JUDGMENT Verma, J. - This is an appeal by the defendants in a suit for the recovery of Rs. 9025. The Court below has granted the plaintiffs a decree for Rs. 7700 with proportionate costs and future interest at three per cent, per annum. It appears that the plaintiffs agreed in the Court below that the suit should be decreed for Rs. 7700 only and that the defendants also accepted the correctness of this figure and stated that a decree might be passed for that amount if their plea of limitation was not accepted. 2. The suit, which was instituted on 26th September 1941 (and not 18th November 1941, as stated in the judgment of the Court below), was based on a Sarkhat dated 16th September 1933. The plaintiffs alleged that their suit was saved from the bar of limitation because of two reasons, (1) that the period from 5th August 1936 to 30th September 1939, had to be excluded because of proceedings taken by some of the debtors under the United Provinces Encumbered Estates Act, and relied on S. 9 (5) of that Act and (2) that there was an acknowledgment of the debt by the present defendants-appellants in a written statement filed in those Encumbered Estates Act proceedings on 21st September 1939. The defendants-appellants agreed that the plaintiffs were entitled to the exclusion of the period from 5th August 1936 to 30th September 1939, in other words, that the plaintiffs could bring a suit on the basis of this Sarkhat upto 11th November 1939. They contended, however, that, as the acknowledgment relied upon had been given, not within the period of three years prescribed by Sch. 1, Limitation Act, but within a period which was to be excluded under a local or special act that acknowledgment was not an acknowledgment within S. 19, Limitation Act and that, therefore, the suit was barred by time. The Court below overruled this contention of the defendants. 3. The only question that arose in the Court below, and that has been argued before us, is the question of limitation. On behalf of the appellants reliance has been placed on the Full Bench decision of this Court in L. Shanker Lal and Another Vs. Rana Lal Singh and Another Shankar Lal v. Rana Lal. That decision is entirely in their favour. On behalf of the appellants reliance has been placed on the Full Bench decision of this Court in L. Shanker Lal and Another Vs. Rana Lal Singh and Another Shankar Lal v. Rana Lal. That decision is entirely in their favour. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents has contended, however, that it required reconsideration because it runs counter to the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in AIR 1935 85 (Privy Council) Maqbul Ahmad v. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh, and has emphasised that in the judgment of the Full Bench in L. Shanker Lal and Another Vs. Rana Lal Singh and Another Shankar Lal v. Rana Lal, the Privy Council case has not been mentioned, although it had been decided three years earlier. The argument is that, as their Lordships of the Privy Council observed in their judgment that the period which has to be excluded under S. 14, Limitation Act has to be added to what is primarily the period prescribed by Sch. 1, Limitation Act, the period which has to be excluded under S. 9 (5) U.P. Encumbered Estates Act must also be deemed to be on the same footing as a period which has to be excluded under S. 14, Limitation Act. It appears to us that this contention is not well-founded. In the first place, even though the case in 57 ALL. 2422 does not appear to have been cited before the learned Judges who decided the case in L. Shanker Lal and Another Vs. Rana Lal Singh and Another Shankar Lal v. Rana Lal, they do make observations which indicate the grounds on which they would have held that the decision of the Privy Council was not applicable to the facts of the case before them. At p. 366 of the report they observed as follows: The question before us is, therefore, whether an acknowledgment made after the expiry of the prescribed period, but during an excluded periodexcluded by a special and local Actcan form an acknowledgment to extend limitation under S. 19, Limitation Act. and at p. 370, at the and of their judgment, they stated their conclusion thus: THE conclusion, therefore, is that S. 19 cannot apply to an acknowledgment made after expiry of the period of limitation prescribed but during the period excluded by S. 52, U.P. Court of Wards Act, Act 4 [IV] of 1912. and at p. 370, at the and of their judgment, they stated their conclusion thus: THE conclusion, therefore, is that S. 19 cannot apply to an acknowledgment made after expiry of the period of limitation prescribed but during the period excluded by S. 52, U.P. Court of Wards Act, Act 4 [IV] of 1912. It has thus been clearly held by the Full Bench thatwhatever may be the position when a certain period has to be excluded under one of the sections of the Limitation Acta period which has to be excluded under any other enactment does not stand on the same footing. The words in S. 19, Limitation Act, are "before the expiration of the period prescribed". This must, in our opinion, mean prescribed by the Act in which S. 19 occurs, that is, the Limitation Act, read by itself and without reference to any other enactment. The observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in AIR 1935 85 (Privy Council) , Maqbul Ahmad v. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh, relied upon by the plaintiffs, respondents, were made with reference to a section of the Limitation Act itself and learned counsel for the plain tiffs-respondents has failed to convince us that we shall be justified in holding, on the basis of those observations, that the Full Bench decision in L. Shanker Lal and Another Vs. Rana Lal Singh and Another Shankar Lal v. Rana Lal requires reconsideration. It may also be pointed: out that S. 3, Limitation Act, makes it incumbent on the Court to dismiss every suit instituted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor by Sch. 1, and the only exception is contained in the words "subject to the provisions contained in Ss. 4 to 25 (inclusive)." That also indicates that, where a plaintiff, instituting a suit after the period prescribed by Sch. 1, Limitation Act, seeks to take advantage of an enactment other than the Limitation Act, he is not entitled to contend that his suit is outside the mischief of S. 3. 4. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents has also cited the cases in Nagarpur Sambayya Vs. Nagarpur Pedda Subbayya, AIR 1938 Mad 19 Sambayya v. Pedda Subbayya and AIR 1937 26 (Oudh) Sukhnandan Prasad v. Ahmad Ali Khan. 4. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents has also cited the cases in Nagarpur Sambayya Vs. Nagarpur Pedda Subbayya, AIR 1938 Mad 19 Sambayya v. Pedda Subbayya and AIR 1937 26 (Oudh) Sukhnandan Prasad v. Ahmad Ali Khan. The question in the latter case had also arisen as to a period excluded by S. 52, U.P. Court of Wards Act and the decision there is just the reverse of what the Full Bench of this Court subsequently decided in L. Shanker Lal and Another Vs. Rana Lal Singh and Another Shankar Lal v. Rana Lal. No reasons, however, are given by the learned Judges of the Chief Court for the conclusion. The whole of the judgment on this point is contained in two sentences which run thus : In this way a suit on the basis of the earlier promissory note would have been in time upto 16th August 1932, and a suit on the second promissory note would have been in time up till 30th August 1932. The letter (Ex. 19) and the post card (Ex. 18) were, therefore, written before the period of limitation for a suit on the promissory notes had expired. There was no consideration of the language of the relevant sections of the Limitation Act. That a suit would have been in time upto a certain date does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that an acknowledgment given before that date, but after the expiration of the period laid down in Sch. 1, Limitation Act, is a good acknowledgment within the meaning of S. 19, Limitation Act. In the former case, the learned Judges of the Madras High Court did interpret the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in 57 ALL. 2422 as laying down that the word "prescribed" in S. 19, Limitation Act, is not limited to the period mentioned in Sch. 1 of the Act and that, in computing the period prescribed, the period which a party is entitled to exclude under any law for the time being in force should be taken into account. We do not, however, think, as has already been stated, that the Privy Council decision, which was concerned with the, interpretation of S. 14, among other sections of the Limitation Act, adversely affects the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in L. Shanker Lal and Another Vs. We do not, however, think, as has already been stated, that the Privy Council decision, which was concerned with the, interpretation of S. 14, among other sections of the Limitation Act, adversely affects the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in L. Shanker Lal and Another Vs. Rana Lal Singh and Another Shankar Lal v. Rana Lal which was a case in which the exclusion had to be made under an enactment other than the Limitation Act. That decision is binding on us and we must, therefore, hold that the Court below was wrong in coming to the conclusion that the suit was saved from the bar of [limitation. 5. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents has also argued that the proviso to S. 9 (5), U.P. Encumbered Estates Act, must be deemed to be incorporated in the Limitation Act and must be treated as one of the provisions contained in that Act. We do not think that there is any justification for this contention. 6. The appeal must be allowed and it must be held that the suit brought by the plaintiffs-respondents was barred by time. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the decree passed by the Court below and dismiss the suit with costs in both Courts.