JUDGMENT Ghulam Hasan and Kaul, JJ. - These appeals were referred by one of us u/s 14(2) of the Oudh Courts Act for disposal by a Bench of this Court. 2. A preliminary objection was raised to the maintainability of the appeals on behalf of the Respondent. In order to properly appreciate this objection it is necessary to set out the facts briefly. The Plaintiff-Appellant filed two suits u/s 108(2) of the Oudh Rent Act before the Assistant Collector of the second class on the 15th June 1938. The rent was paid by the Defendant-Respondent during the pendency of the suit and the Assistant Collector, therefore, decreed the suits for sway items only. The suits were decreed on the 25th February and the 8th March, 1939. Two appeals were preferred to the Collector u/s 116(a) and both were dismissed on the 13th July, 1939. Appeals were taken to the District Judge on the 19th September, 1939, u/s 119A and they were allowed on the 7th May, 1940, with the result that both the suits were dismissed, The Plaintiff has preferred a third appeal in each of the two cases u/s 269 of the U.P. Tenancy Act No. XVII of 1939. the objection raised on behalf of the Respondent is that no third appeal can lie. 3. It is agreed that if the right to appeal is governed by the old Oudh Rent Act, these appeals are not maintainable, and this is settled by a decision of the Full Bench in Goya Prasad v. Kalap Nath 1 It was also held there that no revision lies u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is, however, urged that the new Act applies and u/s 269 an appeal lies to this Court from the appellate decree of a District Judge on any of the grounds specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. (See Section 269). We are of opinion that the preliminary objection has force and must be upheld. 4. Section 269 in our opinion, cannot be availed of by the Appellant to confer on him a right of third appeal. A reference to a few of the preceding sections will make the position at once clear. Section 263 lays down that no appeal shall lie from any decree or order passed by any Court under this Act except as provided in this Act. A reference to a few of the preceding sections will make the position at once clear. Section 263 lays down that no appeal shall lie from any decree or order passed by any Court under this Act except as provided in this Act. It is obvious that before an appeal can be entertained against a decree or order it must be shown that the decree or order is passed by any Court under the provisions of the U.P. Tenancy Act (XVII of 1939) and under no other. Section 264 allows an appeal to the Collector from every decree of the Assistant Collector of the second class No appeal appears to have been provided against the appellate decree of a Collector except to the limited extent mentioned in Section 266, which permits an appeal to the District Judge from the appellate decree of the Collector in any suit in which a question of jurisdiction has been decided and is in issue in appeal, i.e. if the question of jurisdiction has not been decided by the Collector in the exercise of his appellate jurisdiction and the same is not in issue in appeal before the District Judge the order of the Collector passed u/s 264 must be regarded as final and conclusive. Section 265 clearly permits an appeal to the District Judge from the Original decree of the Assistant Collector first class or of the Collector in a certain class of suits and to the Commissioner in certain other classes. Sub-section (3) of this section also allows an appeal to the District Judge from the original decree of an Assistant Collector of the first class or of the Collector in all suits, in which a question of jurisdiction has been decided and is in issue in appeal. Section 267 gives a right of an appeal to the Board from the appellate decree of the Commissioner. Section 269 authorizes an appeal to the High Court from the appellate decree of a District Judge passed u/s 266 and in no other case, Learned Counsel for the Appellant made a feeble attempt to show that the words of Section 259 were not subject to any restriction and the appellate decree of a District Judge passed under whatever law was appeasable to the High Court under the provisions of Section 269. This argument scarcely deserves serious consideration. This argument scarcely deserves serious consideration. In the present case the appellate decree of the District Judge was a decree passed under the provisions of the old Oudh Rent Act, which was repealed by Section 2(2) of the U.P. Tenancy Act (No. XVII of 1939). There is hardly any merit in the contention that the Legislature in allowing appeal to the High Court from the appellate decree of a District Judge u/s 269 would be referring to the appellate decree of a District Judge given under the provisions of the repealed Act, Then again, the decree of a District Judge must have been passed on appeal from the decision of a Collector in which a question of jurisdiction had been decided and the same question formed the subject-matter of consideration in appeal before him. Admittedly these conditions are absent in the present case. From a careful examination of the provisions of the new U.P. Tenancy Act relating to appeals it follows that these appeals are not competent u/s 269 of the Act. 5. The matter may be looked at from another point of view. Section 296 is the only section in the new Tenancy Act which lays down that a suit pending at the commencement of the Act namely on the 1st January, 1940 shall be decided in accordance with the corresponding provision of the Act and if there is no such corresponding provision, the proceedings relating to such suit shall be quashed. This makes no provision for the disposal of the appeal pending at the commencement of the Act and this Court has held that the section applies to pending suits and not to appeals. See Bhagwati Prasad v. Ram Lautan 1940 O.A. 496 : A.W.R. (CC) 279 : O.W.N. 621 and Shea Rakhan Lal v. Sunder Lal 1940 O.A. 1054 : A.W.R. (CC) 476 : O.W.N. 1123. 6. It has been contended on the authority of the Full Bench decision in Debi Prasad v. Phundan Lal 1942 O.A. 189 : A.W.R. (CC) 177 : O.W.N. 251 that as the appeals were decided by the District Judge after the new Tenancy Act came into force, the right to further appeal should be deemed to be governed by the provision of the new Act. The case, however, is clearly distinguishable. The case, however, is clearly distinguishable. It was a case in which a right of second appeal had been conferred by the insertion of a new provision in Section 45 of the Encumbered Estates Act. 7. There was an amendment of the law and a new right was conferred. Such is howewer, not the case here. Here the old Tenancy Act has been repealed altogether and has been replaced by an entirely new Act. u/s 6(e) of the U.P. General Clauses Act (No. 1 of 1904) it is clearly laid down that where any United Provinces Act repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not (e) affect any remedy or any investigation or legal proceeding commenced before the repealing Act shall have come into operation in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid and any such remedy may be, enforced and any such investigation or legal proceeding may be continued and concluded and any such penalty, forfeiture, or punishment imposed as if the repealing Act had not been passed. This section is practically the same as Section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act of 1897 which was interpreted by the Federal Court in AIR 1944 1 (Federal Court) . as follows: On the principle embodied in Section 6(e) the result of the repeal of a enactment on esses pending a the time of the repeal would be that they would continue the enactment had not been repeald. But this is subject to the qualification that repealing enactment contains no provision or indication to the contrary. 8. It cannot be pretended in the present case that there is any provision or indication to the contrary in the new Tenancy Act (No. XVII of 1939). Counsel for the Appellant while admitting that Section 269 applied only to pending suit expressed his difficulty as to what would happen to the appeals pending at the commencement of the new Act. The answer to this appears to follow from Section 296 itself. If the Legislature thought fit to provide for the pending suits only, the pending appeals must obviously be governed by the old law under which they were filed. 9. We may also refer to a Full Bench decision in Ram Singha v. Shankar Dayal (1928) 50 All. The answer to this appears to follow from Section 296 itself. If the Legislature thought fit to provide for the pending suits only, the pending appeals must obviously be governed by the old law under which they were filed. 9. We may also refer to a Full Bench decision in Ram Singha v. Shankar Dayal (1928) 50 All. 965 where it was held that the right to appeal in the case of a suit filed under the provisions of the old Tenancy Act must be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit and not by the law that prevailed at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal when the new Act had come into force. 10. The case in Chotey Singh v. Dan Sahai 1943 O.W.N. 1157 cited by the Appellant does not help him at all. That was a case in which a suit pending was, u/s 296 of the Act, decided in accordance with the provisions of the Act and hence it was held that the appeal against the decree lay under the new Act even if the decree was not appeasable under the old Act. 11. Accordingly we uphold the preliminary objection and dismiss these appeals with costs.