JUDGMENT Biswas, J. - This is an appeal on behalf of the Plaintiffs the Berhampore Bank Ltd., against a new decree passed on the application of the Defendant under the Bengal Money Lenders Act. The admitted facts are that on the 7th December, 1930, the Defendant borrowed a sum of Rs. 6,000 from the Plaintiff Bank on executing a promissory note in their favour, stipulating to pay interest at the rate of 13 per cent. per annum. On the 28th August, 1934, a suit was instituted on the promissory note, and on the 16th April, 1935, a solenama decree was passed therein for a sum of Rs. 9, 115-5-0, which was made payable in six equal instalments extending from Chaitra 1342 to Chaitra 1347 B. S. It appears that thereafter the Defendant paid a sum of over Rs. 5.400 to the decree-holders under the decree. On the 30th August, 1941, the decree-holders put the decree into execution for recovery of the balance due, and while that proceeding was pending, the Defendant made an application under the Bengal Money Lenders Act, which had in the meantime come into force. On such application the decree was re-opened and a new decree was passed on the 11th April, 1942, for a sum of Rs. 5, 337-4-9 pies, payable in ten equal annual kists, the first of such kists to be paid in Chaitra 1349 B. S. and the last in Chaitra 1358 B. S. It is against this new decree that the present appeal is directed, and the points that have been raised on behalf of the Appellants are firstly, that the number of instalments should have been much less than ten and secondly, that the court should have imposed certain conditions as to security as contemplated by the Act. So far as the question of instalments is concerned, there was evidence on behalf of the judgment-debtor; an officer of his was examined who stated that the judgment-debtor had other debts in respect of which instalments had been granted by the court and that there had been a fall in his income. It was elicited in cross-examination that his income was about Rs. 2,000/- a year. The suggestion that it was in the neighbourhood of Rs. 15,000/- was denied. The judgment-debtor owned several properties in zamindari right for which he paid a total revenue of Rs. 3,000/- a year. It was elicited in cross-examination that his income was about Rs. 2,000/- a year. The suggestion that it was in the neighbourhood of Rs. 15,000/- was denied. The judgment-debtor owned several properties in zamindari right for which he paid a total revenue of Rs. 3,000/- a year. He also owned two gardens and several bighas of khas lands. In re-examination the witness stated that the judgment-debtor had a large family to maintain. There was no witness examined on behalf of the Plaintiff Bank. A point was sought to be made on behalf of the Appellants that they had evidence available to prove that the circumstances of the judgment-debtor were much better than had been deposed to by the witness. There is nothing, however, to show that such evidence was offered by the Bank, or that the court denied any opportunity to the Bank to offer that evidence. The objection taken on this ground cannot, therefore, be entertained. The position accordingly is that there was the evidence of the Defendant, before the court, and upon consideration of such evidence the Court was of opinion that payment in ten instalments was the proper order to make. We do not think that there are any materials on the record which should induce us to hold that the learned Judge in the Court below did not exercise his discretion properly in this matter. 2. The next question is as to whether the Court should have imposed any conditions as to security or otherwise. It need not be disputed that under sec. 34 (1) (b) of the Bengal Money Lenders Act, the Court may impose such conditions as it thinks fit. Our attention was drawn to the case of Promode Nath Singha, Roy v. Sm. Raseswari Dassi 46 C. W. N. 153 (1941) where Mitter and Akram, JJ., held that u/s 34 of the Act the Court has power, when directing payment of instalments in the case of simple unsecured loan, to impose suitable conditions on the judgment-debtor. Such conditions may, for example, take the form of an attachment of any property of the judgment-debtor, or of a charge being declared on such property. In this particular case the learned Judge apparently did not think fit to impose any conditions. The question is, first, whether under the law he was bound to impose, some conditions, and secondly, if he was, what those conditions should be. In this particular case the learned Judge apparently did not think fit to impose any conditions. The question is, first, whether under the law he was bound to impose, some conditions, and secondly, if he was, what those conditions should be. Mr. Bagchi on behalf of the Appellant argued that in cases arising under sec. 34 (1) (b), the language used in the statute made it obligatory on the Court to impose some conditions on the judgment-debtor. The relevant portion in the section is that in suits in respect of loans, other than those referred to in clause (a) of the section the Court shall order inter alia that the amount of the decree shall, "subject to such conditions as the Court may impose," be payable without interest in such number of annual instalments etc., as he Court thinks fit. The words "subject to such conditions as the Court may impose," in our opinion, mean that it is as much in the discretion of the Court to decide whether any conditions should be imposed at all, as it is within its discretion to specify the conditions, where it chooses to impose any. We do not think that the court is required to impose conditions in each and every case, and that the only matter that is left to its discretion is to determine what the conditions should be. We must give the words occurring in the Act their plain and ordinary meaning, and we do not think that they are capable of bearing the construction which the learned Advocate for the Appellant seeks to put upon them. 3. The question, therefore, that arises in the present case is whether it was a fit case for imposing any conditions. In this connection it is necessary to bear in mind that the parties the selves had originally agreed to the passing of a consent decree which was made payable in instalments. It is doubtless true that where instalments are allowed under Or. 20, rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if there is default in payment of any one instalment, the Court may direct that the whole amount shall be paid. It is not open to the Court to make a default order in such terms under the provisions of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act. To that extent the position of the decree-holder is less secure. It is not open to the Court to make a default order in such terms under the provisions of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act. To that extent the position of the decree-holder is less secure. All the same, so far as the present case is concerned, it does not appear that there was any default on the part of the judgment-debtor in carrying out his obligation regarding the payment of instalments, either under the original decree or under the new decree. Mr. Mukherjee appearing on behalf of the judgment-debtor stated to us that his clients had duly deposited the instalments which were due under the new decree in Court. Mr. Bagchi was not in a position to contradict that statement. In any case, we are satisfied that upon the materials before us there are no grounds for holding that the Court did not exercise its discretion properly in refusing to impose any conditions. 4. It is necessary to add that the whole of the arguments has proceeded on the assumption that sec. 34 (1) (b) applies, but whether this assumption is correct, or the case is really governed by the provisions of sec. 36 (2) (d), is a matter on which we express no opinion. The result is that in our judgment the appeal fails, and is dismissed with costs, hearing-fee being assessed at two gold-mohurs. Chakravartti, J. I agree.