JUDGMENT Benett, J. - This is a Defendants' appeal. The suit out of which it has arisen was brought by certain pre-emptors, Respondents in the appeal, to recover a sum of Rs. 700, which they were obliged to pay to protect from sale in execution of a decree the property which they had pre-empted. The sum which they actually paid with this object was Rs. 3,143, but the greater part of this was taken into account in determining the amount to be paid by them in order to pre-empt the property. One of the questions which we shall have to consider and which we do not think has received sufficient attention from the Courts below is whether such a suit was maintainable. 2. The property consists of a third share in certain zamindari property in a village of the Bareilly district. Bhagwat Prasad, one of the Defendants in the suit, was the owner of this property. In 1930 be executed two simple mortgages, hypothecating it in favour of L. Ram Dhan Das. The latter obtained a decree on these mortgages in 1934, the amount due under the decree after amendment in 1936 being Rs. 2,821 for the payment of which instalments were allowed. 3. Some time after this Bhagwat Prasad executed a usufructuary mortgage of the property in favour of the present Appellants or their predecessors in interest. The sum of Rs. 2,821, due to Ram Dhan Das, was left with them for payment to him. Of this sum only Rs 450 was paid. 4. On the 2nd November, 1940, Bhagwat Prasad executed a sale deed of the property in favour of the usufructuary mortgagees for Rs. 10,500, the amount due under the decree for the payment of which they had previously assumed liability being part of the sale consideration. 5. The pre-emption suit was brought by Respondents in 1941 and was decreed on the 22nd January, 1942, subject to payment of Rs. 8,229 within one month. This amount was paid. No appeal was preferred against the decree. 6. Ram Dhan Das sold his decree to other persons and to save the property from sale in execution proceedings the Respondents satisfied the decree by payment, as stated, of Rs. 3,143. 7. The sum of Rs. 8,229 which the Respondents were required to pay in order to preempt the property was arrived at in this way. The decretal liability of Rs. 3,143. 7. The sum of Rs. 8,229 which the Respondents were required to pay in order to preempt the property was arrived at in this way. The decretal liability of Rs. 2,371 (that is. Rs. 2,821 less Rs. 450 paid) was deducted from the sale price of Rs. 10,500 (leaving Rs. 8,129) and the Respondents were required to pay the vendees a further sum of Rs. 100 on account of the sale deed. But interest had been running on me decretal amount and consequently to satisfy the mortgage decree the Respondents had to pay Rs. 3,143, or Rs. 772 more than the amount (Rs. 2,371) allowed for this purpose in the pre-emption decree. The Respondents assumed liability for costs of execution and inerest accrued from the date of the pre-emption decree and thus claimed only Rs. 700. Their case was that as the vendees bad assumed liability for payment of the mortgage decree when Bhagwat Prasad first of all mortgaged and them sold the property to them they were entitled on acquiring the property to recover from the vendees the amount which they had had to pay, over and above the amount allowed for this purpose in the pre-emption decree, as but for the failure of the vendees to carry out their undertaking to satisfy the decree no such burden would have fallen on them. In other words they claimed to enforce against the vendees the right which Bbagawat Prasad would bare enjoyed against them aS mortgagees had he retained the property and satisfied the decree on the mortgagee's failure to do so. The Courts below after considering various arguments concluded that the suit should be decreed. The train argument advanced against this view appears to have been that there was no privity of contract between the Plaintiffs (that is, the present Respondents) and the Defendants. The Munsif rejected this argument, observing as follows: The result of the pre-emptin decree was that the Plaintiffs were substituted in place of Defendants 1 to 3 (the vendees) so far as sale transaction was concerned. The equity of redemption sold by Bhagwat Prasad came to the Plaintiffs and they came in the position of Bhagwat Prasad, the mortgager, Defendants 1 to 8 remained mortgagees. Whatever rights Bhagwat Prasad had are available to the Plaintiffs. The equity of redemption sold by Bhagwat Prasad came to the Plaintiffs and they came in the position of Bhagwat Prasad, the mortgager, Defendants 1 to 8 remained mortgagees. Whatever rights Bhagwat Prasad had are available to the Plaintiffs. The mortgagor could file a suit for damages against Defendants 1 to 8 for the loss caused to him as in the usufructuary deed Defendants 1 to 3 took upon themselves to pay the amount and there was implied guarantee of indemnity to protect the mortgagor from any loss arising to him by the non-fulfilment of the contract. The same right is available to the Plaintiffs. 8. The Munsif also held that as Bhagwat Prasad had retained no interest in the property the Plaintiffs had no cause of action against him. Bhagwat Prasad has accordingly not been impleaded as a Respondent in this appeal. 9. The district Judge considered some other aspects of the legal position (some of his remarks being rather difficult to follow) but came substantially to the same conclusion, though he appears to have thought that strictly speaking the Plaintiffs should have recovered the amount from Bhagwat Prasad who could then have recovered it from the usufructuary mortgagees who had contracted with him. He said. In fact it is practically conceded by the Appellants that the Plaintiffs could recover this amount from Bhagwat Prasad who could recover it in turn from the Defendants and this would merely lead to multiplicity of litigation and as in equity there is certainly a moral responsibility upon the Defendants 1 to 3 to pay up the full decretal amount, I think it would be encouraging litigation to force the parties to go about it in such a round about manner merely on the basis of what is rather a academic argument. 10. We do not deny the Appellant's moral or indeed legal responsibility so far as Bhagwat Prasad is concerned, had the property remained in his hands, but we think the Courts below have not taken adequately into consideration the facts subsequent to the usufructuary(sic) mortgage. There may be more ways than one of locking at the matter but the facts which seem to us to have a substartial(sic) bearing on the legal position are these. When the mortgagees purchased the property in 1940 they took it subject to the liability under the decree of 1934 36. There may be more ways than one of locking at the matter but the facts which seem to us to have a substartial(sic) bearing on the legal position are these. When the mortgagees purchased the property in 1940 they took it subject to the liability under the decree of 1934 36. The result of the pre-emption decree was that the Plaintiffs-Respondents stepped into their shoes; they accepted liability in their place and it is clear that this was understood and that effect was intended to be given to it in the preemption decree, as they were allowed credit for the amount received by the mortgagees for the purpose of satisfying the decree. Nor were they ignorant of the fact that this amount was then inadequate for this purpose; their plaint clearly shows that they knew that more would have to be paid to satisfy the decree. It the Munsif who passed the pre-emption decree was justified in giving partial effect to the Appellants' liability and making deduction from the sale price to the extent stated-- and this is not disputed we see no reason why be should cot have given full effect to it and deducted from the sale price the whole amount which, on calculation, might have been found due under the decree. This possibility, however, was apparently not brought to the notice of the Court by the pre-emptions and it does not appear to have occurred to the Court itself. But if the relief for which the pre-emptors now ask could and should have been obtained in the pre-emption suit, we cannot bold that the pre emptors are entitled to raise the question in a later suit. It seems to us to be implicit in the judgment in the pre-emption suit that the rights of the parties in the matter were adjudicated upon fully as regards the terms upon which the Plaintiffs could preempt, and that the effect of the Appellants' liability to satisfy the decree was taken into consideration. If the Plaintiffs were not satisfied with the finding that they had to pay as much as Rs. 8,229 to obtain the property subject to the charge upon it under the mortgage decree, they could have appealed from the pre-emption decree on the ground that this amount should have been reduced by the interest which they would have to pay in addition to the sum of Rs. 8,229 to obtain the property subject to the charge upon it under the mortgage decree, they could have appealed from the pre-emption decree on the ground that this amount should have been reduced by the interest which they would have to pay in addition to the sum of Rs. 2,371 allowed for. We see no reason to distinguish between this sum and the interest which had accrued on it. The vendees took the property from Bhagwat Prasad subject to the liability as it stood at the time of the sale and cot as it stood at the time of the mortgage and the fact that at the time of the mortgage that liability was for a smaller sum is in our opinion immeterial. The Plaintiffs asked to be substituted for the vendees and they succeeded in their suit. The possibility that if the legal position had been better appreciated they might have been required to pay less than Rs. 8,229 is no ground for allowing them to re-open the matter in another suit. 11. We are unable therefore to agree with the Courts below that the present suit was maintainable. We allow the appeal, set aside the decrees of the Courts below and dismiss the suit with costs to the Appellants throughout.