JUDGMENT Malik, J. - This appeal has been filed by the Plaintiffs whose suit for recovery of R6. 8,567-3 9 from the Defendant No. 1, Phusi Ram, was dismissed by the Temporary Civil and Sessions Judge of Benares on the 3rd of November, 1942. The Plaintiffs' allegations in the plaint were that there was a partnership entered into between Vidhya Dhar, their predecessor, and Phusi Ram, Raj Narain Singh and Ram Nath Misra, Defendants, on the 15th of April, 1935. The partnership was to carry on business in hemp in the name of Deodutta and Baldeo Prashad at Sheopur, Benares. Vidhya Dhar was to provide the entire money required by the partnership and was to get interest at the rate of ten annas per cent. per mensem on the money invested by him. The other three were to be only working partners in the business and the profits and losses, were to be shared equally between the four partners. Vidhya Dhar died after the institution of the suit as a member of a joint Hindu family and the Plaintiffs, whose names were substituted after his death, claimed that they were members of joint Hindu family with him and that he had entered into the partnership on behalf of the family. 2. I may mention that in the plaint when it was originally filed the date of commencement of the partnership was given as the 29lh of September, 1936. By an amendment made on the 26 th of Sep-tembtr, 1942, the Hindi date was changed from Bhadon 2, Suci 14, Sambat 1993 to Chait Sudi 12, Sam-bat 1997, but no correction was made in the English date. The corresponding English date would be the 16tn of April, 1926. 3. According to the Plaintiffs the partnership was dissolved on the 9th of October, 1938, and it was found that the losses amounted to a sum of Rs. 5,959-0 9. One-fourth of this loss was Rs. 1,484-12-3 which was said to be the share of Defendant No. 1. It was further alleged that the Defendant had overdrawn to the extent of Rs. 6,766-6 0 out of the partnership assets. These two suns were claimed from Defendant No. 1 after giving him credit, for his one-fourth share of Rs. 679-8-0 which, according to the allegations in the plaint, paragraph No. 8, was improperly and without any right entered the loss account. 6,766-6 0 out of the partnership assets. These two suns were claimed from Defendant No. 1 after giving him credit, for his one-fourth share of Rs. 679-8-0 which, according to the allegations in the plaint, paragraph No. 8, was improperly and without any right entered the loss account. Thus a sum of Rs. 1,314-14-3 under the first head as loss and a sum of Rs. 6,756 5 0 under the second head as money overdrawn was claimed from Defendant No. 1. 4. It was further alleged that after the dissolution of the partnership Defendant No. 1 used the trade mark belonging to the Plaintiffs on 6200 bales of hemp for the purpose of Defendant No. l's own business for which he had agreed to pay to the Plaintiffs at the rate of two annas per bale A sum of Rs. 660 was claimed as the rent for the hire of trade mark. It was further alleged in the plaint that Raj Narain Singh and Ram Nath Misra had settled the matter out of Court, that they were being impleaded as pro forma Defendants and that no relief was claimed against them. The Plaintiff claimed a sum of Rs, 8,070-10 3 principal, and Rs. 596-9 6 as interest against Phusi Ram Defendant No. 1 5. The defence on behalf of Defendant No. 1, Phusi Ram, was a total denial of the partnership and it was alleged that he was working as a servant and that he had nothing to do with the losses of the partnership. It was further alleged that the firm Deodutta Baldeo Prashad at Sheopur was merely a branch of a firm of that name in Muhalla baja(sic) Darwaza in the city of Benares and that it had branches at Moghal Sarai and other places. In the written statement it was mentioned that the Defendant was a servant and Murim of the firm and was entitled to a four anna share as profits in lieu of his remuneration. Later on in the evidence the case was developed that in case one fourth of the profits was less than Rs. 2,004 per annum, the Defendant was to get a sum of Rs. 2,000 as remuneration, that is, the Defendant's remuneration was a minimum sum of Rs. 2,000 per annum, Ram Nath Misra, Defendant No, 3, did not enter appearance. Later on in the evidence the case was developed that in case one fourth of the profits was less than Rs. 2,004 per annum, the Defendant was to get a sum of Rs. 2,000 as remuneration, that is, the Defendant's remuneration was a minimum sum of Rs. 2,000 per annum, Ram Nath Misra, Defendant No, 3, did not enter appearance. Raj Narain Singh, Defendant No. 2, filed a written statsment In which he alleged that he had nothing to do with the partnership. He was working merely as a servant and was not responsible for the loss in the business. 6. The lower Court framed eight issues and held on all questions of fact in favour of the Plaintiff, but on the last question that is on issue No. 8. it held that the suit was barred by Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, and dismissed the suit; but as the suit failed on a purely technical ground, the Defendant was allowed half his costs. 7. The Plaintiffs have filed this appeal and learned Counsel on their behalf has urged that, as it was a suit to realise the property of a dissolved partnership, the suit was not barrel by Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act. Learned Counsel for the Respondent has, however, challenged before us all the findings of fact, and it will, therefore, be necessary for us first to consider the question whether the Defendant, Phusi Ram, was a partner and whether any sum was due to the firm from him. 8. Learned Counsel for the Respondent has placed great reliance on the fact that the Plaintiffs originally in their plaint gave the 29th of September, 1936, as the date when the partnership was started and then later charged it to the 15th of April, 1936. He has also drawn our attention to a document dated the 6th of November, 1940, entered into between some of the Plaintiffs of their predecessors and Ram Nath, Defendant No. 3, in which it was mentioned that the business was started at Sheopur on the 28th of September, 1936, and had terminated on the l3th of October, 1937. It would appear that both these dates of commencement and termination of the business differ from the dates given in the plaint(sic). It would appear that both these dates of commencement and termination of the business differ from the dates given in the plaint(sic). It is true that later on in the same document it is mentioned that the parties having carried on the entire business aforesaid up to the 9th of October 1948, closed it and after rendicion(sic) of joint accounts money was found due to the Plaintiffs from Ram Nath. Further it was mentioued that after the death of Pandit Deodutta the share of Ram Nath in the profit and loss account at four annas persupee(sic) was fixed. Deodutta died on the 29th of March, 1937 and learned Counsel for the Respondent has urged that according to this statement the share in the profit and loss was not settled till after the 29th of March, 1937. Ram Nath is the principal witness for the Plaintiff to prove this partnership and the lower Court has relied on his evidence, but the learned Counsel for the Respondent has rightly pointed out that we cannot place any reliance on the evidence of Ram Nath as he was an interested witness. It is admitted on behalf of the Plaintiffs that these was a registered firm in Raj Darwaza, Benares carrying on business under the name Baldeo. Prasad at representing the Plaintiffs family and Ram Nath were partners that was a registered firm. The Defendant case is that that firm had opened branches in various places and one of those places was Sheoper and that the Plaintiffs allegations that Deodutta Baldeo(sic) Prashad, at Sheopor was a different firm of which the partners were different from the firm of the same name at Raja Darwaza is false. The Defendant has drawn our attention to the fact that under the agreement entered into between the Plaintiffs and Ram Nath, Ram Nath was not being made at all liable for the loss, if any, of the Sheopor firm and that in case the suit was decided in favour of the Plaintiff against Phusi Ram, Ram Nath was to gain a sum of Rs. 1,000. Ram Nath is thus(sic) an interested witness and learned Counsel has argued that his evidence was wrongly-accepted by the Court below. The figures given in this agreement bear out the suggestion made by learned Counsel for the Respondent. 1,000. Ram Nath is thus(sic) an interested witness and learned Counsel has argued that his evidence was wrongly-accepted by the Court below. The figures given in this agreement bear out the suggestion made by learned Counsel for the Respondent. The total amount due from Ram Nath, according to the figures given in this agreement, was Rs. 160883-6(sic). out of which the amount due to the Plaintiff from the Nath for the Sehopur firm was over Rs. 5,000. The Plaintiffs gave up about Rs. 5000(sic) and agreed to take Rs. 11,000 from Ram Nath by eleven annual instalments of Rs. 5,000 without any interest and it was provided in paragraph of this agreement that if Ram Nath helped the Plaintiffs in recovering the money due to them by other partners, the Plaintiffs would remit a sum of Rs. 1,000 out of this Rs. 11,000. That, it is suggested, was the price paid hit evidence. 9. It is further pointed cut that though the partnership was alleged to have been dissolved as for back as the 9th of October, 1939, and the Defendant No 2. RaJ Narain Singh, filed his written statement on the 38th of May. 1941 denying all liability, no claim has yet been made against him. The suggestion on behalf of Phusi Ram by his counsel is that the Plaintiffs and the other Defendants have conspired together against his client to make him a scape-goat for the loss of the business carried on by the Plaintiffs. 10. Learned count el for the Respondent has drawn our attention to a decree in suiy No. 79 of 1936 where the firm, Deodutta Baldeo Prashad, filed(sic) a suit against the firm Madan Gopal Kishna Kumar and in the plaint it was mentioned that the firm had its head office in mohalla Raj Dawaza and its branch office at Sheopur. The suit was filed through Deodutta Baldeo Prashad and Ram Nath who were said to be the only partners of the ruin. The suit was filed through Deodutta Baldeo Prashad and Ram Nath who were said to be the only partners of the ruin. The explanalion given by Ram Nath is that when he went to cosuit(sic) his lawyers to institute a suit on behalt of the Sheopur firm he was told that there would be difficulty as the firm was not registered and he was advised to file a suit in the name of the Raja Darwaza firm treating the Sheopur firm as the branch thereof so that the plea that the firm was unregistered might not be available to the Defendant This is a plausible explanation and has been accepted by the Court below, but we find that the suit was instituted on the 13th of October, 1936, and if the difficulty of instituting suits was pointed out to the partners as early as that date there is no explanation why the partnership was not registered, though it existed for about two years, after 1936. A firm Radha Kishun Sheo Datta(sic) who were entitled to get some: money from Deodat Baldeo Prashad. Sheopur filed a suit in which they impleaded Phusi(sic) Ram as a Defendant. Phusi Ram filed a written statement on the 25th of September 1940 in which he alleged that he was not a partner in the Sheopur branch; on the other hand he worked in it as a working partner and was entitled to a four suns(sic)share in the profits in lien(sic) of service and was not liable for its loss. The other Defendants did not contest the suit and on the 3rd of October, 1941, the Court decided in favour of Phuri Ram and Rajjan Singh and decreed the suit against Vidhyadar and Ram,Nath alone. It is, however pointed out to me(sic) that that judgment is still under appeal and the case has not been; finally decided. 11. At against all this learned Counsel for the ' Plaintiffs has relied on a statement made by Phur Ram is this case and on several previous statement's made by him and has argued that it matt be held on the admissions made by the Defendant that the Defendant's share of liability was four annas in the rupee and that the partnership commenced on the 19tb of September, l936, and continued up to the 9th of October, 1938. The first statement of Phusi Ram relied on on behalf of the Plaintiffs is dated th 99th of October, 1917,In which be said that he was a working partner in the firm Deodutta Baldeo Prashad but that his share had not yet been settled or specified. That is not a very clear statement. and we do not think much reliance can be placed on it. The next is an income tax return submitted on the 3rd of Decemder, 1938. It it signed by Phusi Ram and his name is given as one of the pa Inert(sic) and his share is mentioned as four annas, but the name of the business is given as Ganga floar Mill, Raja Darwaza, Benares, though in the heading the name is mentioned as Deo Dat Baldeo Prasad but the status It given as "Gaoga Flour MH1."(sic) Nobody has come forward to explain what 'Ganga Floor Mill" means and what connection it had With this firm at Sheopur. We do not think we can place much reliance on this return either. In a criminal case Phusi Ram made a statement on the 4th of August 1941, in which he laid that he was a partner in the firm Deodutta Baldeo Prashad and that he had a four anna share in the profits. Besides this statement, the statements of a Phusi Ram in this case and his conduct is such that we have no doubt that he was a partner in the Sheopur firm. We have already mentioned that Phuri Ram did not claim that be was to get a minimum salary of Rs. 2,000 a year till he gave his evidence on the 2nd of October, 1949. In the written statement all that he had said war that the was to get a one fourth share in the profits as his remuneration. He admitted in evidence that, there was a separate naukrana khata in which the names, of all the servants(sic) were mentioned but his name or that of Raj Narain did not find a place in that. Khata. He further admitted that in the income tax returns the amount paid to him was never shown as remuneration paid to an employee. He admitted in evidence that, there was a separate naukrana khata in which the names, of all the servants(sic) were mentioned but his name or that of Raj Narain did not find a place in that. Khata. He further admitted that in the income tax returns the amount paid to him was never shown as remuneration paid to an employee. He admitted that there was loss in the first year and there was profit in the second year and he got one-fourth share of the balance as his remuneration which clearly means that he was made liable for one fourth of the loss for the first year. He has explained that his statement before the income tax Officer that he was a partner in the Plaintiffs' firm and bis signature on various cheques as proprietor were all in accordance with the directions given by the real proprietors. He admitted that he had taken out a sum of Rs. 6,766/8/2(sic) from the firm out of which he said he was entitled to deduct Rs. 6,000 towards his salary. We cannot accept his statement, which is a very belated one, that he was entitled to get Rs. 2,000 a year as salary. It is unlikely that a pers on who was merely a servant in the firm and was not one of its proprietors would be allowed to withdraw a sum over Rs, 6,000 without any protest on behalf of the proprietors. We, therefore, feel satisfied that Phusi Ram was a partner of the firm and his share in the loss and profits of the business was four annas in the rappee. He has admitted that the partnership business commenced on the 15th of April. 1936, and continued up to the 9th of October, 1988. 12. The next question that we have to consider is whether the suit is maintainable or is barred by Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act. Section 69 came into force on the 1st of October, 1933), one year after the commencement of the Act and though the Act does not in so many words make registration of firms compulsory nor(sic) does it impose penalties such as are imposed under the English law by the Registration of Business Names Act, yet the effect of the rules in this section were intended to necessitate the registration of a firm at one time or the other. With this object in view the section provides that no suit to enforce a right arising from a contract or conferred by this Act shall be instituted in any court by or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in a firm agianst the firm or any person alleged to be or to have been a partner in the firm unless the firm is registered and the person suing is or has been shown in the Register of firms as a partner in the firm. This sub sec;ion which is Sub-section (1) of Section 69 relates to a suit against third parties by or on behalf of a firm and provides that no suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and the person suing are or have been shown in the Register of firms as partners in the firm. These two Sub-sections were intended to be wide enough to include all possible suits relating to partnership where the claim was against a partner or against a third party There are, however, certain important exceptions in the next Sub-section and we are only concerned in Ibis case with Sub-section (8), Clause (a) which is in these trems: The provisions of Sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply also to a claim of set off or other proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract, but shall not affect-la) The, enforcement of any right to sue for the dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm, or any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm. 13. In the case before us the firm was dissolved on the 9th of October, 1938. long before the suit was filed. 13. In the case before us the firm was dissolved on the 9th of October, 1938. long before the suit was filed. All that we have, therefore, to see is whether it is a suit "for accounts of a dissolved firm, or any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm." At one time the opinion in this Court was that a suit for accounts under this Sub-section was a suit for a relief of a limited nature and it was held that "the prayer for taking the partnership account could be granted only in the limited terms of Section *8 of the Act" and the words, realise the property" in Section 69 (3) (a) of the Act did not cover the question of taking accounts from a partner to pay the sum so ascertained (see Magan Behari Lal v. Ram Partap Singh ,1939. A W R (H C) 355,. This view was, however, soon dissented(sic) from and the case was overruled by the decision in Shibba Mal v. Gulab Kai,1939 A W R (H C) 832 (F. B.),. It was held in that case that the rights of a partner of an unregistered firm to a decree for acounts In a suit for (dissolution remained unaffected by the provisions of Section 69 of Partnership Act in view of the proviso contained in Sub-Section 3 thereof. 14. Learned Counsel for the Respondent has supported the decision of the Court below on the ground that this was not a suit for dissolution of a firm as the Plaintiffs' allegations were that the firm had already been dissolved. He has further contended that it is not a suit for accounts of a dissolved firm as the Plaintiffs his claimed specific sums of money from Defendant No 1 aloue. laustly(sic), he has urged that it is not a suit to realise the property of a dissolved firm as that, according to him coatemplies a suit against a third party and not against partner. Learned Counsel wants us to read Sub-Section 3 of Section 69 in the way that a suit for the dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm is an exception to sab Section (1) and is a suit that can be. Learned Counsel wants us to read Sub-Section 3 of Section 69 in the way that a suit for the dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm is an exception to sab Section (1) and is a suit that can be. filed against a partner while a suit to realise the property of a dissolved firm is an exception to Sub-section (2) and can be filed only against a third party. He has relied on certain observations by Beaumont C. J, in Appayaa Nijling-appa Hattargi v. subrao Babajis, I L R 1938 Bom. 102, where the learned Chief Justice has observed that "the two parts of Sub-clause (I) of Sub-Section 3 must be read as referring respectively to the first ,two subsections" and has gone on to say: As I have pointed out, the first Sub-section deals with the right to enforce a contract by one partner against the others, and the second Sub-section deals with the right to enforce a contract by the firm against 3rd parties. 15. To our mind, learned Counsel has misunderstood the judgment of Beaumont C.J. In an earlier part of the judgment his Lordship has mentioned that Sub-section (3) introduces certain exceptions to the disabilities imposed by the fist two subsections. And as we read the judgment, it does not appear to us that it means that a suit to realise specific sums of money due to the firm from a partner of a dissolved partnership is not maintainable. From the report it is not clear whether the claim in that case was against a partner or against a third party. If the claim was against a partner, then the decision is against the Respondent as the suit was decreed; but if it was a claim against a third party, then the observations are merely obiter. 16. To our mind, the exception in Sub-section (3) is wide enough to include a claim for money due to a dissolved firm either by a partner or by a third party. 17. Learned Counsel has then drawn our attention to the observations in the overruled decision in Magan Behari Lal's, 939. 16. To our mind, the exception in Sub-section (3) is wide enough to include a claim for money due to a dissolved firm either by a partner or by a third party. 17. Learned Counsel has then drawn our attention to the observations in the overruled decision in Magan Behari Lal's, 939. A W R (H C) 355, case, referred to above, that the words "realise the property" mean turning the property into money by sale and do not cover the question of taking accounts from a partner to be followed by a final decree directing the partner to pay the sum so ascertained. According to learned Counsel the meaning of the words "realise the property" as given in this case has not been overruled by the Full Bench. We do not think, however, that the interpretation put by learned Counsel on the decision of the Full Bench of this Court is correct and, to oar mind, the words "any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm" would include the right to recover it from a third party or from a partner from whom the property may be recoverable and the word "property" must be interpreted to include a claim for money. To put any other interpretation on this Sub-section would raise this anomaly that, while a partner may sue another partner of a dissolved partnership for accounts which would result in a decree in bis favour for such sum as may be due from the Defendant, if they go into the accounts out of Court and it is found that a certain sum of money is due to the partnership from one of the partners, no suit for the recovery of that amount would lie and the Plaintiff would have to claim accounts afresh. It being admitted, therefore, that the partnership was dissolved before the date of the suit and it being the Plaintiffs' case that the sums claimed by the Plaintiffs were due from the Defendant, Phusi Ram, to the partnership, the suit, to oar mind, was clearly maintainable. It being admitted, therefore, that the partnership was dissolved before the date of the suit and it being the Plaintiffs' case that the sums claimed by the Plaintiffs were due from the Defendant, Phusi Ram, to the partnership, the suit, to oar mind, was clearly maintainable. We need hardly mention a point which has now been well settled that Section 69, Sub-sections (1) and (2) relate not only to an unregistered firm which is in existence but also to a firm which has been dissolved and bars all suits by or on behalf of a firm or by or on behalf of a partner in an unregistered firm unless they come within one of the exceptions mentioned in Sub-section (3). We have, therefore, to see whether the case comes under one of the exceptions and, to our mind, it clearly does. 18. Oat of the three amounts claimed by the Plaintiffs the claim for Rs. 650 cannot come under the bar of Section 69 on the allegations made by the Plaintiffs in their plaint. They alleged that the trade mark was the private property of the Plaintiffs and it was rented out to Phusi Ram after the dissolution of the partnership on a rent of two annas per bale. Learned Counsel for the parties are agreed that if the allegations in the plaint are true, the claim for the sum of Rs. 660 is not barred by Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act. Learned Counsel for the Respondent has, however, strenuously argued that the allegations in the plaint are not true, and we shall deal with this point when we deal with the specific items which have been claimed by the Plaintiffs. Of the other two items claimed, Rs. 6,756.5-0 was the amount which Phusi Rain had admittedly overdrawn from the partnership assets and Rs. 1,341-14-3 was alleged to. be Phusi Ram's share of the loss incurred by-the partnership The question is whether the soil by a partner of a dissolved firm to realise these two items can be called suit to realise the property of a dissolved firm and we have already said that, to our minds, it is a suit of that nature. 19. Learned Counsel for the Respondent has relied on the case of S. H Patel v. Hussenbhai Mahomed, I.L.R 1937 Bom. 19. Learned Counsel for the Respondent has relied on the case of S. H Patel v. Hussenbhai Mahomed, I.L.R 1937 Bom. 628, a decision of Beaumont C.J. In that case there was a firm carrying on business in the name of the Union Trading Agency. The accounts were made up and the estimated amount of income tax payable by the firm was taken to be a sum of Rs. 600. Later on however, the assessment was for Rs. 3,400 odd. The Plaintiff paid the whole amount and claimed contribution giving credit for the sum of Rs. 600 and odd already paid by the Defendant. In that case it was held that the suit was not to realise the property of a dissolved firm and was therefore not maintainable. The main decision turned on the question whether Sub-sections (l)and (2)of Section 69 applied to an existing firm or also to a dissolved firm and his Lordship pointed out that it was net essential that the firm should be actually in existence at the date when the suit was instituted to apply the bar of Sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 69. We may, with great respect, point out that in one view of the nutter it might have been construed as a Suit for realisation of the property of a dissolved firm inasmuch as if the true amount of income tax payable were known at the time of dissolution and accounting between the parties the assets of the firm would have bad to be deducted by a sum of Rs. 3,100 and it was only the balance that would, have been vailable for division between the partners, However that may be, the facts of that case, are entirely different from the facts of this case, and that decision was explained by Beaumont C. J. himself in the case of Appaya Nijlingappa Hattargi v. Subrao Babaji, I L R 1938 Bom. 102, and the decision of the later case supports out view that a suit to recover a debt due to a firm by partners, who were members of the firm at the date of dissolution, is a suit to enforce the right to realise the property of a dissolved firm and is maintainable. 20. 102, and the decision of the later case supports out view that a suit to recover a debt due to a firm by partners, who were members of the firm at the date of dissolution, is a suit to enforce the right to realise the property of a dissolved firm and is maintainable. 20. We may, however, mention that for the reasons to be given by us later we have come to the conclusion that the accounts of the partnership- weep, never settled between the parties and though the Plaintiffs have claimed specific sums of money we think that the proper relief which should have been claimed by the Plaintiff's was a relief for accounts. In the present case where the Plaintiffs have claimed specific sums of money on the allegation, though we might mention that the Plaintiffs do not specifically say that there was ever any settlement of account that the accounts were gone into and the sums were found due to the Plaintiffs, we may pass a decree for accounts if we are not satisfied that there was a proper settlement thereon and it does not seem to be necessary that we should either direct the Plaintiffs to withdraw the suit or dismiss it on the ground that the relief claimed was not the proper relief. 21. The allegations as regards the settlement of accounts are in these words in the plaint, paragraph No. 6: An account was prepared up to that date (9.th of October,1938) and the entire Jama kharch entries were made in the account book of the partnership firm aforesaid and it was found that there was a loss of Rs. 6,939-0-9(sic) up to 9th October, 1938. 22. Ram Nath one of the partners, who was the principal witness(sic) for the Plaintiffs stated: Accounts were settled on that date and the balance sheet was prepared. Ex. 17 is the balance sheet of the firm. 23. His cross-examination, however clearly showed that there were various articles belonging to the partnership which were not taken into account at the time of dissolution. He stated that the trade mark bad been paid out of the firms money. We may mention that learned Counsel for the Appellant Mr. Mushtaq Ahmad, made a clear statement on instructions obtained by him in our presence that it was bit clients case that the trade mark was the property of the firm. He stated that the trade mark bad been paid out of the firms money. We may mention that learned Counsel for the Appellant Mr. Mushtaq Ahmad, made a clear statement on instructions obtained by him in our presence that it was bit clients case that the trade mark was the property of the firm. We want to mean(sic) it here as it goes against the allegations in the plaint as we read the same. It* does not appear bow this trade mark was disposed of. Mr. Mushtaq Ahmed suggested that the trade mark was transferred to the Plaintiffs for the same price for which it had been purchased, but we can find no evidence to that effect. If this trade mark was the properly of the firm and it was used by one of the partners after its dissolution anything that may have to pay under this head would be payable to the partnership and not to the Plaintiffs. In the account that has to be gone into by the Court below this aspect of the claim would have to be considered in deciding whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to anyting for the use of the trade mark by Phusi Ram and, if so, how much. Phusi Ram's case is that be used the trade mark free of charge, whereas the Plaintiffs allege that he had to pay two annas perbale(sic) as hire. We wish to express no final opinion on this point of the hire(sic) as we consider that it would be proper that the point should be left to the decision of the lower Court after it goes through the accounts either Itself or through a commissioner. The lower Court held that the sum of Rs. 650 was recovreable by the Plaintiffs but it had found a few sentences earlier that the trade marks were the property of the Sheopur partnership as they Were bought out of the money belonging to the Sheopur firm. If that were so, we do not see how the Plaintiffs Were held to be entitled to claim the whole of the sum of Rs. 650. We, therefore, consider that it would be more satisfactory it this point is considered by tbe Court below at the time of the settlement of accounts. Coming back to the judicaton(sic) of settlement of accounts, Baldeo Prasad one of the Plaintiff said that Ex. 650. We, therefore, consider that it would be more satisfactory it this point is considered by tbe Court below at the time of the settlement of accounts. Coming back to the judicaton(sic) of settlement of accounts, Baldeo Prasad one of the Plaintiff said that Ex. 17 was the final balance sheet prepared alter due accounting, in respect of that firm. In his cross-examination he showed complete ignorace as to what happened to the stock of the dissolved firm and admitted that he did not know the value of the stock at the time of dissolution. He went on to say that the balance sheet was prepared in bis presence. His fattier was also present but the Plaintiff did not check the balance sheet. There is no other evidence on the point, A glance, however, at Ex. 17. the so called balance sheet, would show that it is not a settlement of accounts nor does it purport to be such, II is called in Hindi a Talipat(sic) from Aaauj(sic) sudi 10 Sambat 1994, which would be same date in Septmeber October 1937 to the 8th of October, 1938. A settlement of account to be complete would have to be from the beginning of the partnership right up to the end. Further, Exhibit 17 appears to be merely a total of the debits and credits of the various ladger heads. On the debit side is shown a suspense account of Rs, 73-10-9(sic) and on credit and debit side are various ledger heads living the amounts due to and from various persons and then they have been totalled up. The sum of Rs. 5,939 0 9 which the Plaintiffs claim was the loss incurred by the partnership as a resuit of the working for the several years is itself shown as one of the items on the debit side(sic) Whatever may be slid about the line of defence taken by Phusi Ram. we find from his evidence In Court mat be has been rather frank and has admitted many things which now go against him. According to him Ex. 17 in the balance sheet of the credits and debits of the partnership and we are included to accept his statement. To our mind, the accounts of the partnership were, never settled in accordance with the mode of settlement of acounts(sic) given in Section 44 of the Indian Partnership Act. According to him Ex. 17 in the balance sheet of the credits and debits of the partnership and we are included to accept his statement. To our mind, the accounts of the partnership were, never settled in accordance with the mode of settlement of acounts(sic) given in Section 44 of the Indian Partnership Act. It will, therefore be necessary for us to send this case back to the lower Court for the settlement of accounts and then for a decision as to how much was due from Phusi Ram to the Plaintiffs. If nothing was due, the Plaintiff sort must fail. 24. Learned Counsel has argued that his clients invested the entire capital needed by the partner ship and at the Defendant has admitted that he had overdrawn to the extent of Rs. 6, 756-5, his clients should get a decree at least for that sum We, however, cannot treat that sum as a separate claim and it must be taken into account in settling(sic) the (accounts of the partnership in accordance with the provisions of Section 48 of the Indian Partnership Act. 25. The result, therefore, Is that this appeal is allowed, the decree of the lower Court is set aside and the case is sent back to that Court for settlement of accounts and preparation of a decree in accordance with the provisions of Section 48 of the Indian Partnership Act. 26. As regards costs, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to any costs. 'Their suit in its(sic) form was defective and we are showing then an indulgence by giving them decree for accounts when they came into Court on false allegations and claimed only specific sums of money. Their conduct in trying to siddle(sic) the responsibility or Bhusi Ram alone is also not comendable. In this Court they had fist engaged Mr. Harnandan Prasad as counsel but eventually took away the papers from bim under a trick and never paid him his fees nor did they send any reply to his letters or allow him to withdraw from the case Under the circumstances we think we should make them pay their own costs in both the Courts. The Defendant will bear his own costs.