JUDGMENT Mitter, J. - On the 18th July 1925 the respondents borrowed Rs. 5000 from the appellant. The loan was secured by a mortgage of immoveable properties. It carried simple interest at the rate of twelve per cent, per annum. Thereafter the borrowers paid Rs. 1576 in payment of interest on diverse dates before the year 1936. In that year the lender filed the suit for recovery of the loan. As the Assam Money-Lenders Act (4 (IV) of 1934) was then in force the claim was laid at Rs. 5000/- for the principal and Rs. 5000/- for interest, total Rs. 10,000, for S. 9 of that Act prevented the Court from passing a decree for arrears of interest for a sum greater than the principal of the loan. A preliminary decree for sale for the said amount and for Rs. 577/8/- for costs, total Rs. 10, 577/8/-, was passed on the 21st May 1937. The decretal amount carried interest at the rate of six per cent per annum. On 9th January 1939, a sum of Rs. 1,000/- was paid towards the decree. Thereafter on the 27th January 1939 a final decree for the balance was passed. Between the 30th January 1941 and the 19th May 1942 a further sum of Rs. 3150/- was paid leaving a balance of Rs. 5725/- plus interest outstanding on the decree. On the 22nd January 1943, a sum of Rs. 10036/11/6 was due in terms of the decree. On the next day execution was started for recovering the said amount. While the said execution was pending the Assam Money Lenders' Act was amended by Act 6 [VI] of 1943. The amendments came into operation on the 14th July 1943. By the amendment, S. 9 of the parent Act was radically changed. The relevant portion of the Section as amended is as follows: No money-lenders shall, in respect of any loan made before or after the commencement of this. Act, recover, on account of interest and principal, whether through Court or otherwise.... a sum greater in aggregate than double the principal of the loan. Explanation. The term "aggregate" means and includes the amount already paid amicably or otherwise. The judgment debtors filed on the 4th August 1943 an objection under S. 17, Civil P. C., invoking the aid of the amended section. a sum greater in aggregate than double the principal of the loan. Explanation. The term "aggregate" means and includes the amount already paid amicably or otherwise. The judgment debtors filed on the 4th August 1943 an objection under S. 17, Civil P. C., invoking the aid of the amended section. The learned Subordinate Judge gave effect to that objection and held that only a sum of Rupees 4275 plus the cost of execution was recoverable. The decree holder has preferred this appeal. The only point, is whether S. 9 as amended governs this case. We are of opinion that it does not, and the decree holder is entitled to get the sum for which the application for execution, had been filed plus interest in terms of the final decree, which has accrued due since then. 2. The ordinary rule is that the rights of litigants are to be governed by the law in force when the action was commenced. The corollary from this is that a change in the substantive law, as opposed to adjective law, would not affect pending actions, unless the Legislature had indicated otherwise either by express enactment or by necessary implication (Per Denman C. J. in (1837) 6 A. & E. 943 Hitchcock v. Way (1837) 6 A. & E. 943 : 6 L. J. (N. S.) K. B. 215; Per Sir George Jessel in (1876) 1 Ch. D. 48 In re Joseph Suche Ltd. (1876) 1 Ch. D 48 : 45 L. J. Ch. 12 : 33 L. T. 774 : 24 W. R. 184). The decision of the Judicial Committee (63 I. A. 47) K. C. Mukherjee v. Mt. Ram Ratan Kuer ('36) 23 A. I. R. 1936 P. C. 49 : 15 Pat. 268 : 63 I. A. 47 : 160 I. C. 105 (P. C.) does not militate against the rule. There the language used in S. 26(N), Behar Tenancy Act, "shall be deemed to have given consent" made that section retrospective and what was laid down was that the Legislature had not made any discrimination against a purchaser who had purchased an occupancy holding before 1st January 1923, but whose right to remain on the land was under challenge in a suit which was pending when that section, namely, 26(N), came into operation. The second general rule is that : You should not give a larger retrospective power to a section, even in an Act which is to some extent intended to be retrospective, than yon can plainly see the Legislature meant : ((1886) 31 Ch. D. 402 Reid v. Reid (1886) 31 Ch. D. 402 : 55 L. J. Ch. 294 : 54 L. T. 100 : 34 W. R. 332, per Bowen L. J. at pp. 408 and 409; 17 C. W. N. 889 Munjuri Bibi v. Akel Mohamed ('13) 19 I. C. 793 : 17 C. W. N. 889 at p. 912; 49 C. W. N. 552 Jogendra Chandra Ghose v. Bawani Charan Law ('45) 32 A. I. R. 1945 Cal. 425 : 49 C. W. N. 552 at p. 557). The Assam Money Lenders Amendment Act (6 (VI) of 1943) must, in our judgment, be considered in the light of those rules of construction. That Act consists of five sections : section 1 (2) enacts that "it shall apply to pending suits and appeals." 3. This provision was required, for otherwise the provisions of S. 4 of the Amending Act which had replaced S. 8 of the present Act would not have applied to suits already filed and pending either in its original or appellate stage when the Amending Act came into force. In our judgment the Legislature, however, did not intend to make S. 5 of the Amending Act applicable to pending execution proceedings. In the first place the language of S. 1 (2) falls short, and in the second place no provision is made in the Amending Act akin to that occurring in the Bengal Money Lenders Act of 1940 empowering the Court to reopen decrees. We cannot, especially for the second reason, give effect to the respondent's contention that the word "suit" used in S. 1(2) must betaken to include a proceeding in execution on the ground that proceedings in execution are to be regarded as continuation of the suit. In matters of procedure, proceedings in execution have no doubt been sometimes regarded as continuation of the suit, but for that reason only the word "suit" as used in S. 1(2) of the Amending Act should not be taken to include a proceeding in execution, for, vested rights, rights created by decrees of Court, are involved. In matters of procedure, proceedings in execution have no doubt been sometimes regarded as continuation of the suit, but for that reason only the word "suit" as used in S. 1(2) of the Amending Act should not be taken to include a proceeding in execution, for, vested rights, rights created by decrees of Court, are involved. Moreover, the Legislature by using the words "and appeals" in that section have given the indication that the word "suit" used in that section is not to have a wider meaning than what it strictly has. 4. The result is that this appeal is allowed and the case remanded to the lower Court with a direction to proceed with the execution in the light of the observations we have made. The parties to bear their respective costs of the appeal. Clough, J. 5. I agree.