JUDGMENT Ghulam Hasan and Kaul, JJ. - It will be convenient, in order to make the question of law raised for our decision clear, to state the following facts: Bakhshish Husain applied u/s 4 of the Encumbered Estates Act. The usual procedure provided for the disposal of such an application was adopted, Irshad Husain, who was one of the creditors, was granted a decree for Rs. 5,500. In due course this, along with other decrees passed u/s 14, was transmitted to the Collector as provided by the statute. A claim u/s 11 of the Encumbered Estates Act was put in at this stage This was allowed. Within a month of that decision Bakhshish Husain obtained an order for quashing all proceedings as contemplated by Section 20 of the Act. Irshad Husain has preferred an appeal (Miscellaneous Appeal No. 13 of 1944) against that order to this Court. He paid a Court-fee of Rs. 3-120 on his memorandum of appeal under Schedule II Article 11 of the Court Fees Act. 2. The appeal was valued at Rs. 3,000. Bakhshish Husain, who is arrayed as Respondent No. 1 has made the present application challenging the correctness of the valuation of the appeal and contends that the court-fee paid thereon is insufficient. It was urged on his behalf that the order appealed against was one which has the force of a decree and is not covered by Schedule II Article 11 of the Court Fees Act. 3. We have found it a little difficult to follow the argument of the Learned Counsel for the applicant. The expression "decree" is not defined either in the Court Fees Act or in the General Clauses Act. It may, therefore, be safely assumed that this expression, as used in schedule II Article 11 of the Court Fees Act, bears the meaning given to it by Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor can it be disputed that there is a vital differences between a "decree" and an "order in matters relating to appeals. An appeal is a creature of statute. u/s 96 of the CPC save where otherwise expressly provided in the body of the Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal lies from every decree passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction to the Court authorised to hear appeals from the decisions of such Court. An appeal is a creature of statute. u/s 96 of the CPC save where otherwise expressly provided in the body of the Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal lies from every decree passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction to the Court authorised to hear appeals from the decisions of such Court. On the other hand, no appeal lies from an order unless it is one mentioned in Section 104 or Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code, or where it is otherwise expressly provided either by the Code or by any other law for the time being in force. It does not, however, follow that every order which is appealable is a decree, or has the force of a decree. Various Statutes have in different places specifically provided what orders shall have the force of decrees. For instance paragraph 6 of Schedule III of the CPC lays down that the decision by the Court of any dispute arising under paragraph 4 or paragraph 5 of that Schedule shall, as between the parties thereto, have the force of and be appealable as a decree. Under Order 21, Rule 50(3) of the CPC where the liability of any person has been tried and determined under Sub-rule (2) of that rule, the order made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree. Rule of the Rules framed under the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act (IV of 1938) provides that the order of the Court declaring the amount of the debt under Rule 7 shall be subject to appeal and second appeal as if it were a decree in an original suit. u/s 11(4) of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act (XXV of 1934) any order passed by the Special Judge under that Section shall be deemed to be a decree of a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. Section 50(2) of the Malabar Tenancy Act provides that appeals shall lie from orders made u/s 12 etc., as if they were decrees in suits. A distinction between the various classes of orders, to which reference has been made above, is noteworthy. Section 50(2) of the Malabar Tenancy Act provides that appeals shall lie from orders made u/s 12 etc., as if they were decrees in suits. A distinction between the various classes of orders, to which reference has been made above, is noteworthy. It is a distinction of an essential character, and where the law says that an order shall be deemed to be a decree, or that an order shall be appealable as if it were a decree, it does not follow that the order in question has the force of a decree. The Court Fees Act is a fiscal statute and must be construed strictly. 4. With regard to the order which forms the subject-matter of miscellaneous appeal No. 14 of 1944, there is no provisions in the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act laying down that such an order shall have the force of a decree. As pointed out by Niamat Ullah J. in Ram Prasad v. Triloki Nath to have the force of a decree an order must possess all the characteristics of a ;decree. Mostly-where the law contemplates that an order should have the force of a decree, it expressly says so. Even, however, if the expression "an order having the force of a decree" be deemed to include also such orders as by implication or inference may be considered to have the force of decrees, it is necessary that they should fulfill all the essential conditions of a decree. We are clear that the order in question does not fulfill these conditions. It is not the formal expression of an adjudication as to the rights of the parties, nor is it one capable of execution. As distinct from being an expression of an adjudication as to the rights of the parties, it has the effect of quashing the proceedings which would have resulted in such adjudication. This order is in our opinion one which is covered by Schedule II Article 11 of the Court Fees Act and the Court fee paid on the memorandum of appeal is sufficient. 5. As regards the valuation of the appeal it was contended by Mr. Faiyaz Ali that the memorandum of appeal should have been valued at Rs. 12,821-1-0, the total amount decreed in favour of various creditors of Bakhshish Husain by the decrees passed u/s 14 of the Encumbered Estates Act. We are unable to uphold this contention. 5. As regards the valuation of the appeal it was contended by Mr. Faiyaz Ali that the memorandum of appeal should have been valued at Rs. 12,821-1-0, the total amount decreed in favour of various creditors of Bakhshish Husain by the decrees passed u/s 14 of the Encumbered Estates Act. We are unable to uphold this contention. Irshat Husain has not appealed against any of those decrees, nor does he by his appeal challenge the correctness of the Court's decision with regard to any of those decrees. His appeal on the other hand challenge the validity of the order u/s 20 of the Act which, if it remains intact, will have the result of wiping off all the decrees passed u/s 14. In such a case the proper valuation is the figure at which the Appellant values the right which is the subject matter of the appeal. 6. We accordingly reject both contentions of the applicant and dismiss the application.