JUDGMENT Pathak, J. - This execution second appeal is conecrned with the interpretation of S. 158, U.P. Tenancy Act of 1939. The facts are very short and may be stated as follows: The decree-holders, the appellants, held a decree for arrears of rent against the respondent in execution of which the respondent was ejected from his holding on 18-8-1939. It appears that in the meantime arrears of rent for a period subsequent to the one in respect of which the aforesaid decree was passed also fell due and on 3-10-1939 the decree-holders filed another suit for recovery of arrears of rent for this subsequent period and obtained a decree on 24-10-1939 in respect of such arrears. All these proceedings had taken place in accordance with the provisions of the Agra Tenancy Act of 1926. On 1-1-1940, the U.P. Tenancy Act of 1939 came into force. On 9-7-1940, the decree-holders made an application for execution of the decree passed on 24-10-1939. The judgment-debtor took an objection that in accordance with the provisions of S. 158, U.P. Tenancy Act of 1939, the arrears of rent in respect of which the decree under execution had been passed should be deemed to have been paid and, therefore, the execution application was not maintainable. This plea has been upheld by both the Courts below and the execution application has been dismissed. The decree-holders have come up in appeal to this Court and it has been urged on their behalf that S. 158, U.P. Tenancy Act of 1939 has no retrospective effect and applies only cases in which a tenant is ejected after 1-1-1940, the date on which that Act came into force. In my judgment, the contention of learned counsel for the appellant must prevail. Section 158, U.P. Tenancy Act of 1939, which is a new provision, is in the following terms : Subject to the provisions of Ss. 159 and 160, when a tenant is ejected from the whole or any portion of his holding in execution of a decree or order of ejectment for arrears of rent, all arrears of rent, whether decreed or not, due in respect of such holding on the date of the delivery of possession shall be deemed to have been paid. For the purposes of this case, Ss. 158 and 160 are not relevant and may be left out of account. For the purposes of this case, Ss. 158 and 160 are not relevant and may be left out of account. The natural and grammatical meaning of the expression "is ejected" is that the tenant is ejected in accordance with the provisions of the U.P. Tenancy Act of 1939 and there is nothing in the context to suggest that this expression means "has been ejected" prior to the coming into force of that Act. As has been stated by me above, there was no corresponding provision in the Agra Tenancy Act of 1926, and on the date of ejectment, namely 18-8-1939 the arrears of rent which were due on that date could not be deemed to have been paid. On 1-1-1940 when the U.P. Tenancy Act of 1939 came into force, the arrears of rent in respect of which the decree had been passed were outstanding and one would have expected the Legislature to have used clearer language if its intention had been to extinguish the right of the landlord to the arrears of rent, which were outstanding on the date when this Act came into force. The language used by the statute does not compel a construction which would have the result of depriving the landlord of his right to recover the arrears of rent due on the date when the Act came into force and I do not see any reason to depart from what appears to me to be the plain and grammatical construction of the section. 2. I am glad to find that the view that I am inclined to take has been taken by the Board of Revenue as well as by the Oudh Chief Court. See the cases in ('41) 1941 A.W.R. Rev. 274, Radhika Prasad v. Jiwan, ('42) 1942 A.W.R. Rev. 74, Ganga Prasad v. Dwarka Prasad and AIR 1944 86 (Oudh) 3. The result is that I allow this appeal, set aside the orders passed by the Courts below and direct the Court of first instance to proceed with the execution application in accordance with law. The appellants will get their costs, hitherto incurred from the respondent in all the Courts.