Provash Ch. Roy v. Prokash Ch. Roy — 1946 DIGILAW 91 (CAL)

JUDGMENT Das, J. - This application raises two important questions, one depending on a construction of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, and the other on Hindu Law. Both the points appear to be of first impression for no reported decision directly hearing on either of them has been brought to my notice. The relevant facts are not in dispute and may be shortly stated as follows:-- One Purna Chandra Roy a Hindu governed by the Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law died intestate on May 23rd 1941, seised and possesed of his dwelling house No. 2914, Haradhole Lane in the town of Calcutta and some movable properties. He left him surviving two sons, the Plaintiff Provash and the Defendant Prokash, a widowed daughter-in-law, namely, the added Defendant No. 3, Sm. Usha Rani being the widow of his predeceased son Pratap who died in 1930 and a grand-daughter, namely, the added Defendant No. 4. Shantilata being the only daughter of the said predeceased son. In March, 1942, the present suit was instituted by Provash against the Defendant Prokash for partition of the estate left by their father Purna. Shortly thereafter Provash sold a part of is undivided share in the dwelling house to Uday Sing Nahar who has since been added as Defendant No. 2. Usha Rani the widow of the predeceased son Protap was out of town, on account of the illness of her daughter, at the time of the death of Purna and at the date of the institution of this suit. On her return to town she is alleged to have come to learn about the suit and to have protested against her exclusion. The Plaintiff thereupon made an oral application to Mr. Justice Ameer Ali for certain directions and on that application an order was made on December, 1942, directing that Usha Rani and Shantilata being the widow and the daughter respectively of the said predeceased son Protap be added as Defendants in this suit. Service of fresh writ of summons was waived and Usha Rani was appointed guardian-ad-litem of Shantilata and she filed a written statement for herself and as such guardian-ad-litem. On February 2nd, 1945, a preliminary decree was passed declaring the shares of the parties and appointing a Commissioner of partition with liberty to sell the said dwelling house. Service of fresh writ of summons was waived and Usha Rani was appointed guardian-ad-litem of Shantilata and she filed a written statement for herself and as such guardian-ad-litem. On February 2nd, 1945, a preliminary decree was passed declaring the shares of the parties and appointing a Commissioner of partition with liberty to sell the said dwelling house. By that decree it was amongst other things declared that the Defendant Usha Rani was entitled to 4/12 share in the dwelling house and to 1/3rd share in the admitted movable properties mentioned in the decree to be held by her as a Hindu widow. No provision appears to have been made by that decree for the Defendant Shantilata. On October 19th, 1945, the Defendant Usha Rani died leaving her surviving her only daughter the Defendant Shantilata who has now attained majority. She has taken out the present notice of motion praying that the death of the Defendant Usha Rani be recorded and the Register of the cause title be amended by describing her, the applicant, as having attained majority and leave be given her to defend and proceed with the suit in her own name and that the Commissioner be directed to allot to her the share, which was by the decree allotted to the Defendant Usha Rani, for and in lieu of her maintenance, residence and marriage expenses or alternatively the Commissioner be directed to deposit into Court 1/3rd share of the sale proceeds of the immovable property after payment of the costs as also 1/3rd share of the movable property directed to be allotted to the Defendant Usha Rani and suitable direction be given for the applicant's maintenance, residence and marriage expenses and if necessary the decree be reviewed and/or modified and other incidental reliefs. 2. The first question raised on this application is as to what, now that the Defendant Usha Rani is dead, is to happen to the share to which she was declared entitled, and which she was to hold as a Hindu widow. The answer must obviously depend upon the true meaning and effect of the relevant provisions of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, by virtue which the Defendant Usha Rani got her share. The answer must obviously depend upon the true meaning and effect of the relevant provisions of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, by virtue which the Defendant Usha Rani got her share. There is no dispute that under the Hindu Law as interpreted and administered by the Courts a father-in-law is under no legal obligation maintain the widow of his predeceased son out of his separate property, although he is, as a matter of moral obligation, expected to do On the death of the father-in-law, however, his heirs who inherit his estate are held legally bound to maintain the widowed daughter-in-law out the estate come to their hands as such heirs. The Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act 1937, was enacted "to give better rights to women in respect of property." A perusal of the few sections at once shows that this Act give-better rights "to three specified females, viz., the widow, the widow of a predeceased son a the widow of a predeceased son of a predeceased son." It may be taken, therefore, that the Act was designed "to give better rights" to the three females specified in the operative provisions of the Act. By sec. 2, notwithstanding any rule of any Hindu Law or custom to the contrary the provisions of sec. 3 shall apply where a Hindu dies intestate. The following are the relevant provisions of sec. 3 applicable the case of a Hindu governed by the Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law:-- 3. (1) When a Hindu governed by the Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law dies intestate leaving any property................his widow, or if there is more than one widow, all his widows together, shall, subject to the provisions of Sub-section (3), be entitled in respect of property in respect of which he dies intestate to the same share as a son: Provided that the widow of a predeceased son shall inherit in like manner as a son, if there is no son surviving of such predeceased son, and shall inherit in like manner as a son's son if there is surviving or son's son of such predeceased son; Provided further that the same provisions shall apply mutatis mutandis to the widow of a predeceased son of a predeceased son. (2)................................ (2)................................ (3) Any interest devolving on a Hindu widow under the provisions of this Section shall be the limited interest known as a Hindu woman's estate, provided however that she shall have the same right of claiming partition as a male owner. (4)........................... 3. Purna died intestate in 1941, that is to say, after the commencement of the Act. The predeceased son Protap has left no son or son's son. Therefore, under the first proviso to sub-sec. (1) his widow Usha Rani as the widow of the predeceased son of Puma became entitled to inherit "in like manner as a son." Purna having left him surviving two sons, Usha Rani along, with those two sons inherited the estate of Purna in equal shares each having 1/3rd share in the estate. The 1/3rd share which this devolved on the Defendant Usha Rani under the provisions of sub-sec. (1) was by sub-sec. (2) to be held by her as and for the limited interest known as a Hindu woman's estate but with the right of claiming partition and the preliminary decree declared accordingly. So far there is no dispute. 4. Learned Counsel appearing for the applicant contends that the provisos to sub-sec. (1) are the operative and therefore the dominant provisions which confer rights and therefore control sub-sec. (3). According to him under the first proviso the widow of a predeceased son inherits "in like manner as a son," that is to say, she stands exactly in the same position as the predeceased son if alive would have done. The share is given to the widow of the predeceased son really in the right of the predeceased son. To put the same idea in other words the share is really given through the predeceased son to his widow. The widow of the predeceased son gets the share only because she is his widow and therefore in contemplation of law through the predeceased son. Therefore on the death of the widow of the predeceased son the share must pass on to those who would be the heirs of the predeceased son at the time of the death of his widow. I am unable to accept this argument for it is obviously unwarranted by the language of the section. The object of the Act is to give better rights to the three specified females. Sub-sec. I am unable to accept this argument for it is obviously unwarranted by the language of the section. The object of the Act is to give better rights to the three specified females. Sub-sec. (1) implements this object by giving to the three specified females a right of inheritance in certain, circumstances. The share is not expressed to be given to anyone but the three specified females themselves. It is true that the share is given to her because she is the widow of the last full owner or the widow of his predeceased son or the widow of the predeceased son of his predeceased son but it is expressly and directly given to her. She inherits the estate of the owner who dies intestate because she stands in a particular relationship with him. In the case of the widow of the predeceased son, she inherits the estate of the father-in-law and not the estate of her husband who had no right in the estate when he had died. In other words these three specified females have, by the Act, been made heirs of the deceased last full owner directly and put in the category of a son or son's son, as the case may be, in the order of succession. In the case now before me Usha Rani, because she was the widow of the predeceased son of Purna, inherited the of Purna "in like manner as a son" under the first proviso. It is she herself who inherited directly and it is Puma's estate that she inherited. The provision that the widow of a pre-deceased son inherits "in like manner" as a son or son's son, as the case may be, indicates, as I have held in Kamala Bala Bose v. Jiban Krishna Since reported: 50 C. W. N. 555 (1946) that she has been put into the category of heirs of the last full owner along with his son or son's son, as the case may be, in the line and order of succession. The interest that devolves on her is by sub-sec. (3) the limited interest known as a Hindu woman's estate in Hindu Law. The interest that devolves on her is by sub-sec. (3) the limited interest known as a Hindu woman's estate in Hindu Law. Therefore on the deatit is the widowed daughter-in-law the estate of the share that devolved on her under the Act reverts to the last full owner, that is to say, the father-in-law and passes on to those who would be his heirs had he died at that point of time. The heirs of the predeceased son do not come into the picture at all, for the predeceased son had no manner of title in or interest to this estate. 5. The next argument is that the widow of the pre-deceased son inherits "in like manner as a son." Therefore she inherits as a full owner and on her death the share would pass to her heirs. The words "in like manner as a son" in sub-see, (1) control sub-sec. (3) which should be construed as putting only certain restrictions on her power of alienation. The argument appears to me to be fallacious. Under the Hindu Law although the limited owner fully represents the estate there are two important qualifications, namely, that she cannot alienate the estate except for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate and that she does not become a root of title or stock of descent. On her death the estate devolves on those who would be the heirs of the last full owner. The words "in like manner as a son or son's son" do not in my opinion constitute her a full owner in the sense of her becoming a root of title or stock of descent. Those words qualify the preceding word "inherit" and indicate her position in the order of succession whenever the question of succession to the estate of the person in respect of whose estate she has been made an heir arises, be it at the date of his death or subsequently on the death of an heir who took a woman's estate. The nature and quantum of her interest, however, is defined by sub-sec. (3) as the limited interest known as a woman's estate with all the limitations implied by that expression. I see no reason to exclude one of the two important limitations of that estate which I have mentioned. In my judgment sub-sec. (3) controls or qualifies sub-sec. (1). The nature and quantum of her interest, however, is defined by sub-sec. (3) as the limited interest known as a woman's estate with all the limitations implied by that expression. I see no reason to exclude one of the two important limitations of that estate which I have mentioned. In my judgment sub-sec. (3) controls or qualifies sub-sec. (1). Consequently on the death of the widow of the pre-deceased son the share given to her must revert to the last full owner and pass on to those who would be his heirs had he died at that point of time. 6. Learned Counsel for the applicant strenuously argues--and the argument impressed me considerably at the time--that to reject his construction of sec. 3 will result in great hardship in some cases. Suppose, says learned Counsel, a Dayabhaga Hindu dies leaving a son, a widow of a pre-deceased son and a son of that pre-deceased son. The estate would devolve as to half on the son and as to the other half on the widow and the son of the pre-deceased son in equal shares. Then suppose the widow of the pre-deceased son dies. If the construction suggested by learned Counsel were adopted then the 1/4th share of the widow of the pre-deceased son would go to the heir of the pre-deceased son, viz., the son of the pre-deceased son, so that, the son of the pre-deceased son would get the whole of the half share which he would got at the date of the death of the last full owner had this Act not been passed. If, however the construction suggested by him be rejected a it be held that the 1/4th share of the widow of the pre-deceased son must revert to the last full owner then that 1/4 share will pass on heirs of the last full owner, viz., the son and the son of the pre-deceased son in equal shares. If, however the construction suggested by him be rejected a it be held that the 1/4th share of the widow of the pre-deceased son must revert to the last full owner then that 1/4 share will pass on heirs of the last full owner, viz., the son and the son of the pre-deceased son in equal shares. The result will be that the share of the son will be which he got at the time of the death of last full owner plus 1/8 which he gets on the death of the widow of the pre-deceased on aggregating to 5/8 and the share of the son of the pre-deceased son will be 1/4 which at the time of the death of the last full plus 1/8 which he gets at the date of the death of the widow of the pre-deceased son aggregating to 3/8. If the statute had not been a the son and the son of the pre-deceased son would have got equal shares. This, indeed an astounding result which, concludes the learned Counsel, could never have been intended by the legislature. This hardship, accord learned Counsel, can be avoided only if it held that the share of the widow reverts estate of the pre-deceased son and pass on to the latter's heirs, viz., in the illustration he has taken to the son of the pre-deceased son or that the widow of the pre-deceased son takes as full owner as a son and on her death passes on to her heir, who, in that illustration, is the same person, namely, the son of the predeceased son. Apart from the consideration that neither of the suggested constructions is at all warranted by the language of the section, such construction will inevitably lead to equally great hardship to more than one person. Suppose a Dayabhaga Hindu dies leaving no son grandson, great-grandson or widow but leaving a daughter and a widow of a pre-deceased son. By virtue of sec. 3 of the Act the widow of the pre-deceased son will inherit the estate in preference to the daughter, for the widow of the pre-deceased son has been put in the same category as a son or a son's son in the order of succession. Thus by the Act the daughter's claim is superseded. By virtue of sec. 3 of the Act the widow of the pre-deceased son will inherit the estate in preference to the daughter, for the widow of the pre-deceased son has been put in the same category as a son or a son's son in the order of succession. Thus by the Act the daughter's claim is superseded. Then suppose the widow of the pre-deceased son dies during the life-time of the daughter leaving a daughter of the pre-deceased son. If the constructions suggested by the learned Counsel be accepted that the estate does not pass to the heirs of the last full owner but goes to the heir of the pre-deceased son or her own heir then it will pass on to the daughter of the pre-deceased son. The daughter of the last full owner is in effect permanently superseded and this time by a person who is not an heir at all of the last full owner either under the Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law or even under this Act. Thus hardship will be caused not only to the daughter, but to daughter's son, father, mother and indeed all other heirs of the last full owner down the line of succession for the sake of the pre-deceased son's daughter although she is not one of the three specified females to whom better rights are intended to be given by this Act. I am not prepared to adopt a construction which is not strictly warranted by the language used by the legislature and which, while mitigating the hardship of the son of the pre-deceased son in the illustration given by the learned Counsel for the applicant, may cause equal or greater hardship to a number of persons as shown in the illustration suggested by me and may benefit a person, e.g., a daughter of a pre-deceased son who is not one of the persons to whom better rights are sought to be given by this Act. The hardship of the son of the pre-deceased son in the illustration put forward by learned Counsel for the applicant might have been obviated if it could be held that on the death of the widow of the pre-deceased son of his illustration the whole estate including the share given to the son in his illustration reverted back to the last full owner so as to pass on to those who would inherit the estate of the last full owner had he died at that point of time. But I do not know of any principle of Hindu Law by which a share vested in a male heir can be divested and made to revert back to the original owner. In the next place such reverter may also cause new hardship, for it is quite conceivable that the son may die leaving a daughter before the death of the widow of the pre-deceased son of the illustration of the learned Counsel. It is clear, therefore, that the avoidance of hardship is a frail and unsatisfactory consideration in the matter of the construction of the statute with which we are concerned and cannot be allowed to influence such construction. It is better to recognize that the language of this Act is unfortunate and defective and to construe the Act according to the ordinary meaning of the language used, leaving the hardship to lie where it falls until it is mitigated by the legislature itself. On a consideration of the arguments advanced on both sides with commendable earnestness and zeal and construing the Act as best as I may, I have come to the conclusion that the share that devolved on Usha Rani the widow of the pre-deceased son of Purna passed on to Provash and Prokash as the then heirs of Purna the last full owner. 7. It remains now to consider the second point raised by the applicant, viz., that provision should be made for her maintenance, residence and marriage. I have already mentioned that although Shantilata was considered as a necessary party and added as a Defendant in this suit yet no provision was made for her by the preliminary decree. This was presumably because a share was given to Usha Rani and it was thought unnecessary to make any separate provision for her. I have already mentioned that although Shantilata was considered as a necessary party and added as a Defendant in this suit yet no provision was made for her by the preliminary decree. This was presumably because a share was given to Usha Rani and it was thought unnecessary to make any separate provision for her. Having regard to the altered position brought about by the death of Usha Rani and the passing of that share to the surviving sons of Purna, I do not think it will be just or right to hold the applicant's claim for maintenance, etc., adversely concluded for all times by the absence of any express provision in that behalf in that decree. Indeed learned Counsel for the Plaintiff Provash and learned Counsel for the Defendant No. 2 do not contend before me that the applicant is precluded by the decree from now claiming that provision should be made for her maintenance. The only argument advanced by learned Counsel for the Plaintiff and for the Defendant Nahar is that the daughter of a predeceased son is not entitled to maintenance from the grand-father during the latter's life-time or out of his estate from his heirs after his death. I have, therefore, to consider only this argument in the light of Hindu Law as interpreted by judicial decisions. 8. Under the Hindu Law the obligation to maintain others is placed in some cases on a person irrespective of any property in his hands and in certain cases on the property itself. The personal obligation is again sub-divided into two classes, namely, legal and moral. The liability of property is also divided into two classes depending on the nature of the property, ancestral or separate. 9. The Hindu law-givers enjoin on a Hindu the duty of maintaining others. It is interesting to compare the language used in the different texts. English translations of three texts from Manu as given in Sastri's Hindu Law, 8th Edn., Ch. XI, are as follows: The father, the mother, the Guru (an elderly relation worthy of respect), a wife, an offspring, poor dependants, a guest and a religious mendicant are declared to be the group of persons who are to be maintained. It is declared by Manu that the aged mother and father, the chaste wife and an infant child must be maintained even by doing a hundred misdeeds. It is declared by Manu that the aged mother and father, the chaste wife and an infant child must be maintained even by doing a hundred misdeeds. Neither mother, nor father nor wife nor son, deserves abandonment; one abandoning these when not degraded (or outcasted for commission of any heinous sin) shall be punished by the King, six hundred (Panas). 10. It will be noticed that in the two last texts only four relations are referred to, whereas the first text embraces some persons who are not relations at all and whose claims cannot be to anything more than charity. It will be further noticed that the language of the second text is made very emphatic by sanctioning, figuratively no doubt, the "doing a hundred misdeeds." The language of the third text is more legal in its terms and prescribe even punishment by King. In the first text there is no sanction at all. In these circumstances the Courts have construed the first text as merely preceptive and prescribing a moral duty, and the last two texts and like texts from other sages as mandatory and imposing a legal obligation. Therefore Courts have held that a Hindu, whether or not he possesses property (ancestral or self-acquired) is bound to maintain his aged parents, his unmarried daughters, his minor sons (which expression includes adopted sons and even illegitimate sons by a Hindu woman) and has virtuous wives. This obligation being emptory is legal and can be enforced in a Court of law. The duty of maintaining other retail is left to the conscience and good sense of the person with only a social sanction behind it and arises when the person has separate property. If he has no property then there is not even any moral obligation. No relation other than those specified above can, as a matter of right, claim maintenance from a person independently of property. The merely moral obligation of a Hindu although it arises on his having property personal cannot be enforced against him or his property in a Court of law. Thus it has been held Bai Daya v. Natha Govindlal I. L. R. 9 Bom. 279 (1885) that a son is under no legal obligation to support stepmother independently of the existence in his hands of family property. Thus it has been held Bai Daya v. Natha Govindlal I. L. R. 9 Bom. 279 (1885) that a son is under no legal obligation to support stepmother independently of the existence in his hands of family property. Nor is a Hindu under any legal obligation to his grand-children [Manmahini v. Balak Chandra 8 B. L. R. 22. (1871)] or to daughter-in-law [Kalu v. Kashibai I. L. R. 7 Bom. 127 (1882)]. Meenakhi v. Rama Aiyar I. L. R. 37 Mad. 396 (1912), Janki v. Nandram I. L. R. 11 All. 194 (1888) or to his married daughter [Bai Mangal v. Bai Rukmini I. L. R. 23 Bom. 291 (1898) and Mokhada v. Nundo Lall I. L. R. 28 Cal. 278 (1901)] or to a step-brother [ AIR 1937 76 (Lahore) ]. 11. The liability of property in the hands of a Hindu for the maintenance of others when it exists is always a legal duty and can be enforced in a Court of law. Thus joint family property is liable for the maintenance of every co-parcener and his dependants. On the death of a coparcener it continues to be liable in the hands of the surviving members for the maintenance of every person whom the deceased co-parcener, if alive would have been legally bound to maintain. On partition, provision must be made for those members who by reason of any legal disqualification do not get a share and his wife and children. We have seen that a Hindu is liable for the maintenance of certain specified relations irrespective of his having any property at all. This liability is a legal one and can be enforced by getting a decree against him personally and then attaching his separate property or by getting a charge declared on the property by the decree. Thus the separate property of a person may, during his life-time, be made available for the maintenance of those specified relations. There can be no question that on the death of a Hindu leaving separate property such property descends burdened with the legal obligations of the deceased owner. The heir takes the property not for his own benefit but for the spiritual well-being of the deceased owner. As the discharge of this legal obligation by the heir will enure for the spiritual salvation of the deceased the heir is legally bound to fulfil this obligation of the deceased owner. The heir takes the property not for his own benefit but for the spiritual well-being of the deceased owner. As the discharge of this legal obligation by the heir will enure for the spiritual salvation of the deceased the heir is legally bound to fulfil this obligation of the deceased owner. See Tulsha v. Gopal Rai I. L. R. 6 All. 632 (1884) as to the rights of a widow and unmarried daughter against the property inherited by the step-son and step-brother, Narbada Bai v. Mahadeo I. L. R. 5 Bom. 99 (1880) as to the right of the widow against the property inherited by the step-son. 12. We have seen that apart from the legal obligation to maintain certain specified relations the Hindu law also enjoins a moral obligation to maintain other persons who come within "the group of persons to be maintained." (Poshyabarga). Leaving aside the specified relations for whom peremptory provision has been made by other texts and the guru, the guest and the religious mendicant whose claim must, according to modern ideas, be relegated to the domain of charity and cannot be recognised by a Court of law at all, we have to consider the case of "poor dependants" (Deenap Samashritah) in the first text of Manu quoted above. As to who are comprised within this expression must be determined, as stated by Banerjee, J., in Kamini Dassee v. Chandra Pode Mondle I. L. R. 17 Cal. 373 at 378 (1889) in each case, having regard to the relationship, the means and various other circumstances of the party claiming maintenance, the principles of Hindu law and the usages and practice of the Hindus. If on a consideration of these matters a person is held to be a "poor dependant" that person comes within "the group of persons to be maintained" (Poshyabarga) and becomes entitled to the benefit of the moral obligation imposed on a Hindu to maintain such person although this moral obligation cannot be enforced in a Court of law against the person liable even if he has separate property in his hands. The question is, does this moral obligation die with him or is transmitted to his heirs who take his property by right of inheritance? 13. It has been held in several cases that a Hindu is under no legal obligation to maintain the widow of his pre-deceased son. The question is, does this moral obligation die with him or is transmitted to his heirs who take his property by right of inheritance? 13. It has been held in several cases that a Hindu is under no legal obligation to maintain the widow of his pre-deceased son. Those very cases, however, recognise the moral duty of the father-in-law in this regard during his lifetime. The question whether this obligation passes along with the separate property to his heirs has been decided in numerous cases in favour of the widowed daughter-in-law. Reference may be made in this connection to the Full Bench ruling of the Allahabad High Court in Janki v. Nand Ram I. L. R. 11 All. 194 (1888). It has been held there that a father-in-law is under a moral, though not a legal, obligation not only to maintain his widowed daughter-in-law during his life-time, but also to make provision out of his self-acquired property for her maintenance after his death and that such moral obligation in the father-in-law becomes by reason of his self-acquired property having come by inheritance into the hands of his surviving son, a legal obligation enforceable by suit against that son (who takes the estate not for his own benefit but for the spiritual benefit of the last proprietor) and against the property in question. The matter was minutely examined and dealt with by Mahmood, J., in his very learned and illuminating judgment in that case. That decision has been followed in Kamini Dassi v. Chandra Pode Mondle I. L. R. 17 Cal. 373 at 378 (1889). In that last mentioned case Banerjee, J., accepted the observations of the learned Judges in the case of Khettramani Dassi v. Kasi Nath Das 2 B. L. R. (A. C.) 15 (1868), although obiter, as laying down the correct principle of Hindu law. His Lordship also accepted the decision in the Allahabad Full Bench case. Reference may also be made to the case of Siddessury Dassee v. Janardan Sarkar I. L. R. 29 Cal. 557 (1902) and Yamunabai v. Manubai I. L. R. 23 Bom. 608 (1899). It is thus clear on these authorities that the moral obligation in the father-in-law to maintain the widowed daughter-in-law ripens into a legal obligation in his heirs who take his property by inheritance. 557 (1902) and Yamunabai v. Manubai I. L. R. 23 Bom. 608 (1899). It is thus clear on these authorities that the moral obligation in the father-in-law to maintain the widowed daughter-in-law ripens into a legal obligation in his heirs who take his property by inheritance. The Judicial Committee in Rajani Kanta Pal v. Sajani Sundari Dassya L. R. 61 I. A. 29: s. c. 38 C. W. N. 262 (1933) has accepted this principle as well established by authoritative judgments and not liable to be re-opened. Ameer Ali, J., in Fool Coomari v. Debendra Nath I. L. R. (1942) 1 Cal. 202, following Gopal Chandra Pal Vs. Kadambini Dasi and Others, AIR 1924 Cal 364 has upheld the rights of the widowed daughter-in-law alike against heirs and devisees of the father-in-law. 14. The case of a married daughter is also in point. On marriage the daughter goes out of the family of her father and becomes incorporated into the family of her husband. The father is under no legal obligation to maintain her any more. But if this daughter becomes destitute by reason of her inability to get maintenance from her husband's family and comes back to her father, the father is under a moral obligation maintain her. The High Courts of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras recognise this moral obligation. There is conflict of opinion as to whether this moral obligation like that in favour of the widowed daughter-in-law ripens into a legal obligation in the heirs who inherit the father's property. Ranade, J., of the Bombay High Court in Bai Mangol v. Bai Rukmini I. L. R. 23 Bom. 291 (1898) held that it did not and remained always a moral obligation. The Calcutta High Court in Mokhada v. Nundo Lall I. L. R. 28 Cal. 278 (1901) left the point undecided, for in that case there was no evidence that the widowed daughter was unable to get maintenance from her husband's family. Further there was an offer by the heir of the father to maintain her in the family but she claimed separate maintenance. In these circumstances it was not necessary for the Court to decide point we are considering. Further there was an offer by the heir of the father to maintain her in the family but she claimed separate maintenance. In these circumstances it was not necessary for the Court to decide point we are considering. Maclean, C. J., however, observed with reference to the Bombay case:--"Although the judgment there was delivered by a Judge of great knowledge and experience in Hindu law, it may be a matter consideration hereafter whether, having regard to the dicta of Peacock, C. J., in the case of Khettramani Dassi v. Kashinath Das 2 B. L. R. (A. C.) 15 (1868), Mr. Justice Ranade has not gone a little too far in saying that there is no legally enforceable right by which a widowed daughter's maintenance can be claimed as a charge on her father's estate the hands of his heirs." A Full Bench of Madras High Court in the recent case of Ambu Bai Ammal v. Soni Bai Ammal I. L. R. (1941) Mad. 13 has definitely decided the point in favour of the destitute married daughter. Their Lordships have held that the principle of the decision in Janki v. Nand Ram I. L. R. 11 All. 194 (1888) that a moral obligation becomes a legal obligation when the estate of a person on whom the moral obligation lay comes into the possession of his heirs, applies to the case of a destitute married daughter. The learned Judges pointed out that Ranade, J., in Bai Mangal v. Bai Rukmini I. L. R. 23 Bom. 291 (1898) did not consider the principle of the Allahabad Full Bench decision in Janki v. Nand Ram I. L. R. 11 All. 194 (1888). In the Madras Full Bench case it was strenuously urged that because a daughter on marriage goes out of the father's family the principle enunciated in Janki v. Nand Ram I. L. R. 11 All. 194 (1888) in favour of the widowed daughter-in-law who on marriage came into the family of the father-in-law should not be extended to the widowed daughter even if she was destitute. The Madras Court, however, saw no difficulty in extending the principle to the case of the destitute married daughter. I do not see why this principle should be limited to the case of a widowed daughter-in-law or destitute married daughter. The Madras Court, however, saw no difficulty in extending the principle to the case of the destitute married daughter. I do not see why this principle should be limited to the case of a widowed daughter-in-law or destitute married daughter. It seems to me that once a moral obligation such as the Courts may recognise is established in favour of a person, the principle of Janki v. Nand Ram I. L. R. 11 All. 194 (1888) should at once come into play. It is illogical to differentiate between such moral obligation to maintain on mere difference in the degree of relationship. The duty of the heir who takes the estate not for his own benefit but for the Spiritual well-being of the deceased owner must be the same in respect of all such moral obligations as are recognised by Courts. Indeed Mulla in Article 544 of his treatise on Hindu Law, 9th Edition at p. 582 puts it in a general form thus : An heir is legally bound to provide, out of the estate which descends to him, maintenance of those persons whom the late proprietor was legally or morally bound to maintain. The reason is that the estate is inherited subject to the obligation to provide for such maintenance. 15. I respectfully agree with the reasoning in the Madras Full Bench case and hold that the Yule in Janki v. Nand Ram I. L. R. 11 All. 194 (1888) is a general rule based on the principles of Hindu law and is applicable wherever a moral obligation such as a Court of law will recognise existed in the deceased proprietor to maintain a relation. In this view of the matter I have to ascertain whether in this case having regard to the considerations referred to by Banerjee, J., in Kamini Dassi's case I. L. R. 17 Cal. 373 at 378 (1889) there was a moral obligation on Purna to maintain the applicant Shantilata. Once this is established in her favour, the rule in Janki v. Nand Ram I. L. R. 11 All. 194 (1888) must apply. 16. Shantilata is the daughter of Purna's predeceased son. Therefore she is a daughter of Puma's family. She is unmarried and, therefore, still remains in this family. There is no dispute that during Purna's life-time she and her mother lived under the care and protection of Purna in his dwelling house. 194 (1888) must apply. 16. Shantilata is the daughter of Purna's predeceased son. Therefore she is a daughter of Puma's family. She is unmarried and, therefore, still remains in this family. There is no dispute that during Purna's life-time she and her mother lived under the care and protection of Purna in his dwelling house. She has been ailing from a serious disease from before the death of Purna. According to the Plaintiff, although it is denied by the applicant, Purna gave Usha Rani a sum of Rs. 4,000 on an agreement that she would not ask for anything more from his estate for herself and the applicant. If any payment was made at all, probabilities are that the same was done towards the medical expense and upkeep of Shantilata in the Pendra Sanitarium in pursuance of a sense of moral duty. Having regard to the relationship and the notions of the Hindus even in these modern times I have no hesitation in holding that an unmarried daughter of a pre-deceased son is an object of tender affection and every Hindu considers himself morally bound to maintain such a person. In my judgment Shantilata in this case answers the description of "poor dependant" of Purna (Deenap Samashritah) and is within "the group of persons to be maintained" both according to the letter and the spirit of the text of the Hindu sage and law-giver to which I have referred. There being thus a moral obligation in Purna, which, as a Court of law I am prepared to recognise, his heirs who take his property must, according to the rule laid down in Janki v. Nand Ram I. L. R. 11 All. 194 (1888), be legally bound to maintain her out of the estate, for they take it not for their benefit but for the spiritual salvation of Purna, and his property descends to the heirs with the burden of that moral obligation transformed into a legal obligation in them. Therefore Provas, Prakas and Usha Rani who took the estate of Purna in equal shares were equally liable for the maintenance of Shantilata out of the property so inherited by them. Therefore Provas, Prakas and Usha Rani who took the estate of Purna in equal shares were equally liable for the maintenance of Shantilata out of the property so inherited by them. Now that Usha Rani is dead and the share given to her to be held as a Hindu woman's estate must revert to Pravas and Prakash as reversioners of Puma, Pravas and Prakash are legally liable to maintain Shantilata out of the whole estate of Purna inherited by them and not out of the 1/3 share only that on the death of Usha Rani passes on to them. The next question is as to the quantum of maintenance that should he paid to Shantilata. The estate is small. Its value is estimated by Shantilata at Rs. 12,000 for the immovable property and Rs. 1,000 for the movable properties. There is no denial of the correctness of this estimate. Now the whole of the 1/3 of this estate will not yield an income which can sufficiently maintain a person in these days. Therefore it will not be fair to fix her maintenance on the basis of income. If a sufficient income is given to her it may involve taking away much more than 1/3 share from the two sons. That will not be fair to them either. In these circumstances I think it will be just and proper if only the 1/3 share of the sale proceeds of the immovable, properties only, after deducting the 1/3 share of the costs and expenses of sale and of the Commissioner's remuneration and the whole of the costs of Usha Rani of the suit and the whole of the costs of Shantilata of this application and further proceedings if any, be paid to her once for all in lieu of all her rights of maintenance, etc. I order accordingly. There will also be an order in terms of cls. (a) and (b) of the notice of motion. The other parties will have their costs of this application out of the 2/3 share of the sale proceeds according to their respective shares.