JUDGMENT Misra and Madeley, JJ. - These three appeals arise out of a suit for possession of properties left by Sitla Bux Singh. The following pedigree will be helpful in understanding the facts. 2. Sitla Bux Singh died issueless on 26th August, 1888. Mutation in respect of his properties was effected jointly in favor of his widow, Mst. Janakraj Kuar and his mother, Mst. Sarup Kuar. During the period of their possession the two ladies made a number of mortgages in favor of various persons. On 18th February, 1896, they jointly executed a will, Ex. D7, in favor of Sitla Bux's sister's sons namely Lal Babadur Singh and Bal Bahadur Singh. Mst. Sarup Kuar died on 22nd December, 1909 and the properties which stood in her name in the revenue records to the extent of half were mutated in favor her legatees. Lal and Bal also executed a number of mortgages between 1915 and 1926 and in some of them they were joined by Mst. Janakraj Kuar. Their mother Sheonath Kuar likewise occasionally borrowed monies on hypothecation of these properties. (It is unnecessary for the purposes of this judgment to give the details of the transfers), Lal died in 1925 leaving a widow Mst. Lachmiraj and three sons, Bijaipal Singh, Sheoraj Bahadur Singh and Avadhesh Pratap Singh, born of a predeceased wife. Ambika Prasad Singh was the next presumptive reversionary of Sitla Bux and Mst. Janakraj Kuar executed on 21st October, 1927, a relinquishment deed, Ex. 1, in his favor surrendering her interest as a Hindu widow. At one time there was a dispute as to whether the rights so surrendered did or did not constitute her entire interest then possessed by her as a Hindu widow the Plaintiffs alleging that it did and the Defendant contending that it did not, but the controversy is now settled and the finding of the lower Court that it was the whole of that interest has not been challenged before us, Mst. Janakraj Kuar stated in the deed that she was in possession and enjoyment of the entire zamindari baqiat left by her husband, and that her nephews Lal and Bal and their mother, Mst. Sheonath Kuar had been put in possession of certain portions thereof only for purposes of maintenance. On 4th November, 1927 Bal and his brother's wife Mst. Janakraj Kuar stated in the deed that she was in possession and enjoyment of the entire zamindari baqiat left by her husband, and that her nephews Lal and Bal and their mother, Mst. Sheonath Kuar had been put in possession of certain portions thereof only for purposes of maintenance. On 4th November, 1927 Bal and his brother's wife Mst. Lachhmiraj Kuar acting for herself and as guardian of her three minor step sons also executed a deed of relinquishment, Ex. D50, in favor of Ambika. Ambika in his turn executed a deed of gift, Ex. 2, transferring the entire estate of which be bad become the owner to Mst. Lachhmiraj Kuar and Mst Brijraj Kuar (wife of Bal). Later Mst. Lachhmiraj Kuar made a gift of a portion of the property to her step son Bijalpal Singh on 30th January, 1935 (Ex. 3). 2. The apparent result of Exts. 1, 2 and 3 was that Mst. Lachhmiraj Kuar, Mst. Brijraj Kuar and Bijaipal became the proprietors of the estate of Sitla. As such they instituted the suit, out of which this appeal arises, on 17th October, 1939, and sought possession of the properties detailed in the plaint against 46 persons. 3. Most of these 46 Defendants were transferees from Msts. Janakraj Kuar, Sarup Kuar and Sheonath Kuar or from Lal Bahadur Singh and Bal Bahadur Singh, and their names were recorded in revenue papers. Two of them, Bhaiya Sheo Prasad, Defendant No. 42 and Bhaiya Lalit Mohan Tandon, Defendant No. 43 had purchased the right, title and interest of Mst. Sarup Kuar in some of the properties at an auction sale In execution of a joint decree against her and Janakraj for a sum of Rs. 84. The Plaintiffs alleged that these Defendants were not entitled to remain in possession after the surrender of 1927 or at any rate after the death of Mst. Janakraj in 1931. Lal's two other sons namely Sheoraj and Avadhesh Pratap were impleaded as Defendants Nos. 39 and 40 and Ambika as Defendant No. 41 since their names were entered in the revenue records of villages Paraspatti and Hasanpur in respect of some portions of the property in suit though they had no title. So far as this part of the case (i e. against Defendants 39 to 41) is concerned there is no contest. The transferees who were Defendants Nos. So far as this part of the case (i e. against Defendants 39 to 41) is concerned there is no contest. The transferees who were Defendants Nos. 15 to 21 entered into a compromise. The proceedings were ex parte against Defendants Nos. 6, 24, 26, 28, 37, 42, 45 and 46. The suit was contested mainly by the remaining transferees and by one of the two auction purchasers. They disputed the Plaintiffs title and maintained that the persons from whom the contesting Defendants had acquired title had become full owners by adverse possession and that in any event the auction purchase by Defendants Nos. 42 and 43 was made in good faith. 4. On the pleadings of the parties the learned lower Court framed 15 issues. It found that the properties in suit were owned by Sitla Bux Singh and on his death by Mst. Janakraj Kuar as a Hindu widow, that the possession of Mst. Sarup Kuar and after her of Lal and Bal was permissive rather than adverse that, the auction purchasers were not entitled to the benefits of Section 41, Transfer of Property Act, that the relinquishment by Mst. Janakraj Kuar in favor of Ambika Prasad Singh who was at the time the nearest reversionary operated to confer upon him full proprietary interest in the property of Sitla Bux Singh, that the deed of gift, Ex. 2, operated as an effective conveyance of his proprietary rights to Plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2, namely Mst. Lachhmiraj Kuar and Mst. Brijraj Kuar, that Plaintiff No. 3 Bijaipal Singh had also therefore acquired a valid tide from his step-mother by virtue of Ex. 3 and that the transfers by Mst. Janakraj Kuar and those who held under her could not bind the Plaintiffs. The learned Civil Judge accordingly decreed the suit against the contesting Defendants other than Defendants Nos. 1, 7, 8, 12, 9, 10, 11 and 35, against whom the suit was dismissed. So far as Defendant No. 1 was concerned, he was found entitled to remain in possession of the properties covered by the deed of mortage, Ex. A3, till it was redeemed. The consideration of this mortgage was Rs. 3,000, but it was held to be valid only to the extent of Rs. 300. Against Defendants Ns. 15 to 21 the suit was decreed in terms of the compromise. 5. A3, till it was redeemed. The consideration of this mortgage was Rs. 3,000, but it was held to be valid only to the extent of Rs. 300. Against Defendants Ns. 15 to 21 the suit was decreed in terms of the compromise. 5. Three appeals have been preferred against the aforesaid decision of the learned Civil Judge. First Civil Appeal No. 6 of 1941 is by Bhaiya Lalit Mohan Tanlon who along with Bnaiya Shao Prasad claimed to have acquired certain properties in suit by auction purchase in the year 1910, Sheo Prasad has been made a Respondent, because he did not pin in the appeal. First Civil Appeal No. 20 is by Babu Bhaskar Pratap Sahi and others, Defendants Nos. 1, 4, 13, 41 and 29 to 34. First Civil Appeal No. 37 has been preferred by the Plaintiffs. It is directed against the finding of the lower Court in respect of the validity of Ex. A3 to the extent of Rs. 300. 6. The principal argument at the bar in Defendants' appeals relates to adverse possession. It is said on their behalf that if the plea of adverse possession succeeds, the surrender of 1927 in favor of Ambika must remain a dead letter, and the Plaintiffs, title must fail. It is, therefore, necessary to examine in some detail the nature of possession enjoyed by Mst. Sarup Kuar and by Lal and Bal. 7. It has already been stated that after the death of Sitla BUK Singh his property was mutated in favour of Ms's. Janakraj Kuar and Saruo Kuar. In the presence of Mst. Janakraj Kuar who was the widow of Sitla Bux Singh there can be no doubt that his mother Mst. Sirup Kuar could not succeed. The Defendants-Appellants claim that Mr. Sirup Kuar obtained mutation of half of the property inspire of the opposition of Mst. Janakraj Kuar. On the other hand the Plaintiffs maintain that the mutation in favor of the mother was permissive having been made with the consent of the widow The record of the mutation proceedings of 1888 is no longer available and the parties had to fall back upon evidence afforded by subsequent entries in the khewats, the conduct of widow and her mother-in-law during the letters lifetime and upon the deposition of Mst. Janakraj Kuar (Ex. D8), recorded on 20m March, 1910, in the second mutation case. Exs. Janakraj Kuar (Ex. D8), recorded on 20m March, 1910, in the second mutation case. Exs. 10, 11, 12 and 13 are khewats of the villages owned by Sitla Bux. The en res in the remark column reveal that originally mutation was made in favor of Mst. Janakraj Kuar alone by an order of the Assistant Collector, Mr. Katamat Husain, of 16th April, 1889. There was a review and the learned Assistant Collector passed of order on 28th May, 1889, whereby the property was mutated jointly in favor of the two ladies. Mst. Sirup Kuar apparently had no title to succeed in reference to Mst. Janakraj Kuar, and in a contest between the two it is diffract to believe that her claim to nation could succeed. We may mention that the joint entry is particularly significant and dispels the be of exclusiveness. If therefore we had no other evidence on the raced, it would be easy to hold that Mst. Sarup Kuar's name was entered by consent of her daughter in law. The deposition of Mst. Jarakraj Kuar, (Ex. D8), somewhat militates against this view and we will now pieced to consider whether it can be safely accepted as true. 8. We have already stated that this deposition was recorded in 1910 in course of the mutation proceedings consequent on the death of Mst. Sarup Kuar. Mst. Janakraj Kuar stated at the time that her mother-in-law with the help of her brother Gudar Singh fought cut the mutation case that she took a moiety share from the Sultanpur Court and that ever since the relations between the two ladies became inimical. She added that her mother-in-law's possession was against her wish, and that she had never consented to it. She admitted, however, that even after the mutation she resided in one and the same house with Mst. Sarup Knar, that the performed the family ceremonies jointly with her and that the sir lands were also joint. There is in addition documentary evidence which would show that from the time of mutation in 1889 up to 1907 Mst. Sarup Kuar and her daughter-in-law took joint debts and executed joint deeds (vide Exs. A13, All, A7, A9, A14, A4, A5, A10, A3 and A16), We have already mentioned that they executed also a joint will in 1896. There is in addition documentary evidence which would show that from the time of mutation in 1889 up to 1907 Mst. Sarup Kuar and her daughter-in-law took joint debts and executed joint deeds (vide Exs. A13, All, A7, A9, A14, A4, A5, A10, A3 and A16), We have already mentioned that they executed also a joint will in 1896. The recitals in this document disclose that far from being on terms of enmity there subsisted between them a community of interest, and they lived in harmony and on terms of peaceful cordiality. A13, All, A7, A9, A14, A4, A5, A10, A3 and A16), We have already mentioned that they executed also a joint will in 1896. The recitals in this document disclose that far from being on terms of enmity there subsisted between them a community of interest, and they lived in harmony and on terms of peaceful cordiality. The following passage taken from the aforesaid document will illustrate this Whereas, we the executants, have no male issue and this mortal life in unstable, and whereas it is necessary to manage the properties situate in district Sultanpur and Fjzabad, owned and possessed by us, the executants, so Bal Bahadur and Lal Bahadur who are related to me, Sarup Kuar, wife of Jaiman Singh as nawasas (daughter's sons; and to me, Janakraj Kaur wile of Sita Bux Singh as bhanjas (husband's lister's son-) and since the time of their birth up till this day they are living with the executants and they had been brought up and maintained by Sitla Bux Singh, deceased as his sons, and after his death, we, the executants, have brought them up in the same capacity, and we, the executants, as well as Sitla Bux Singh deceased, have performed all the religious ceremonies to example mundan (tonsure ceremony) etc., and Sitla Bux Singh hed also a desire to make a will, which he expressed to us, the executants, adding that his end was approaching then and that he could not execute any deed, that it was his will that if such stage might reach, that is, if he might die then alter his death Lal Bahadur and Bal Bahddur who were his sister's sons and were his heirs in reject of his property, owned and possessed by him, should get his entire property, owned and possessed by him, existing then or might accrue thereafter ; consequently, we, the executants, while in the enjoyment of sound health and unimpaired intellect, without reluctance and coercion, and in accordance with the will of Sitla Bux Singh, having declared Lal Bahadur and Bal Bahadur at present minors who are the heirs of the property owned and possessed by us, the executants, as our heirs, we hereby stipulate and reduce to writing that after our death they shall be the heirs. 9. These recitals would further show the affection that Sarup Kuar and Janakraj Kuar had for the sons of Mst. Sheonath Kuar. 9. These recitals would further show the affection that Sarup Kuar and Janakraj Kuar had for the sons of Mst. Sheonath Kuar. According to her own statement in Ex. D8 when on the death of Mst. Sarup Kuar, Ambika Prasad Singh desired to obtain mutation of the property which was entered in revenue papers in the name of the deceased, Janakraj Kuar felt that the property should be secured for Lal and Bal. We believe that this desire was responsible for her story in Ex. D8 about the contest between her and Sarup Kuar in 1889. The story is belied by her conduct and cannot be taken at its face value. We hold therefore that the possession of Mst. Sarup Kuar was permissive and she did not prescribe for any hostile title against Janakraj Kuar much less against the reversionary heir. 10. We have next to see whether the possession of Lal and Bal which commenced in 1910 after the death of Mst. Sarup Kuar ever ripened into prescriptive ownership. In the mutation proceedings of 1910 there were four persons in the filed viz., Ambika Prasad Singh, Mst. Janakraj Kuar, Lal Bahadur Singh and Bal Bahadur Singh. The reason why Mst, Janakraj Kuar claimed mentation in her own name was given by her in her deposition, Ex. D8 to which we have already referred. She stated that she had filed her objections, because she did not want Ambika Prasad Singh to get the property and that she had no objection, if Lal Bahadur Singh and Bal Bahadur Singh's names were substituted in place of her deceased mother-in-law. The learned Assistant Collector refused to accept the claim of Aabika Prasad Singh and of Lal and Bal and ordered mutation on 16th June, 1910, in favor of Janakraj Kuar. Ambika was content with the decision. Lal and Bal were not. They knew that Mst. Janakraj Kuar was in their favor, and once Ambika had been got rid of, there was no further obstacle in their way. Accordingly they appealed to the Court of the Deputy Commissioner, Sultanpur and imp leaded Mst. Janakraj Kuar alone as Respondent. There was a compromise. Janakraj Kuar withdrew her objection and gave her assent to the entry of the names of Lal and Bal in the revenue records. Accordingly they appealed to the Court of the Deputy Commissioner, Sultanpur and imp leaded Mst. Janakraj Kuar alone as Respondent. There was a compromise. Janakraj Kuar withdrew her objection and gave her assent to the entry of the names of Lal and Bal in the revenue records. In our opinion the proceedings of the mutation case of 1910 do not furnish the starting point of any hostile title. 11. We will next proceed to consider whether the possession of these two persons assumed adverseness at any later point of time. The evidence reveals that Lal and Bal were living with Mst. Janakraj Kuar and looked after the entire property which had come down from Sitla Bux, Half of this property stood in their names and the other half in the name of the widow. In or about the year 1915, Mst. Janakraj Kuar apparently came under the influence of Ambika and she preferred an application in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Office praying that she should be allowed to manage the property herself. The application was sect to the Tahsildar. His report, Ex. D5 says that Mst. Janakraj Kuar had filed the application at the instigation of Ambika Prasad Singh, Ranjit Singh and other persons, that Lal Bahadur Singh and Bal Bahadur Singh realized money in respect of their own share for which they paid land revenue and that the name of Mst. Janakraj Kuar was entered farzi. The repost, we think, is in many respects confused. It ignores for example the fact that the entry of the name of Mst. Janakraj Kuar in the revenue records with respect to half was based upon her title as a Hindu widow and that the possession of Lal Bahadur Singh and Bal Bahadur Singh over this half was merely as her agents. The Sub-Divisional Officer, however, accepted the report and dismissed Janakraj Kuar's application. Her endeavor to take the management in her own hands gave rise to disputes and to commencement of the proceedings u/s 145, Criminal Procedure Code. These proceedings terminated in an order passed by a Sub-Divisional Magistrate Sultanpur, on 21st February, 1916, declaring that Lal and Bal were in possession and that they were entitled to retain it until they were evicted there from in due course of law. These proceedings terminated in an order passed by a Sub-Divisional Magistrate Sultanpur, on 21st February, 1916, declaring that Lal and Bal were in possession and that they were entitled to retain it until they were evicted there from in due course of law. The learned Magistrate said that Lal Bahadur was lambardar of Paraspatti where the parties lived and interference I with his possession was unwarranted. He relied also on an earlier statement of Mst. Janakraj Kuar that Lal and Bal were the real proprietors and that her name was entered farzi in the khewats. 12. The Learned Counsel for the Defendants-Appellants claims that this order made it incumbent on Mst. Janakraj Kuar to move the Civil Court and to obtain precission within three years, and as she failed to do so, the possession of Lal and Bal matured into ownership at the expiry of that period by the combined effect of Article 47 and Section 28, Indian Limitation Act. We might also mention that in 1922 Lal Bahadur Singh applied for the removal of Mst. Janakraj Kuar's name from the revenue records on the allegations that it was entered by mistake and that she was not in actual possession. The lady did not appear though served with norice. Ambika objected saying that he was the next reversionary of Mst. Janakraj Kuar and that the entry of her name, if removed, would affect him prejudicially, but his objections were rejected presumably because he had no present right to the property. The result was that the Sub-Divisional Officer ordered on 23rd April 1923 that the name of the lady be removed and the names of Lal and Bal be entered instead. (See Ex. D4). We are not able to discover the extent of the property or the village to which this order related. It said that though Janakraj Kuar's name had been expunged by the order of the Deputy Commissioner in 1910 and that of Lal and Bal had been substituted, yet the entry of widow's name still remained. From this it would seem that Janakraj's name had continued to be recorded in respect of that half which was mutated in 1910 in favor of Lal and Bal and that this was unwarranted. There are however, some indications for the view that the order related to the whole of that property which was left over after the alienations. 13. From this it would seem that Janakraj's name had continued to be recorded in respect of that half which was mutated in 1910 in favor of Lal and Bal and that this was unwarranted. There are however, some indications for the view that the order related to the whole of that property which was left over after the alienations. 13. The arguments have been founded on these events of 1916 and 1923. (1) that after the order of the Criminal Court the inaction on the part of Mst. Janakraj Kuar for three years operated to invest Lal and Bal with full proprietary rights and to extinguish the entire interest of the widow in the property of her husband. (2) that in consequence of the extinction of Mst. Janakraj Kuar's interest and the removal of her name from the revenue records in 1923 she rendered herself incapable of making a surrender, and her deed, Ex. 1, in favor of Ambika could not, therefore, be effective. 14. After a careful consideration of the arguments at the bar we have come to the conclusion that these contentions are not entitled to succeed. 15. It is well known that possession cannot be adverse against a person who has no present right to possess. It follows that even if it was adverse against the widow, it could scarcely affect the reversionary, because his right to possession accrues only after her death or surrender. The order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate rendered it incumbent on Mst. Janakraj Kuar, if she wanted to recover possession, that she should agitate the matter in Civil Court within three years. Her failure to do so within the time specified in Article 47 of the Indian Limitation Act can at best operate to bar her right to file a suit subsequently. Ambika Prasad Singh, it is clear, was not bound by the order, since he was no party to the litigation. And if the order did not bind him, he could not otherwise maintain a civil suit because his reversionary right was no better than a mere spes successions till the widow's death. Section 28 of the Indian Limitation Act would at best extinguish Mst. Janakraj Kuar's rights to the property in 1919 but not those of Ambika Prasad. 16. It is urged for the Defendants that the decisions against Mst. Section 28 of the Indian Limitation Act would at best extinguish Mst. Janakraj Kuar's rights to the property in 1919 but not those of Ambika Prasad. 16. It is urged for the Defendants that the decisions against Mst. Janakraj Kuar by the Criminal Court in 1916 and by the Revenue Court in 1923 amounted to decrees or orders of competent Courts and since they were fairly and properly obtained against the widow who under Hindu Law represented the inheritance they would bind the reversionary heirs equally as well. In support of this proposition reliance is placed on the law laid down by Lord Justice Turner in Katama Natchier v. Srimut Raja Moottoo Vijaya Raganadha Bodha Gooroo Sawmy Periya Odaya Taver (7he Raja of Shivagunga) (1863) 9 Moo I.A. 539 at 543. The relevant observation runs thus the whole estate would for the time be vested in her, absolutely for some purposes though, in some respects, for a qualified interest; and until her death it could not be ascertained who would be entitled to succeed. The same principle which has prevailed in the Courts of this country as to tenants in tail representing the inheritance would seem to apply to the case of Hindu widow; and it is obvious that there would be the greatest possible inconvenience in holding that the succeeding heirs were not bound by a decree, fairly and properly obtained against the widow. 17. It is pointed out that in Hurrinath Chatterji v. Mohunt Mothoor Mohun Goswami (1893) 20 I.A. 183, the principle of the decision in Shiva Gunga case was applied and the same view was followed in Vaithialinga Madaltar v. Srirangath Anni (1925) 52 I.A. 322. In our opinion these cases do not support the contention because there as also in the decision of their Lordships' Board in Jaggo Bai v. Utasava Lal (1929) 56 I.A. 267, the decree against the female holder of the estate which was held to be binding on the succeeding reversionary involved the decision of a question of title and not a mere question of possession. In Srimati Rajlakshmi Dassi v. Bholanath Sen (1938) 65 I.A. 365 the rule in Shiva Gunga's case was explained by Lord Tankerton and it was confined to cases where a decree bad been fairly and properly obtained against a widow in a suit in which a question of title was in issue. 18. In Srimati Rajlakshmi Dassi v. Bholanath Sen (1938) 65 I.A. 365 the rule in Shiva Gunga's case was explained by Lord Tankerton and it was confined to cases where a decree bad been fairly and properly obtained against a widow in a suit in which a question of title was in issue. 18. It will be remembered that in cases of adverse possession against a female arising under the Limitation Act of 1859 it had been held on the principle of Shiva Gunga's case that she represented the inheritance even for purposes of limitation, that the cause of action which arose for the female arose also for the reversionary heir and that the bar against her operated as a bar against the reversionary also. When the Act of 1871 came to be passed, a fresh article was incorporated in it corresponding to present Article 141 and it gave to the reversionary a period of 12 years from the date of the female owner for instituting his suit for possession. This was apparently because the limited owner did not represent the estate for purposes of limitation. The decision of their Lordships in Jaggo Bat's case having confined the effect of Shiva Gunga's case to "decrees or other acts in law" in the widow's lifetime the result is that the reversionary heir in matters of limitation has the right to rely upon Article 141 and claim that his title is not barred by lapse of time against the widow. 19. It is not argued on behalf of the Defendants that inaction on the part of Mst, Janakraj Kuar from 1916 to 1919 and the extinguishment of her right to possession as a Hindu widow operated as her civil death in 1919 and the title of Lal Bahadur Singh and Bal Bahadur Singh in respect of the properties covered by the order u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure became absolute. The argument is unsound and innocuous. In the first place the inaction on the part of a widow cannot be placed on the same footing as her civil death. The Learned Counsel for the Appellants has not referred to any authority in support of the proposition that the death of a female referred to under Article 141 includes death by influx of time. In the first place the inaction on the part of a widow cannot be placed on the same footing as her civil death. The Learned Counsel for the Appellants has not referred to any authority in support of the proposition that the death of a female referred to under Article 141 includes death by influx of time. As far as we have been able to ascertain there is no case which goes the length of supporting this view. One of the modes in which civil death takes place is when the widow remarries and it has been held that in such a case the reversioner's suit for possession falls under Article 143 and not under Article 141. The reason is that the Plaintiff is considered to have become entitled by forfeiture and not by death-see Nathu v. Musammat Nai Bahu (1891) 29 I.C. 612, and Hassu v. Ibrahim (1933) 141 I.C. 399. In the second place Article 141 gives 12 years for a suit by a recessionary entitled to possession of immovable property on the death of the female and the time has to be computed from the date "when the female dies." Assuming that the inaction of Janakraj Kuar amounted to her civil death in 1919 the right of Ambika to recover the property still subsisted in 1927 when those who were prescribing against him surrendered their rights. 20. We may mention that there is yet another reason on the basis of which Ambika Prasad Singh is sought to be bound by the orders of 1910, 1915 and 1923. It is said that although he was not in fact a party to those litigations, he was intimately connected with them and was thus virtually a party. This argument on the face of it is untenable. Even if it be true that Ambika was helping Mst. Janakraj Kuar in those litigations, his act would not render the orders operative personally against him or generally against the reversionary. 21. The second argument impugns the validity of Janakraj Kuar's surrender, but it scarcely arises in view of what has been said above. The attack as formulated before us is twofold. Janakraj Kuar in those litigations, his act would not render the orders operative personally against him or generally against the reversionary. 21. The second argument impugns the validity of Janakraj Kuar's surrender, but it scarcely arises in view of what has been said above. The attack as formulated before us is twofold. It is said in the first place that the inaction of Janakraj Kuar till 1919 resulted in extinction of her right in the estate or her husband and the effect of this extinction was to render her incapable of executing a valid deed of surrender in 1927. In the second place it is contended that the surrender was merely a device to secure the property for the family of the widow's nephews. It is emphasized in this connection that the two nephews had been ever since their infancy the object of Janakraj Kuar's bounty. We think that in view of the fact that the first surrender was followed by a deed of relinquishment by those who were affecting to prescribe for a hostile title since 1919, the validity or otherwise of Janakraj Kuar's surrender became a matter of indifference. It was of course open to those who claimed an adverse right which bad not yet ripened into full proprietary title to abandon their possession as well as its adverseness. We may say, however, that neither of the two contentions advanced in course of the attack on Ex. 1, appear to us to be sound, because Mst. Janakraj Kuar passed to Ambika at the time of surrender the whole of the interest which she was then capable of passing for accelerating his succession and because on facts it would be difficult to bold that the document was collusive in the sense in which a surrender deed is rendered ineffective at Hindu Law. It is obvious that the deed did not bring about a division of the property between the widow or her nominees and the next presumptive reversionary and it did not enlarge the limited interest of Mst. Janakraj Kuar either. We are not prepared to consider in this connection the reasons which motivated her action. The conduct of Ambika in divesting himself of the entire estate violently militates against the theory of collusion or device. In our judgment therefore, the widow's surrender was valid. Janakraj Kuar either. We are not prepared to consider in this connection the reasons which motivated her action. The conduct of Ambika in divesting himself of the entire estate violently militates against the theory of collusion or device. In our judgment therefore, the widow's surrender was valid. It follows that Ambika's title was complete when he made gift in favour of Plaintiffs 1 and 2. The mere fact that Exs. 1, 2 and 3 were registered on the same day scarcely affects the question. 22. The gift in favor of Plaintiff No. 3 has not been impugned in this Court, and it follows from what has been said above that Plaintiffs had a right to challenge within 12 years of the widow's death the possession of the transferees who derived their right from her or from those whom she had permitted to remain in possession and enjoyment during her lifetime. 23. The lower Court, has found that there was no binding necessity for the alienations with which we are concerned in appeals Nos. 6 and 20. This finding has not been questioned and from what we have seen of the evidence we have no reason to differ. 24. There remains one small point which has been raised in the first of these two appeals, namely, that the auction sale under Ex. QQ25 held in execution of the decree against Mst. Sarup Kuar in 1910 was binding on the reversionary estate and is equally effective against the Plaintiffs. We have already mentioned that the sale had taken place in execution of a decree of Kanhai Lal lambardar for a sum of Rs. 84 against Mst. Janakraj Kuar and Mst. Sarup Kuar. The Defendants sought protection of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act but being auction purchasers this section could not help them. The title of Ambika Prasad Singh arose long after the sale, and the fact that he was made a party to the execution proceedings as a representative of Mst. Sarup Kuar could Scarcely make the sale binding on the reversion. As a person representing the reversionary interest he had no locus stand at that time to object to the sale of the property which was not in his possession. 25. This concludes First Civil Appeals Nos. 6 and 20 of 1941. 26. Sarup Kuar could Scarcely make the sale binding on the reversion. As a person representing the reversionary interest he had no locus stand at that time to object to the sale of the property which was not in his possession. 25. This concludes First Civil Appeals Nos. 6 and 20 of 1941. 26. In First Civil Appeal No. 37 of 1941 the Plaintiffs challenge the finding that out of the consideration of Rs. 3,000, mentioned in the possessor mortgage, Ex. A3, Rs. 300, were validly borrowed. The deed was jointly executed by Mst. Janakraj Kuar and Mst. Sarup Kuar on 16th January 1900 in favour of Rao Shankar Pratap Sahi. The details about the receipt of consideration in Ex. 43 would show that a sum of Rs. 300, was left with the mortgagee and was made payable to one Bishun Dutt Dube in whose favor Sitla Bux Singh had executed a mortgage deed, Ex. A6, on 22nd March, 1882. That the debt was duly discharged by Rao Shankar Pratap Sahi is proved by the receipt, Ex. A8, dated 26th May, 1901. It is contended on Appellants' behalf that there was no necessity to pay off the amount by borrowing at a high rate of interest. We may mention that the possessors mortgage does not stipulate for any payment of interest but in certain eventualities it provides that interest at 2 per cent per month would run. The payment of the husband's debt by the widow who has inherited property from him is a religious act and an essential duty. There being no restriction on her power of alienation to fulfill this duty we can see no reason to differ from the lower Court's opinion regarding the binding nature or Ex. A3 to the extent indicated. 27. The decision of the Court below, in our opinion, is sound. These appeals must, therefore, fail and are accordingly dismissed with costs.