JUDGMENT Chakravartti, J. - This appeal is on behalf of the Plaintiff and arises out of a suit for recovery of rent for the year 1344 B. S. on the basis of a lease granted to the predecessor of the Defendants on the 27th of Chaitra, 1293. The Plaintiff laid his claim at the rate of 6 salas and 15 pal is of paddy which, according to him, was the rent annually payable but the actual claim made was for a sum of money in lieu of the rent in kind, calculated at Rs. 7 per sala on the basis that that was the then market price of paddy. The defence that in case the rent was not paid in kind market price was payable, but the Plaintiff would be entitled to recover only a sum of Rs. 33-12 for each year as fixed in the lease. A second defence was that in any event the market price for the relevant year was not Rs. 7 per sala but Rs. 5. The Plaintiff based his claim substantially on two grounds. In the first place he contended that on a proper construction of the lease which was Exhibit A in the case, it ought to be held that the parties intended the market price of the paddy to be paid, in case the rent was not paid in kind. It was contended in the next place that in any event this question was barred by res judicata by reason of a previous decision in Rent Suit No. 294 of 1940 where this identical question had been raised and decided. 2. The trial Court held in favour of the Plaintiff on both the contentions and decreed the suit at the rate claimed. The Court held on a construction of the lease, although it does not deal with the matter very fully, that the document provided for market price. It also held that the previous decree operated as res judicata. 3. On appeal, this decision was reversed on both the points. The learned Judge held that the effect of the previous decree was limited to the claim for the year which was in litigation in the previous suit and could not operate as res judicata with respect to the claim for any future year. 3. On appeal, this decision was reversed on both the points. The learned Judge held that the effect of the previous decree was limited to the claim for the year which was in litigation in the previous suit and could not operate as res judicata with respect to the claim for any future year. With regard to the effect of the lease itself, he held that the parties intended the quantity of paddy mentioned to be the rent payable and further stipulated that in case the paddy rent was not paid in time the lessor would be entitled only to the fixed sum of Rs. 33-12 as the equivalent of the paddy rent. On these findings the learned Judge decreed the suit in part in accordance with his view of the terms of the lease. 4. Thereupon the present second appeal was preferred by the Plaintiff. 5. A preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the appearing Respondent who. I may state, is Defendant No. 2 in the suit. It was contended that the suit was one for rent and valued only at Rs. 57-9. The decision appealed from was a decision of a Subordinate Judge and therefore, having regard to the provisions of sec. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, no second appeal lay, inasmuch as the learned Judge had decided none of the questions mentioned in the proviso to sub-cl. (b) of that section. 6. The argument in support of the preliminary objection was put before me in the following manner. It was that, under the Bengal Tenancy Act, rent meant whatever was lawfully payable or deliverable in money or kind by a tenant to the landlord on account of the use or occupation of the land held by him. Reference was next made to the terms of sec. 153 and it was contended that the only one of the exceptions under which the present case could possibly come was that contained in the last clause of the proviso, viz., "a question of the amount of rent annually payable by a tenant." On these provisions it was contended that there was no dispute in the present case as regards the amount of rent annually payable which, according to both parties, was 6 salas 15 palis of paddy. The only dispute was with regard to the amount paid in case a default occurred in payment of the rent. The only dispute was with regard to the amount paid in case a default occurred in payment of the rent. But that amount, it was contended could not be said to be rent as the term was understood in the Bengal Tenancy Act. It was only a sum of money in the nature of penalty; or it might be the variable equivalent of the rent in kind; in no case, could it be said to be the rent annually payable. 7. I am not prepared to give effect to this contention. It seems to me that the real question, on a contention of this kind, is to see not what the strict rights of the parties are under the engagement between them but what precise question was raised before the Court below and what it actually decided. The dispute in the present case, in my view, was what amount was payable by the tenant under the terms of the lease in case he failed to pay the rent in kind within the relevant year. The contention of one party was that the amount payable would be the paddy's worth according to current price, while the contention of the other party was that the amount payable was a fixed sum. On these contentions the question which arose and fell to be decided was in my view, what amount was payable to satisfy the landlord's claim for rent in cases where the principal mode of payment, viz., payment in kind, was not complied with : in other words, what was the alternative amount of rent payable? 8. Turning next to the other part of the question, viz., what the learned Judge has actually decided, it will appear from his judgment that he has decided several things. In the first place, he has applied himself to the real effect of the alternative provision regarding payment in money and has said that the amount mentioned in the lease cannot he considered to be the rent of the tenancy. This, in my view, involves a decision as to what the amount of rent annually payable is not. All that we are concerned with is a decision and it is immaterial whether the decision is of a positive or a negative character. 9. This, in my view, involves a decision as to what the amount of rent annually payable is not. All that we are concerned with is a decision and it is immaterial whether the decision is of a positive or a negative character. 9. In the second place, the learned Judge has held that if payment for a year was not made within the year, the landlord would be entitled to recover only Rs. 33-12 as the equivalent of the annual rent. It was contended that this was a finding as to what was "recoverable" by the landlord and not a finding as to the amount of rent annually payable by the tenant. This argument, in my view overlooks the fact that what is recoverable by the landlord is payable by the tenant; and since the learned Judge was deciding a general question as to what the measure of the alternative liability of the tenant would be, in my view, here too, he was deciding substantially a question as to the amount of rent annually payable. 10. I am fortified in the view which I am taking by an observation contained in a judgment delivered by a Division Bench of this Court [Hamid Ali v. Ram Kumar Poddar 62 I. C. 639 (1921)]. It is true that the question did not call for the decision in the case inasmuch as the claim exceeded the amount of Rs. 100, but an expression of opinion was recorded by the Court and I may usefully refer to the proposition stated. It was observed that a question as to the amount payable in money in default of the payment of rent in kind is a question of the amount of rent annually payable by a tenant within the meaning of sec. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. 11. With that view I respectfully agree. 12. I am, therefore, of opinion that the preliminary objection must be overruled. 13. In view of the previous rent decree, it seems to me unnecessary to decide in this appeal the dispute between the parties as to the terms of the lease. Cases of this type are quite familiar Courts of law and must ultimately be decided the language of the relevant document taken as a whole, which perhaps is not always very easy to construe. Cases of this type are quite familiar Courts of law and must ultimately be decided the language of the relevant document taken as a whole, which perhaps is not always very easy to construe. In the present case, however, that task need not be undertaken because the matter was decided in a previous litigation between parties. The decree upon which the Plaintiffs rely was, as I have stated, passed in Rent Suit No. 294 of 1940. The claim in that suit was a claim for the market value of the paddy rent for the year 1343 B. S., and it appears from a reference to the judgment passed that the identical question, put in issue in the present case, was raised there as well. In the course of the judgment the learned Munsif who decided that case observed as follows: The only defence which was passed at the time of trial is that the Plaintiff cannot get the price of paddy at the market rate . . . . In accordance with the terms of those documents the Plaintiffs can only claim Rs. 33-12- which is the price stated there. 14. The question which arose for consideration on that defence was stated by the learned Munsif to be Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to claim the amount of paddy at the prevailing market rate. 15. His decision was that on the terms of the lease the Plaintiff was entitled to claim the market price. He referred, inter alia, to the are stance that the lease was a mokurari lease and observed that if the lessor was letting out the land at a fixed rent in kind, it was inconceivable that he was at the same time taking the risk of a fall in prices, by agreeing to a fixed equivalent in money for all time. 16. The learned Judge has dismissed this judgment and decree with the observation that it operated only as to the claim of the particular year for which rent was being claimed in that suit; and it (sic) by way of the reason for this view, that the cause of action for rent recurred from year to year. I do not see how the decision in the previous case can he said to be limited to the claim for any particular year. I do not see how the decision in the previous case can he said to be limited to the claim for any particular year. The question which was put in issue was a question relating to the effect of the lease and surely that was a question which would be equally applicable to all years and could not have any special meaning or any special limitations so far as any particular year was concerned. It was the basic question of the tenants' true liability under the lease, in no way dependent on any accidental circumstances of the claim made in that suit. Again, the question was raised so directly and the decision is so definite that it seems to me to be beyond argument that it must operate as res judicata. I am of opinion, therefore, that the Defendants in the present suit are bound by the interpretation of the lease contained in the judgment in Rent Suit No. 294 of 1940, which they invited and suffered, and they are liable to pay the Plaintiff the market price of the paddy in case of default in payment in kind, as held in that judgment. 17. In view of what I have said above it is unnecessary for me to consider, on my own account, the effect of the potta of 1293. 18. The result is that the appeal is allowed the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court are set aside and those of the learned Munsif restored. The Appellant will have his costs in this Court and in the lower Appellate Court from the appearing Respondent. Leave to appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent has been asked for. It is refused.