JUDGMENT Sharpe, J. - The plaintiffs are the appellants and this appeal arises out of two appeals disposed of by the learned Subordinate Judge of Birbhum in respect of a suit brought by the plaintiffs to establish a right of easement of irrigation of certain plots described in schedule Ka of the plaint from four tanks which are C. S. plots Nos. 7393, 7311, belonging to the principal defendants and 7179 and 7432 belonging to the pro forma defendants. The trial Court gave the plaintiffs a decree with regard to irrigation from the tanks in plots Nos 7311, 7179 and 7432 but dismissed the suit with regard to any right of irrigation from the tank in plot No. 7393. 2. Against this decision two appeals were taken to the lower appellate Court, Appeal No. 104 of 1941 was by the plaintiffs with regard to the dismissal of their claim in respect of irrigation from the tank in plot No. 7393; the other Title Appeal NO. 106 of 1941 was by the defendants against the decision allowing the plaintiffs a right of irrigation from the remaining three tanks. Title Appeal NO. 104 was dismissed by the lower appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the trial Court, the other appeal No. 105 was allowed in part and the learned Subordinate Judge declared that the plaintiffs-respondents had a right of easement to irrigate all their plots enumerated in schedule Ka by the water from the tanks in C. S. plots Nos. 7179 and 7432, but with regard to the tank in plot No. 7311 he declared that they had a right of irrigation only in respect of settlement plots Nos. 7324, 7325, 7341, 7342, 7345, 7346, 7347 and 7358. He gave a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiffs easements as declared but vacated the mandatory injunction made by the trial Court with regard to the removal of a bundh between the tanks in plots Nos. 7179 and 7811. 3. 7324, 7325, 7341, 7342, 7345, 7346, 7347 and 7358. He gave a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiffs easements as declared but vacated the mandatory injunction made by the trial Court with regard to the removal of a bundh between the tanks in plots Nos. 7179 and 7811. 3. In coming to these decisions the learned Subordinate Judge first decided on a consideration of certain authorities that proof of enjoyment for a continuous period of about 25 years would be sufficient to establish a case of acquisition by a lost grant and then he proceeded to apply this proposition of law to the evidence adduced by the plaintiff in the case and decided generally that the evidence was insufficient to establish continuous user for this period and that the presumption of the settlement records which was in the defendant's favour had not been rebutted. It was for these reasons, mainly that he disposed of the appeals in the manner stated above. 4. A preliminary objection was taken by Mr. Tafazzal Ali for the respondents that since appellant 3 (original plaintiff 3) had died and his heirs had not been substituted within time the appeal should abate either generally or specifically in so far as that appellant is concerned. It appears that the plaintiffs claimed rights of irrigation from the tanks above mentioned in respect of particular plots and so I do not see any reason to hold that the appeal has abated generally but the appeal has certainly abated in so far as the claim of the deceased plaintiff 3 is concerned, that is to say, with regard to the claim of the right to irrigation in respect of C. S. plots Nos. 2529, 2734, 2755, 2783, 2789 and 2812, in so far as any right of irrigation from either of the tanks in plots NOS. 7311 and 7393 is concerned. 5. Three points have been taken by Mr. Mukherji for the appellants. They are that the learned appellate Court erred in law : (1) In not referring to and incorporating his impressions obtained by a local inspection in his judgment. (2) In reversing the decision of the trial Court regarding the plots which could be irrigated from the tank in plot NO. 7311 and in vacating the mandatory injunction for removal of the bundh between the tanks in plots Nos. (2) In reversing the decision of the trial Court regarding the plots which could be irrigated from the tank in plot NO. 7311 and in vacating the mandatory injunction for removal of the bundh between the tanks in plots Nos. 7311 and 7179 without referring to findings of the trial Court or the report of the Pleader Commissioner who prepared a map of the locality, and without indicating any reasons for the vacation of the injunction. (3) In holding that no presumption of easement by grant could be proved without establishing continuous user for about 25 years, and in his application of this erroneous view of the law to the evidence given by the plaintiffs' witnesses. 6. In support of the first contention, reliance has been placed mainly on the decision, 15 C. L. J. 403 Alias Rai v. Jhingur Tewari ('12) 39 Cal. 476 : 13 L. C. 844:15 C. L. J. 403. That decision related to a criminal case, in connection with which a local inspection had been held by a Magistrate for the purpose of appreciating the evidence and in response to a prayer on behalf of the accused, who asserted that a local inspection would make it clear that no occurrence of the nature alleged by the prosecution could have occurred at the place and in the manner described. In that case, the Magistrate utilised the facts observed by him in reaching his decision and it was held that not only was this not improper but that it was the duty of the Judge to consider the results of such observation and state them in his judgment. 7. In the present case, however, the learned Subordinate Judge noted before he held his inspection under the provisions of O. 18, R. 18, Civil P. C. that he was of opinion that an inspection of the subject-matter of the suits out of which these appeals arise will be of help to me in understanding the evidence and in appreciating the arguments. 8. 8. The purpose was therefore distinctly and precisely stated; and it would clearly have been difficult if not improper for him to ascertain by inspection whether the irrigation of particular plots from particular tanks was as contended by the plaintiffs or by the defendants, or more particularly whether such user had been established for any period of time sufficient to justify a presumption of a right of easement by lost grant. No suggestion has been made as to the observations which might have been made or incorporated in his judgment, or as to how the appellants were prejudiced by this omission. There is no provision in O. 18, R. 18, Civil P. C., for the making of any memorandum to form part of the record, such as is provided by S. 539B, Criminal P. C., for criminal cases. If the Subordinate Judge had made such a memorandum, or incorporated it in the record, no doubt the unsuccessful party would have taken serious objection to it. The inspection was made on the prayer of both parties and the learned Judge made quite clear to them before it was held the limited purpose for which their prayer was granted. I do not think they can now have any grievance on this ground or that it is one which would justify interference at this stage. 9. I think it will be better to deal with the third point next because that is the most important question involved in these appeals, and because in the view I take, it will be necessary in any event to remand the appeals to the learned lower appellate Court for rehearing. As already stated, the learned Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion after reviewing the various decisions on the matter that proof of enjoyment for a continuous period of about 25 years will be sufficient to establish a case of acquisition of easement by lost grant. 10. In reaching this conclusion, he relied apparently on a few cases noted in his judgment, in which decisions were subsequent to the Limitation Act 9 [IX] of 1871. They are 8 C. W. N. 158 Krista Das v. Joynarain ('04) 8 C. W. N. 158, 6 Cal. 394 Bairup Koer v. Abdul Hossain ('81) 6 Cal. 394:7 I. A. 240: 4 Sar. 199 (P. C.) and 7 cal. 182 Koylash Chunder v. Sonatun Chung ('82) 7 Cal. 132. They are 8 C. W. N. 158 Krista Das v. Joynarain ('04) 8 C. W. N. 158, 6 Cal. 394 Bairup Koer v. Abdul Hossain ('81) 6 Cal. 394:7 I. A. 240: 4 Sar. 199 (P. C.) and 7 cal. 182 Koylash Chunder v. Sonatun Chung ('82) 7 Cal. 132. He has also referred to two earlier cases reported in 8 W. R. 311 Toolsee Doss v. Bhyrublall ('67) 8 W. R. 311 and 9 W. R. 91 Joy Prokash Singh v. Ameer Ali ('68) 9 W. R. 91, and in the course of his argument, Mr. Mukherji has also relied on three other decisions reported in 11 W. R. 236 Kisto Mohun v. Juggurnath Roy ('69) 2 Beng. L. R. A. C. 323 : 11 W. R. 236; 11 W. R. 522 Kartick Chunder Sircar v. Kartick Chunder Dey ('69) 3 Beng. L. R. A. C. 166 : 11 W. R. 522 and in 12 W.R. 274 Roop Chunder Ghose v. Roop Moonjuree Dassee ('70) 3 Beng. L. R. A. C. 323 : 12 W. R. 274. These are all decisions prior to the enactment of the Limitation Act of 1871, and whilst, in some of these cases, periods of 12 years, or more, or less, were considered sufficient on the facts of the particular cases to justify the presumption of easement by lost grant, the general trend appears to be as stated in 11 W. R. 236 Kisto Mohun v. Juggurnath Roy ('69) 2 Beng. L. R. A. C. 323 : 11 W. R. 236. In this country, while the law recognises that rights may be gained by long and continuous enjoyment, i. e. by prescription, no particular period is necessary for the establishment generally of a prescriptive right. 11. The same principle is enunciated in 12 W. R. 274 Roop Chunder Ghose v. Roop Moonjuree Dassee ('70) 3 Beng. L. R. A. C. 323 : 12 W. R. 274 where it is held: Where there is evidence showing a long and continuous user, it is sufficient for the Court to find whether it has or has not lasted long enough to confer the right to it, without particular reference to any specific number of years. 12. L. R. A. C. 323 : 12 W. R. 274 where it is held: Where there is evidence showing a long and continuous user, it is sufficient for the Court to find whether it has or has not lasted long enough to confer the right to it, without particular reference to any specific number of years. 12. It is not disputed that, apart from a. 36, Limitation Act, a right of prescription may also be claimed and established on the basis of immemorial user justifying a presumption of grant or agreement. This was recognised as early as the year 1880, when it was pointed out in 6 cal. 394 Roop Chunder Ghose v. Roop Moonjuree Dassee ('70) 3 Beng. L. R. A. C. 323 : 12 W. R. 274 that the statute is remedial and not prohibitory ox exhaustive. A man may acquire title under it who has no other right at all, but it does not exclude or interfere with other titles or modes of acquiring easements. 13. This was recognised also in 7 cal. 132 Koylash Chunder v. Sonatun Chung ('82) 7 Cal. 132 where it was held that if a suit be barred on account of there being no actual user within 20 years of suit, despite the fact that the plaintiffs had proved actual user for 20 years. the only way to establish rights by prescription would be to claim not under the Limitation Act but by immemorial user and get the Courts to presume their rights after 25 to 30 years enjoyment, unless the defendants could show anything to the contrary. 14. There are many other decisions in which the right to establish easement outside S. 26, Limitation Act has been recognised. Mr. Tafazzal Ali for the respondents does not challenge the correctness of this proposition, and it is not necessary, therefore, to discuss it further. Mr. 14. There are many other decisions in which the right to establish easement outside S. 26, Limitation Act has been recognised. Mr. Tafazzal Ali for the respondents does not challenge the correctness of this proposition, and it is not necessary, therefore, to discuss it further. Mr. Mukherji, however, contends that since this right is admitted, and since the decisions to which reference has already been made have not been over-ruled and provide that it is not necessary to establish user for any particular number of years in order to justify a presumption of easement by lost grant, and since in those decisions periods of 12 years more or less were considered to be sufficient to justify such a presumption, proof of user in the present case for a period of 12 years more or less should be deemed to be sufficient to justify a presumption in his clients' favour. For the respondents, on the other hand, Mr. Tafazzal Ali has maintained that after the enactment of S. 26, Limitation Act, proof of user for any period less than 20 years will not be sufficient to justify a presumption of right of easement by lost grant. In support of this view he has relied on the observations already quoted in 7 cal. 132 Koylash Chunder v. Sonatun Chung ('82) 7 Cal. 132 and on the decision of 8 C. W. N. 158 Krista Das v. Joynarain ('04) 8 C. W. N. 158. In particular he has relied on the observations in the "Law of Limitation and Prescription," Tagore Law Lectures, by U. P. Mitra, Edn. 6, p. 545 and the decision in 158 I. C. 344 Shevram v. Kisan ('35) 22 A. I. R. 1935 Nag. 205 : 31 N. L. R. 393 : 158 L. C.344. 15. The only decision subsequent to the enactment of the Limitation Act which appears to support Mr. Mukherjee's contention that a period of 20 years enjoyment, as provided by S.26, Limitation Act to be the minimum for establishing rights of easement under the section, is of no value for deciding the period of user necessary to justify a presumption of easement by lost grant, is contained in 5 Mad. 253 Karupam Zaraindar v. Merangi Zamiqdar ('82) 5 Mad. 258 in which user for 18 years was held to be enough. 253 Karupam Zaraindar v. Merangi Zamiqdar ('82) 5 Mad. 258 in which user for 18 years was held to be enough. It would appear from that decision that reliance was placed on decisions which were given prior to the introduction of the Limitation Act, since reference is made to an earlier Madras decision that a grant of easement might be presumed from a twelve years user and that "this view was followed by the Calcutta High Court." There does not appear to be any such decision of the Calcutta High Court after 1871. Moreover, in that case, the plaintiffs had established 18 years user prior to 1871 and there was, therefore, some justification for allowing them the benefit of the law in force prior to the Limitation Act. This decision is therefore of little assistance in the present matter. On the other hand the decisions on which Mr. Tafazzal Ali relies support the view that after the enactment of the Limitation Act no presumption of a right of easement by lost grant has been made on the basis of user for less than a period of 20 years. The decision in 158 I. C. 344 Shevram v. Kisan ('35) 22 A. I. R. 1935 Nag. 205 : 31 N. L. R. 393 : 158 L. C.344 goes further and is a direct authority for the view that : The presumption of lost grant cannot be made in respect of such possession as cannot be characterised as immemorial, i. e. exceeding 20 years. 16. In reaching this conclusion it was held, after reviewing a number of cases on the matter, including some of those referred to above, that the cases in which the doctrine of lost grant was applied were either those in which the enjoyment was proved for more than 20 years or the rights were claimed on the ground of custom. The decision did not proceed directly on the view that the period could not be less than 20 years because that period was mentioned in S. 26, Limitation Act, a view which has been suggested in Mitra's Law of Limitation and Prescription in these words: As the law expressly requires an enjoyment of 20 years for the acquisition of easements, by prescription proper, the presumption of a lawful title from long enjoyment, it is apprehended, cannot now arise, unless the enjoyment has lasted for more than 20 years. 17. Mr. Tafazzal Ali has urged that this is the correct view, since it is impossible to conceive that a right should be acquired outside S. 26, Limitation Act by proof of user for a less period than that provided by that section, and that without the penalty of 2 years limitation within which a suit must be brought from the date of any interference or interruption of the enjoyment. I am on the whole in agreement with this view, which seems both reasonable and in accordance with previous decisions on the matter. I should not, however, state it in categorical terms, since the position still is, as stated at the outset, in so far as concerns suits outside S. 26 that no particular period has been prescribed and can therefore be said to be essential for the establishment of a prescriptive right, but where such right is based on a claim of continuous or uninterrupted user alone, proof of enjoyment for any period not exceeding 20 years will, in my opinion, ordinarily be considered insufficient to establish immemorial user so as to justify any presumption of easement by lost grant. The view taken by the lower appellate Court that user for a period of about 25 years is required to be proved does not appear to follow any particular decision on the point; it is probable that it is based on the observations of 7 cal. 132 Koylash Chunder v. Sonatun Chung ('82) 7 Cal. 132 but those observations were in the nature of an 'obiter dictum' and cannot, I think, be construed as laying down as a proposition of law that proof of user for a period of 25 to 30 years is essential. I might add here that the learned appellate Court has in a number of places in his judgments referred to the fact that there must be proof of continuous user for about 25 years in order to establish the right claimed. If by the use of "continuous" he intended to imply "uninterrupted" there may be no difficulty, but it is quite clear from a number of decisions on the subject that in case of a claim of easement for use of water for irrigation or rights of an analogous nature, proof of absolute continuous user is not necessary. If by the use of "continuous" he intended to imply "uninterrupted" there may be no difficulty, but it is quite clear from a number of decisions on the subject that in case of a claim of easement for use of water for irrigation or rights of an analogous nature, proof of absolute continuous user is not necessary. The right can be established by proof of periodical user, so long as the full period is covered, and the user has existed openly and uninterruptedly. 18. Applying the view which I have taken to the case now under consideration it seems to me that the learned Subordinate Judge erred in applying in a rigid manner the formula adopted by him, and although there will not ordinarily be much difference between the proof of user for a period exceeding 20 years, as found above to be ordinarily necessary in a case of the present nature, and proof of user for about 25 years as adopted by him, he has unfortunately rejected in toto the evidence of a number of witnesses merely on the ground that the evidence of a particular witness does not show that the plaintiffs have been exercising their right of irrigating the plots of Sch. Ka for a period of nearly 25 years. Indeed, he goes further in some instances and has rejected the evidence of a particular witness because be does not say that all the plaintiffs have been irrigating all the plots continuously for a period of about 25 years. The application of any formula in such a rigid manner to the evidence of particular witnesses seems to me to have been unfortunate and improper; if it is applied in such a manner it would render the task of the plaintiffs in a suit of this nature almost impossible of performance. It might well be that particular witnesses would establish the enjoyment by one or more plaintiffs of some of the plots for periods which might be more or less than the minimum period but it is the value of the evidence in the aggregate which is to be seen in order to determine finally whether the plaintiffs have established generally their claim of a right of irrigation by proof of enjoyment for such a minimum period as would establish a case of acquisition of easement by lost grant. For these reasons, I must agree with Mr. For these reasons, I must agree with Mr. Mukherjee's second contention and the appeals out of which this appeal has arisen will have to be remanded to the lower appellate Court for rehearing. 19. In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary to discuss at length the second point which has been raised. In my opinion, however, there is some considerable force in Mr. Mukherjee's contention. There is no indication in the judgment in appeal that the findings of the lower Court or his reasons for those findings or the report of the Pleader Commissioner received any, or at least, any adequate consideration. I have moreover been unable to find in the judgment any reasons for the final order made in the appeal that the mandatory injunction regarding the removal of the bundh is vacated. It may well be, as suggested by Mr. Tafazzal Ali for the respondents, that this order was a necessary consequence of the view taken that the presumption of the settlement records had not been rebutted, but Mr. Makherjee has claimed that the result of this order has been to nullify the right of irrigation from the tank in plot 7311 which the appellants have been allowed in respect of certain plots, and in my opinion, it was necessary for the learned Subordinate Judge to give some indication that he had considered the relevant matters and to state, at least briefly, the reasons which led him to reverse completely this part of the trial Court's decree. 20. The result is, therefore, that this appeal is allowed and the decrees of the lower appellate Court are set aside. The appeals out of which this appeal has arisen will be remanded to the lower appellate Court for rehearing. There will be no order as to the costs of this Court and future costs will abide the result of the rehearing.