JUDGMENT Allsop, Ag. C.J. 1. This is an appeal under the Letters Patent against a judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court who set aside a decree for dissolution of marriage passed in favour of a Muslim woman under the provisions of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939. The Courts below held that the plaintiff had proved that her husband had treated her with cruelty and that he had not maintained her for a period of two years. The learned Judge of this Court did not go into the question of fact. He came to the conclusion that the allegation about cruelty was barred by the rule of res judicata and that the husband had not been guilty of any failure in the matter of maintenance. The fact is that the husband and wife disagreed soon after they were married in the year 1922 and that they had never come together in spite of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights in favour of the husband. In the suit for restitution the present plaintiff, that is the wife, alleged that her husband had treated her with cruelty in that he had habitually beaten and abused her. This matter was in issue between the parties and it was finally decided by this Court that the present plaintiff had failed to establish that she had been habitually beaten or abused. This meant that it was held as between the parties that she had not been beaten or abused. In the present suit she had again made the allegation that she was beaten and abused and we think that the learned Single Judge was perfectly right in saying that no evidence was admissible upon the point because this question was res judicata between the parties. On the other point it has been argued that there is an absolute duty on a husband to maintain his wife and that the wife is entitled to a decree for dissolution of marriage even if she avoids the husband and refuses the shelter of his house which he offers to her. In our judgment there is no force in this argument. It must be remembered that the wife is not entitled to a decree for dissolution unless there is a failure on the husband's part. In our judgment there is no force in this argument. It must be remembered that the wife is not entitled to a decree for dissolution unless there is a failure on the husband's part. The Act does not mean that the husband is bound to follow his wife wherever she may go and force money or food or clothes upon her. In the present case the husband had obtained a decree for restitution and it seems that his house was open to his wife. If she refused to avail herself of the shelter which was offered to her, she cannot complain and is certainly not entitled to a decree. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs.