JUDGMENT Sinha, J. - This is an appeal by a defendant against whom a suit for restitution of conjugal rights was dismissed by the learned Munstf, but decreed by the learned Civil Judge. 2. The parties are Mohammedans and were married so far back as the year 1933. It appears that, after the marriage they got a number of children and, although it is difficult to say what precisely their relations were from the very inception, the present suit was instituted only in 1941. It appears that, sometime in that year, the defendant 1, the wife, went to live with her father, Khan Bahadur Sana Ullah, one of the defendants in this action, at Dehra Dun. She refused to come back to Allahabad, with the result that the present suit was instituted. The plaintiff's case was that he was a good husband and the wife, left to herself, would come back to him, but for the sinister influence exercised by her parents. 3. The defence, in the main, was that, from the very beginning, the relations between the parties left a great deal to be desired, if they were not positively unhappy. After some time the husband became more and more aggressive and, later on, more and more cruel till, on a certain day in January 1911, he administered her a severe beating, which endangered her life and, at all events, raised a reasonable apprehension in her mind that she would not find a safe home under the roof of her husband. Another plea was raised, namely, that the prompt portion of the dower had not been paid and this disentitled the husband from making the present claim. 4. The learned Munsif in a judgment, marked by care and ability, dismissed the suit. On the legal question whether the non-payment of the dower debt disentitled the plaintiff from bringing the suit, he held in the plaintiff's favour. He went into the evidence and came to the conclusion that the marriage had never been happy and that, as time wore on, the treatment of the husband deteriorated, with the result that it became so bad that it amounted to legal cruelty within the meaning of the law. 5. The husband went in appeal. He went into the evidence and came to the conclusion that the marriage had never been happy and that, as time wore on, the treatment of the husband deteriorated, with the result that it became so bad that it amounted to legal cruelty within the meaning of the law. 5. The husband went in appeal. The learned Civil Judge, in a judgment which does not indicate a correct appreciation of the facts or law, has reversed the finding of the learned Magistrate (Sic, munsif). Most of the judgment is devoted to considerations which are absolutely irrelevant to the case. It may be that the treatment of the plaintiff's father-in-law towards him was not what it should have been. I am prepared to go a step further and assume that it was positively bad. But the relations between the plaintiff and his father-in-law could not legally affect the fate of the suit The plaintiff was to stand or fall by his own treatment to his wife and not by the treatment of his father-in-law to, himself. The parties produced a number of documents. On a consideration of all the documents and the oral evidence, the learned Munsif came, as I have already indicated, to a conclusion in favour of the wife. On a consideration of the same evidencea number of documentsthe learned Civil Judge held otherwise. 6. Sitting in second appeal it is open to me to go into the evidence and arrive at a conclusion of my own: vide AIR 1927 102 (Privy Council) as interpreted in Mt. Beti and Another Vs. Sikhdar Singh and Others and Gopi Lal and Others Vs. Abdul Hamid and Others . But I am relieved of the necessity of doing so, inasmuch as I find one document noticed by the learned Civil Judge himself, which completely gives away the plaintiff's case; indeed, it entirely puts him out of Court. It is a letter addressed by the wife to her father. It is not dated, but the date can be gathered from the envelope enclosing it. 7. Before I address myself to this letter, I might clear the ground by noticing the objection of the learned counsel for the respondent. It is argued that this letter was not put to the plaintiff, when he was in the witness-box. It is not dated, but the date can be gathered from the envelope enclosing it. 7. Before I address myself to this letter, I might clear the ground by noticing the objection of the learned counsel for the respondent. It is argued that this letter was not put to the plaintiff, when he was in the witness-box. It is also argued that the fact that it bears no date detracts from its value, if it does not entirely destroy its effect. That it is undated is not surprising. The wife was livingif her statement is to be acceptedwith an unkind husband, who was anxiousif she is further going to be believedthat there should be no correspondence between her father and herself. She must, therefore, have stolen a few moments with great difficulty to scribble a few lines. And if she did not have enough time to sign that letter or to go through the other ordinary formalities, it will not affect the evidentiary value of such a document. One has only to visualise the scene in an Indian family, where a wife has to live in such conditions. It is not surprising that the letter is unsigned. But what is surprising is that she could have found some time to write such a letter in such adverse circumstances. 8. As regards the objection that it was not put to the plaintiff in the witness-box, it is singularly devoid of merit. It was produced in evidence on the date of the issues, after which the plaintiff offered to go into the witness-box. It lay upon him to place before the Court his explanation. He did not take any such step and must, therefore, take the consequences. 9. If this letter can be taken as evidence as I think and I am clear that it must be it is a document which, as I have already said, puts the plaintiff completely out of Court. Into the antecedent history it is not necessary to enter after this letter. I think that its importance demands that it should be quoted in extenso. Aj unhonne mujhe bahut mara. Mujhse unki mar nahin khai gai. Is se bahtar yeh hi hai ki men samjhun ki men rand hun. Aese shauhar se men baz ai. Ap akar mujh ko fauran le jaiye ya men khud kisi ke sath ya akeli ghar se nikalkar chali aungi. Aj unhonne mujhe bahut mara. Mujhse unki mar nahin khai gai. Is se bahtar yeh hi hai ki men samjhun ki men rand hun. Aese shauhar se men baz ai. Ap akar mujh ko fauran le jaiye ya men khud kisi ke sath ya akeli ghar se nikalkar chali aungi. Ap mujhko akar le jaiye. Men khula ke darkhast dekar inse alahdgi karna chahti hun, Yeh khat men roti jati hun aur likhti jati hun. [10] Its English rendering is in these words: Today he - the husband - beat me very much. I could not stand this beating. It is better that I should consider myself a widow. I would rather live without such a husband. Please come at once and take me from here or I should come with somebody or step out of the house all by myself. You please come and take me. I want a judicial separation. As I am writing this letter I am weeping and shedding tears. 11. This letter does not show merely an isolated beating, but it evidences habitual beating, which culminated in the fateful beating of that particular day. If there had been no other evidence on the record it was quite enough to dismiss the suit for restitution of conjugal rights and I am surprised that any experienced judicial officer should have dismissed this piece of evidence in the manner in which the learned Civil Judge has done. I had better quote his own words : The quarrel which appears to have caused this whole trouble was an incident reported by Mt. Sophia Begum in Ex. P-2 in which she says that her husband beat her and wrote to her father to come and take her away. There is no evidence whether a few slaps were given to Mt. Sophia Begum on some stick was used, but no injury is reported in this letter by Mt. Sophia Begum. So I conclude that she was given a few slaps. I do not know what was the circumstance that resulted in this quarrel, but a solitary instance cannot amount to a legal cruelty as understood under Muslim law to justify the refusal of the restitution of the conjugal rights. In every house-hold some quarrels arise and when one party is impulsive, such things do occur but soon they are forgotten and the pair continues to live on as happily as before. In every house-hold some quarrels arise and when one party is impulsive, such things do occur but soon they are forgotten and the pair continues to live on as happily as before. Family life is not a bed of roses, it is full of difficulties and those difficulties give rise to quarrels but this does not mean that as soon as any quarrel develops, whatever its nature, the parties should separate. 12. I can only say that the above makes amazing reading. It is true that the tendency of the law is to set up a home and not to break it. But the conception of a home is peace and harmony and not where one party dominates and illtreats the other. To my mind, all the premises of the learned Civil Judge are wrong. In the first place, as I have said, this letter evidences a habitual cruelty. It is not a few slaps administered gently by a loving husband to a beloved wife, which would have made the wife write it. It says: "It is better that I should consider myself ft widow. I would rather live without such a husband." It is only when a wife is driven to desperationthat she raises such a cry. The letter also shows that, as she writes this, she is shedding tears. How the learned Civil Judge should have placed such an interpretation upon it I cannot follow. The language of the letter being clear and explicit, it fell upon the plaintiff to explain whether what he administered was a few slaps or heartless beating. He has not offered any explanation and I must take it, on its plain reading, that he was guilty of gross cruelty. The interpretation which I have placed upon this letter will deprive the plaintiff of all relief on the basis of any civilised system of law and it cannot be denied that the Muslim law is no exception. I, however, propose, having regard to the earnestness of Mr. Darbari, the learned counsel for the respondent, to notice a few of the authorities on which he has taken his stand. 13. He has relied upon the Holy Quran by Maulvi Muhammad Ali (Edn. 2) p. 211. I, however, propose, having regard to the earnestness of Mr. Darbari, the learned counsel for the respondent, to notice a few of the authorities on which he has taken his stand. 13. He has relied upon the Holy Quran by Maulvi Muhammad Ali (Edn. 2) p. 211. The relevant passage is: Men are the maintainers of women, because Allah has made some of them to excel others and because they spend out of their property ; the good women are therefore obedient, guarding the unseen as Allah has guarded ; and (as to) those on whose part you fear desertion, admonish them, and leave them alone in the sleeping places and beat them ; then if they obey you, do not seek a way against them ; surely Allah is High, Great. 14. It will be observed that it speaks of fear of "desertion." It is not a case of desertion or apprehended desertion. The passage, therefore, has no bearing. 15. He next relies upon Asmati Bibi and Others Vs. Saimuddi Pathan, AIR 1925 Cal 533 The whole of the evidence on the question of legal cruelty in that case amounted to 'simple chastisement once or twice." 16. The state of affairs disclosed by this letter does not amount to "simple chastisement once or twice," but it evidences something much more violent and serious to the wife. This authority too is hardly in favour of the plaintiff. 17. There is yet another aspect of the matter which must be considered. The rights of a Mohammedan wife have been greatly enlarged by the recent enactment, the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 (8 [VIII] of 1939). By this Act, the Legislature has made a distinct endeavour to ameliorate the lot of the wife and we must appreciate the evidence and apply the law in consonance with the spirit of the Legislature. 18. I, therefore, think that the view taken by the learned Civil Judge was wrong. I, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the degree of the lower appellate Court and restore that of the Court of first instance with costs, in all Courts. Leave to appeal under the Letters Patent is refused.