ORDER Mulla, J. - This is an application in revision by one Lala Gillumal who has been convicted of an offence u/s 13, U.P. Cotton Cloth and Yarn Control Order, 1943, and has been sentenced to a fine of Rs. 100. The applicant is admittedly a partner in the firm of Arjun Das Shankar Lal which deals in cloth. It is also admitted and found that he is a registered retailer. It appears that the shop was visited by one J.S. Singh, who is presumably an officer of the Supply. Department, and he found that certain copies of cash memos retained in the shop in accordance with the provisions of Section 6, U.P. Cotton Cloth and Yarn Control Order, 1943, did not contain all the particulars which should have been mentioned therein. Section 6, U.P. Cotton Cloth and Yarn Control Order, 1948, runs as follows: Every manufacturer, selling agent, wholesale dealer, commission agent and retailer shall, if the value of goods purchased is Rs. 10 or more in all oases and if the value of goods is less than Rs. 10 when so requested by the purchaser give to the purchaser of cotton cloth or yarn a memo stating the quantity and description of cotton cloth or yarn sold by him and the price charged and shall keep a copy thereof. Explanation - The description must include the variety and dimensions in the case of cloth and the number of counts in the case of yarn, and trade mark or trade number and name of manufacturing mill and its tex mark and number in the case of both cloth and yarn. 2. The prosecution case is based upon copies of two cash memos that were found in the shop. It is urged that the name of the mill was not mentioned and also that there was no correct description of the kind of cloth sold. Upon these facts the applicant was tried for an offence u/s 13, U.P. Cotton Cloth and Yarn Control Order and convicted and sentenced, as mentioned above, hence this application in revision. It is urged that the name of the mill was not mentioned and also that there was no correct description of the kind of cloth sold. Upon these facts the applicant was tried for an offence u/s 13, U.P. Cotton Cloth and Yarn Control Order and convicted and sentenced, as mentioned above, hence this application in revision. The defence of the applicant was that though he was one of the partners owning the shop in question yet he had nothing to do with the actual management of the shop and hence he could not be held liable for any defects in the two copies, of cash memos upon which the prosecution case was based. This defence was rejected by the learned trying Magistrate who pointed out that the responsibility for any illegal omission in the copies of cash memos is still on the applicant, who is admittedly a proprietor of the firm, though he may not have been actually managing the firm or might not have been present when the two documents were prepared. The learned Sessions Judge also arrived at the same conclusion and dismissed the application in revision made by the applicant. The only point which arises for consideration in this application is whether the applicant can be found guilty because he was admittedly the proprietor of the shop even though the two documents upon which the prosecution case is based may not have been actually prepared by him or that he may not have been present in the shop when they were prepared. Learned Counsel for the appellant who raised this question wanted it to be answered in the negative on the strength of a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Chotey Lal v. Emperor Cri. Ref. No. 1348 of 1944. In that case it was held by the learned Single Judge that Chotey Lal, who was the proprietor of the shop, could not be held responsible for the refusal on the part of his servant to issue a cash memo because he himself was not present at the time of the transaction in question. That case is not exactly on all fours with the present one, but I feel that it lends some support to the contention advanced by learned Counsel for the applicant in the present case. That case is not exactly on all fours with the present one, but I feel that it lends some support to the contention advanced by learned Counsel for the applicant in the present case. With due respect to the learned Single Judge who decided this Chotey Lal v. Emperor Cri. Ref. No. 1348 of 1944. I find myself unable to accept the view taken by him. In my opinion, Section 6, U.P. Cotton Cloth and Yarn Control Order, lays certain duties upon every manufacturer, selling agent, wholesale dealer, commission agent and retailer, and one of those duties is to issue cash memos in certain cases and to keep copies thereof. The cash memos so issued and their copies must contain all the particulars which are mentioned in the explanation to the section. The applicant in this case is admittedly a partner in the firm and a registered retailer. The law laid certain duties on him and he cannot escape the consequences of not performing those duties by saying that he entrusted the performance of those duties to someone else, either a servant or an agent. As there is a conflict of opinion I do not think it proper to decide this case - for contrary decisions of this kind are apt to mislead the Courts below. I would, therefore, recommend that this case should be decided by a Bench. It will be laid before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting a Bench for its decision. JUDGMENT Mulla, J. 3. This case has come up before us upon a reference made by one of us by an order, dated 12th December 1945. The relevant facts out of which the question for decision arises are set out in that order and we need not add anything to it. The simple question is, whether a person who is a registered retailer within the meaning of Section 6, U.P. Cotton Cloth and Yarn Control Order, 1943, when charged with having contravened the provisions of that section, can take shelter behind the plea that the contravention was by some person other than himself, either his servant or agent, and that he was himself not present at the time? It was argued on behalf of the applicant that the answer to that question should be in the affirmative and in support of that contention reliance was placed upon a ruling of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Chotey Lal v. Emperor Cri. Ref. No. 1348 of 1944. In that case it was held by the learned Single Judge that the proprietor of a shop could not be held responsible for the refusal on the part of his servant to issue a cash memo because he himself was not present at the time of the transaction in question. We have carefully considered that decision in the light of the language of Section 6 of the Order and we are not inclined to agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge. In our judgment Section 6 prescribes certain duties which have to be performed by a manufacturer, selling agent, wholesale dealer dad retailer in certain circumstances and it is only a manufacturer, selling agent, wholesale dealer or retailer who can be called to account for failing to perform those duties. It is not in our judgment a good defence to say that the manufacturer, selling agent, wholesale dealer or retailer was not himself present when the provision of law was contravened. The duty lay upon him and it was for him to see that the duty was properly performed as required by the law. His presence or absence is in our judgment immaterial. Learned Counsel for the applicant contended that u/s 18 of the Order, which prescribes the punishment for such contravention, it is laid down that the person who is liable to punishment is "any person who contravenes any of the provisions of this Order" and it was contended that upon a strict interpretation of these words it is only the servant or agent who fails to carry out the provisions of Section 6 of the Order who renders himself liable to penalty. In our judgment this argument is not sound. u/s 18 the words "any person" must refer to any one of the persons referred to in the preceding sections of the Order. In our judgment this argument is not sound. u/s 18 the words "any person" must refer to any one of the persons referred to in the preceding sections of the Order. The servant or agent can always plead in his defence that he is not one of the persons mentioned in Section 6 of the Order who are required to perform certain duties in certain circumstances and, therefore, he cannot be said to have contravened any provision of the Order. That would in our judgment be a good defence on his behalf. If the argument of the learned Counsel for the applicant is accepted, then it is not possible to punish either the registered dealer or his servant when the provisions of Section 6 of the Order are contravened. This is obviously an absurd result and it only shows that the correct interpretation of Section 13 is that the words "any person" there refer only to someone of the various persons referred to in the preceding sections of the Order. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the applicant in this case was rightly found guilty of having contravened the provisions of Section 6 of the Order. The result, therefore, is that we dismiss this application in revision.