JUDGMENT Pathak, J. - This is an appeal u/s 10 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Caurt, whereby the execution application relied by the Appellant in the Court of the Munsif Haveli, Azamgarh, was dismissed. The facts giving rise to this appeal are very short and may be stated as follows: The ancestor of the decree-holder, who is the Appellant before us, obtained a decree on the basis of a compromise in suit No. 156 of 1927 against the predecessor-in-title of the judgment-debtor, the Respondents in this appeal. That suit was for a perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants from interfering wita the Plaintiff's possession over a certain zamindari property and, in the alternative, for possession over the same. In the course of the trial in that suit, the parties arrived at a compromise which they filed in Court, with the prayer that a decree be passed in terms thereof. As a result of the compromise, Defendant No. 1 in the suit agreed to transfer certain property to the Plaintiff by way of an exchange for the property which Defendant No. 1 was allowed to retain in his possession. Under the compromise the parties were to execute and get registered a deed of exchange. The Court dealing with the suit passed an older directing a decree to be prepared in terms of the compromise. The result was that the terms of the compromise were incorporated in the decree. Condition No. 5 of the compromise is relevant and may be set out as follows: The Plaintiff and Defendant No. 1 will execute a deed of exchange and get it registered within a month. In case any of the parties fails to do so it Will be open to the other party to file an application for compulsory registration of the deed of compromise or the deed of exchange ; or a suit for specific performance of the contract to execute and complete a deed of exchange with the terms mentioned above miy be filed. No party will have any objection therefor. 2. In the execution application, the decree-holder prayed, inter alia for the execution add completion of the deed of exchange iti accordance with the compromise decree. 3. This application was not opposed by the judgment debtor on the ground that the decree was not capable of execution. No party will have any objection therefor. 2. In the execution application, the decree-holder prayed, inter alia for the execution add completion of the deed of exchange iti accordance with the compromise decree. 3. This application was not opposed by the judgment debtor on the ground that the decree was not capable of execution. The decree-holder's reply to this objection was that, in the first place, by reason of the previous proceedings taken by the decree-holder for the execution of the decree, it was not open to the judgment-debtor to raise the question whether the decree was capable of execution or not and in the second place on a true interpretation of the decree, it was executable under the provisions of Order 21, Rule 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Munsif who dealt with the execution application dismissed the objection filed by the judgment debtor upon the short ground that the contention raised by the judgment-debtor, namely, that the compromise deed could be enforced only by means of a suit, was not correct. In appeal, the learned Civil Judge discussed the questions involved in the objections filed by the judgment-debtor at considerable length. He referred to the previous proceedings taken by the decree-holder, particularly to the third application for execution made by decree-holders on April 27, 1937. He noted that upon the death of the judgment debtor during the pendency of this execution application, his heirs were brought upon the record on September, 1937 and the original decree-holder also having died in the meantime his legal representatives were also substituted in his place. This execution application was ultimately dismissed on December 23, 1937. Upon the question of res judicata, the learned Civil Judge came to the conclusion that in view of the fact that orders were passed by the executing Court for the substitution of the legal representatives of the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor, the execution application, during the pendency of which those orders were passed, became fructuous; and relying upon the Full Bench decision in Genda Lai v. Hazari Lai 1935 AWR 1371: ALJ 1189, he held that the objection regarding the executability of the decree could not be taken by the judgment debtor. With regard to the question whether the compromise could not be enforced only by means of a sparate suit and the decree passed on the basis thereof was not executable, the learned Civil Judge held adversely to the decree- holder. In the view that the learned Civil Judge took on the question of res judicta, he affirmed the decree passed by the learned Munsif. Against this decree an appeal was preferred to this Court by the judgment-debor, which came on for hearing before the learned Single Judge, who reversed the decrees passed by the Courts below. 4. Upon the point relating to the question of res judicata, the learned single Judge took the view that until and unless the relief of partial satisfaction was granted to a decree-holder in the course of the execution proceedings, the principle of res judicata could not apply. The learned Judge was further of the view that the mere fact that an order adverse to the judgment debtor was passed which would not have been passed if the point as regards the executability of the decree had been raised before the Court passing that order, was not sufficient to attract the applicability of the principle of res jucucata With regard to the point whether the decree was capable of execution or not, the learned single Judge held that the compromise, as it stood, was incapable ot being incorporated in the decree even if the Court so desired and that it was not possible for any execution Court to enforce a specific performance or to have a document compulsorily registered unless the decree was passed in a suit for specific performance. 5. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has challenged the view taken by the learned singla Judge on both the points. In logical sequence, the question of res judicata should be dealt with first. In the view that we are inclined to take, that question will be decisive of the present appeal. But for the moment we pass it by, as certain general observations occur to us which we feel bound to make. This case illustrates how failure on the part of the Civil Courts to observe the rules of procedure in framing decrees results in unnecessary litigation and waste of money. But for the moment we pass it by, as certain general observations occur to us which we feel bound to make. This case illustrates how failure on the part of the Civil Courts to observe the rules of procedure in framing decrees results in unnecessary litigation and waste of money. We note with deep concern that in a number of cases, which have come up before us, we have had occasion to observe that no attention was paid to the relevant provisions of the Code of CPC at the time of passing decrees. We have to remak that the present litigation from the Court of the Munsif to this Court upto the stage of the Letters Patent appeal has been occasioned by the slipshod manner in which the decree under execution was prepared by the Court which passed it. If at the time when that decree was passed, the Court had complied with the provisions or Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, all the expense and trouble involved to this litigation would have been saved to the parties. That rule is imperative in its terms. It says: Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, or where the Defendant satisfies the Plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the suit. 6. Twenty-seven years ago, in the case of Hemanta Kumari Devi v. Midnapur Zamindari Co., Ltd. (1919) 17 ALJ 1117, this rule came in for consideration before their Lordships of the Privy Council. After quoting the rule, their Lordships proceeded: The terms of this section need careful scrutiny. In the first place, it is plain that the agreement or compromise, in whole and not in part, is to be recorded and the decree is then to confine its operation to so much of the subject-matter of the suit as is dealt with by the agreement. In the first place, it is plain that the agreement or compromise, in whole and not in part, is to be recorded and the decree is then to confine its operation to so much of the subject-matter of the suit as is dealt with by the agreement. Their Lordships are not aware of the exact system by which documents are recorded in the Courts in India, but a perfectly proper and effectual method of carrying out the terms of this section would be for the decree to recite the whole of the agreement and then to conclude with an order relative to that part that was the subject of the suit, or it could introduce the agreement in a schedule to the decree; but in either case, although the operative part of the decree would be properly confined to the actual subject-matter of the then existing litigation the decree taken as a whole would include the agreement. 7. We may respectfully add that before making the compromise a rule of the Court, the Court should ascertain with precision the terms of the compromise and state in the operative portion of the decree the rights of the parties with such clearness as may leave no room for doubt with regard to the exact scope of those rights. Certainty is of the essence of a decree and upon a perusal thereof it should appear whether it is merely declaratory or is directory and executable. 8. To return to the question of res judicata the opposed views are, on the one hand, that the principle of res judicata applies to execution proceedings only in cases where some money has been realised or some other kind of satisfaction has been made in the course of those proceedings; on the other and, that if the Court has passed an order which is for the benefit of the decree-holder and to the detriment of the judgment-debtor, and which would not have been passed if a certain point had been raised by tbe judgment-debtor, the hearing of such a point would be barred by the principle of res-judicata. In our judgment, the application of this principle depends upon the existence of a decree or order and has no relation to the gathering of tbe fruits of such a decree or order. In our judgment, the application of this principle depends upon the existence of a decree or order and has no relation to the gathering of tbe fruits of such a decree or order. Reference was made by the learned single Judge as well as by the lower appellate Court to the Full Bench case of Genda Lal v. Hazari Lal1. At page 1199, Sir Shah Sulaiman observed: If however some further step had been taken and the judgment-debtor had remained silent and such step had amounted to the application for execution fructifying so as to become analogous to a suit being decreed, then certainly it would have been too late for the judgment debtor to raise an objection that the application itself was barred by time. And the bar would have continued even if that application were dismissed and objection were raised in a subsequent execution proceeding that the previous application was barred by time. 9. In the judgment of Sir Shah Sulaiman, Bennet, J. concurred. Niamatullah, J. however, delivered a separate judgment and at page 1205 of the report, there occurs in his judgment, the trowing passage: The judgment-debtor is not barred by the principle of res-judicata, unless ....where the judgment-debtor might and ought to have taken the plea of limitation, but failed to do so, and the final result of the application was to grant the relief of partial satisfaction of the decree to the decree-holder. 10. If the observation made by Niamatullah, J. is open to the interpretation that the realisation of money or partial satisfaction of the decree is a necessary condition precedent to the application of the principle of res-judicata, we, with great respect, are unable to follow this view, as in aur opinion, it is Opposed to the view taken by the majority in the Full Bench case. For this reason, we do uot find ourselves in agreement with the judgment of the learned single Judge upon this point and we are compelled to uphold the view taken by the lower appellate Court. 11. We are glad to find that we can rest our decision upon the other ground also. It is noteworthy that the decree under execution was passed in the year 1928. 11. We are glad to find that we can rest our decision upon the other ground also. It is noteworthy that the decree under execution was passed in the year 1928. It was the duty of the judgment debtor as much as that of the decree-holder to see that a proper decree was framed by the Court and that the operative portion of the decree expressed the real intention of the parties. The judgment-debtor never raised an objection, at the proper time, to the frame of the decree. He acquiesced in the decree being passed in the manner in which it was passed and he took benefit thereunder. The question of the framing of the decree is a matter relating to procedure. In these circumstances, therefore, we cannot rip up the transaction which is eighteen years old at the invitation of a patty who has not only lain asleep upon his rights, assuming there were any, but has also gained material benefits under this transaction. We shall not, therefore, linger over the question whether the decree was framed by this Court, which passed it, in strict compliance with the provisions of Order XXII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We shall proceed upon the footing that clause No. 5 of the compromise was incorporated in the operative portion of the decree in accordance with the terms of that rule. All that we are concerned with, therefore, is to construe the decree as we find it. The first portion of Clause 5, as mentioned above, directs the parties to execute and to get registered a deed of exchange. This in our judgment, is a directory provision in the decree and is capable of execution in the executing Court. The contention of the judgment-debtor, however, is that a reference to the remedy by way of a suit for specific performance makes the decree merely declaratory. In our judgment, if the decree is executable by reason of the first portion of Clause 5, the mere fact that a reference is made to the remedy by way of specific performance in the letter portion, would not alter the nature of the decree and would not deprive the earlier portion thereof of its effect. In our judgment, if the decree is executable by reason of the first portion of Clause 5, the mere fact that a reference is made to the remedy by way of specific performance in the letter portion, would not alter the nature of the decree and would not deprive the earlier portion thereof of its effect. The latter portion which might have been introduced on account of misconception of law would be repugnant to earlier portion and would be devoid of any legal consequence, so far as the question of the nature of the decree is concerned. In our judgment, the decree is capable of execution and, upon this point, we do not share the view taken by the learned single Judge or by the lower appellate Court. we are glad to find that the view that we have taken upon both the points is in accord with the justice of the case. 12. In the result, we set aside the judgment of the learned single Judge of this Court and restore the decree passed by the lower appellate Court. We direct that the judgment-debtor will pay the costs of the decree-holder incurred in the Courts below as well as in the second appeal which was disposed of by the learned single Judge also in this appeal.