JUDGMENT Sinha, J. - This is a Defendant's appeal and arises out of a suit for possession of a grove, for mesne profits amounting to Rs. 115 and also for a sum of Rs. 60 on account of the price of timber wrongfully cut by the Defendants. 2. The following genealogical table will be helpful: 3. The family was a family of businessmen and carried on business in the name of Prem Raj Makhan Lal. 4. The facts are these: In 1915 Janki Das purchased the grove in dispute from one Maggu Khan and died either in 1927 or the beginning of 1928 It appears that Radha Kishan, his brother, obtained possession of this grove. He was adjudicated an insolvent on April 11, 1932. This order was challenged on appeal by some creditor and on November 5. 1932, the District Judge remitted an issue for a finding whether the firm was a joint family firm. During the pendency of the appeal the Official Receiver on July 28, 1933, sold the grove in dispute to one Pitam Lal, who is the grandfather of the present Plaintiff. On August 18, 1933, the learned Insolvency Judge found that there was no joint family and on September 15, 1933, the District Judge annulled the insolvency. The Plaintiff, who is the grandsonof the purchaser, brought a suit for the reliefs mentioned above, ou the allegation that he was in peaceful possession of the property upto 1942 but was disturbed in the month of April of that year. The defence was that the sale by the Official Receiver was a void sale inasmuch as it was made at a time when the declaration contemplated by Section 60 of the Provincial Insolvency Act had been made by the Leal Governmet and no title passed to the Plaintiff's grandfather. The Plaintiff's possesion upto 1942 was also denied. 5. The learned Munsif found in favour of the Defendants and dismissed the suit. The learned District Judge acceded to the defence only in so far that the sale was a void sale, but held that Radha Kishan had, by his conduct having withdrawn a sum of Rs. 1,675, which was the sale considera tion, after the annulment of the insolvency, estopped himself from challenging the sale and that estoppel affected not only him but all the defendadants. In the result he decreed the suit. 1,675, which was the sale considera tion, after the annulment of the insolvency, estopped himself from challenging the sale and that estoppel affected not only him but all the defendadants. In the result he decreed the suit. One of the Defendants has come to this Court in second appeal. 6. The learned Counsel for the Appellant contends that, on the finding that Radha Kishan was a member of a joint Hindu family with the Defendants and on the further finding that the grove was a revenue paying grove and the declaration made by the Local Government was in force, there was no answer to the defence. 7. The learned Counsel for the Respondent does not concede that the grove in dispute is a revenue paying grove, but I am bound by the finding of fact recorded by the learned District Judge that it is a revenue paying grove and shall proceeed upon that assumption. Section 60 of the Insolvency Act runs thus: 60(sic) (1) In any local area in which a declaration has been made under S 68 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and is in force, no sale of immoveable property paying revenue to the Government or held or let for agricultural purposes shall be made by the Receiver.... 8. This section intended to achieve the same end as Section 68 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 9. The learned Counsel for the Appellant relies upon Narotam Das v. Bhagwan Das (1934) 3 AWR 545, That was the case of a sale of agricultural land under the orders of the Civil Court at a time when the Governor in Cousnel had, acting u/s 68 of the Code of Civil Procedure, declared that The execution of decrees in cases in which a Civil Court has ordered any agricultural land situated in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh or any interest in such land to be sold, shall be tranaferred to the Collectors. 10. The question before the learned Judges did not arise in the precise form in which it falls for consideration at my hands, but the learned Counsel is right that they held that the sale was a void sale. Indeed in Sarju Prasad v. Ramsaran Lal 1931 A L J 400. 10. The question before the learned Judges did not arise in the precise form in which it falls for consideration at my hands, but the learned Counsel is right that they held that the sale was a void sale. Indeed in Sarju Prasad v. Ramsaran Lal 1931 A L J 400. Sulaiman J. has put it more emphatically and held: Where a mortgage deed of joint ancestral property was executed jointly by a father and his son, who were members of a joint Hindu family, while the Collector was seized of the entire estate under Sch 3, Code of CPC and was taking steps to sell the whole estate, the mortgage by the father was wholly void and inoperative and could not be effective to create a charge on the property. 11. The law, to my mind, draws a distinction between the case of an alienation of property which from its very nature, is incapable of allenation for all time and in all circumstances, and the case where the bar has been created for certain specific purposes. There is yet another class of cases where the law throws a special cloak of protection over the person concerned, for instance, a minor. The prohibition is absolute and a contract by him is not merely voidable but void. Where the disability attaches to the person, no question of ratification can come in. Mohori Bibi v. Dharamodas Ghose (1943) 30 Cal. 539 (P C). The only qualification which has been introduced not by statute but by judicial decisions based upon principles of equity is that the Court may, where the minor himself seeks its aid as a Plaintiff and repudiates the contract, call upon him to restitute the benefit. The leading case on this point is Ajudhia Prasad v. Chandan Lal 1937 A W R 661 (F B). The present is not a case where the property is, by its very nature, immune from transfer, for instance, an occupan cy tenancy. It is, on the other hand, a case where certain special proceedings have interposed a bar--may be a temporary bar--against-tbe transfer. The present is not a case where the property is, by its very nature, immune from transfer, for instance, an occupan cy tenancy. It is, on the other hand, a case where certain special proceedings have interposed a bar--may be a temporary bar--against-tbe transfer. It appears to me, however, that the dictum--at least in its extreme form--laid down in Narotam Das v. Bhaguwan Das and Sarju Prasad v. Ram Saran Lal cannot, after the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Raja Mohan Manucha v. Manzoor Ahmad Khan 1943 A W R (P.C.) 52, hold the field in its full force. Say their Lordships. If it be settled law that the incapacity imposed on a judgment debtor by Paragraph 11 of the Taird Schedule is an incapacity to affect his property and not a general incapacity to contract, it fallows that the covenant to repay is not made void by the mere operation of the paragraph. 12. Their Lordships gave effect to the principle underlying Section 65 of the Contract Act. If the contract was void in the sense in which the learned Judges of the Court treated it, there was no scope for the principle enshrined in Section 65. I must also be borne in mind that their Lordships went further than the learned Judges of the Full Bench in Ajudhia Prasad, because it was not the debtor who bad moved the Court, but the creditor who was the Plaintiff and who claimed and was allowed restitution. The learned Counsel has also relied upon Gaurishankar Balmokund v. Chin-numiya (1919) 46 Cal. 183 (P.C.) according to which, The incompetency imposed on a judgment-debtor by Section 326 of the CPC Code, 1882, to mortgage the property attached; in execution of a decree whilst it is in the possession and under the management of the Collector, is, on the proper interpretation of the section in the exact and plain sense which the words imply, absolute, and no implied limitation can be read into it. 13. The Privy Council case noticed above is an answer to this case too. The case may be approached from yet another point of view. The sale was no doubt made by the Receiver at a time when there was a cloud. 13. The Privy Council case noticed above is an answer to this case too. The case may be approached from yet another point of view. The sale was no doubt made by the Receiver at a time when there was a cloud. It was a bad sale, not in the sense that it was void, but in view of the decision of their lordships, in the sense that it could be avoided. It was open to Radha Kishan to avoid it and claim back the property; it was also open to him to accept it. He elected to follow the latter course by withdrawing the sale consideration of Rs. 1,675. 14. Barring Section 60 of the Insolvency Act it is not suggested that thre is any other provision of law to render the contract invalid because the law seems to be well settled that such an alienation in a Hindu family is not void, but voidable Hanuman Kamat v. Hanuman Mandur (1893) l8 Cal. 123 at 126 (P.C.) and Jagesar Pande v. Deodat Pande (1923) 21 A L J 608. Nor is it suggested that the sale was not justified by legal necessity or was tainted by illegality or immorality. The ratification was, therefore, a good ratification not only qua Radha Kishan but also qua the present Defendants. They never repudiated it by any of the methods known to the law, they stood by for nearly ten years and then took the law into their own hands and disturbed the Plaintiff's possession. In this view of the matter the plea based on Section 60 of the Provincial Insolvency Act loses all its force No other point has been argued. I, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs. Leave to file a Letters Patent appeal is refused.