JUDGMENT Ghulam Hasan and Kaul, JJ. - This is the Plaintiff's appeal from the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Judge, Bahraich partly dismissing the suit. 2. A short pedigree will elucidate the controversy. 3. Wazir Khan died in 1929. Amir Khan died in 1935. The Plaintiff's case was that Wazir Khan and Amir Khan were real brothers and were in proprietary possession of property entered in list A in equal sharer. He claimed to be the sole heir of Wazir Khan and Amir Khan and claimed possession against the Defendants who had, according to the plaint allegations taken unlawful possession of the property in suit. List A consists of six items. Items 1 to 3 are houses situate in Bahraich and Balrampur. Item No. 4 is a khandahal in Balrampur, item No. 5 consits of two groves and item No. 6 consists of tenancy plots. Various defenses were raised to the suit and issues were framed. The trial Court held that the Plaintiff had established his claim in respect of the two groves mentioned in item No. 5 and decreed his claim. He dismissed the rest of the suit. 4. The findings of the trial Court in respect of items Nos. 3 and 4 have not been challenged. Item No. 3 was found to have been gifted by Amir Khan as the exclusive owner thereof to Saeadan, Defendant No. 1, and as regards item No. 4 it was found that the Plaintiff was not proved to be its owner and none of the Defendants was shown to have been in possession of it. The only items which, therefore, remain for consideration are 1, 2 and 6. 5. As regards item No. 1 which is a tiled Kham house situate in Mohalla Qazipur, Bahraich, it was proved that Amir Khan was the exclusive owner of the house and he gifted it to Hasan Raza, Defendant No. 3, vide Ext. CI. The deed of gift was attested by Sakhawat Husain and Wazir Khan. Sakhawat Husain gave evidence and proved the gift. Apart from his evidence there is the evidence of Ezas Husain, D. 3, W. 2, Ali Haider D. 3, W. 3, Mehdi Raza D. 3, W. 4 and Hasan Raza D. 3, W. 5, who proved that the house originally belonged to the sister of Ejaz Husain. She made an oral sale of it to Amir Khan for Rs. Apart from his evidence there is the evidence of Ezas Husain, D. 3, W. 2, Ali Haider D. 3, W. 3, Mehdi Raza D. 3, W. 4 and Hasan Raza D. 3, W. 5, who proved that the house originally belonged to the sister of Ejaz Husain. She made an oral sale of it to Amir Khan for Rs. 50. These witnesses unanimously state that Wazir Khan had no right whatsoever to the house. This evidence was believed by the Court below, and in our opinion, rightly. Nothing has been said in the course of the arguments to persuade us to disagree with that finding. 6. As regards item No. 2 which is a tiled Kham house No. 8299 situate in Mohalla Qazipura, Bahraich, it appears that in the Khasra abadi, Ext. 2 the house was shown to belong to Sultan Khan. There is the evidence of Ali Haider D. 3, W. 3, Mehdi Raza, D. 3, W. 4 and Hasan Raza D. 3, W. 5, that Amir Khan and Hasan Bandi gifted their shares in the aforesaid ancestral house to Wazir Khan about 20 years before the suit. This evidence was not challenged in cross-examination and we can see no reason to differ from the view taken by the trial Court with believed that evidence. Wazir Khan thus became the exclusive owner of the house. As such he mortgaged it to Enayat Husain, Defendant No. 2 and subsequently sold it to him. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the Plaintiff can put forward no claim to this house which now belongs to Enayet Husain. 7. As regards item No. 6, which consists of tenancy plots, the trial Court found that as Amir Khan died while the old Oudh Rent Act of 1886 was in force the Plaintiff being the collateral relation of Amir Khan could succeed only if he proved that he was joint with him in cultivation. There being no evidence on that point, the Plaintiff's claim to this item was rejected. We are opinion that this rending must also be maintained. Amir Khan died in 1935 and the suit was tiled on 22nd August, 1939 while the old Oudh Rent Act was still in force. The U.P. Tenancy Act came into force from 1st January, 1940. There being no evidence on that point, the Plaintiff's claim to this item was rejected. We are opinion that this rending must also be maintained. Amir Khan died in 1935 and the suit was tiled on 22nd August, 1939 while the old Oudh Rent Act was still in force. The U.P. Tenancy Act came into force from 1st January, 1940. It is argued on behalf of the Plaintiff-Appellant that succession to the tenancy must be determined according to Section 35 of the new Tenancy Act. It is urged that according to Section 296 of the U.P. Tenancy Act the present suit which was brought under the Provisions of the Oudh Rent Act, 1886 and was pending at the commencement of the new Tenancy Act should be decided in accordance with Section 35 which is the corresponding provision of the new Act. 8. We are of opinion that Section 296 has no application to the present case. That section obviously contemplates that the suit should have been brought under the provisions of the Oudh Rent Act, 1886 in a Rent Court. But such is not the case here. The present suit was not filed under the provisions of the Oudh Rent Act of 1886 because such a suit by an heir claiming to succeed to the tenancy against his rival could only have been filed in the Civil Court. Section 296 does not govern suits which are filed in a Civil Court. As the suit was not filed under the provisions of the Oudh Rent Act of 1886 in a Rent Court and as no such suit was pending at the commencement of the U.P. Tenancy Act, it follows that the second part of Section 296 requiring that the suit should be decided in accordance with the corresponding provision of the new Act does not apply. 9. There is no room, therefore, for the application of the rule of succession laid down in Section 35. Assuming, however, that Section 35 applies to the case, it is clear that upon the death of Amir Khan his widow, Mst. Saeedan, Defendant No. 1 would exclude the Plaintiff who is the brother's son. 10. It was also contended that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim in respect of the tenancy land and such a claim could be made in the Rent Court under the new Tenancy Act. Saeedan, Defendant No. 1 would exclude the Plaintiff who is the brother's son. 10. It was also contended that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim in respect of the tenancy land and such a claim could be made in the Rent Court under the new Tenancy Act. It cannot be denied that the suit, when filed in 1939, was rightly filed in the Civil Court. The view held at that time was that even where the suit was partly cognizable by the Rent Court and partly by the Civil Court the whole suit could be entertained in the Civil Court. Section 59 was enacted for the first time in the new Act by which any person claiming to be a tenant or a joint tenant can sue the landholder for a declaration that he is a tenant or for a declaration of his share in the joint tenancy. There was no corresponding provision in the old Oudh Rent Act of 1886. Section 296 of the new Act will not apply. The jurisdiction which vested in the Civil Court to try the present suit as it was then filed could not be taken away by the provisions of Section 296 which, as we have already held, have no application to the present case. 11. Lastly it has been urged that Mst. Saeedan having died during the pendency of the appeal and her brother Akbar Khan having been substituted in her place as the Respondent, the Plaintiff as neppew of Amir Khan is entitled to succeed u/s 36 of the U.P. Tenancy Act and can claim a declaration u/s 59 of the new Act. We express no opinion on this point. The cause of action upon which the Plaintiff-Appellant came to Court was the death of Amir Khan in 1935 and the dispossession by the Defendants. Upon that cause of action his claim fails and it is not open to him to introduce another cause of action at this stage, namely, the death of Mst. Saeedan The Plaintiff can, if so advised, claim any such relief from the appropriate Court. 12. We hold, therefore, that the trial Court had jurisdiction to decide the case. 13. We accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs.