JUDGMENT Wali Ullah, J. - This is a plaintiff's appeal against the decree passed by the lower appellate Court which set aside the decree passed by the Court of first instance and dismissed the suit with costs throughout. The plaintiff claimed a declaration that the house No. 185 (new) situate in Sabzi Mandi, Allahabad, belonged to him and in the alternative, he also prayed for possession of the same. It was alleged that the plaintiff was the next reversioner of one Kallu Ram and that after the death of Kallu Ram Mt. Sahodra, the mother of Kallu Ram, succeeded to the propetry as the mother of Kallu Ram, that Mt. Sahodra sold the house to the defendant under a sale-deed dated 20-10-1938 for Rs. 4000 but there was no legal necessity for the same. Lastly it was alleged that Mt. Sahodra died on 1-2-1939 and the plaintiff was consequently entitled to the possession of the house as the next reversioner of Kallu Ram. 2. The suit was resisted inter alia upon the ground that the pedigree set out in the plaint was not complete and that Bhau Ram, who was the' original owner or the house, had a sister Mt. Gulabo whose sons were alive. It was further alleged that Kallu Ram had died during the lifetime of his father Bhau Ram and that Mt. Sahodra succeeded to the property as the widow of Bhau Ram, On the death of Mt. Hahodra the next reversioners of Bhau Ram according to law were the sons of a sister of Bhau Ram who are still alive and the plaintiff was, therefore, not the nest reversioner. It was further alleged that in any event the house was sold for legal necessity and for consideration and the sale was, therefore, binding upon the next reversioner. 3. On the issue whether Bhau Ram died first or Kallu Ram predeceased Bhau Ram, the learned Munsif found that Bhau Ram died 29 or 30 years before the suit in 1939 but that Kallu Ram died on 30-10-1918 and, therefore, Kallu Ram "was the last male holder of the property in suit. 3. On the issue whether Bhau Ram died first or Kallu Ram predeceased Bhau Ram, the learned Munsif found that Bhau Ram died 29 or 30 years before the suit in 1939 but that Kallu Ram died on 30-10-1918 and, therefore, Kallu Ram "was the last male holder of the property in suit. He accordingly held that although Bhau Ram's sister's sons were alive the last male owner being Kallu Ram himself, the plaintiff, as the next reversioner of Kallu Ram, had the right to sue, On the question of legal necessity, the Court of first instance was of the opinion that out of the consideration of Rs. 4000 paid by the defendant, only a sum of Rs. 890 was for legal necessity. In view of these findings the suit was decreed for possession on condition that the plaintiff deposited a sum of Rs. 890 in Court within a period of two months for payment to the defendant. 4. On appeal, the learned Civil Judge found that Kallu Ram predeceased Bhau Ram and, therefore, in the presence of the sons of a sister of Bhau Ram, the plaintiff was not the next reversioner of Bhau Ram and consequently he was not entitled to sue as such. On the issue relating to legal necessity the lower appellate Court found itself in agreement with the Court of first instance. In view of its finding, however, that Kallu Ram predeceased Bhau Ram, obviously the plaintiff had no right to institute the present suit. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the suit was dismissed with costs throughout. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously contended that the finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court to the effect that Kallu Ram predeceased Bhau Ram is vitiated in law inasmuch as it rests substantially upon the recitals of a will executed by Mt. Sahodra on 10-9-1934 and that this will has not been proved according to law. Learned counsel for the appellant has invited our attention to S. 63, Succession Act, 39 [xxxix] of 1925 which provides that a will like the will of Mt. Sahodra shall be attested by at least two witnesses. Learned counsel has next referred us to the provisions of S, 68, Evidence' Act, regarding the manner of proof of a document required by law to be attested. Sahodra shall be attested by at least two witnesses. Learned counsel has next referred us to the provisions of S, 68, Evidence' Act, regarding the manner of proof of a document required by law to be attested. His contention is that the provisions of S. 68, Evidence Act, have not been complied with inasmuch as no attesting witness has been called by the defendant. The contention of the learned counsel in effect comes to this that the deed, dated 10-9-1934 purporting to be a will of Mt. Sahodra could not be used in evidence for any purpose in this case unless the provisions of S. 68, Evidence Act, were fully complied with. Lastly the learned counsel has contended that any statement contained in the will of Mt. Sahodra would not be admissible in evidence under S 32 (5) (6) Evidence Act, and he has in support of his contention relied upon the well-known case in (1883) 13 Q.B.D. 818 : 53 L.J.Q.B. 521 : 51 L.T. 645 : 33 W.R. 99, Haines v. Guthrie 6. In order to appreciate the points raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, it is necessary to state some relevant facts. On the issue whether Kallu Ram predeceased Bhau Ram-and that was the principal issue in the case-parties led oral as well as documentary evidence. The plaintiff examined himself and four witnesses, viz., Nandoo and Ram Narain two sons of Bhau Ram's sister, Deep Narain, and Mathura Prasad who is a son-in-law of Bhau Ram. On his part the defendant examined himself, Sheo Charan, Prag Datt and Murtaza Husian. In addition to this oral evidence, there was also before the Courts below some documentary evidence including an extract from the municipal khasra which showed that after the death of Bhau Ram the name of his widow Mt. Sahodra was mutated and not that of his son Kallu Ram. There was also the will of Mt. Sahodra dated 10-9-1934. 7. The learned Munsif, on a consideration of the evidence led by the parties came to the conclusion that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff was more reliable than that of the defendant. He, however, did not consider the recitals in the will of Mt. There was also the will of Mt. Sahodra dated 10-9-1934. 7. The learned Munsif, on a consideration of the evidence led by the parties came to the conclusion that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff was more reliable than that of the defendant. He, however, did not consider the recitals in the will of Mt. Sahodra to the effect that her husband (Bhau Ram) was the owner of the property and that about 22 years back after the death of his only son Kallu Ram, he installed the deity of Shri Thakurji Maharaj in house No. 13. The reason seems to be that according to the learned Munsif no attempt had been made to prove the will according to the provisions of S. 68, Evidence Act and it was also otherwise a nullity at law. 8. When the case came in appeal before the learned Judge, he, on a consideration of the oral evidence adduced by the parties, was of the opinion that but for the recitals aforementioned, contained in the will of Mt. Sahodra, he would not have been inclined to disturb the finding of the learned Munsif. He, however, considered the recitals aforementioned, contained in the will of Mt. Sahodra to be the most reliable piece of evidence in the case and in view of this evidence be found it impossible to believe the plaintiff's evidence. The result, therefore, was that he, in effect, relying on the recitals in the will held that Kallu Ram predeceased Bhau Ram. 9. The main question which has to be decided in this appeal is whether the statement contained in Mt. Sahodra's will referred to above was admissible in evidence and the learned Judge was right in relying on the same. It must be remembered that in the present, case we are not concerned with the validity or invalidity of the will as such. It is obvious that Mt. Sahodra, being in possession of the property as a limited owner under the Hindu Law, whether as the widow of the last owner Bhau Ram or as the mother of the last owner Kallu Ram had no right to transfer the property by will. Section 68, Evidence Act would certainly come into play if any of the two parties to this litigation had founded his claim on the will but that is not the case here. This will of Mt. Section 68, Evidence Act would certainly come into play if any of the two parties to this litigation had founded his claim on the will but that is not the case here. This will of Mt. Sahodra is a registered document and it has been specifically referred to in the sale deed in favour of the defendant. It has been exhibited by the Court of first Instance as Ex. QQ and, therefore, it is clear that it was tendered in evidence. The statement of the defendant's witness, Sheo Charn, in favour of whose wife Mt. Moti Kunwar, the will was executed, has definitely stated in the course of his deposition that Mt. Sahodra executed "a will" in favour of his wife Moti Kunwar in 1934. No objection seems to have been raised in the course of the proceedings in the Court of first instance with regard to the existence of this will or its execution by Mt. Sahodra. A glance at the statement of Sheo Charan would show that first of all be referred to this will in his examination in chief. In cross-examination learned counsel for the plaintiff appears to have repeatedly questioned Sheo Charan with reference to this will, but the questions were all put to the witness with a view to eliciting from him the facts bearing upon the invalidity of the will. It is true that the will Ex. QQ does not bear on it any statement to the effect that its execution was admitted, but on a careful examination of the long statement of Sheo Charan there can be no doubt whatsoever that the cross-examination of Sheo Charan proceeded on the footing that the registered document dated 10-9-1934 purporting to be a will of Mt. Sahodra was a document executed by Mt. Sahodra. 9a. It must, therefore, be taken that the only contention raised OH behalf of the plaintiff with regard to this document in the trial Court was that it has not been proved in accordance with the provisions S. 68, Evidence Act. And it is well settled that an objection that a document which per se is not admissible (inadmissible?) in evidence, has been improperly admitted in evidence in the trial Court, cannot be entertained in the Court of appeal. And it is well settled that an objection that a document which per se is not admissible (inadmissible?) in evidence, has been improperly admitted in evidence in the trial Court, cannot be entertained in the Court of appeal. If such an objection bad been taken in the trial Court it might have been easily met and the proceedings regularized : vide Lachuman Lal Pathak and Another Vs. Kumar Kamakshya Narayan Singh, AIR 1931 Patna 224 and Sayeruddin Akonda Vs. Samiruddin Akond and Another, AIR 1923 Cal 378 As mentioned already, S. 68 would apply only if the document were relied upon as a will and therefore as a document requiring attestation. It has been repeatedly held that non-compliance with the provisions of S. 68 does not prevent the document from being used in evidence under S. 72 for any other or collateral purpose. Reference might be made to the case in Mathra Pershad and Another Vs. Cheddi Lal, AIR 1915 All 254 also to the case in Moti Chand and Others Vs. Lalta Prasad and Others, AIR 1918 All 201 reference might be made to the decision of a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court in Pt. Shyam Lal Vs. Lakshmi Narain and Others 10. Next it has to be considered whether the statement of Mt. Sahodra contained in this will to the effect that Kallu Ram predeceased Bhau Ram is admissible in evidence under S. 32 (5) (6), Evidence Act. Admittedly Mt. Sahodra is dead and in the year 1934 no dispute had arisen between the parties as to whether Bhau Ram at the time of his death had left a son Kallu Ram. It is obvious that Mt. Sahodra, being the wife of Bhau Ram and the mother of Kallu Ram, had special means of knowledge. The only question, therefore, is whether the statement in question relates to the existence of any relationship by blood, marriage or adoption. It is obvious that Mt. Sahodra, being the wife of Bhau Ram and the mother of Kallu Ram, had special means of knowledge. The only question, therefore, is whether the statement in question relates to the existence of any relationship by blood, marriage or adoption. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the statement is not admissible and he has strongly relied upon the well-known English case, (1883) 13 Q.B.D. 818 : 53 L.J.Q.B. 521 : 51 L.T. 645 : 33 W.R. 99, Haines v. Guthrie in which all the authorities in the, English law on this point are fully considered but there can be no doubt whatsoever that on this point the law in India under the Evidence Act is very different from the law of England. Reference might be made to. Woodroffe and Ameer Ali's Law of Evidence, 9th edition, pp. 354 and 355, where the distinction has been clearly brought out. It is specifically noted therein that the principle laid down in (1883) 13 Q.B.D. 818 : 53 L.J.Q.B. 521 : 51 L.T. 645 : 33 W.R. 99, Haines v. Guthrie is not the law in India. In this connection reference might be made to some very salutary observations made by their Lordships of the Privy Council in ('28) 15 AIR 1928 P.C. 2 : 7 Pat. 221 : 55 I.A. 18 : 107 I.C. 14 (P.C), Mt. Ramanandi Kuer v. Mt. Kalawati Kuer at p. 4, where their Lordships are Reported to have observed: It has often been pointed out by this Board that where there is a positive enactment of the Indian Legislature, the proper course is to examine the language of that Statute and to ascertain its proper meaning, uninfluenced by any consideration derived from the previous state of the law or of the English law upon which it may be founded. 11. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent has contended that the statement in question is admissible under S. 32 (5), Evidence Act. 11. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent has contended that the statement in question is admissible under S. 32 (5), Evidence Act. He has invited our attention to the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in ('16) 3 AIR 1916 P.C. 242 : 43 I.A. 256 : 39 I.C. 401 (P.C.), Mahomed Syedol Ariffin v. Yeoh Ooi Gark where it was held that entries in the book of births and deaths in the family kept by the father having special means of knowledge and made before any dispute or question arose between the parties are admissible under this section to prove the age of the person mentioned therein. Their Lordships in the course of their Judgment approved of the decisions of the Calcutta High Court in the cases in ('93) 20 Cal 758, Ram Chandra Datt v. Jogeshwar Narain Deo ('97) 24 Cal. 265 (S.B.), Dhanmull v. Ram Chunder Ghose and of the Madras High Court in ('02) 25 Mad. 183, Oriental Government Security Life Assurance Co. v. Narasimba Chari Their Lordships have also referred to illustration L appended to S, 32. In this connection reference might also be made to the Full Bench case in Mt. Naima Khatun Vs. Basant Singh Mt. Naima Khatun v. Basant Singh where in the order of reference to the Full Bench at p. 407, their Lordships Sulaiman C, J. and Young J. have observed: There can be no doubt that the rule of English Law is particularly strict, and the admission of hearsay evidence in pedigree cases is confined to the proof of pedigree and does not apply to proof of the facts which constitute a pedigree, such as birth, death and marriage when they have to be proved for other purposes. In (1883) 13 Q.B.D. 818 : 53 L.J.Q.B. 521 : 51 L.T. 645 : 33 W.R. 99, Haines v. Guthrie an affidavit filed by the defendant's father stating the date of the defendant's birth in an action to which the plaintiff had not been a party was held inadmissible as evidence of the age of the defendant in support of his defence. In India we have S. 32, Evidence Act which does not seem to be so strict. 12. In India we have S. 32, Evidence Act which does not seem to be so strict. 12. Again, their Lordships observed at p. 409: If we were to take the sub-s. (5) of S. 32 literally, it might in one sense be said that a statement relating to the age of a boy is not a statement relating to the existence of any relationship by blood or by marriage. But it has been laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in ('16) 3 AIR 1916 P.C. 242 : 43 I.A. 256 : 39 I.C. 401 (P.C.), Mahomed Syedol Ariffin v. Yeoh Ooi Gark. following an observation made by a learned, Chief Justice (Judge?) of the. Madras High Court that the question of age falls within this sub-section because it indicates the commencement of such relationship. When a person says that this relation was born on such and such a date, be by implication states that his relationship with the person came into existence on that date. In this view of the matter a statement made as regards age would be tantamount to a statement as to the existence of relationship. 13. In this case their Lordships were considering the question of the admissibility of a statement contained in the deed of adoption executed by Rani Bishen Kuer, the adoptive mother of the defendant Basant Singh. It was argued before their Lordships that her statement "that the boy had been previously born on a particular date,' is no part of any statement as regards the commencement of relationship with him and is, therefore, not admissible. With reference to this contention their Lordships observed at p. 410. It is true that to some extent the statement made by Rani Bishen Kuer, as regards the age of the boy in the deed of adoption, is distinguishable from the admission made by the father as to the age of his son in ('16) 3 AIR 1916 P.C. 242 : 43 I.A. 256 : 39 I.C. 401 (P.C.), Mahomed Syedol Ariffin v. Yeoh Ooi Gark. Nevertheless we think that we must apply the same principle to this case and hold mat the statement made by the adoptive mother as regards the age of the boy, although it would not show her own relationship with him, was equally admissible. Nevertheless we think that we must apply the same principle to this case and hold mat the statement made by the adoptive mother as regards the age of the boy, although it would not show her own relationship with him, was equally admissible. There is no doubt that their Lordships of the Privy Council have interpreted this sub section in a liberal sense and it seems to be our clear duty to follow that example. 14. Reference might also be made to two cases decided by the Chief Court of AIR 1927 278 (Oudh) Krishnapal Singh v. Sri Raj Kuar In this case it was held by King J. that: Statements made by the deceased members of the family about certain facts of family history and statements regarding the seniority of members of the family are admissible in evidence under S. 32, cl. (5), Evidence Act. His Lordship further observed : It seems necessary to give a very liberal interpretation to the words 'when the statement relates to the existence of any relationship by blood relations.' Other wise the only evidence of any value regarding matters of family history would be excluded. (2) AIR 1944 162 (Oudh) Kanhaiya Bus Singh v. Mt. Ram Dei Kuer In this case two learned Judges of Oudh Chief Court agreed with the decision of King J. in AIR 1927 278 (Oudh) Krishnapal Singh v. Sri Raj Kuar and the decision of the Special Bench of three learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court in ('97) 24 Cal. 265 (S.B.), Dhanmull v. Ram Chunder Ghose. In that case it was argued that s, 32, clause (5) is confined in its scope to statements relating to the existence of any relationship by blood, marriage or adoption between persons as to whose relationship the person making the statement had special means of knowledge and illustrations (k), (1) and (m) merely show that the date of birth, death or marriage may be understood as falling within the words 'existence of any relationship' in so far as such date indicates termination or the commencement of that relationship. It was argued that the statement that a person is an older or younger son of his father in so far as it does not indicate the commencement of relationship does not fall within the ambit of the word relationship' as used in that clause. It was argued that the statement that a person is an older or younger son of his father in so far as it does not indicate the commencement of relationship does not fall within the ambit of the word relationship' as used in that clause. With reference to this argument their Lordships observed at page 183 : In our opinion a statement whether an ancestor of the person making the statement was related to him as an elder uncle or a younger uncle or an elder brother or a younger brother or an elder son or a younger son is a statement as to relationship within the meaning of :S. 32, clause (5). Further we think that if the dates of birth of Sheo Baksh Singh and Guman Singh could be admissible on the ground that they indicated commencement of the relationship with the person making the statement, the statement as to relative seniority is also equally admissible on the same ground showing as it does that the relationship with one commenced earlier than the relationship with the other. 15. In view of the authorities referred to above it must be held that under S. 32, sub-cl. (5), Evidence Act, a statement relating to the existence of any relationship by blood, marriage or adoption is admissible to prove the facts mentioned in the statement. As the question as to the existence of any relationship also includes the question as to the, commencement of that relationship declarations of deceased competent declarants have been held to be admissible to prove a person's date of birth, and, consequently his age, minority or majority or the order in which the members of the family were born. Such declarations have also been held to be admissible to prove parentage, names of relations or the date of death of a member of the family as death implies the termination of a relationship just as birth implies its commencement. 16. The statement contained in the will of Mt. Sahodra to the effect that Kallu Earn had predeceased Bhau Ram must, therefore, be taken to be admissible in evidence. The finding of the lower appellate Court that Kallu Ram predeceased Bhau Ram was a perfectly valid finding of fact and is binding upon us in second appeal. 17. The result, therefore, is that there is no force in this appeal and I would accordingly dismiss it with costs. The finding of the lower appellate Court that Kallu Ram predeceased Bhau Ram was a perfectly valid finding of fact and is binding upon us in second appeal. 17. The result, therefore, is that there is no force in this appeal and I would accordingly dismiss it with costs. Bennett J. 18. I agree.