JUDGMENT Malik, J. - This is a Defendant's appeal against a decree passed by the lower appellate Court for bis ejectment. The Plaintiff is the owner of a piece of land. On the 17th August, 1928, the Plaintiff gave the land to the Defendant on a lease for a period of seven years to run a brick kiln. The period expired in 1935. In 1939 the Plaintiff filed a suit, No. 585 of 1939, for ejectment of the Defendant and for arrears of rent. Daring the pendency of the suit there was a compromise in the year 1940. The Plaintiff made a statement that he was prepared to allow the Defendant to remain in possession as lessee up to the 16th August, 1943, provided the Defendant paid up all the arrears of rent due up to that date and the costs of the suit and provided further that he gave up possession of three out of the seven plots in his possession and that the rent then would be Rs. 80 per annum instead 100. The Defendant agreed to these condition also to the further condition that in case of default he was to be ejected and paid hup the arrears and gave up possession of the three plots. No registered lease was executed in favour of the Defendant, but the Defendant remained in possession of the four plots and continued to pay rent at the rate of Rs 80 per year. In the decree the terms of the compromise were not incorporated. 2. The Plaintiff served the Defendant with a notice to quit on the 16th August, 1943, the date originally agreed to, and this notice was served on the Defendant on the 16th July, 1943. The suit out of which this appeal has arisen was filed on the 19th August, 1943. 3. The Defendant in hie written statement urged that as the lease was for a period of more than one year, a registered instrument was necessary u/s 107 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882). As there was no registered instrument in his favour, the Defendant's contention was that he became a year to year tenant and that a notice of six months expiring with the end of the year of tenancy was necessary u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 4. As there was no registered instrument in his favour, the Defendant's contention was that he became a year to year tenant and that a notice of six months expiring with the end of the year of tenancy was necessary u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 4. This contention found favour with the trial Court and the Plaintiff's suit was dismissed. 5. The Plaintiff filed an appeal, and the lower appellate Court has held that the agreement was embodied in the operative portion of the judgment and consequently in the decree also, that it was later acted upon, that the principle of Section 53A of the transfer of Property Act, therefore, applied and that the Defendant must be deemed to be a tenant for a period ending with the 16th August, 1943. The lower appellate Court decreed the Plaintiff's suit and directed the ejectment of the Defendant. The Defendant has filed this second appeal. 6. On behalf of the Defendant it has been urged that the terms of the compromise were not embodied in the decree and therefore a registered instrument was necessary and Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act had no application to the case. It has been further urged that the Defendant must be deemed to be a tenant holding over u/s 116 of the Transfer of Property Act and that as the rent reserved was payble annually it must be-deemed that he was a tenant holding over from year to year and that he would be entitled to six months notice expiring with the end of the year. 7. I have looked into the decree passed in suit No. 585 of 1939 and I find that the terms of the compromise were not in the decree. It is not necessary for me, therefore, to consider what would have been the effect if the terms of the compromise bad been embodied in the decree of the Court. 8. Learned Counsel's argument that as there was no register lease it must be deemed that he was a tenant holding over under the lease dated the 17th August, 1928, is, to my mind, unsound. There was a fresh contract in tbe year 1940 and fresh terms were settled. The rent was reduced and three plots wen given up by, the Defendant. The lease dated the 17th August 192.1, bad expired on the 17th August, 1935. There was a fresh contract in tbe year 1940 and fresh terms were settled. The rent was reduced and three plots wen given up by, the Defendant. The lease dated the 17th August 192.1, bad expired on the 17th August, 1935. The Defendant was a tenant holding over when the suit No. 585 of 1939 was filed, but during the pendency of the suit the Defendant agreed to give up that position and entered into a new contract. After that contract I do not see how it can be urged that the Defendant must be deemed to be a tenant holding over under the lease dated the 17th August, 1928, u/s 116 of the Transfer of Property Act where a lessee remains in possession of the property givon in lease after the determination of the lease with the consent, express or implied, of the lessor, the lease is deemed to be renewed from year to year or from month to month. In this case it cannot be said that there was any expiess or implied intention that the Defendant should remain in possession in accordance with the terme of the lease dated the 17th August, 1928, after its expiry. To my mind, therefore, the Defendant was not a lossee holding over after the expiry of the lease dated the 17th August, 1928. 9. There can be no doubt that the Plaintiff . is the owner of the land and that the Plaintiff gaave consent to the Defendant remaining in possession of the land up to the 16th August, 1943. Before the expiry of the period the Plaintiff on the 16th July, 1943, intimated in clear terms that she wished the land to be vacated I do not see any right vested in the Defendant, either in equity or in law, which would entitle him to remain in possession against the wishes of the owner of the land after the 16th August, 1943. Even to create a lease from year to year reserving an anuual rent, a registered document was needed u/s 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. Even to create a lease from year to year reserving an anuual rent, a registered document was needed u/s 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. I do not see how the Defendant can claim to have become a tenant from year to year in the absence of a registered instrument when it is his case that the lease for a period up to the 16th August, 1943, was bad inasmuch as there was no registered instrument evidencing it. 10. In that view of the matter the Defendant's appeal must fail and it must be held that the Defendant was not a year to year tenant or tenant holding over u/s 116 of the Transfer of Property Act and was not therefore, entitled to six months notice. 11. As, however, the lower appellate Court has relied on Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, and learned Counsel for the Respondent has argued that though there was no registered lease yet on the doctrine of part performance it must be held that the parties were bound by the orel agreement, I may briefly express my view on the point. 12. Learned Counsel for the Respondent has urged that if the agreement of lease is one of which specific performance will be ordered then the parties are treated as having the same rights and as being subject to the same liabilities as if the lease had been granted; consequently the lessor is entitled to distrain, and the lessee, on the other hand, is entitled to hold for the agreed term. He has cited Halsbury's Laws of England, Hailsham Edition, Vol. 20, p. 37, paragraph 43. He has also drawn my attention to a passage in paragraph 61 of the sane volume at p. 59 to the effect that where the lessee has entered, the right to specific performance is sufficient to give the parties respectively rights equivalent to the legal rights, and place them under obligations equivalent to the legal obligations, of lessor and lessee. 13. Learned Counsel has also relied on the observations of Cotton, L. J. in Lowther v. Heaver Law Reports 41 Ch.D 248 264. Now I am of opinion that the late Master of the Rolls was correct in saying, as he did in Walsh, v. Lonsdale (sic), (L R. 21 Ch. D. 9). 13. Learned Counsel has also relied on the observations of Cotton, L. J. in Lowther v. Heaver Law Reports 41 Ch.D 248 264. Now I am of opinion that the late Master of the Rolls was correct in saying, as he did in Walsh, v. Lonsdale (sic), (L R. 21 Ch. D. 9). that a tenant holding under an agreement for a lease of which specific performance would be decreed stands now the same position as if the lease had been granted He is entitled only in equity it is true to a lease, but being entitled in equity to have a lease granted, bis rights ought, in my opinion, to be dealt with in the same way as if a lease had been granted to him, and do not depend upon its actuelly having been granted. 14. Learned Counsel has drawn my attention to Section 27A of the Specific Relief Act which was added to that Act by the Transfer of Property Amendment Supplementary Act (XXI of 1929) when Section 53A was added to the Transfer of Property Act by the Transfer of Property Act Amendment Act (XX of 1929). u/s 27A a contract to lease immoveable property if made in writing signed by the parties thereto or on their behalf, when it has not been registered, may be specifically enforced if where specific performance is claimed by the lessor has delivered possession of the property to the lessee in part performance of the contract, and if where specific performance is claimed by the lessee, he has in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property, or, being already in possession, continued in possession in part performance of the contract. 15. Learned Counsel has urged that this agreement being in writing signed by the parties and having been entered into after the 1st April, 1930, was capable of specific performance and the Court must, therefore, hold that the rights of the parties ought to be dealt with in the same way as if a registered lease had been executed. This view was followed by Mukerji J. in the case of Bibi Jawahir Kumari v. Chatterput 1905) 2 Cal L J 343 348. 16. The equitable rule enunciated above that what ought to be done as a consequence of a binding agreement is treated as actually accomplished does not appear to be a good law in India. This view was followed by Mukerji J. in the case of Bibi Jawahir Kumari v. Chatterput 1905) 2 Cal L J 343 348. 16. The equitable rule enunciated above that what ought to be done as a consequence of a binding agreement is treated as actually accomplished does not appear to be a good law in India. Under the Indian enactments there is no distinction between legal and equitable interest. The right of a person entitled under an agreement of lease is not an equitable interest but a personal right. In Ariff Jadunath Majumdar (1931) 58 I A 91 their Lordships pointed out: It was stated in Maddison v. Aldeison (1888, 8 A C 467) that the equitable doctrine of part performance did not rest upon the view that equity will relieve against a public statute in eases which fall within it and against that Their Lordships find themselves in agreement with the High Court in the view that Walsh v. Lonsdale (1883, 31 Ch. D. 9) has no application to this case, owing to the fact that the Respondent's right to enforce the verbal contract had been barred long before the commencement of the present suit. The Respondent was not in a position to obtain specific performance of the agreement for a lease from the same Court and at the same time as the relief claimed in this action. Had he been so entitled, the position would be very different, for then the Respondent could claim to have executed in his favour by the Appellant an instrument in writing which he could duly have registered, the Appellant's' ejectment action being stayed in the meahntime. In these circumstances the Respondent would obtain complete protection, but consistently with and not in violation ot the provisions of the Indian statute. 17. This clearly lays down that the equitable rule cannot override the provisions of the statute and replace the necessity of a registered instrument, but where a suit for specific performance can be filed and is still not barred by limitation, the Courts would allow such a suit to be brought. 18. Under Article 113 of the Indian Limitation Act, limitation for a suit for specific performance of a contract is three years from the date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the Plaintiffs has notice that the performance is refused. 18. Under Article 113 of the Indian Limitation Act, limitation for a suit for specific performance of a contract is three years from the date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the Plaintiffs has notice that the performance is refused. It is not necessary for me to consider in this case whether a suit for specific performance of contract was or was not within time inasmuch as the point has not been argued before me. Where the Respondent had allowed his right to enforce bis contract to become time-barred with the result that be could only resist the Appellant's claim to possession by seeking to establish a title, the acquisition of which was forbidden by the statute, their Lordships pointed out the statute disabled him from contesting the Appellant's right to possession. In drawing this distinction between the equitable rule in England and the law as applicable in this country, their. Lordships pointed out. It is well settled that the statute of Frauds only affects the right to sue on the contract, The contract subsists notwithstanding the absence of any signed memorandum. The Courts of Equity, in England, however, have decided that once the making of the contract has been established by the part performance of it, one of the parties to it shall not be permitted to use the Statute of Frauds as an instrument of fraud. 19. In India the application of the doctrine would mean that an interest would be created without any writing when the statute (Transfer of Property Apt) says that it only be created by means of a registered instrument. 20. The position was further explained by their Lordships in the case of Mian Pir Bux v. Mahomed Taher (1934) 61 I.A. 388: 4 AWR 417 where their Lordships of the Privy Council pointed out that if the contract was specifically enforceable, then the proper procedure would be to stay the suit and have the contract enforced, unless the case fell u/s 53A of the Transfer of Property Act where a person put in possession of an immoveable property in part performance of a contract might resist a claim of the transferor or any person claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee had taken possession or had continued to remain in possession. 21. 21. In view of the above authorities it is not possible for me to hold, specially as I do not know whether the Plaintiff's suit for specific performance is still within time or not, that the Courts ought to deal with the parties on the footing as if a lease had been granted by the Plaintiff to the Defendant. I am, however, of the opinion, as I have already expressed above, that the Defendant is not entitled to claim six months notice and the suit for bis ejectment was, therefore, rightly decreed. 22. No other point has been urged by learned Counsel. 23. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Leave to appeal under the Letters Patent is granted.