JUDGMENT Malik, J. - This is a defendant's appeal. The plaintiffs filed a suit under S. 33, U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act of 1934 for accounts of money due to the defendant from the plaintiffs and for a declaration of the amounts so due. The transactions which ultimately resulted in a mortgage dated 26th June 1925, executed by the plaintiffs in favour of the defendant and which was subsequently renewed by another mortgage dated 19th June 1931, between the same parties have been fully set out in the judgments of the Courts below. 2. The learned Munsif held that the mortgages of 1925 and 1931 did not refer to transactions which could be called loans within the meaning of that expression in the Debt Redemption Act (XIII [13] of 1940). The reason given by him was that at no stage the defendant advanced any money to the plaintiffs. 3. On appeal the lower appellate Court held that in view of the fact that the liability of payment of the consideration under the sale deed had subsequently been changed into the liability as mortgagors under the mortgage deeds dated 26th June 1925 and 19th June 1931 the transactions as evidenced by the latter two documents do in fact amount to loans. He, however, remanded the case to the trial Court with directions that the case might be disposed of according to law after taking accounts between the parties. 4. So far as the remand order is concerned, no objection can be taken to it as the plaintiffs would, in any case, be entitled to a decree for accounts and for a declaration under S. 83, Agriculturists' Relief Act, whether the debts due from them were loans as defined under the Debt Redemption Act or the Agriculturists' Belief Act or were not. The lower Court has observed as follows: The crucial point for consideration in this appeal is as to whether or not the transaction under the mortgage deed dated 26th June 1925, does or does not amount to a loan because if it does not, the suit would not be maintainable under S. 33, Agriculturists' Relief Act. The lower Court has observed as follows: The crucial point for consideration in this appeal is as to whether or not the transaction under the mortgage deed dated 26th June 1925, does or does not amount to a loan because if it does not, the suit would not be maintainable under S. 33, Agriculturists' Relief Act. The view of the learned Judge that if the transaction did not amount to a "loan" the suit for accounts and for a declaration of the amounts due would not be maintainable under S. 33 of the Act, does not seem to be correct as a reference to the first sub-Section would show that the word 'loan' is not mentioned in it at all. An agriculturist debtor is entitled under sub-s. (1) Of S. 33 to sue for an account of money lent or advanced to, or paid for him by any person, or due by him to any person as the price of goods or on a written or unwritten engagement for the payment of money, and of money paid by him to such person. It would be clear that the words of the sub-S are wide enough to include liabilities which may not come strictly under the definition of the word 'loan' in the Debt Redemption Act or the Agriculturists' Relief Act. 5. The only relevancy of the determination of the question whether the amounts due are 'loans' as defined in the Debt Redemption Act or the Agriculturists Relief Act is that in calculating the rate of interest if the amounts are loans as defined in the Debt Redemption Act, Ss. 8 and 9 of that Act would apply. If, on the other hand, they are loans as defined in the Agriculturists' Relief Act and not under the Debt Redemption Act, the relevant sections of the Agriculturists' Relief Act would be applicable. If the amounts are not loans under either of the two Acts, then the plaintiffs would be entitled to the benefit of only the Usurious Loans Act. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the expression of the opinion of the learned Civil Judge that the amount due under the mortgage dated 26-6-1925, was a loan under the Debt Redemption Act would prejudice him as the trial Court would calculate the interest in accordance with the provisions of the Debt Redemption Act. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the expression of the opinion of the learned Civil Judge that the amount due under the mortgage dated 26-6-1925, was a loan under the Debt Redemption Act would prejudice him as the trial Court would calculate the interest in accordance with the provisions of the Debt Redemption Act. He has urged that we should hold in his favour that the amounts due under the mortgages of 1925 and 1931 are not loans as defined under the Debt Redemption Act. We do not, however, see how we can do that. The defendant's father had advanced two sums of money to Brij Behari Lal in the years 1918 and 1919 with the result that Brij Behari Lal was the debtor and Roshan Lal, father of the defendant, was the creditor. Brij Behari Lal died and his sons sold certain properties to the plaintiffs and left some money in their hands to pay off the debts due to Roshan Lal. The plaintiffs instead of paying up Roshan Lal paid him in part and for the rest executed a mortgage in his favour on 26-6-1925. From these facts, it is clear that the defendant, who is the son of Roshan Lal, Roshan Lal having died, agreed to change his debtor and treat the plaintiffs as his debtors in place of Brij Behari Lal, the original debtor. 7. Learned counsel has further argued that as the sum of Rs. 5200 for which the mortgage was executed, either wholly or in part at some time represented the unpaid purchase money, it can, in no case, ever amount to a loan. With that proposition we are not prepared to agree. 8. Learned counsel has referred us to the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Hajee Mohd. Shibli Khan Vs. Ish Datt Dikshit, AIR 1939 All 398 In that case the mortgage transaction was between the vendor and the vendee. Without expressing any opinion as to the correctness of that decision, all that we need say is that the facts of that case are entirely different. In the case before us, the mortgage deed was executed by the plaintiffs who had purchased some property in favour of not their vendor but in favour of an entirely third party, a creditor of the vendor. In the case before us, the mortgage deed was executed by the plaintiffs who had purchased some property in favour of not their vendor but in favour of an entirely third party, a creditor of the vendor. We do not see how we can hold that this is not a transaction which is a loan and that the mortgage debt does not in substance amount to an advance as defined in the U.P. Debt Redemption Act. There is no force in this appeal and we dismiss it with costs.