JUDGMENT Misra and Madeley, JJ. - This judgment will cover First Appeal No. 53 of 1942 and Miscellaneous Appeal No. 77 of 1941. 2. The facts of the case are that Raj Karan Lal was a resident of district Sultanpur. He practiced as a revenue Agent in Fyzabad. He acquired the property in suit, the bulk of which is situated it; Suitaupur district. IN 1906 HE opened a Vedic PailsPala at Pasli;for feeding the AIYA (sic) On the 20th December, 1907, i.e. executed await under which he decided his estate it his own two widows and the widow of his brother for life and the (sic)nder to I am Anand Prasad. the latter is the son of RajKaran Lal's brother's daughter, Pesides this povision there was a legacy of Rs. 25 per me(sic)em for the School at Kashi, but if a school could be opened in his owu village for the same purpose, this legacy was to be transferred to that school. On the 3rd November, 1911, he executed a deed of endowment of some of his prophecies in favour if the Arya Samaj Patbshala at Fyzabad. This deed of endowment is Exh. 2, and it contains among other things the following entry, Momo: I had executed a will with respect to the rest of my property in favor of Bachcha Ram Anand daughter's son of my younger brother, on the 20th December. 1907, and got it registered on the 21st December, 1907, in the office of the Sub-Registrar Jagdishpur, district Sultanpur, and had made him the last owner on certain conditions, but on account of his misbehavior and bad character, I have cancelled the will as far as he or his relations are concerned. 3. On the 18th January, 1921, Ram Anand Prasad, along with two of the. widows, obtained probate of the will. Their application is Exh. A-3. In this the revocation of the will was not disclosed. On the 30th November, 1931, this lest of the life-estate holders died and the reversion opened. In the absence of any testamentary disposition in favor of Ram Anand Prasad Plaintiffs 2 to 5 were the nearest reversionary. On the 23rd December, 1932, Ram Anand Prasad obtained mutation over the property of Raj Karan Lal. On the 30th November, 1931, this lest of the life-estate holders died and the reversion opened. In the absence of any testamentary disposition in favor of Ram Anand Prasad Plaintiffs 2 to 5 were the nearest reversionary. On the 23rd December, 1932, Ram Anand Prasad obtained mutation over the property of Raj Karan Lal. The Plaintiffs filed this suit for possession on the 20th August, 1939, alleging that Plaintiffs 2 to 5 were the nearest reversionary on the death of the widow in 1931 and that Ram Anand Prasad the Defendant has no right or title to the property. Plaintiff No. 1 is the financier. The defense was that the Plaintiffs are not the nearest reversionary, and furthermore that the will executed by Raj Karan Lal and of which probate had been granted by a competent Court, stands in the way of the Plaintiffs. So long as this probate was not revoked by the proper Court, the Civil Court could not ignore it, In reply to this the Plaintiffs alleged that the will of Raj Karan Lal had been revoked on the 3rd November, 1911, by means of the registered deed which is Exh.2. The lower Court dismissed the suit It found that the Plaintiffs were the nearest reversionary and the will. was revoked, but the probate cannot be cancelled by it as it has no jurisdiction, and as long as the probate exists the Plaintiffs cannot succeed. This decision is dated the 4th December, 1940, and on the 18th March, 1941, the first appeal in this Court was admitted. On the 1st December, 1941, the Plaintiffs applied to the probate Court for cancellation of the probate on the ground that the will had been revoked so far as it was still in force, the widows being dead. It was also alleged that the revocation of the will was within the knowledge of Ram Anand Prasad and he had deliberately withheld this information from the probate Court. They further alleged that no citations were issused to the present Plaintiffs and that they knew nothing about the proceedings. Ram Anand Prasad denied the revocation and his knowledge of it. He also denied the necessity of issuing citations to the Plaintiffs. The lower Court dismissed this application, finding that the revocation of the will is not proved. It also held that no fraud was proved. 4. Ram Anand Prasad denied the revocation and his knowledge of it. He also denied the necessity of issuing citations to the Plaintiffs. The lower Court dismissed this application, finding that the revocation of the will is not proved. It also held that no fraud was proved. 4. The main question is of course whether revocation of the will has taken place or not The passage in Exh. 2 has already been quoted. The learned lower Court first disposed of the evidence other than the "waqfnama" for the cancellation of the will. There was first an allegation that Raj Karan Lal told Ram Anand Prasad orally that he had cancelled the will. For this there was no evidence. The other evidence is an entry in Raj Karan Lal's diary, Exh. 7 in the cancellation of probate case. "Minjumla 3 annas sarfa notice mansukhi wasiatnama 20th December, 1907, banam bachcha Ram Anand." 5. To the reasons for not relying upon this given by the learned Judge,--that this is not sufficient to prove that the notice was actually sent and that the diary is not regularly kept,- we have another reason to add, viz., that we have not any accurate idea of what was written in the notice even if it was sent. 6. The "waqfnama", however, afford stronger evidence of cancellation. The learned Civil Judge deal with this question as follows: As regards waqnama, Exh. 3, it does not help the applicants. It does not cancel the will although it Bays that the executants has cancelled the will so far as the opposite-party is concerned The executants made a note be way of yaddasi' and said that he had cancelled the will executed in favor of the opposite-party. The words used are 'mar sukh kar dia hai'-that is to say, he has already cancelled the will. The expectant does not say that he is canceling the will. I may point out here that the applicants' case; as stated in Para 4 if the application, is that the deceased made the matter of cancellation public by executing the waqfnama, The words used in the application are 'wasiatnama bahaq fariqsani ki mansukh ka izhar wa clan kar diya'. In his statement before the Court D.W. 1 says that the cancellation was proclaimed means of the waqfnama. It was not their case that the will was cancelled by the waqfnama. Exh. In his statement before the Court D.W. 1 says that the cancellation was proclaimed means of the waqfnama. It was not their case that the will was cancelled by the waqfnama. Exh. 3 therefore, does not operate as cancellations. 7. As to this argument we are of opinion that whether Exh. 3 of itself operates as cancellation or not, there could be no clearer evidence of cancellation than a statement made by the testator himself in a registered document that he had cancelled the will. Admittedly Section 70 of the Succession Act does not apply to this revocation and the formalities required thereby have no application. In this it is stated that a will may be revoked (among other ways) by some writing declaring an intention to revoke the same and executed in the manner in which an unprivileged, will is hereinbefore required to be executed. Now provision as to the manner of execution does not apply, but the rest of this clause may be used as an example. We think that if the expression of an intention by the testator to revoke the will is sufficient, so is a statement made in a registered document that he has actually done so; in other words if not regarded as conclusive evidence that the will has been revoked before, this statement is in itself sufficient to express the intention of revoking it. The arguments that since Raj Karan Lal went on making provision for the needs of Ram Anand Prasad and his family, therefore this revocation is inconsistent with his conduct and must be regarded as only a threat, or in the alternative that by his subsequent conduct Raj Karan Lal revoked the revocation, do not appeal to us. Raj-Karan Lal may well have thought fit to provide for the bodily needs of Ram Anand Prasad out of his income during his life-time without having any intention of allowing him to have the corpus of his property after his death. As we take this view of Exh. 3, it is clear that we must allow the appeal in the probate case. The probate of a will, which has been legally revoked, cannot be allowed to stand. So far as the valid part of the will in favour of the widows is concerned, it has been given effect to. As we take this view of Exh. 3, it is clear that we must allow the appeal in the probate case. The probate of a will, which has been legally revoked, cannot be allowed to stand. So far as the valid part of the will in favour of the widows is concerned, it has been given effect to. The only part remaining to be given effect to has been revoked by Exh. 3. 8. In view of this finding it is not necessary for us to enter into the question whether the probate was invalid because the reversionary were not mentioned by the applicants and therefore no special citations were issued to them. 9. We now come to the appeal in the suit for possession. This suit would have been decreed but for the emission of the Plaintiffs to get the probate set aside before bringing the suit. The issue is issue No. 7 "7" (a) Was the probate obtained by fraud as alleged by the Plaintiffs ? (b) Is the above plea open to the Plaintiffs in this suit ? 10. The finding on this issue is "Accordingly, 1 find issue 7 against the Plaintiffs and dismiss this suit holding that the Plaintiffs have no right to sue till the probate Ext. 3 subsists, and this Court has no power to ignore it on the ground of fraud". This was the only ground on which the suit was dismissed as the Court found in favor of the Plaintiffs on the question of revocation. 11. We have now to decide what is the proper order for us to pass in the appeal against this latter decision. The Respondent's Learned Counsel argues that we should not allow the appeal against this decree since the Court which made it could make no other, the fact which gave the Court jurisdiction to decree the suit, did not come into existence till alter the suit had been dismissed, and a question of limitation will now arise which will bar the Plaintiffs from going any further with the case. We do not agree with this view. The trial Court could have adjourned the case and given time to the Plaintiffs to file an application for revocation of probate. This would probably have been the fairest thing to do. In that case no question of limitation would have arisen. We do not agree with this view. The trial Court could have adjourned the case and given time to the Plaintiffs to file an application for revocation of probate. This would probably have been the fairest thing to do. In that case no question of limitation would have arisen. It is open to us to remand the case for decision, taking into consideration our revocation of the probate. It would then be the same case and no question of limitation Would arise. There is however, another way of dealing with the matter which we think better. In Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukal v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhri 1941 A.W.R. (FC) 39 : O.A. 224 O.W.N. 372. their Lordships of the Federal Court, relying upon the Supreme Court of the United States, held that in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction they have power not only to correct error in the judgment under review but to make such disposition of the case as justice requires. And in determining what justice does require, the Court is bound to consider any change, either in fact or in law, which has supervened since the judgment was entered. There can be no doubt that the High Courts have the same powers in respect of this matter, and we can, therefore in deciding the possessor suit, take into consideration the filing of the application f or revocation of probate and the final conclusion arrived at by this Court thereon. In other words we can decree the suit for possession without remanding the case to the lower Court. 12. The result, therefore, is that we allow both these appeals and revoke the probate of the will so far as it relates to the bequest in favor of the Respondent Ram Anand Prasad. We set aside the decree of the lower Court in the suit for possession and substitute for it a decree for possession in favor of the Plaintiffs-Appellants. The Plaintiffs-Appellants will get their costs throughout in the probate case (Miscellaneous Appeal No. 77 of 1942) but partes will pay their own costs throughout in the case for possession (First Civil Appeal No. 53 of 1941).