JUDGMENT Ghulam Hasan and Kaul, JJ. - This is the judgment-debtors appeal from an order of, the Civil Judge, Fyzabad, dismissing his objection u/s 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. It appears that on 15th February, 1930, Moti Lal, the deceased father of the Respondents, obtained a final decree for sale on foot of a mortgage. Several execution applications were made but they proved in fructuous for one reason or the other. The amount of the decree was well over Rs. 10,000. The decree was sent to the Collector for execution. While the execution proceedings were pending Moti Lal died on 10th July, 1933. On the 19th October, 1933 the Respondents who are the sons of the decree-holder applied to the Civil Courts, which had passed the decree, under Order 21, Rule 16. The application states that the sale proceedings were going on in the Court of the Sale Officer, Fyzabad and 22nd November was fixed in the case. It went on to say that as Rai Sahib Moti Lal, decree-holder, had died on 10th July, 1933, and the applicants as his sons, heirs and legal representatives were in joint possession of his property, they prayed that they may first be substituted as representatives under Order 21, Rule 16, Code of Civil Procedure. and their names should be entered as decree-holders. It was further requested that a Rubkar be sent to the Sale Officer, Fyzabad, that the applicants has stepped into shoes of the deceased decree-holder. The applicants were substituted on 17th November, 1933 without any objection by the judgment-debtor. Subsequently the judgment-debtor applied for amendment of the decree under the provisions of the Agriculturists' Relief Act against the Respondents but his application was dismissed on 2nd-May, 3936. His application for stay under Act X of 1937 was, however, allowed on 13th August, 1938, and the proceedings remained stayed till the end of 1940. The proceedings thereafter continued at the instance of the Respondents. On 6th July, 1942 the judgment-debtor for the first time filed an objection to execution on the ground that the Respondents were not entitled to execute the decree as no application for execution had been made by them as required by Order 21, Rule 16, Code of Civil Procedure 3. The proceedings thereafter continued at the instance of the Respondents. On 6th July, 1942 the judgment-debtor for the first time filed an objection to execution on the ground that the Respondents were not entitled to execute the decree as no application for execution had been made by them as required by Order 21, Rule 16, Code of Civil Procedure 3. The learned Civil Judge held that the application of 19th October, 1933 was a sufficient compliance with the provisions of Order 21, Rule 16 inasmuch as the prayer in the said application amounted to a prayer not only to be brought on the record but also to be allowed to proceed with the execution proceedings. No fresh application under the circumstances was necessary. The objections were, therefore, dismissed. 4. We are of the opinion that the order of the learned Civil Judge must be maintained. 5. It is contended for the judgment-debtor, on the authority of the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Baij Nath v. Ram Bharos (1927) 49 All. 509 which was followed by a Bench of this Court in Mirza Muhammad Sadiq Ali Khan v. Sajjad Mirza alias Munney Agha (1928) 3 Luck. 126 that under Rule 15 of Order 21 it is not necessary for the legal representative of the deceased decree-holder to apply for more substitution of names but he must apply for execution of the decree in the usual form of 10 columns given in Rule 11. Order 21, Rule 16 lays down: Where a decree is transferred by assignment in writing or by operation of law, the transferee may apply for execution of the decree to the Court which passed it: and the decree may be executed in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as if the application were, made by such decree-holder. 6. This rule on a plain reading permits transferee or the legal representative of a decree-holder to apply for execution in, place of the transferor or the deceased but it does not forbid expressly, or by implication, an application on the part of a legal representative to continue the application made by the deceased. If this interpretation were not accepted startling results will follow. If this interpretation were not accepted startling results will follow. Supposing a decree-holder, who has been making in fructuous applications for a period of 12 years due to the dilatory contrivances of the judgment debtor, dies shortly after making the last application for execution: According to the contention of the judgment-debtor the legal representatives of the decree-holder would have no remedy to continue the application and a fresh application would obviously be barred. We do not think we should be prepared to countenance such an inequitable result unless we were borne ' down by the express language of the Code. A rational construction of the language of Rule 16 does not, in our opinion, lead to any such inequitable result. The cases relied upon for the Appellant do not go to the length of holding that it is forbidden to a legal representative on the language of Rule 16 to continue the application for execution made by the deceased decree-holder. In the Full Bench case the original judgment-debtor's interest the property had been sold in execution of the decree and the purchaser took a year's time to pay the decrials debt. 7. The Collector to whom the execution proceedings were transferred returned the papers to the Civil Court. No money having been paid within the time allowed the decree-holder asked for return of the papers of the execution case to, the Collector. This was allowed. Soon after the decree-holder died and his sons made the last execution application praying that they be brought on the record in place of their father and that execution be continued. The objection was that the decree had become time barred by lapse of 12 years rule. It was held that neither. the decree holder's application, nor that of his sons after his death was a fresh application within the meaning of Section 48. The case was, therefore, remanded with the direction that execution be proceeded with according to law. In making this order Mr. Justice Mukerji with whom the other learned Judges agreed observed: When the sons of Ram Lal, on his death, made the application of the 28th of April, 1926 they did not ask for any fresh proceedings. They said that Ram Lal's name might be removed and the Petitioners' name might be entered in the array of decree-holders. Justice Mukerji with whom the other learned Judges agreed observed: When the sons of Ram Lal, on his death, made the application of the 28th of April, 1926 they did not ask for any fresh proceedings. They said that Ram Lal's name might be removed and the Petitioners' name might be entered in the array of decree-holders. They had to make an application in the usual form of ten columns because there is no rule of law which enables the legal representative of a deceased decree-holder to apply for mere substitution of names. He most apply, whenever, he does apply, for execution of the decree, vide Order 21, Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is clear, therefore, that neither the application of the 28th of January, 1925, nor the application of the 28th of April, 1925 was a 'fresh application' within the meaning of Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 8. The remark that legal representatives had to apply in the usual form of ten columns and not merely for substitution of names was at least obiter. The only question which arose before the learned Judges was whether the application made by the original decree-holder or his legal representatives was a fresh application within the meaning of Section 48 of the CPC and upon this question the answer was in the negative. The further question that a legal representative can only apply for execution of the decree in the usual form of ten columns as required by Rule 11 of Order 21 did not arise for decision, much less that a legal representative could not continue an application made by the deceased decree-holder. As a matter of fact the case was remanded to the lower Court with the direction that execution be proceeded with according to law. In the Oudh case some of the heirs of the original decree-holder on his death applied for substitution of names. The Subordinate Judge allowed the application. This application was presumably not one under Order 21, Rule 16 for the learned Judges observed that the Subordinate Judge called it as such. This application was treated as a step in aid of the execution of the decree. The Subordinate Judge allowed the application. This application was presumably not one under Order 21, Rule 16 for the learned Judges observed that the Subordinate Judge called it as such. This application was treated as a step in aid of the execution of the decree. The learned Judges after quoting with approval the observation of the Full Bench held that there was no necessity for the heirs to have applied for substitution under Order 21, Rule 16, and that it was certainly not an application for execution but a step in aid. This case, therefore, also does not advance the position of the judgment-debtor. There is clear authority of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Venkatachalam Cheti v. Rammaswamy Several (1932) 55 Mad. 352 where it was held that the legal representative of a deceased decree-holder who died during the pendency of an execution petition filed by him could be substituted in his place in the execution petition and be allowed to continue it. 9. In that case the application for execution was made after 12 years and would have been barred by Section 48 if it was treated as a fresh execution application, but if the legal representative was allowed to continue the execution application already filed by the deceased decree-holder then the application was within time. 10. Madhavan Nair, J, after holding that Rule 3 of Order 22 did not apply observed: It is true that there is no specific machinery in the Code for that purpose, but does it necessarily follow from this that the Code prohibits the legal representative from making an application to continue the pending petition after substituting his name in it ? I think not. If Rule 3 dose not apply, then obviously there can be no objection for proceeding u/s 146, of the Code and Order XXI, Rule 16. u/s 146, there being no other procedure provided, a legal representative of a decree-holder may make an application which may be made by the decree-holder, and under Order XXI, Rule 16 where a decree is transferred by assignment or operation of law as happens in the case of the death of a decree-holder, the transferee may apply for the execution of the decree. 11. The two cases relied upon for the judgment-debtor were referred to and explained. 11. The two cases relied upon for the judgment-debtor were referred to and explained. A similar view was taken in Kachrabhai Lohrabhai v. Kacharabhai Vadilal A I R 1931 Bom. 433 and Shailendranath Ghosh v. Surendranath De (1930) 57 Cal. 1137 12. We accordingly hold that the decision of the lower Court must be maintained. 13. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.