., in Kumarandy Kudumban v. Venkatasubramania Aiyar (1926) 52 Mad. 641 at p. 645 has observed that the word. Bona fide' in Explanation 6 of Section 11 C. P. C. could only apply to litigation where every attempt is made to bring all the persons interested before the Court. 21. If the decision on the objection of one judgment-debtor is to be taken to conclude the point against all other judgment-debtors who are parties to the execution case though not to the objection or to the miscellaneous case which arises out of it, then we consider it necessary to adopt some such restricted meaning of the words bond fide, used in this connection. It is not suggested that the litigation of the objection in 1943 was conducted bona fide in this sense. The remaining argument advanced on behalf of the decree-holder is that quite apart from Order No. 53 of the 27th November, 1943, passed on the objection of the 22 judgment-debtors, the result of some or all of four other orders is to raise the bar of constructive res judicata. These orders have not been appealed from, and not having taken the objections which they might and ought to have taken at an earlier stage, the Appellants, it is contended, were not entitled to take them after those orders were made. They rely on the principles embodied in Explanation IV of sec. 11, Civil Procedure Code, and on the principles laid clown by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Mungul Pershad Dichit v. Grija Kant Lahiri (1881) 1. L. R. 8 Gal. 61 The four orders, are: Order No. 54. 27. 11. 43. Execution case be put up on 8. 12. 43 for orders. Decree holder to take necessary steps on that date. 55. 11. 12. 43. The fixed date and two days following were holidays. On decree-holder's petition to 20. 12. 48 for orders. No cost of the petition is allowed. 56. 20. 12. 43. On D. H. petition to 8. 1.44 for taking necessary steps. No costs of the petition. 57. 3. 1. 44. On D. H. petition case adjourned to 16. 1. 44 for taking necessary steps. No bar of res judicata either actual or constructive comes into existence unless and until the matter which directly and substantially arises for decision is heard and decided either actually or constructively. 1.44 for taking necessary steps. No costs of the petition. 57. 3. 1. 44. On D. H. petition case adjourned to 16. 1. 44 for taking necessary steps. No bar of res judicata either actual or constructive comes into existence unless and until the matter which directly and substantially arises for decision is heard and decided either actually or constructively. When for example it is held either expressly or impliedly that an application for execution is maintainable, and execution is directed to proceed, there is implied a decision adverse to objections which are of such a nature that the order could not have been made if they had been raised and not so disposed of. For example in Venkamanidi Bala Krishnayya v. Nanna-panchi Linga Rao A I R (1943) Mad. 449 it was held that an order of an executing Court passed after notice to the judgment-debtor by which execution against some items of the judgment-debtor's property was refused, but which directed the decree-holder to file the sale papers in regard to certain other items of property, involved a determination by the Court that the decree was executable, and operated as res judicata, even though there was no express decision on the point, and though in that particular case the execution petition was not in fact pressed and was ultimately dismissed on that ground. The principle is that when an order for execution of a decree is made then the implication is that the decree-holder has the right to execute the decree, that it is an executable decree, that it is not barred by limitation, and that the judgment-debtor is liable to satisfy it. (3). For the decree-holder in the case before us it is urged that the four orders we have mentioned are-at any rate some of them are-orders for execution which carry this implication. 22. The material before us does not enable us to come to any decision whether this argument is well-founded or not. The argument was not presented before the lower Court, and in the circumstances none of the necessary material has been included in the Paper Book. We have not seen any of the several petitions mentioned in the orders, and the orders themselves are not so phrased that they can be recognized on their face as orders for execution which will carry the necessary implication. We have not seen any of the several petitions mentioned in the orders, and the orders themselves are not so phrased that they can be recognized on their face as orders for execution which will carry the necessary implication. Nor does it appear whether, so far as the Appellants are concerned, any notices under Or. 21, r. 22 were necessary if so whether they were served, and how and when. The learned Advocate for the Appellants gave us certain dates but this matter must be properly considered. In the circumstances we are not able to come to any conclusion whether a bar of res judicata was created by any of these orders, and we leave this question open. 23. The matter must be referred back to the learned Subordinate Judge for further, consideration; if the plea of res judicata is raised before him on the strength of these four orders he will consider and deal with the matter in the light of the observations we have made, and if res judicata is not established, then he will determine the objection on its merits. 24. The appeal of Abdur Rahaman Mondal, Appellant No. 2 is dismissed with costs- the hearing-fee is assessed at three gold mohurs. He need not pay any other costs save and except the amount of the hearing-fee stated above. The appeal of Appellants Nos. 1, Abdul Karim Mondal, 3, Abbasali Mondal, 4, Azizur Rahaman Mondal, 5, Abdul Jabbar Mondal and 6, Meheruddin Mondal is allowed with costs here. Hearing-fee in this Court six gold mohurs. The Respondent, however, will have to pay all the other costs payable by him. Future costs will abide the result. Let the case be remitted to the Court below to be dealt with in accordance with the directions given above. Edgley, J. I agree.