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Allahabad High Court · body

1946 DIGILAW 268 (ALL)

Har Baksh Singh v. Sujan Singh

1946-11-22

MALIK

body1946
JUDGMENT Malik, J. - This is a Defendant's appeal in a suit for contribution A suit was filed by the landlord against Sardar Har Bakhsh Singh and Sujan Singh for arrears of rent The suit was decreed on the 17th September, 1932, and a joint decree was passed against both. On the 19th April, 1933, Har Bakhsh Singh paid his share of the liability, that is Rs. 600. The decree holder then applied for execution of the decree as resgards the balance. Har Bakhsh Singh filed objections that be had paid his share of the liability and was not liable to pay anything more. The objection of Har Bakhsh Singh was dismissed and he appealed against that order. In the appealiate Court he filed an application for stay. The applicat on was granted on condition that he deposited cash security in the executing Court. The order in is not before me, but that is what the lower Courts have found and that finding is not disputed. On the 13th July, 1936, Har Bakhsh Singh deposited a sum of Rs. 585. The tender Ex. A is on the record and it appears that it was not properly filled in and it makes no mention of the fact that the money was being deposited as security in accordance with the orders of the appellate Court. The money remained in deposit during the pendency of the appeal. The appeal was dismissed on the 7th September 1938. The decree-holder however, did not apply for payment of this money and this money was not paid to him till the 6th January 1939. The present suit for contribution was filed on the 5th January, 1942. The suit has been decreed. 2. In this appeal, filed on behalf of Sujan Singh, three points are taken. The first point is that the suit was barred by limitation, the second is that the Appellant was not liable to pay interest from the date of the deposit that is, the 13th July 1936, but from the date when the amount was paid out an i if the Court held that the payment was made on the 6th January 1939, then he could only be made liable to pay interest from that date and the last is that the Appellant was not liable to pay any special costs. 3. 3. It may be noticed that no objection is taken that the money deposited on the 13th July 1936 represented the share of the liabilities of Sujan Singh. 4. u/s 149 of the U. P. Tenancy Act of 1939 a co tenant who has paid rent on a count of another co-tenant of from whom such rent has been recovered may sue such co-tenant for the amount so paid. The period of limitation for such a suit for contribution is mentioned in Schedule IV, Group A, Serial No. 3 as three years from the date of payment or recovery. The question, therefore, is whether the suit was filed within three years of the date of payment or recovery. 5. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has urged that the payment must be deemed to have been made on the date the money was deposited, that is, the 13th July 1936, or, at any date, on the date when the appeal was dismissed, that is the 7th September 1938, after which date the decree-holder was entitled to take away the money. 6. Learned Counsel has relied on certain rullings under Article 99 of the Limitation Act. Under Article 99 a suit for contribution has to be filed within three years from the date of payment. In Gahar Ali Hawlader v. Abdul Owahab Shikdar (1929) 56 Cal 192 a landlord had obtained a decree for arrears of rent against his tenants. When the decree was executed and the property was advertised for sale, one of the judgment-debtors deposited the entire decretal amount. The deposit was made on the 4th February 1920 and the Court on the same date accepted the money in satisfaction thereof. The money however, remained in Court till the 14th February 1920 and in the suit for contribution the Plaintiff wanted to compute the period of limitation from that date, that is the 14th February. The Court held that the date of payment was the date when the money was deposited to the decree-holder's account in satisfaction of the decree. 7. The facts of that case are materially different from the facts of the case before me. In this case it is admitted that the Plaintiff did not make any deposit towards the payment of the decree on the 13th(sic) July 1936. 7. The facts of that case are materially different from the facts of the case before me. In this case it is admitted that the Plaintiff did not make any deposit towards the payment of the decree on the 13th(sic) July 1936. He was, as a matter of fact denying his liability to pay and it was only as a condition to the granting of stay that he was asked to furnish security. The Court did not appropriate the money in satisfaction of the decree, not could it do so, nor was the decree-holder bound to satisfy his decree only from this amount which was in deposit After the decision of the appeal on the 7th September 1938 he might have executed his decree against any other property of the Judgment-debtor. The judgment-debtor, in that case, might no doubt have applied to the Court that the money in deposit be paid to the decree-holder towards satisfaction of his decree, but till the amount was so paid it could not be said that the decree had been satisfied meraly because the security monoy was in deposit. 8. In Meghavaranam v. Md, Mohideen Sahib AIR 1919 Mad 73 (sic) where money had been paid into Court for payment to the decree-holder and it was prayed that the sale should be set aside, the Madras High Court held that the date of the deposit was the date from which limitation was to be computed, but the observations were mere obiter. The facts of that case are also materially different from the facts of the case before me. In that case the property, belonging to one of the judgment-debtors, was sold and he deposited the entire decreal amount, to have the sale set aside and then claimed contribution and the question was from what date the period of limitation would run. 9. The last case cited by learned Council is a decision of the Oudh Chief Court in AIR 1933 478 (Oudh) . There was no question of payment in that case. The property of one judgment-debtor was sold in satisfaction of the entire decree and he claimed. contribution and the question was on what date it would be deemed that the decree was satisfied or paid by reason of the sale. There was no question of payment in that case. The property of one judgment-debtor was sold in satisfaction of the entire decree and he claimed. contribution and the question was on what date it would be deemed that the decree was satisfied or paid by reason of the sale. It was urged that the date of sale was not materially different from the date on which the decree holder took possession of the property. It was held that the date of sale was materially different and the suit should have been filed within throe years of that date. 10. In my view, thougt from the tender it does not appear that the money was deposited as security, but the facts being not only found but admitted that the money was deposited as security, it could not be said that there was a legal tender made to too Plaintiff or that the payment was made on the date of the deposit, that is the 13th July. I consider that the decree must be deemed to have been satisfied and the payment made on the 6th January, 1939, the date on which the money was withdrawn. The Plaintiff could not have, merely after the deposit of the security, filed a suit for contribution The right to claim contribution could only arise after (he decree was satisfied from the money deposited by the Plaintiff, and in that view the limitation must begin to run from the 7th January 1939 and the suit was filed within time. 11. I have not been able to follow the reasonings of the lower Court when it hold that the suit would not be barred by reason of the provisions of the U. P. Stay of Proceedings (Revenue Courts) Act, (IV of 1937). That Act only applies to claims which are detailed in the Schedule attached to that Act. I cannot find any provision in that Schedule which would govern a suit for contribution. 12. Learned Counsel for the Respondent has relied on the Temporary Postponement of Execution of Decrees Act (X of 1937), I do not see how that Act is applicable as it only applies to suits for money which can be filed in the Civil Court. 13. The lower Courts have allowed interest from the 13th July 1936. 12. Learned Counsel for the Respondent has relied on the Temporary Postponement of Execution of Decrees Act (X of 1937), I do not see how that Act is applicable as it only applies to suits for money which can be filed in the Civil Court. 13. The lower Courts have allowed interest from the 13th July 1936. Interest should be calculated from the 6th January 1939, the date on which payment was made and the date on which the Plaintiff got the right to claim contribution from the Defendant. 14. The Appellant is not liable to pay any special costs and the order as regards special costs, is, therefore, set aside. 15. With these modifications the rest of the appeal is dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs of this appeal. 16. Leave to file an appeal under the letters patent is granted.