JUDGMENT Kaul, J. - This second appeal arises out of a suit in ejectment. The facts material for the determination of the appeal are as follows: Village Naomi in Rae Bareli district belongs to the Raja of Maurawan. Rameshwar who claimed to be an under proprietor of plot No. 181 in that village, brought a suit against the present Appellants alleging that they had wrongfully trespassed upon his land by making certain constructions thereon and installing an idol of the deity Mahadeoji. It was further alleged that the Defendants claimed to have taken possession of this land under the permission of the Court of Wards which had assumed superintendence of the estate of the Raja. The Manager Courts of Wards, was also impleaded as a Defendant accordingly. The Plaintiff claimed a decree for ejctment of the Defendants and removal of the constructions made by them on plot No. 181. It appears that the Court of Wards refused to lend any support to the Defendants and was discharged from the suit as an unnecessary party. A number of pleas were raised in defence only two of which new survive. The trial Court decided all the points that arose in the case against the Defendants and in favour of the Plaintiff and decreed the suit. This decree was confirmed on appeal by the Civil Judge of Rae Bareli. Dissatisfied with his decision the Defendants have preferred the present appeal. 2. Only three points were argued by the Learned Counsel of the Appellants at the hearing of the appeal. (1) It was contended by him that the land in dispute was appurtenant to the houses of the Defendants and formed part of their saltan darwaza; and (2) that Mst. Chandi was also a co-sharer of the Plaintiff in plot No, 181 and as she was not made a party to the suit and the Plaintiff claimed to be sole proprietor, his suit was not maintainable. 3. It was further argued that the suit was bad and could not be maintained inasmuch as the idol Sri Mabadeoji was not made a party. 4. The last point may be disposed of first. It appears from the judgment of the lower appellatte Court that an undertaking was given by the Plaintiff that he would not disturb the idol nor remove the Chabutra on which it was installed. 4. The last point may be disposed of first. It appears from the judgment of the lower appellatte Court that an undertaking was given by the Plaintiff that he would not disturb the idol nor remove the Chabutra on which it was installed. Thus, as observed by the Court below, it became unnecessary to consider that matter further. In the present case no property was dedicated to the idol, and the Plaintiff gave up his claims for the relief as regards the removal of the Chabutra on which the idol was installed. It is unnecessary to say anything further on this subject. 5. As regards the second point also I. am clearly of opinion that it is without substance. The Plaintiff brought the suit claiming to be the sole under-proprietor of plot No. 101. The plaint contained a pedigree of the Plaintiff's family which shows that Lachman Prasad, Plaintiff's uncle, died without leaving any issue. It was pleaded on behalf of the Defendants that Lachman Prasad had left a son and that Mnsammat Chandi, his daughter was alive. It was contended accordingly that the Plaintiff could not maintain the suit without impleading Musammat Chandi. The trial Court held on the evidence on record that the Plaintiff formed a joint family with his uncle Lachman Prasad. It further opined that even if there was any other co sharer of the Plaintiff who was not made a party to the suit, his claim to a decree for ejectment of the Defendants who were trespassers could not be affected thereby. In dealing with this matter the lower appellate Court has not given any clear finding. The judgment of the learned Civil Judge on this point betrays some confusion of thought, but it is clear that he has not differed from the trial Court's finding that Lachman Prasad and the present Plaintiff Appellant formed a joint family. In these circumstances it is clear that a daughter of Lachman Prasad's son would have no interest in the property. Assuming, however, that there is any other co-sharer who is entitled to a share in this property along with the Plaintiff Respondent, I agree with the trial Court that his claim to eject the Defendants could not be affected by his failure to implead such co-sharer. Assuming, however, that there is any other co-sharer who is entitled to a share in this property along with the Plaintiff Respondent, I agree with the trial Court that his claim to eject the Defendants could not be affected by his failure to implead such co-sharer. Reliance was placed by the learned Counsed for the Appellants on the decision of the present Chief Judge in Ali Raza Khan v. Nawazish Ali Kahn 1938 O.A. 815 : O. W.N. 1157. where it was held that the right of a tenant in common to recover the whole property against a trespasser was a right which he was entitled to exercise on behalf of himself and his co-tenants and that he could not do so in assertion of a right to the whole property in himself. If he asserted an exclusive title in himself the suit should be dismissed. The facts of that came were miterialiy different from those of the case before me. A distinction should be drawn between cases where a person claiming to be the sole proprietor of some property claims possession thereof against a person who has no right to retain possession, and cases where a party in possession claiming to be the sole owner of some property seeks to eject therefrom a trespasser who has dispossessed him. The principle laid down in the case to which reference has been made might possibly apply to the former class of cases if it found that the Plaintiff is not the sole owner but has other co-sharer who are entitled to some interest in the property, but were not made party to the suit. It is, however, inapplicable to cases of the other class mentioned above ; and the reason is clear. This class contemplate cases in ejectment against rank trespassers. A co-sharer is entitled to a share in every inch of land comprised in the property. If a trespasser interfers with his possession he is certainly entitled to bring an action against him in order to defend his right of possession. In such cases no question of the right of other co-sharers and the Plaintiff who claims to be the sole owner falls to be determined. The only point that has to be determined is whether the Plaintiff is entitled to retain possession of the property in dispute against the Defendant who is a rank trespasser. In such cases no question of the right of other co-sharers and the Plaintiff who claims to be the sole owner falls to be determined. The only point that has to be determined is whether the Plaintiff is entitled to retain possession of the property in dispute against the Defendant who is a rank trespasser. Reference may in this connection be made to the observation of their Lordships of the Madras High Court in Syed Ahmad Sahib Shutari v. The Magnesite Syndicate Ltd.(1916) 30 Mad 501. For the reasons given above this point must also be answered against the Appellants. 6. The next point for consideration is whether the land in suit formed part of what has been called the sahan darwaza of the Appellants. The finding of the trial Court is definitely against them. It is expressed in these words: The circumstances and probabilities of the case coupled with the oral and documentary evidence abundantly prove that the Plaintiff had been in possession over the plots in suit which has never been used by the Defendants as their sahan. 7. So far as can be gathered from the judgment of the lower appellate Court, this finding was not challenged before that Court but the argument proceeded on somewhat different lines. It appears to have been argued that the Appellants being Bhurjis they must be allowed to retain possession of the land lying in front of their houses to enable them together their cattle upon it and for convenient exercise of their profession as Bhurjis. The learned Civil Judge was of opinion that such a right could, if at all, be claimed only in respect of land which belonged to the taluqdar of the village whose riyayas the Bhurjis were, and not upon land which belonged to some other person, in the present case the Respondent who was an under-proprietor. In this view of the matter the Appellants cannot be permitted to contend that the land in dispute formed their sahan darwaza and raise in this Court a plea which appears to have been abandoned before the Court of first appeal. Even assuming that they could be permitted to raise such a point it is clear that no plea of the existence of any right of easement was raised in the present case. Even assuming that they could be permitted to raise such a point it is clear that no plea of the existence of any right of easement was raised in the present case. The mere fact that certain land belonging to an under-proprietor lay in front of the Appellants' houses would not entitle them to use it for their purpose without his permission. It may further be pointed out that this land is separated from the houses of the Appellants by what is shown in the amin's map, on the record of the trial Court, as a road or passage. The land in dispute is survey plot No. 181, and it is separated from the Defendants' houses by two other plots Nos. 200 and 182. I am satisfied that the Appellants have no right or interest of any kind whatsoever in the disputed land and the Courts below came to a correct conclusion in decreeing this claim of the Plaintiff Respondent. 8. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs.