JUDGMENT Biswas, J. - This appeal arises out of a suit on a mortgage. The plaintiff is not the original mortgagee. The original mortgagees were the executors to the estate of Rakhal Chandra Saha, who had advanced a loan of Rs. 20,000 to one Sachindra Nath Ghosal on the security of certain properties on 17th September 1930. Sachindra Nath Ghosal is defendant 1 in the suit. There were three other defendants impleaded on the allegation that they had purchased two out of the three properties covered by the mortgage at a sale in execution of a money decree against the mortgagor. Of them defendant 2 and defendant 4, however, disclaimed all interest in these properties. Defendant 2 is now dead. Defendant 3 was the only contesting defendant who resisted the suit in the Court below and has resisted it in this Court. The plaintiff is the present owner of the estate of Rakhal Chandra Saha and is admittedly entitled to the mortgage as part of the assets of the estate. 2. Various defences were raised which were all negatived by the Court below. The learned Subordinate Judge passed a preliminary decree on 31st August 1942, for a sum of Rs. 41,280, including interest up to the date of the suit and subsequent interest up to the date of the decree, and costs. In the present appeal, only two points were pressed on behalf of the appellant: one arose out of the defence set out in para. 14 of the written statement filed by defendant 3, and was to the effect that the mortgage bond was invalid for want of proper registration on the ground that a "fictitious" property in Calcutta was deliberately included in the document with a view to get it registered in Calcutta. The second point related, to the number of instalments which the Court below had allowed under the provisions of the Bengal Money-lenders Act, the decree having been drawn up in terms of S. 34 of that Act. It was contended that the Court below should have allowed 20 annual instalments instead of five. 3. We may dispose of the second point at once on the short ground that the appellant had offered no evidence in the Court below regarding his own circumstances or the circumstances of the plaintiff. It was contended that the Court below should have allowed 20 annual instalments instead of five. 3. We may dispose of the second point at once on the short ground that the appellant had offered no evidence in the Court below regarding his own circumstances or the circumstances of the plaintiff. There was only a petition which he had filed, but which was not even supported by an affidavit. It doubtless contained some allegations to the effect that the defendant was a man of moderate means who could not afford to pay the amount claimed, except in small instalment is spread over a very long period. The Court below obviously took this into consideration in making the order for five instalments, and we have not been referred to any materials on the record which would require us to hold that the Court did not act fairly or properly in the exercise of its discretion in this behalf. This particular contention of the appellant must consequently be overruled. 4. That takes us to the first point which was in fact the substantial question raised in the appeal. The argument of the appellant was based on a number of decisions of the Privy Council, the first of which is the case in 41 I. A. 110 Harendra Lal v. Hari Dasi Debi ('14) 1 A. I. R. 1914 P. C. 67 : 41 Cal. 972: 41 I. A. 110 : 23 I. C. 637 (P. C.). This is in fact considered to be the leading case on the point. There a mortgage deed was executed in which a property purporting to be a Calcutta property was included, and on the strength of the inclusion of this property, registration of the bond was secured in Calcutta. There was in fact no property in existence answering to the description given in the document, and it was obvious that this property was mentioned only as a device to evade the provisions of S. 28, Registration Act, under which the document could not be registered in Calcutta unless it related to some property within the juris. diction of the Calcutta Registration Office, This case was followed in 43 I. A. 127 Biswanath Prashad v. Chandra Narayan ('21) 8 A. I. R. 1921 P. C. 8 : 48 Cal. diction of the Calcutta Registration Office, This case was followed in 43 I. A. 127 Biswanath Prashad v. Chandra Narayan ('21) 8 A. I. R. 1921 P. C. 8 : 48 Cal. 509 : 48 I.A. 127 : 63 I.C. 770 (P.C.), in which the facts were a little different in the sense that the property which was included in the bond could not be said to be a nonexistent property. All the same, their Lordships held that the case fell within the principle laid in 41 I. A. 110 Harendra Lal v. Hari Dasi Debi ('14) 1 A. I. R. 1914 P. C. 67 : 41 Cal. 972: 41 1. A. 110 : 23 I. C. 637 (P. C.). They quoted the following passage from the judgment in the earlier case: Their Lordships hold that this parcel is in fact a fictitious entry, and represents no property that the mortgagor possessed or intended to mortgage, or that the mortgagee intended to form part of his security. Such an entry intentionally made use of by the parties for the purpose of obtaining registration in a district where no part of the property actually charged and intended to be charged in fact exists, is a fraud on the registration law, and no registration obtained by means thereof is valid. 5. In the case before them, their Lordships held that though the property, which was only a one-kowri share in a village, existed, still the mortgagor had no interest in it and the parties to the mortgage never intended that it should form part of the security. On this footing the case was held to come within the ruling in 41 I. A. 110 Harendra Lal v. Hari Dasi Debi ('14) 1 A. I. R. 1914 P. C. 67 : 41 Cal. 972: 41 1. A. 110 : 23 I. C. 637 (P. C.). In the third case, 61 I. A. 286 Collector of Gorakhpur v. Ram Sundar Mal ('34) 21 A. I. R. 1934 P. C. 157 : 56 All 468 : 61 I. A. 286 :150 I. C. 545 (P. C.), the document was a sale deed, and it comprised four villages within a particular registration sub-district, and also a one-third share in a garden room situated in another registration sub-district. The deed gave the purchasers no access to the garden-room, and one of the purchasers had admitted that it was of no value to them. It was further found that the vendor bad no title to it. The deed was registered in the sub-district where this share in the garden-room lay. On these facts, their Lordships were of opinion that the deed was not validly registered, because upon the evidence it appeared that the parties did not intend that the share in the garden-room should really pass, its inclusion in the deed being a mere device to evade the Act Their Lordships went on to point out that the word "fictitious" used in 41 I.A. 110 Harendra Lal v. Hari Dasi Debi ('14) 1 A. I. R. 1914 P. C. 67 : 41 Cal. 972: 41 1. A. 110 : 23 I. C. 637 (P. C.) was not confined to non-existing properties. The test which they applied was whether or not the circumstances of the case allowed that the particular property, on the strength of which registration was effected in a particular district, was intended to form part of the transaction evidenced by the document. 6. The last case is that in 63 I. A. 169 Venkatarema Rao v. Sobhanadri Appa Rao ('36) 28 A. I. R. 1936 P. C. 91 : 59 Mad, 539 : 63 I. A. 169 :161 I. C 29 (P.C.). In this case the conveyance, as originally prepared and as executed by the vendor, contained no reference to a small strip of land, which was in fact inserted in an additional sheet subsequently annexed to the conveyance. At the time this little strip of land was included in this way, no value was placed upon it and no part of the consideration was assigned to it. It was farther found that the purchaser neither lived in nor owned any property in the district in which this strip of land lay, and in which, on the basis of this strip of land, the conveyance was registered. It was also doubtful on the evidence whether the strip of land ever belonged to the vendor, or was in fact identifiable. It was also doubtful on the evidence whether the strip of land ever belonged to the vendor, or was in fact identifiable. There was farther evidence to show that the purchaser never made any attempt to take possession of that strip of land, and that on his estate being partitioned amongst his heirs upon his death, no account was taken of it and no reference was made to it, and shortly afterwards it was enclosed and built over by the owner of the immediately adjacent land. In other words, the cumulative effect of the facts found was that this property was never intended to be treated as a property in the real sense by either party to the transaction, and the only object of including it in the document was to obtain its registration in a particular registration district. On these grounds, their Lordships held that the case fell within the pronouncements of the Judicial Committee in the three earlier cases. The criterion, they observed, by which the question must be decided is whether upon the facts established by the evidence the parties intended this one yard of land to pass under the deed. Their Lordships were satisfied that no such intention existed in that case, and in that view held that the registration was invalid. 7. Mr. Sannyal has tried to invoke the authority of these decisions in support of his argument in the present case. The initial difficulty with which he is faced is that the foundation for a case of fraud on the law of registration is altogether wanting. In all the cases which were before the Judicial Committee, it was assumed or found that the document in question could not be registered in the particular district or sub-district where it had been actually registered except for the fact that some property was included in it which was supposed to lie within that district or sub-district: in other words, the basic assumption of these judgments was that a particular property was included in the document, because the document could not otherwise be registered at a particular place. Where, however, the law permits the registration of a document in the intended jurisdiction, independent of the inclusion of any item of property in it, it is difficult to see how it can be said that the parties intended by such inclusion to commit a fraud on the law of registration. 8. In the case before us, the mortgage deed comprised two properties which were situated in Bhowanipur, which was within the jurisdiction of the Alipore Sub-Registry. Item 3 of property was a Calcutta property. It is said that because of the inclusion of this item 3 of property in the mortgage deed it was possible to get it registered by the Registrar of Assurances in Calcutta. Section 30, Registration Act, however, shows that the Registrar of a Presidency Town may receive and register any document referred to in S. 28, without regard to the situation in any part of British India of the property to which the document relates. It is no doubt true that for the purpose of registration of such a document in Calcutta an extra fee has to be paid. It is said that the extra fee which was payable under the rules at the time this document was registered was a sum of RS. 20. It is difficult to see, therefore, why in order to save this extra fee of Rs. 20, any of the parties to the transaction should go to the trouble and expense of acquiring a property at a much higher value and then including it in the document only for the purpose of securing its registration in Calcutta. 9. I should have stated that the Calcutta property which was inserted in the mortgage in this case was actually acquired by the mortgagor on the very day that the mortgage was executed, and it was admittedly acquired for the purpose of including it in the mortgage. The purchase was in fact put through for the mortgagor by the mortgagees' attorneys, and the consideration was also deducted by the attorneys from the mortgage before it was made over to the mortgagor. The price paid for the property was Rs. 100. If we are to accept Mr. Sannyal's argument, it would amount to holding that for the purpose of saving a sum of Rs. 20, the mortgagor deliberately put himself to unnecessary expense to the extent of at least Rs. The price paid for the property was Rs. 100. If we are to accept Mr. Sannyal's argument, it would amount to holding that for the purpose of saving a sum of Rs. 20, the mortgagor deliberately put himself to unnecessary expense to the extent of at least Rs. 100 by recourse to this round about process for securing an object which could otherwise be easily secured. A charge of fraud is not to be lightly laid. Where the admitted facts of the case themselves ruled out a possible foundation for fraud, one does not see how a superstructure of fraud could be raised, merely by trying to show that the property which was included in the document was a "fictitious" property in the larger sense of the word, as used in the Privy Council cases. 10. It is relevant in this connection to refer to a decision of this Court in 41 C. W. N. 854 Premsukh Mahata v. Mangal Chand ('37) 41 C. W. N. 854, where Costello and Panckridge, JJ. held that where the conveyance was otherwise registrable in Calcutta under S. 30, there was no room for the application of the principle laid down by their Lordships in the cases referred to above. In view of the arguments addressed to us, however, I deem it necessary to point out that on the evidence in the case also there is hardly any room for bringing it within the mischief of those rulings. It is not necessary to set out any long extracts from the judgments of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee. Each succeeding case has in fact discussed the earlier pronouncements in detail. The final conclusion common to all the cases is that the crucial test to be applied in order to find out whether the registration law was evaded or defrauded is whether or not the parties intended that the property in question on the basis of which the document was registered should form part of the transaction. In one case the document was a mortgage, in the others the transactions were by way of conveyance. The principle applicable, however, is the same. Car it be said that the particular item of property, the inclusion whereof in the document founded jurisdiction for registration purposes, was intended in any real sense to form part of the transaction ? In one case the document was a mortgage, in the others the transactions were by way of conveyance. The principle applicable, however, is the same. Car it be said that the particular item of property, the inclusion whereof in the document founded jurisdiction for registration purposes, was intended in any real sense to form part of the transaction ? Applying this test, there can, in my opinion, be no doubt upon the facts here that both the mortgagor and the mortgagees intended that the property in Calcutta should form part of the security. 11. On behalf of the defence, no evident on this point was offered. The appellant defendant 3 contented himself with cross-examining the witnesses on behalf of the plaintiff. The plaintiff examined the members of the firm of attorneys, through whom the mortgage had been put through. He also examined an agent and constituted attorney, and also called evidence from the Calcutta Corporation and the Calcutta Improvement Trust to show that the property had been entered in the Assessment Books of the Corporation and acquired, before the suit, by the Calcutta Improvement Trust under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, showing clearly that the property did actually exist as an entity. The evidence on the last mentioned point was apparently necessitated by reason of an argument which had been raised at one stage and which was also faintly attempted to be raised in this Court at the beginning, that the property had no real existence. This extreme contention was afterwards abandoned, and the only attempt that was made was to show that for the purposes of the mortgage the property might be deemed to have been non-existent for practical purposes. As I have already stated, this attempt must also fail. The evidence is that the mortgagees insisted before they were prepared to make the advances that some Calcutta property should be included in the mortgage. 12. What led them to insist on this condition it is unnecessary to examine, but obviously it could not be solely for the purpose of obtaining registration in Calcutta, as was sought to be suggested on behalf of the appellant. That object could be achieved even without a Calcutta property being included in the document, because of S. 30 of the Act, and there would be no point in requiring a Calcutta property to be added simply for that purpose. That object could be achieved even without a Calcutta property being included in the document, because of S. 30 of the Act, and there would be no point in requiring a Calcutta property to be added simply for that purpose. If then the mortgagees wanted a Calcutta property to be included and if they were not prepared otherwise to advance the money, the mortgagor had no choice in the matter. He had to get a Calcutta property. The evidence shows that the mortgagor was the owner of two properties in Bhowanipur, and had no property within the Calcutta ares. If, therefore, he had to comply with the condition insisted on by the mortgagees, it was necessary for him to procure some property, and obviously, having regard to the fact that there was already a mortgage subsisting which had to be repaid, it was natural that the mortgagor should wish to pay as little as possible over acquiring a Calcutta property for the purpose of obtaining the loan he was applying for. 13. It so happened that the attorneys of the mortgagees in charge of the transaction had a convenient parcel of land available for sale belonging to one of their managing clerks. The managing clerk had purchased a small bit of land in the Shambazar area, being a divided portion of premises No. 10, afterwards 10 A, Shyam Square Lane. The area was quite small, one chittak and 16 sq. ft. and the dimensions were 60 ft. in length and 1 ft. in width. He had bought it at a court sale held by the Registrar of the High Court on the Original Side, and he had paid near about a sum of Rs. 300 for the lot. It was a property which was identifiable, had a saleable value, was separately recorded in the books of the Corporation, and, as subsequently transpired, it had a ready market through the very firm of Solicitors where the purchaser was an employee. As the conveyance executed by this person to the present mortgagor shows, he had actually found it possible to dispose of this tiny bit of property to four different parties all of whom possibly required the land for very much the same purpose as the present mortgagor. These transactions obviously show that the property had a real market value and was by no means of fictitious existence. 14. Mr. These transactions obviously show that the property had a real market value and was by no means of fictitious existence. 14. Mr. Sannyal argued that that was not enough to take the case out of the Privy Council rulings. What bad to be shown was that the property was capable of actual physical enjoyment. No doubt in one or two of the cases their Lordships did apply the test of being capable of effective physical enjoyment; but that was not really the crucial test. That was referred to for the purpose of considering what was the intention of the parties. What is material is the intention, and in order to find out the intention, the fact whether the property admits of physical enjoyment may no doubt be sometimes relevant. But that is about all In the present case, there can be no doubt that the mortgagees definitely intended that a Calcutta property should be included, and the mortgagor definitely acquired a Calcutta property in order that it might be included in the mortgage. The parties certainly contemplated that the property should form part of the mortgaged premises. Whether or not, having regard to the fact that the loan was realizable out of the other two properties only, the mortgagees gave up the security of the Calcutta item, is of no significance. There might be a hundred and one reasons as to why the mortgagees wished to include the property as part of the security, and afterwards chose to abandon that security. The point is whether at the time the mortgage was executed this was intended to form part of the security. As I have said, the evidence makes it abundantly clear that the intention was that this Calcutta property should form part of the security which was offered by the mortgagor. I have no hesitation, therefore, in coming to the conclusion that the case does not in any way attract the principle laid down in the Privy Council decisions relied on on behalf of the appellant. The argument on the question of the validity of the registration, therefore, falls to the ground. The result is that in my opinion the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs. Chakravartti, J. 15. I agree. The argument on the question of the validity of the registration, therefore, falls to the ground. The result is that in my opinion the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs. Chakravartti, J. 15. I agree. The principal contention of the appellant was that the mortgage was unenforceable because it was invalid; it was invalid because it had not been duly registered; and it had not been duly registered because the only item of property, by the inclusion of which the registration was held in Calcutta, was of a fictitious character, since it did not exist at all, or even if it did exist, was incapable of effective enjoyment or use. In support of this contention, reliance was placed upon four decisions of the Privy Council to which my learned brother has already referred. 16. It seems to me that as regards the facts, the present case does not stand on the same basis as those on which the Judicial Committee pronounced in the decisions cited. The basis of those decisions is that but for the property questioned, no legal registration could be had at all at the hands of the officer who had registered the deed. Proceeding on that basis, their Lordships examine the facts relating to the crucial property and find either that it had no tangible existence, or that it did not belong to the mortgagor or vendor, or that as an item of property it was as good as nonexistent, since, besides being of an utterly inconsequential nature, it could not possibly be, in view of its character, the subject of any beneficial ownership or enjoyment. From such findings their Lordships conclude that the property concerned did not represent any asset which one party really intended to sell or mortgage and the other party really intended to purchase or accept as a part of the security. To quote the language used in one of the decisions, the document did not relate to such property for any effective purpose of enjoyment or use; but if it was yet made to include the property, that device was adopted for the fraudulent purpose of obtaining registration at a place where it could not have been registered if this particular property had not been included. In these circumstances, so hold their Lordships, the property must be treated as not included in the deed at all, and since' the remaining properties could not justify registration at the place where the deed was actually registered but would require registration at some other place, the registration was void and so was the trans, action. The last result follows, because by reason of the provisions of the Registration Act no document requiring registration but not duly registered could affect immovable property comprised therein and by reason of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, there can be no valid mortgage or sale in the absence of a registered instrument, where that Act requires one. 17. The above, it seems to me, is the whole logic of the decisions upon which the appellant relied, but that logic cannot obviously apply to the facts such as we have before us in the present case. In the present case, the deed of mortgage was registered by the Registrar of Assurances, Calcutta. Under S. 30 (2), Registration Act, the officer has jurisdiction to receive and register any document referred to in S. 28 without regard to the situation of the property to which the document relates, provided it is situated within British India. A mortgage deed is among the documents referred to in S. 28 and it is plain that the Registrar of Calcutta, who registered the deed in the present case, could have registered it even if the fraction of property situated at 10, Shyam Square Lane, was not included in the schedule. In that state of the law, it is not easy to see why it should be supposed that the parties included that particular property for the purpose of getting the deed registered in Calcutta, or that by including the property they committed a fraud. The commission of such fraud for the purpose of obtaining registration in Calcutta was in no way necessary. It is to be noted that there is no positive evidence that any fraud was intended or committed. We are asked to infer fraud merely from the fact that the property at No. 10, Shyam Square Lane is, according to the appellant, a property of a fictitious character. It is to be noted that there is no positive evidence that any fraud was intended or committed. We are asked to infer fraud merely from the fact that the property at No. 10, Shyam Square Lane is, according to the appellant, a property of a fictitious character. Assuming it is so, I am entirely unable to see why the inclusion of that property should be attributed to a fraudulent design to evade the law of registration which did not require to be evaded, or how it could be a fraud on that law to include an item of property which did not alter the legal position in the slightest manner. In my opinion, no fraud can be inferred from the facts such as they are in the present case. 18. I would go further and say that even if we were to suppose that the parties, while not intending that the property at Shyam Square Lane should form part of the security in a real sense, yet included it in the deed under the mistaken notion that no registration could otherwise be had in Calcutta, the position would not, in my view, be different The intended fraud would not be a fraud in fact, for the law of registration is what is contained in the Registration Act and not what someone erroneously supposes it to be. What the Judicial Committee laid down is that if the parties, by including in a deed an item of property with which they were not really dealing obtained its registration at a particular place where it could not otherwise have been registered, there is a fraud on the law of registration and "no registration obtained by means thereof can be valid." In the case I have assumed, registration would not be obtained by means of fraud, but it would be obtained lawfully, by reason of the fact that the registering officer happened to be the Registrar of Calcutta and the Registration Act happened to contain amongst its provisions S. 30 (2). It is, however, not necessary to pursue this point further, because, as I have said, there is no evidence of fraud and I am unable to see why an unnecessary fraud should be inferred merely from the circumstance that the property is one of a somewhat inconsequential character. 19. It is, however, not necessary to pursue this point further, because, as I have said, there is no evidence of fraud and I am unable to see why an unnecessary fraud should be inferred merely from the circumstance that the property is one of a somewhat inconsequential character. 19. But it was contended that the registration in the present case was not made under S. 30 (2), but under S. 28, as would appear from the notes made on the deed of the fees levied. This argument, in my view, proceeds on a total misconception of the scope and effect of the two sections. Section 28 of the Act lays down the general rule that every document shall be presented for registration in the office of the Sub-registrar within whose sub-district the whole or some portion of the portion to which such document relates is situated. Section 30 confers some special powers on District Registrars and Registrars of Presidency Towns who are empowered to register any document relating to property in British India, irrespective of where such property may be situated. The two sections do not provide for two different modes of registration and do not warrant the view that if an officer, specially empowered under S. 30 (2), registers a deed comprising property no part of which is situated within his own registration district, such registration shall be valid only if the registration is impliedly or in substance under S. 30 (2), and shall be invalid if the registration is under S. 28. As far as I understand the Act, there is no such thing as registration under one section rather than under another. It is true that the Registration Manual provides for additional fees to be levied in cases where a District Registrar or the Registrar of a Presidency Town registers a document comprising property, no part of which is situated within his registration district. But that requirement has nothing whatever to do with his jurisdiction to register a deed and it cannot be supposed that when such an officer registers a deed on receipt of the lower fee, he somehow contracts into a Sub-Registrar and exceeds his authority if he exercises the larger powers. But that requirement has nothing whatever to do with his jurisdiction to register a deed and it cannot be supposed that when such an officer registers a deed on receipt of the lower fee, he somehow contracts into a Sub-Registrar and exceeds his authority if he exercises the larger powers. The authority conferred by S. 30 (2) is absolute and in my view it is in no way affected by the Registrar charging' the lower fee chargeable in cases where some part of the property is situate within his jurisdiction. The levying of a lower fee may be an irregularity and, if it is an irregularity, it may be curable under S. 37 of the Act. But it is a complete mistake to suppose that the matter has any bearing whatever on the jurisdiction of the Registrar to make the registration in such circumstances. 20. The matter may be looked at from. another point of view to which I have already referred, although somewhat indirectly. The point which we are considering is whether the registration was valid. Under the law it is equally valid, whether the questioned property is treated as included in the deed or not. In such circumstances any enquiry as to whether the property was an essential factor, going into the making, of the transaction, or was introduced simply in order that it might do duty for a piece of property situated in Calcutta, seems tome to be an utterly irrelevant and purpose, less enquiry. Even without the addition of this particular property, the deed might be validly registered where it was. 21. But it was contended that such too was the position in 41 L. A. 110 Harendra Lal v. Hari Dasi Debi ('14) 1 A. I. R. 1914 P. C. 67 : 41 Cal. 972: 41 1. A. 110 : 23 I. C. 637 (P. C.), where also the deed was registered in Calcutta and yet the Judicial Committee held that since the only property shown as situated in Calcutta had no existence, the registration was void. 972: 41 1. A. 110 : 23 I. C. 637 (P. C.), where also the deed was registered in Calcutta and yet the Judicial Committee held that since the only property shown as situated in Calcutta had no existence, the registration was void. With reference to that decision, it may be pointed out that the officer who registered the deed is referred to in the judgment as the Sub-Registrar and it is quite plain that their Lordships were not dealing with the position of a Registrar of a Presidency Town upon whom special powers have been conferred under S. 30 (2) of the Act. It was pointed out to us that the deed was registered in the year 1895 and by a Notification, dated 1892, the Local Government had amalgamated the offices of the Sub-Registrar of Calcutta and the Registrar. However, that may be, it is perfectly clear that oven if the Sub-Registrar of Calcutta was, at the relevant time, also the Registrar, that matter was not brought to the notice of their Lordships and they proceeded on the basis that the deed could not have been registered in Calcutta unless some property situated in Calcutta and forming a real part of the transaction was included in the deed. That decision, in my opinion, cannot be regarded as negativing a view which their Lordships never considered. 22. My conclusion, therefore, is that where, as here, the registration was by an officer vested with special powers under S. 30 (2), the existence of some property within the registration district of that officer is immaterial and accordingly no intention to commit a fraud on the law of registration could be inferred from the mere fact that some property of an inconsequential character, or even not intended to form a real part of the security, was included in the deed. Nor can there be a fraud on the law of registration if such an item of property is deliberately included, for, by such inclusion jurisdiction is not conferred and the registration also, in my view, cannot be held to be void, because the document happens to comprise some property of such character. 23. What I have said above is quite sufficient to dispose of the question raised before us. But in deference to the argument addressed to us at some length, I would add one observation. 23. What I have said above is quite sufficient to dispose of the question raised before us. But in deference to the argument addressed to us at some length, I would add one observation. On the facts of this case, it may be argued that the property at No. 10. A, Shyam Square Lane, was of an inconsequential character and the parties did not count on it to a very large extent, or to any extent, as forming a part of the security. But there can be no question that the property had an existence in fact, that the mortgagor had title to it, and that, although as a piece of security it might have been of an inconsequential character, the mortgagor intended that it should pass under the mortgage and the mortgagees intended to accept it as part of the security. It might not have been included because it was required to complete the security as such, but it was certainly included openly and for a definite purpose, which was to comply with the wishes of the mortgagees, who would not advance any money unless some Calcutta property was also included. 24. It follows that the property was included, not fraudulently, but openly, avowedly, for a bona fide purpose and with the intention that it should pass for what it was worth, and a question may well have to be considered whether in such a case the registration would be invalid, even though such an item of property may have been included with the definite object of making registration possible at a particular place. Since the present case does not fall to be decided on the principle laid down by their Lordships in the cases cited but by S. 30 (2), it is not necessary for me to pursue this matter further. But I might observe that, as at present advised the inclination of my view. is that in such cases the registration could, not be void. The Registration Act makes no distinction between substantial properties and properties of small value. But I might observe that, as at present advised the inclination of my view. is that in such cases the registration could, not be void. The Registration Act makes no distinction between substantial properties and properties of small value. The authority to register arises from the existence of some property within the jurisdiction of the registering officer and if the property is a property as the term is understood in law and is capable of ownership and enjoyment and if it is intended to pass, then however inconsequential in character it may be and whatever may be the object with which it is included in the document, as a matter of law the registration, it seems to me, would be valid. But it is not necessary for me to express any final opinion on this matter. 25. I would add only one other observation. It would rather seem that in the present case the questioned property was included in the document not for the purpose of creating jurisdiction in the Registrar of Calcutta, but presumably for the purpose of creating jurisdiction in this Court on its Original Side to try any suit which might be brought on the mortgage. If such a suit had been brought in this Court, it might well have been held that since the only property lying within the original jurisdiction of this Court was of such a character that it would be no part of the real security, the mortgage in fact comprised no property lying within such jurisdiction and therefore no suit would lie in this Court. When, however, a suit came to be brought, it was brought not in this Court but before a Subordinate Judge of Alipore within whose jurisdiction the more substantial properties undoubtedly lay. Nothing further, therefore, need be said on the aspect of the case. In the result, I agree with my learned brother that this appeal should be dismissed with costs.