JUDGMENT Das, J. - The suit in which this application has been made is a partition suit filed by one Kalachand Chunder, an attorney of this Court, for partition of premises No. 7, Murali Dhar Sen Lane. On December 22, 1941, a preliminary decree was passed in this suit declaring the shares of the parties in the property and appointing Mr. T. Chatterjee as the commissioner of partition and Mr. Salehjee as the receiver. By this decree it was provided, inter alia, that in the event of the said commissioner of partition finding that; the said premises could not be conveniently and reasonably partitioned by metes and bounds, the commissioner of partition should sell the same by private treaty or by public auction to the best purchaser provided the commissioner of partition considered that a sufficient bid had been offered. The commissioner of partition was directed to fix a reserve price and was given liberty to issue advertisements for sale. Liberty was also given to the parties to bid at the sale. 2. On March 3, 1944. Mr. T. Chatterjee and Mr. Slashed were by an order of Court discharged and Mr. A. C. Gupta was appointed the receiver and commissioner of partition on the same remuneration and with the same powers. 3. Dost Mahomed, one of the Defendants, having died intestate, an order was made on August 16, 1944, recording the death of Dost Mahomed and amending the register of the suit by describing the Defendants Fazle Karim. Nazir Mohamed and Aysha Bibee (being the brothers and sister of Dost Mahomed) in their individual capacities as well as in their capacities as heirs and legal representatives of the said deceased and re-adjusting the shares of the Defendants consequent upon the death of Dost Mahomed. 4. On April 25, 1945, a petition was, filed before me by the wife and children of Kalachand Chunder praying for an inquisition as to the mental state of Kalachand Chunder. The petition was intituled in the matter of clause 17 of the Letters Patent and Act IV of 1912. It was alleged that Kalachand Chunder had become a person of unsound mind and had, while in that state of mind, left his dwelling house and could not be traced. The petition was intituled in the matter of clause 17 of the Letters Patent and Act IV of 1912. It was alleged that Kalachand Chunder had become a person of unsound mind and had, while in that state of mind, left his dwelling house and could not be traced. This petition which was accompanied by a medical certificate was verified by the affidavit of the wife of Kalachand Chunder and was also supported by a separate affidavit of his father, Mr. B. P. Chunder, a senior attorney of this Court. On a consideration of the facts appearing on the record before me, I made an order on that date directing that an enquiry be held before the Court on June 25, 1945, (1) as to whether the said Kalachand Chunder was a person of unsound mind and incapable of managing himself and his affairs, (2) as to the time during which he had been of unsound mind, (3) as to the nature of the property belonging to him and (4) as to such other points as the Court might think fit. I further directed a copy of that order to be served on Mr. B. P. Chunder and Mr. Sambhu Nath Chunder being the father and brother respectively of Kalalchand Chunder and on the said Kalachand Chunder in the several modes therein mentioned. In view of the urgency arising out of the facts that several suits to which Kalachand Chunder was a party were pending, that the rents of several houses belonging to Kala Chand Chunder had to be collected from the tenants and that municipal rates and taxes had to be paid, I did by the same order appoint Mr. B. P. Chunder until the enquiry was held or until further orders, the interim receiver and manager to look after the affairs of Kala Chand Chunder with various powers for the management, realisation and preservation of his estate as therein specified. Mr. B. P. Chunder was empowered, amongst other things, to continue proceedings already instituted by the said Kala Chand Chunder, in his own name in the Small Causes Court and in this Court and bring them to a termination, to join in the sale of the premises No. 7, Murlidhar Sen Lane and to do all acts necessary for the proper management of the estate including the execution of documents on behalf of Kala Chand Chunder. It was further provided by that order that the receipt of Mr. B. P. Chunder as such receiver should be a sufficient discharge for all such sums of money or property as should be paid or delivered to him. 5. The enquiry, however, could not be proceeded with on the appointed day and had to be adjourned in view of the difficulty, brought about by the disappearance of Kala Chand Chunder, in producing him before the Court and in procuring any evidence of his state of mind at or about the time of the enquiry, and eventually on September 3, 1945, an order was made giving certain additional powers to Mr. B. P. Chunder as such receiver and manager including the power to spend a sum not exceeding Rs. 300 per mouth towards the maintenance of the family of the said Kala Chand Chunder and to invest the moneys representing the accumulation of rents as also the sale proceeds of half share of 7, Murlidhar Sen Lane in 3 1/2 per cent. Government Promissory Notes and adjourning the enquiry sine die. 6. Mr. A. C. Gupta, the Commissioner of partition appointed in this suit, being of opinion that the premises No. 7, Murlidhar Sen Lane could not be conveniently partitioned by metes and bounds, proceeded with the sale of the premises as he was authorised to do by and under the decree passed in this suit. The sale actually took place on July 13, 1946. It was held subject to certain conditions of sale, a copy of which is annexed to the present petition and marked " A." At the sale the present applicant was declared the highest bidder and purchaser of the said premises at and for Rs. 76,000. In terms of the conditions of sale the purchaser paid to the commissioner of partition 25 per cent, of the purchase money. 7. The abstract of title having been delivered to the purchaser, the latter, on or about July 24, 1946, by and through his attorney caused certain requisition on title to be made which were answered by the Plaintiff's attorney. On August 6,1946, certain further requisitions arising out of the answers to the earlier requisitions were delivered and answered. All these requisitions and answers are annexed to the petition and collectively marked " B." There is no suggestion that the requisitions on title were not delivered within time. On August 6,1946, certain further requisitions arising out of the answers to the earlier requisitions were delivered and answered. All these requisitions and answers are annexed to the petition and collectively marked " B." There is no suggestion that the requisitions on title were not delivered within time. Item No. 3 of the first set of requisitions and Items Nos. 1 and 2 of the further requisitions raised the question as to how and by whom was the interest of Kala Chand Chunder to be legally conveyed to the purchaser. Item No. 10 of the first set of requisitions and Item No. 3 of the further requisitions related to the absence of a certain original conveyance dated July 27, 1921, which solely related to the premises in question. 8. On August 8, 1946, the purchaser took out the present summons praying for leave to pay the balance of the purchase money, for delivery of the said original conveyance dated July 27, 1921, for suitable directions in default of delivery of the same, for necessary directions for the conveyance of the share of Kala Chand Chunder and as to the person who should sign and execute the conveyance on his behalf, if necessary, for the setting aside of the sale and return of the moneys already deposited by the purchaser. The summons was made returnable on August 9, 1946. On that date an order was made giving leave to the purchaser to pay the balance of the purchase, money to the commissioner and the rest of the application was adjourned. The purchaser paid the balance of the purchase money to the commissioner of partition and there is no doubt that he is a bond fide purchaser and has made this application in perfect good faith. Indeed Mr. P. B. Mukherjee appearing for the purchaser has made it clear that his client is anxious to complete purchase, provided that a reasonably good and marketable title can be conveyed to him. 9. The adjourned application came up for hearing before me when learned Counsel for all parties other than Fatehdin and Aysha Bibee appeared. After hearing arguments I took time to consider my judgment. 9. The adjourned application came up for hearing before me when learned Counsel for all parties other than Fatehdin and Aysha Bibee appeared. After hearing arguments I took time to consider my judgment. On going through the papers I found that the summons had been served on Fatehdin and Aysha Bibee, two of the Defendants, by registered post and the registered letters had come back with the remark " addressee not known." I had doubts whether this was a proper service. Further the appearance of Fatehdin who was alleged to have the missing title deed was considered necessary. Consequently I directed fresh service by advertisement and also by registered post and adjourned the application. I understand that fresh notices have again been sent by registered post but advertisements have not yet been issued. The matter was mentioned to me yesterday and I was told that Fatehdin had since then come down to Calcutta and would produce the original conveyance. In these circumstances I did not consider it necessary that the advertisements should be issued and I directed the matter to be listed for judgment. The order I propose to make will not adversely affect Aysha Bibee. 10. Mr. Mukherjee's first contention which was based on Item No. 3 of the requisitions and Items Nos. 1 and 2 of the furthered requisitions was that in the events that had happened there could be no valid and effective transfer of the half share of Kala Chand Chunder in the premises in question, for there was nobody who could convey it for him. His argument was as follows: Kala Chand Chunder left his dwelling-house some time in September, 1944, and had not been heard of since. Sufficient time had not elapsed so as to give rise to any presumption of death. Therefore we must proceed on the basis that he is alive. It is alleged that Kala Chand Chunder was, at the time he left his dwelling-house, a person incapable, by reason of unsoundness of mind, of managing himself and his affairs. He had not been found to be a lunatic on inquisition under the Lunacy Act and therefore, no manager of his property could have been validly and properly appointed. Mr. It is alleged that Kala Chand Chunder was, at the time he left his dwelling-house, a person incapable, by reason of unsoundness of mind, of managing himself and his affairs. He had not been found to be a lunatic on inquisition under the Lunacy Act and therefore, no manager of his property could have been validly and properly appointed. Mr. Mukherjee took me through the relevant sections of Part III of the Indian Lunacy Act and contended that the scheme and provisions of those sections clearly contemplated the appointment of a guardian of the person or manager of the property after a finding as to lunacy was affirmatively arrived at as a result of the enquiry by the Court. His contention was, that the Act did not contemplate or sanction the appointment of any interim guardian or manager. Therefore, concluded Mr. Mukherjee, the order made on April 25, 1945, in the lunacy proceedings appointing Mr. B. P. Chunder as the receiver and manager of the estate of Kala Chand Chunder until the conclusion of the enquiry was wholly without jurisdiction and Mr. B. P. Chunder did not lawfully represent the estate of Kala Chand Chunder and could not transfer title to any part of it. Mr. Mukherjee relied on the case of Saroj Basini Debi v. Mahendra Nath Bhaduri I L R. (1927) cal. 836. In that case, which was an appeal from the decision of the District Judge, Rankin, C. J., examined the relevant sections of the Indian Lunacy Act and set out in detail the procedure contemplated by the Act. At page 847 the learned Chief Justice made the following observations : Under the jurisdiction with which we are concerned, it may be worth while to notice that orders for the custody of lunatics and for the management of their estates do not come into question at all, until there has been a finding of lunacy as a result of an inquisition. There is no question of interim orders on such matters pending the determination as to the person's state of mind. 11. There can be no doubt that the above observations support Mr. Mukherjee's argument, but with the utmost respect to Rankin, C. J., I am unable to accept his views. 12. There is no question of interim orders on such matters pending the determination as to the person's state of mind. 11. There can be no doubt that the above observations support Mr. Mukherjee's argument, but with the utmost respect to Rankin, C. J., I am unable to accept his views. 12. The sections grouped under the heading " judicial powers over person and estate of lunatic " in Chapters IV and V of Part III of the Indian Lunacy Act appear by their terms to confer on the Court certain powers which can only be exercised in respect of the person or property of a lunatic so found on inquisition. I respectfully agree with the learned Chief Justice that those sections do not in terms contemplate or sanction the making of any interim order for the custody or the management of the estate of a person before he is adjudged to be a lunatic. It is also clear that there is no express provision in the Act authorising the Court to make any interim order of the kind I have mentioned. Nor is there anything in the rules framed by this Court and embodied in Chapter XXX of the Original Side Rules. But does it follow that the Act is intended to be exhaustive in the sense that it takes away all inherent powers of a Court of law. It is easy to visualise cases of such urgency as may imperatively necessitate the making of such interim orders by the Court before which proceedings are pending and every Court must of necessity have such powers. To deny such inherent power may result in irreparable injury to the very person who and whose estate is before the Court and whose interest the Court is expected to protect. There can be no doubt that proceedings in lunacy are civil proceedings in a Court of civil jurisdiction [see Moni Lal v. Nepal Chandra (1917) 22 C. W. N. 547 If that be so, then sec. 141 of the CPC will apply and the powers for making interlocutory orders under Or. 39 and Or. 40 must necessarily become available to the Court. This section, I apprehend, will also save the inherent powers of the Court. 141 of the CPC will apply and the powers for making interlocutory orders under Or. 39 and Or. 40 must necessarily become available to the Court. This section, I apprehend, will also save the inherent powers of the Court. I find support for my views from the observations of Costello, A. C. J., in the case of Rajendra Kumar Gupta v. Shailendra Kumar Gupta I. L. R. (1938) Cal. 180 42 In that case after quoting the above passage from the judgment of Rankin, C. J., in Saraj Basini's case I. L. R. (1927) cal 836 the learned Acting Chief Justice observed as follows at pp. 183-184: I am not at all sure that Sir George Rankin intended to say more than this, that there should not be an interim order for the custody of lunatics or for the actual management of their estates pending the result of the inquisition, emphasis being placed on the word " management." To put the matter in another way, it would not be proper either to appoint a custodian or a manager before there had been a definite finding on the inquisition that the alleged lunatic was in fact a lunatic. If, however, the learned Chief Justice intended to say that in no order touching the property of an alleged lunatic be made, then, with all possible respect to him, I can only say that I am unable to agree with his opinion, having regard to the authority in a contrary sense furnished by certain decisions of the Courts in England. It has been suggested in course of the argument before us that the observations of the learned Chief Justice as regards interim orders were after all no more than obiter dicta, in that in the case then before the Court there had been no question of making an interim order at all. Whether that is so or not, it seems to me that it would be most unfortunate, undesirable and certainly not in accordance with the practice in England if we were to hold that a Court in this country has in no circumstances power to appoint an interim receiver for the protection of the property of a person who is alleged to be a lunatic. In my view the provisions of the Indian Lunacy Act of 1912 and the amending Acts-which compendiously may be called the Indian Lunacy Act, 1912-1926-are not absolutely exhaustive. Clearly the present matter is not one which in any sense falls within the scope of either sec. 71 or sec. 71 read with sec. 56. If there is any section in the Indian Lunacy Act which deals with the point we are considering or any question closely akin to it, it must, in my opinion, be sec. 67 and not sec. 71. However, we may take it that this is a matter which lies outside the actual provisions of the statute, and in those circumstances it seems to me that the Courts in this country are entitled to exercise that kind of inherent jurisdiction which originally was exercised by the Courts of Chancery in England in all matters concerning the welfare and the care of infants and lunatics. 13. I do not think it serves any useful purpose to try and explain or distinguish this case from that before Rankin, C. J. It is better to openly express my disagreement which I respectfully do. 14. Even if there be any doubt as to the powers of the District Courts in the matter of making interim orders in pending lunacy proceedings, I entertain no doubt whatever as to the powers of this High Court to do so. This High Court has lunacy jurisdiction under clause 17 of the Letters Patent of 1865. That clause confers on this Court " the like power and authority with respect to the persons and estates of infants, idiots and lunatics within the Bengal Division of the Presidency of Fort William as that which was vested in the said High Court immediately before the publication of these presents." This takes us back to the Letters Patent of 1862 which was in force immediately before the publication of the Letters Patent of 1865. Clause 16 of the Letters Patent of 1862 ordained that the High Court should have the like jurisdiction as to infants and lunatics as was then vested in the Supreme Court. This provision takes us further back to the Charter of 1774 establishing the Supreme Court at Fort William in Bengal. Clause 16 of the Letters Patent of 1862 ordained that the High Court should have the like jurisdiction as to infants and lunatics as was then vested in the Supreme Court. This provision takes us further back to the Charter of 1774 establishing the Supreme Court at Fort William in Bengal. Under clause 4 the Chief Justice and Judges of the Supreme Court were given the same powers as the Judges of King's Bench of England had and under clause 18 the Supreme Court was constituted as a Court of Equity with " full power and authority to administer justice in a summary manner, as nearly as may. according to the rules and proceedings of our High Court of Chancery in Great Britain." Clause 25 of that Charter authorised and empowered the Supreme Court " to appoint guardians and keepers for infants, and their estates according to the order and course observed in that part of Great Britain called England and also guardians and keepers of the persons and estates of natural fools or of such as are, or shall be deprived of their understanding or reason by the act of God, so as to be unable to govern themselves and their estates " and also authorised and empowered that Court " to inquire, hear and determine by inspection of the person, or by such other ways and means by which the truth may best be discovered and known." From what I have stated it follows that this High Court as the successor to the Supreme Court has all the powers, authority and jurisdiction of the English Courts referred to above. There can be no doubt that the English Courts frequently make interim orders in lunacy proceedings before a person is actually found to be a lunatic on inquisition. Reference may be made to Ex parte Whitfield [1742] 2 A. T. K. 315 : 26 E. R. 591. In. re. re: Pountain [1888] L R. 37 Ch. D. 609 C. A., Seager Hunt ([1900] L R. 2 Ch. 54. and Re: A.-G. [1909] 53 sel. J. 615. The position is summarised in Theobald's Law relating to Lunacy at page 401 in the following words: In an urgent case an interim receiver may be appointed for the. protection of a lunatic's property, upon sufficient medical evidence, and without service or security. 54. and Re: A.-G. [1909] 53 sel. J. 615. The position is summarised in Theobald's Law relating to Lunacy at page 401 in the following words: In an urgent case an interim receiver may be appointed for the. protection of a lunatic's property, upon sufficient medical evidence, and without service or security. The order provides for giving security as soon as possible and for notice of the order to the lunatic with liberty to him to apply to discharge it on short notice. It is not necessary to refer to Rule 83 of the Rules of 1892 for power to appoint an interim receiver; it is part of the inherent jurisdiction to protect the property of lunatics. The powers conferred by the Act of 1908 are also sufficient to meet the case. Interim orders have frequently been made; see, for instance, Seager Hunt ([1900] L R. 2 Ch. 54. These interim orders have also been recognized by the Lords Justices. It was found that an elderly lady of weak mind was living in her own house in a state of neglect, and it was necessary, at once to have her properly cared for. The matte-being urgent, an interim receiver was appointed by the Master. W., January 17, 1922. When the receiver went to the house to carry out the order he was refused admission by a person who had been allowed to occupy the basement. Application was thereupon made to the Lords Justices for an order to commit this person, and after discussion in Court an order for committal was made, thus recognising in the clearest way the validity of the interim order. W., Sterndale, M. R., Younger,.L. J., 1st February, 1922. 15. It has been argued that the provisions of the Letters Patent are by clause 44 thereof made subject to the legislative powers of the Indian Legislature. It is contended that the Indian Legislature has, by the Lunacy Act, altered the law. Reference is made to sec. 2 of the Lunacy Act which provides that nothing contained in Part II will affect the powers of the High Court. It is urged that this section clearly shows that the other provisions contained in other parts of the Act affect the powers of the High Court. Part II provides for the reception, care and treatment of lunatics and gives certain powers to certain persons or tribunal. It is urged that this section clearly shows that the other provisions contained in other parts of the Act affect the powers of the High Court. Part II provides for the reception, care and treatment of lunatics and gives certain powers to certain persons or tribunal. It was, therefore, necessary to make it clear that those provisions did not affect the powers of the High Court over any person found on inquisition to be a lunatic or over the property of such lunatic. Part III, Ch. IV, however, deals with lunacy proceedings in the High Court. In so far as express provisions have been made in that part they are certainly intended to he binding on the High Court and ex hypothesis there could be no occasion for preserving the powers of the High Court as against those provisions. But it is quite a different thing to say that even in matters on which the Act is silent the powers of the High Court must be deemed to have been taken away. I readily agree that the provisions of the Lunacy Act, in so far as they are expressly contrary to or inconsistent with the powers of the High Court under its Letters Patent, must prevail but I am not prepared to countenance the contention that the Legislature has, by a side wind, taken away the inherent powers of this Court, which, I consider, are essentially necessary in the ends of justice. While sitting as a Judge of this Court I for one shall not, in the absence of unambiguous provision enacted by a competent legislative authority, readily give up ancient and time-honored powers, authority and jurisdiction which this Court has inherited from the Supreme Court. In my opinion, for the reasons mentioned above, the order of September 3, 1945, was a valid order and Mr. B. P. Chunder as the receiver and manager of the estate of Kala Chand Chunder can legally convey the latter's half share and pass a good title to the purchaser. I, however, agree with Mr. Mukherjee that the records of this suit should be suitably amended either by substituting Mr. B. P. Chunder as the receiver and manager of the estate of Kala Chand Chunder can legally convey the latter's half share and pass a good title to the purchaser. I, however, agree with Mr. Mukherjee that the records of this suit should be suitably amended either by substituting Mr. B. P. Chunder as such receiver and manager in the place of Kala Chand Chunder or by describing Kala Chand Chunder as a person who, though not adjudged to be a lunatic, is by reason of unsoundness of mind or mental infirmity incapable of protecting his interests and suing by a next friend appointed under Or. 32, r. 15. C. P. C. Even for the purposes of this application such amendment is necessary. Mr. Banerjee agrees that the register of this suit should be amended in the latter way. Relying on the materials on which the order of April 25, 1945, was made and the materials on which an order under Or. 32, r. 15 was made by me in another proceeding on September 3, 1945, which related to the mental state of Kala Chand Chunder and all of which are now filed of record of this Court I find that the Plaintiff Kala Chand Chunder is by reason of unsoundness of mind or mental infirmity incapable of protecting his interests and acting under Or. 32, r. 15, C. P. C. I appoint Mr. B. P. Chunder as the next friend of Kala Chand Chunder to continue this suit to its termination and execute and register the conveyance on behalf of Kala Chand Chunder. Let the register of this suit be amended accordingly and let the sale be now completed. 16. Mr. P. B. Mukherjee's next contention arising out of Item No. 10 of the requisitions and Item No. 3 of the further requisitions was that the original conveyance dated July 27, 1931, from Indra Kumar Sen to Makamdin and another was not forthcoming and in the absence of that-document the title cannot be regarded as clear or free from infirmity. I am free to confess that this objection appeared to me of substance. The point, however, has become academic by reason of the fact that Fatehdin has now appeared and produced the document. I need not, therefore, discuss this question any further. I am free to confess that this objection appeared to me of substance. The point, however, has become academic by reason of the fact that Fatehdin has now appeared and produced the document. I need not, therefore, discuss this question any further. I only direct that this original conveyance be: delivered to the purchaser at the time of the completion of the sale. Fathering through his Counsel has waived service. 17. I ought here to mention that no objection has been taken by Mr. Banerjee or Mr. Ghose as to the form or maintainability of this application on the ground that the rules regulating a sale by the Registrar are not applicable to this sale which was held by the commissioner of partition or otherwise. This Was a sale in a partition suit and presumably sec. 7 of the Partition Act attracts the procedure usually taken for setting aside a sale by the Registrar. 18. Applicant's costs of this application will be paid out of the consideration money by the commissioner of partition. Costs of the other parties will be as in a partition suit. Certified for Counsel. The operation of this order will be stayed for a week after the order is completed and filed.