JUDGMENT Sinha, J. - This is an appeal by the Defendants and arises cut of a suit for possession. The facts, though simple, are unusual They are briefly these: These sale deeds were executed by Chandra Prakash and others. The first was on the 1st of Februaray, 1938, and the remaining two on the l7th of June, 1938. One Kamla brought a suit for pre-emption, which was decreed by the Court of first instance. On appeal by the vendees the consideration was slightly raised and the pre-emptor was given time up to the 2nd of October, 1939, to make the necessary deposit. He transferred almost the whole of the pre-empted property to the present Plaintiffs, who made the necessary deposit on the requisite date. They sought to execute their decree, but were resisted by the vendees. Hence the present suit. 2. The Plaintiff's case was that they had purchased the property for which they paid good consideration and, as they bad stepped into this shoes of their vendor, Kamla they were entitled to claim possession as against the vendees. It might be noted that they cited as Defendants the sons of Kamla as Defendants 8 and 9, Kamla, it appears had died mean while. 3. The defence, in the main was that the sale in favour of the Plaintiffs was not a good sale and that the claim was barred by Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The plea of estoppel was also raised. Some other minor pleas were further taken with which it is not necessary to deal. 4. The learned First Additional Munsif found that the sale was a good sale in the sense that the Plaintiffs paid full and fair price for the property and that the transaction was not only not an improvident transaction but was actually beneficial to the vendors in that they discharged their debts, retained a portion of the pre-empted property and saved a sum of Rs. 800 as a result of this transaction. 5. The plea bared on Section 47 of the Code of CPC did not find favour with the learned First Additional Munsif. 800 as a result of this transaction. 5. The plea bared on Section 47 of the Code of CPC did not find favour with the learned First Additional Munsif. He was of opinion that the case did not fall within the mischief of that section, in-as much as the Plaintiffs Were not the transferees of the decree itself, what they had acquired as a result of the transfer was only a portion of the property preempted. 6. On appeal, the learned Civil Judge affirmed the judgment of the learned First Additional Munsif. The Defendant vendees have come to this Court in second appeal. 7. The learned Counsel contends that, on the date of the sale in favour of the Plaintiffs, the pre-emptor bad not acquired any interest in the pre-empted property and the sale, therefore, did not convey any real interest to the Plaintiffs. It is also contended that, to the extent of the property conveyed, the Plaintiffs were the representatives of the decree-holder, i.e. Kamla, the pre-emptor, and the claim was, as such, barred by Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 8. To take up the first argument, it was a matter essentially between Kamla, the transferor, and the Plaintiffs, the transferees, whether the security transferred to the latter was a good security. It is conceded that, if Kamla had raised the amount on the basis of a promissory note, this plea would not have been available to the Defendants. But it is contended that it is open to them to challenge the Plaintiffs' right and to raise the plea that the sale in their favour was a sale which conveyed no title. It appears to me that there is a fallacy in the argument of the learned Counsel. This Court has held that the crucial dates on which the Plaintiff in a pre-emption suit must establish his subsisting title are the date of the sale, the date of the suit and the date of the decree (vide Baldeo Misir v. Ramlagan Shukul 1923 A L J 648, but this has reference to the property on the strengh of which the suit for pre-emption is brought. It has no reference to the property in respect of which the claim for pre-emption is made. It has no reference to the property in respect of which the claim for pre-emption is made. The merits of a transaction such as the present must be decided with reference to the parties themselves, that is as here between Kamla, on the one side, and the Plaintiffs on the other. In that picture the vendees have no place. It might also be mentioned that, as between them, once Kamla, after the deposit of the pre-emption money, perfected his right to the property he would never have been heard to say that on the date of the transaction he had no right to convey. After his title became complete, he would, because the transfer was the transfer of the property itself as distinguished from a mere right to it, have been confronted with the principle of feeding the estoppel enshrined in Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act. The ratio of the decision in Abdul Ahad v. Brij Narain 1935 A W R 87 and in Shyam Narain Misir v. Mangal Prasad Misir (1934) 4 A W R 1236, lends countenance to this view. It seems, therefore, that the Appellants' contention as regards the Plaintiffs' title must fail. 9. On the question whether Section 47 of the Code of CPC constitutes a bar to the Plaintiffs claim, I am at one with the Courts below. It was not the decree but a portion of the property which was transferred. It will not be out of place to mention-although it will not create any estoppel or otherwise affect the legal position that the plea does not come with a good grace from the Appellants, who resisted the Plaintiffs attempt at execution on a ground just the reverse of what they are taking now. 10. I, therefore, think that the view taken by the Courts below is right and I dismiss this appeal with costs.