JUDGMENT Mitter, J. - On 4th July 1940, a decree by consent for Rs. 3400 odd was passed in favour of the appellants and against the respondent. The said sum represented arrears of rent in respect of a tenure governed by the Bengal Tenancy Act. On 5th August 1943, the decree-holders applied for execution by arrest of the judgment-debtor. At that time, S. 168A, Bengal Tenancy Act which was introduced by Amending Act, 18 [XVIII] of 1940, had come into operation. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the judgment-debtor was liable to be arrested but the learned District Judge on appeal has held otherwise. 2. The first part of S. 51, Civil P. C., indicates the different modes of execution available a decree-holder. In the case of a decree or money he may apply for attachment and sale of the judgment-debtor's property, apply for his arrest or apply for a receiver of his property, section 168A Bengal Tenancy Act, however, puts a limitation. The effect of the Special Bench decision in 48 C. W. N. 835 Sudhir Krishna Ghose v. Satish Chandra Hui ('44) 31 A. I. R. 1944 Cal. 418 : 218 I. C. 41 : 48 C. W. N. 835 (S. B.) is that sub-section (1) to S. 168A, has not confined the landlord absolutely to the tenure or holding in default for realising the decree for rent which he had obtained, but has only prevented him from attaching and selling moveable or immovable property of the tenant judgment debtor other than the tenure or holding in default in those cases where the proviso is inapplicable, with the result that other modes of execution are available to him. In 48 C. W. N. 344 Anil Kumar Basu v. Roy Biman Behari ('44) 31 A. I. R. 1944 Cal. 240: I. L. R. (1944) 2 Cal. 340 : 217 I. C. 101 : 48 C. W. N. 344 a Division Bench of this Court has held that the words "attachment and sale" used in S. 168A (1) ought not to be read as "attachment or sale," with the result that that subsection prohibits an attachment if and only so far as it is a necessary step to the sale of the property. Those cases proceed upon the principle that inasmuch as S. 168A is an encroachment on the rights which the landlord decree-holder had under the ordinary law the ambit of that section ought not to be extended beyond what is warranted by its actual language. We respectfully agree with the canon of interpretation thus laid down. In that view a landlord decree-holder is not debarred from invoking the modes of execution provided for in cls. (c) and (d) of S. 51, Civil P. C., for the purpose of realising his decree for rent. His right to arrest his judgment-debtor must, however, be regulated or limited by what is contained in the proviso to the said section, namely S. 51. Whether he would be able to induce the Court to appoint a receiver over other properties of the tenant judgment-debtor when he has not proceeded against the tenure or holding in default which is still available for the satisfaction of his decree for rent is a question on which we do not express any opinion. 3. In the case before us, it is not the decree-holder's case that the judgment-debtor is likely to abscond or leave the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court or that he has after the institution of the rent suit dishonestly transferred, concealed or removed any part of his property or has committed any other act of had faith in relation to his property. He must, therefore, satisfy the Court that the judgment-debtor has had since the date of the decree sought to be executed by arrest or has now the means to satisfy the said decree or to pay a substantial part thereof. To that end he led evidence, which we accept as reliable, that the judgment-debtor has a very big and substantial residential house in Bhowanipore, is the owner of zemindaries and has a motor-car. We take it that the value of those properties would be many times the decretal amount. It is, however, admitted that the tenure in default is not of sufficient value to afford means to the judgment-debtor to pay a substantial amount of the decree. The question is can the value of those properties be taken into account in calculating his means in view of the explanation to S. 51, Civil P. C., read in the light of S. 168A (1), Ben. Ten. Act. The question is can the value of those properties be taken into account in calculating his means in view of the explanation to S. 51, Civil P. C., read in the light of S. 168A (1), Ben. Ten. Act. In 47 C. W. N. 287 Bahadur Singh Singhee v. Sanyasi Charan Ghosh ('43) 30 A. I. R. 1943 Cal. 233 : ILR (1943) 1 Cal. 538 : 207 I. C. 341 : 47 C. W. N. 287 which was heard ex parte the said explanation was not adverted to. Moreover, that decision being that of a Single Judge is not binding on us. 4. The phrase "the decree" occurring in the said explanation obviously means the self-same decree which is sought to be executed by the arrest of the judgment-debtor. The question, therefore, narrows down to this, whether the zemindaries, the house or the motor-car could have been attached in execution of this decree for rent, that is to say attached as a necessary preliminary step for obtaining payment of the decretal amount in the course of a process other than proceedings for sale. Though, in certain circumstances, a receiver could have been appointed over those three items of property, or some of them, which the respondent has, in execution of the appellants' decree for rent, an attachment of those properties would not be a normal or a necessary step for the said appointment. As the case before us does not come within the proviso to S. 168A (1) Ben. Ten. Act, none of those three items could be attached with a view to sell them. In view of the provisions of S. 188A (1), the value of those properties of the respondent cannot be taken for calculating his means to pay the decretal amount or a substantial portion thereof. That being the effect we hold that the respondent cannot be arrested, though in the popular and the ordinary sense he has ample means to pay the decretal amount. The fiction created by the explanation to S. 51, Civil P. C., taken in conjunction with S. 168A (1), Ben. Ten. Act, stands in the appellants' path. 5. The result is that this appeal is dismissed. The parties do bear their respective costs throughout. Clough, J. 6. I agree.