JUDGMENT Malik, J. - This is a plaintiff's appeal. One Jwala Prasad who was the last male owner of the properties now in suit died in the year 1916. At the time of his death he left a widow Mst. Shiva Kunwar and three daughters, Mst. Chandan Kunwarshe has at times been also described as Mst. Chandrika KunwarMst. Champa Kunwar and Mst. Phulmati Kunwar. On the death of Jwala Prasad, the name of his widow Mst. Shiva Kunwar was entered in the papers. She died sometime in the year 1918 and Chandan Kunwar, the eldest daughter died soon after. A dispute arose between Champa Kunwar and Phulmati Kunwar and the sons of Chandan Kunwar as to the succession. The sons of Chandan Kunwar set up some claim to the property but it is not clear what exactly their claim was. Ultimately the matter was settled in this way that Champa Kunwar and Phulmati Kunwar surrendered their life estates and the grandsons of Jwala Prasad who were then in existence divided the property in three equal shares per stirpes. They have been in possession in accordance with the division of the property in the year 1918. The plaintiff Prem Narain is the third son of Champa Kunwar who was born in the year 1923, five years after the compromise. He has filed this suit claiming a declaration in these terms: This plaintiff and other daughters' sons of Jwala Prasad aforesaid are the owners of the property mentioned below after the death of Mst. Champa Kunwar, defendant 8. 2. Phulmati died in the year 1925 and her son Jagat Narain predeceased her in 1923. The share that was allotted to Jagat Narain is now in the possession of his father Hansraj. Though the plaintiff has not claimed any relief with respect to the surrender and the compromise dated 28-11-1918, learned counsel appearing for him has assured us that that was what his client intended. The allegations of the plaintiff are that Mst. Champa Kunwar and Phulmati Kunwar were not entitled to surrender their life estate in favour of the next reversioners and this has been explained to us by learned counsel to mean that the surrender was not a bona fide surrender but was a device to devide the property between the daughters and the grandsons. Champa Kunwar and Phulmati Kunwar were not entitled to surrender their life estate in favour of the next reversioners and this has been explained to us by learned counsel to mean that the surrender was not a bona fide surrender but was a device to devide the property between the daughters and the grandsons. His second line of attack is that Champa Kunwar and Phulmati Kunwar have asserted in the compromise dated 28-11-1918, that Jwala Prasad had left a will in accordance with which the property was to devolve after the death of Jwala Prasad. Learned counsel has argued that the reference to the will vitiates the surrender. His third objection is that the surrender is invalid as the six daughter's sons who were then in existence were not given one-sixth share each as they were entitled to under the law but the property was divided per stirpes between the sons of the three daughters of Jwala Prasad. 3. The will mentioned in this compromise was not admitted on behalf of the plaintiff and his case was that Jwala Prasad had died intestate and had left no will. The lower Court has accepted the evidence of the defendants' witnesses, Hansraj and Totaram, that Jwala Prasad did make a will. We do not see any relevancy to the question of this will as regards the validity of the surrender, but apart from that we are of the opinion that the lower Court was right in accepting the evidence of the witnesses for the defendants that Jwala Prasad before his death had left an oral will. The lower Court has pointed out that if there was no will left by Jwala Prasad there was no reason why any mention should have been made of this will in the compromise dated 28-11-1918. The will attempted to follow as far as possible ordinary rule about succession according to Hindu law. According to the terms of this will Mt. Shiya Kunwar, the widow of Jwala Prasad, was to be the owner of the property in her lifetime and after her death the property was to go to the three daughters of Jwala Prasad in equal shares and the share given to each daughter was to go to her issue. At the time of the compromise dated 28-11-1918, Mt. Chandan Kunwar was no doubt dead but two of the daughters, Mt. Champa Kunwar and Mt. At the time of the compromise dated 28-11-1918, Mt. Chandan Kunwar was no doubt dead but two of the daughters, Mt. Champa Kunwar and Mt. Phulmati Kunwar were alive and were both married and had children. Phulmati is now dead. Champa Kunwar is alive; she is a party to this suit. She has not filed any written statement nor she has come into the witness bos to explain why a false statement was made in this document that there was an oral will of Jwala Prasad if Jwala Prasad had made no such will in his lifetime. Learned counsel has mentioned to us a registered will executed by Shiva Kunwar on 8-1-1917. The document is not now on the record, nor has it been translated or included in our paper-book. The lower Court thought that there was some reference to the will of Jwala Prasad in this will made by the widow of Jwala Prasad. Learned counsel for the appellant has assured us that there is no mention of the will but what the widow purported to do was to carry out the last wishes of her husband. There is not much difference between the two and we agree with the Court below that that also lends some support to the evidence given on behalf of the defendants that Jwala Prasad after he had been attacked by paralysis sent for his daughters and his grandsons and his widow and told them how he wanted his property to devolve after his death so that they may not quarrel among themselves about the devolution of the estate. 4. Hansraj, defendant, is no doubt an interested witness in the sense that after the death of Jagat Narain he has now become entitled to Jagat Narain's share in the property but he was cross-examined at great length about the oral will and the learned Judge accepted his testimony and that of Totaram, the other witness for the defendant. Learned counsel for the plaintiff while cross-examining these witnesses insisted on their repeating the contents' of the will of Jwala Prasad as far as possible in the words of Jwala Prasad. We do not see any material difference in the version given by these two witnesses. The plaintiff produced two witnesses, Gopi Nath and Ganga Singh, to prove that Jwala Prasad immediately after he got the attack of paralysis became unconscious. We do not see any material difference in the version given by these two witnesses. The plaintiff produced two witnesses, Gopi Nath and Ganga Singh, to prove that Jwala Prasad immediately after he got the attack of paralysis became unconscious. It is not an usual experience to find a man becoming unconscious, immediately after an attack of paralysis unless the attack was very severe. Generally it takes two or three days before a man becomes unconscious. In any case their evidence was not accepted by the Court below and in a matter where the learned Judge had the advantage of having the witnesses examined in chief and cross-examined before him we do not see any reason why we should differ from his conclusions specially as those conclusions are supported by the other circumstances which appear from the record. We, therefore, agree with the decision of the Court below that Jwala Prasad before his death made an oral will under which Shiva Kunwar was to be the owner of the property for her lifetime and after her death the property was to go to the three daughters of Jwala Prasad in equal shares and the share given to each of the daughters was to be inherited by her children. 5. Coming back to the document dated 28-11-1918, the document purports to be a deed of surrender or dastbardari and a tamliknama or an arrangement as regards the title to the property. It is a composite document. Learned counsel had to agree that if the parties had executed two separate documents, one under which Mt. Champa Kunwar and Mt. Phulmati Kunwar had merely surrendered their rights, i.e., they had effaced themselves and the other by way of a family settlement by which the grandsons had decided to hold the property in certain shares, he could not have challenged the deed of surrender. As we read this document it is clearly divisible into two distinct parts. Not only at the end it is called a deed of relinquishment and tamliknama but also in the body of the document it is provided as follows: Consequently, we, Mt. Champa Kunwar and Phulmati Kunwar, have, of our free will and accord, without coercion and compulsion of any one else and while in full possession of our five senses, relinquished our rights and interests in the property aforesaid. 6. Mt. Champa Kunwar and Mt. Champa Kunwar and Phulmati Kunwar, have, of our free will and accord, without coercion and compulsion of any one else and while in full possession of our five senses, relinquished our rights and interests in the property aforesaid. 6. Mt. Champa Kunwar and Mt. Phulmati Kunwar reserved absolutely no right under this document nor were they given any share in the property. The suggestion made by learned counsel that this was a device to divide the property does not appeal to us. What he has argued is that the idea was that Champa Kunwar and Phulmati Kunwar would enjoy the property during the minority of their sons in the name of their sons. We do not think that there is any basis for this suggestion. Champa Kunwar and Phulmati Kunwar if they were only anxious to manage the property they had the right to do so both under the will of Jwala Prasad as well as under the Hindu law and it was not necessary for them to enter into any such device. Moreover both of them had their husbands alive and it would have been their husbands who would have managed the property on behalf of their minor sons. It is clear from the document that Champa Kunwar and Phulmati Kunwar wanted to completely efface themselves to avoid any dispute in future. It is not a case where there was any division of property between a limited owner or her nominee, a third party, and the reversioners. It is a ease where two limited owners effected a complete effacement of their rights and after the deed of surrender of 28-11-1918, the property as a matter of law vested in the grandsons of Jwala Prasad who were then six in number. It is not necessary for a deed of surrender that the limited owner should purport to transfer the property to the next reversioner. All that is necessary for her to do is to give up her rights in the property and then as a matter of law the property would vest in the nearest reversioner, In case a widow surrenders her rights by purporting to transfer it to a reversioner the surrender would only be valid if the property was given to the whole body of next reversioners. Here as we read the document, in the first part of the deed which we have already quoted, Champa Kunwar and Phulmati effected an effacement of their rights. In the second part of the document the grandsons of Jwala Prasad decided by a family settlement in what shares they would hold the property. This arrangement is in accordance with the directions of Jwala Prasad and is therefore perfectly valid. 7. Even apart from that, we do not see what ground for objection the present plaintiff can have. In the year 1918, after the surrender by Champa Kunwar and Phulmati Kunwar, the property, assuming that there was no will of Jwala Prasad, would have vested in the sons and grandsons, who were then in existence, in equal shares and the two sons of Champa Kunwar would have got one-sixth each, that is the branch of Champa Kunwar would have got only one-third. The plaintiff was not born till five years after the surrender. Even if there was no family settlement, the plaintiff would be entitled to get a share in the one-third that came to the two sons of Champa Kunwar who were in existence at the time of the surrender. The plaintiffs would have had no right to get a share out of the property that bad vested in the sons of Chandan Kunwar and Phulmati Kunwar after they had partitioned the property and taken away their shares, that is, under the Hindu law after the surrender by the two life estate holders the sons of Chandan Kunwar would have got a half share and the son of Phulmati Kunwar would have got a one-sixth and the sons of Champa Kunwar would have got the remaining one-third, and after they had partitioned the property, if a son was born to Champa Kunwar, he would have had to share in the one-third that came to his branch. Learned, counsel admitted that his client would not be entitled to anything more than a share in the one-third that would have come to the branch of Champa Kunwar, but he alleged that if the surrender was invalid the partition between the grandsons of Jwala Prasad would not bind the ultimate reversioner whoever he may be and the plaintiff had a right to file a suit in a representative capacity for the benefit of the actual reversioner in whom the property might ultimately vest. We have already held that we see no reason to hold that the surrender was invalid. The Court below has held that Champa Kunwar and Phulmati Kunwar had made a complete surrender of their rights on 28-11-1918, and after that they ceased to have any interest in the property and succession opened out to the reversionary body as then existing, that it was open to the reversionary body to divide the property by mutual agreement and that the family settlement was, therefore, a valid settlement. We fully agree with this finding. The appeal has no force and we dismiss it with costs.