JUDGMENT B. K. Mukherjea, J. - This appeal is on behalf of the defendants in a suit commenced by the plaintiffs for recovery of possession of the land and building described in the schedule to the plaint on the allegation that the defendants are ticca tenants whose tenancy is determined by a notice to quit. The only question that was canvassed in the Courts below relates to the sufficiency of the notice that was served upon the defendants by the plaintiffs landlords. The defendants' contention was that as the lease was taken for manufacturing purposes within the meaning of S. 106, T. P. Act, the lease mast be deemed to be from year to year, and a six months' notice was necessary in terms of that section. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, contended that the lease was a monthly lease, and hence terminable by fifteen days' notice expiring with the month of the tenancy. Admittedly, the defendants carry on hosiery business in the disputed premises under the name and style of Jayanti Hosiery Mills. It is found by both the Courts below that the defendants carry on part of their manufacturing business in another premises where sheets or yarn are prepared from raw material, and on the premises in dispute, there are knitting and cutting machines where the sheets are worked up into articles of hosiery and made ready for the market. The sole controversy centres round the point as to whether on these facts which are admitted and found, it can be said that the lease of the premises in question was taken for manufacturing purposes as contemplated by S. 106, T. P. Act. 2. Having heard the learned advocates on both sides, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the Court of appeal below is wrong. The learned Subordinate Judge seems to be of opinion that as the raw materials are not worked up into hosiery articles in the disputed premises, it cannot be said that the lease was taken for manufacturing purposes even though the knitting and cutting were done in that building. We do not think that we can accept this view as sound. The learned Subordinate Judge seems to be of opinion that as the raw materials are not worked up into hosiery articles in the disputed premises, it cannot be said that the lease was taken for manufacturing purposes even though the knitting and cutting were done in that building. We do not think that we can accept this view as sound. To manufacture, according to its Dictionary meaning, means to "work up materials into forma suitable for use." The word "material" does not necessarily mean the original raw material, for a finished article may have to go through several manufacturing processes before it is fit and made ready for the market. What is itself a manufactured commodity may constitute a "material" for working it up into a different product. Thus, for example, for the tanner, the material would be the raw hide, but the leather itself a manufactured article would constitute the material for the shoe-maker's business, and we cannot say that the shoe-makers are not manufacturers because they do not work on raw hides. 3. So far as the hosiery manufacture is concerned, undoubtedly articles have got to be made from raw cotton as it is picked from the bush. From the cotton, certain yarn or sheets are prepared, and they are knitted into hosiery goods. It is immaterial that the yarn is not produced in the premises in suit. It is enough to make the house a manufacturing house if knitting and cutting operations are gone through in this premises, and that is an essential part of the manufacturing business. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the lease was really taken for manufacturing purposes, and consequently, it must be deemed to be a lease from year to year terminable by six months' notice expiring with the end of the year of the tenancy. The result, therefore, is that we allow this appeal. We set aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court and restore and affirm those of the original Court. The defendants will have the costs incurred by them in the lower appellate Court. We make no order as to costs in this Court. Blank, J. 4. I agree.