JUDGMENT Thomas, C.J. and Misra, J. - The sole point which arises in this execution of decree appeal relates to limitation. The compromise decree of which execution was sought was dated 6th October, 1933. It provided that Azam Qadar Defendant No. 1, shall pay Rs. 2,000 plus half proportionate costs either in a lump summer in instalments, but it was stipulated that it must be paid within three years Interest on the decretal amount at 6 per cent per annum was payable every six months till realisation. The decree further provided that in case of default the Plaintiffs would have the right to realise the amount of the decree from the property of Syed Azam Qadar. On 3rd January, 1935, the latter applied u/s 4, U.P. Encumbered Estates Act, and his application was in due course forwarded to the Special Judge. It was however, dismissed for default on 19th April, 1938. Syed Azam Qadar applied for restoration, but this application failed to achieve its purpose. His appeal against the dismissal was dismissed on 2nd December, 1938. Nothing had been paid in the meantime, and on 9th September, 1939, the decree-holders applied for execution of the decree. 2. The execution case was consigned to records on 18th September 1939, and a second application was made soon afterwards. That application was also consigned to records. The third application for execution which gives rise to the present appeal was preferred on 13th October, 1942. Syed Azam Qadar filed an objection u/s 47, Code of Civil. Porcedure. on the ground that the first execution taken out on 9th September, 1939, was barred by time. The decree, he maintained, became executable six months after its date, i.e. 16th April, 1934 when the first default in payment of interest occurred, and no application for its execution, he urged, could be entertained subsequent to 16th April. 1938. The Courts below overruled the objection. The decision of the Court of first instance was founded on the view that though the default clause empowered the decree-holders to execute the decree on the judgment-debtor's failure to pay interest, he could waive the right and execute the decree within three years of the final default in payment of the decreed sum. The Courts below overruled the objection. The decision of the Court of first instance was founded on the view that though the default clause empowered the decree-holders to execute the decree on the judgment-debtor's failure to pay interest, he could waive the right and execute the decree within three years of the final default in payment of the decreed sum. It held, therefore, that limitation against the decree-holders did not start to run till 16th October, 1936, and the first execution application which was preferred within three years of that date could not be barred by time The lower Court in appeal agreed with this conclusion but added another ground for dismissal of the objection, namely that the decree-holders were entitled to the exclusion of the period of pendency of the proceedings under the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act. 3. In order to succeed in appeal it is necessary for the judgment-debtor to get over both the above-mentioned grounds of dismissal of his objection. The contention that the starting point of limitation was the first default in payment of interest is based on the assumption that the terms of the compromise provided for execution of the decree on non-payment of six monthly interest also. It is true that Syed Azam Qadar was liable to pay interest on the decrial amount every six months, but the realisation of the decrial amount, it would seem, would not have been warranted before the expiry of three years. The language of the compromise is rather vague, but we think the default referred to could hardly be ascribed to default in payment of six monthly interest. It is unnecessary, however, to enter into this question in greater detail or into the applicability of the principle laid down in Lasa Din v. Gulab Kunwar (1932) 7 Luck 442 and The Peoples Bank of Northern India, Limited v. Syed Aijaz Ali 1941 O.A 987: A.W.R (CC) 382 : O.W.N. 1313 which have been relied upon by the learned District Judge, because in our opinion the second ground taken by the lower appellate Court is fatal on the question of limitation. Clause (a) of Section 7 U.P. Encumbered Estates Act, prohibits any fresh process in execution of the decree passed before the date when the Act came into force, and all executions and attachment etc. then pending were to remain stayed. Clause (a) of Section 7 U.P. Encumbered Estates Act, prohibits any fresh process in execution of the decree passed before the date when the Act came into force, and all executions and attachment etc. then pending were to remain stayed. The incompetence to execute the decree thus started from 3rd January, 1936, when the order u/s 6 and passed, and it continued till 2nd December, 1938. Section 15 of the Indian Limitation Act lays down that in computing the period of Limitation prescribed or any suit or application for the execution of a decree the institution or execution of which has been stayed by injunction or order, the time of the continuance of the injunction or order must be excluded. It has been held in Raja Yadavendra Dutt Dube v. Ajodhia Bank, Limited, Fyzabad 1946 O.A. 8 : A.W.R. (CC) 8 that the implication of an order u/s 6 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act is to stay -proceedings in execution, since that is one of the consequences of that order provided for by Section 7. On a party of reasoning we think that an order u/s 6 must also be considered as amounting to an order of injunction prohibiting execution of decree during the pendency of the proceedings under the Act. Having regard to the aforesaid decision the Learned Counsel for the Appellant had to concede that execution was incompetent till the dismissal of those proceedings. He, however, urged that the proceedings must be deemed to have terminated on 19th April, 1938 when the Special Judge passed the order of dismissal for the application u/s 4. In our judgment the order u/s 6 must be considered to have been set aside only when the landlord's application for the liquidation of his debts under the Act was dismissed finally. This did not take place till 2nd December, 1938. We may add that there was a further appeal to this Court which, we are informed by the Appellant's Learned Counsel, was not dismissed till 1941. We are clear in our mind that the execution application is well within time. We accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs.