JUDGMENT Dayal, J. - Sri Radha Krishna insued Kalka Singh and others for profits for the years 1340 to 1343 Fasli. The plaint was filed before the Deputy Commissioner on 26th April, 1938. He sent it to Sub-Divisional Officer, Malihabad, on 3rd. May, 1938. The Sub divisional Officer, Malihabad submitted a note to the Deputy Commissioner on 7th May, 1938. The sarbrahkar was summoned. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Malihabad, rejected the plaint on 23rd. May, 1938. The District Judge allowed the appeal against the rejection of the plaint and returned the case to the Sub-Divisional Officer's Court for disposal on merits by his order dated the 17th November, 1938. 2. Kalka Singh and Jadunath Singh filed their written statement on 13th April, 1939. They contested the suit on various grounds, including that the Plaintiff was not a co-sharer, that his name was not recorded in the khewat and that the suit was not maintainable. The other Defendants also filed a similar written statement. 3. The Court framed an issue: Was the name of the Plaintiff recorded in the Record of Rights' Register for the years in suit? 4. The trial Court decreed the Plaintiff's suit holding that the Plaintiff's name was recorded in the khewat for the years in suit. The Defendants appealed. The learned District Judge allowed the appeal to some extent modifying the decree of the Court below to the effect that the profits were to be calculated on the basis of the actual collections and that the suit was decreed for the profits for the years 1342 and 1343 Fasli only. 5. The learned District Judge held that the suit was maintainable as the Plaintiff's name was recorded in the khewat when the suit was instituted and he decided the point against the Appellants. The Defendants Nos. 1 and 3 have now filed this second appeal. 6. The first point urged before me is that the suit for profits was not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 34(5) of the U.P. Land Revenue Act (No. 3 of 1901). This section provides that no Revenue Court shall entertain a suit or application by the persons so succeeding or otherwise obtaining possession until such person has made the report required by this section, 7. This section provides that no Revenue Court shall entertain a suit or application by the persons so succeeding or otherwise obtaining possession until such person has made the report required by this section, 7. Clause (1) of Section 34 requires a person obtaining possession by succession or transfer, of any proprietary right in a mahal or part thereof, and which is required to be recorded in the register prescribed by certain clauses of Section 32, to report such succession or transfer to the Tahsildar concerned. There is nothing on the record to show that no report about the Plaintiff's obtaining possession over the property in suit was mads to the Tahsildar concerned before the institution of this suit, that is, before 26th April, 1938. It appears that such a report must have been made. The judgment of the trial Court mentions in para. 2: The Plaintiff applied for mutation but his application was dismissed it. default. He obtained mutation on 2-5-'38, but it was wrongly ordered in the name of Sheo Bihari the manager. Then he applied for correction of khewat on 22-8-'39 and correction was ordered on 6.8-'40, i.e., in the beginning of 1348. 8. The learned District Judge repeats these facts in his judgment. It should be presumed, therefore, that the application for mutation which was dismissed for default and the subsequent application on which mutation was ordered in the name of Sheo Bihari the manager must have mentioned that the Plaintiff had obtained possession over the property in suit. It may be that as the application was presented by the manager mutation was wrongly ordered in the name of the manager instead of the Plaintiff. The Appellants did not specifically mention in their written statement that the Plaintiff had not made the report required by Section 34 of the Land Revenue Act to the Tahsildar. They do not appear to have urged this fact before the learned District Judge, They did not urge this fact in their memorandum of second appeal. They really raised the objection of the maintainability of the suit on the ground that mutation in favor of the Plaintiff had not taken place by the time the suit was instituted, Strictly it may be so, but it does not affect the question of the maintainability of the suit. I, therefore, hold that the suit is maintainable. 9. They really raised the objection of the maintainability of the suit on the ground that mutation in favor of the Plaintiff had not taken place by the time the suit was instituted, Strictly it may be so, but it does not affect the question of the maintainability of the suit. I, therefore, hold that the suit is maintainable. 9. The second point urged in appeal is that the suit is time barred. The contention is based on the assumption that the suit be taken to be instituted on the 6th of August, 1940, when the mutation was ordered in favor of the Plaintiff. This assumption is to be made according to the Appellant as the suit could not have been instituted till the Plaintiff's name had been recorded in the khewat. I have already held that the recording of the name in the khewat is not a condition precedent for the institution of the suit, the condition being that a report about obtaining of the possession be made before the institution of the suit. The suit for profits of 1342 and 1343 Fasli instituted in April, 1938, was within limitation. This is not disputed. I, therefore, hold that the suit was not time barred. 10. Lastly it is urge 1 that the Plaintiff could not have acquired the property in suit as no sale of property could take place in favor of the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff being not a living person contemplated u/s 5, Transfer of Property Act. I am referred to the case reported in Tangella Narasimhaswami, Dharmakartha of Sri Kodanda Ramachandra Moorthy Vs. Iamidi Venkatalingam and Others, AIR 1927 Mad 636 . Firstly, I am of opinion that this point cannot be raised at this stage when it was not raised in any of the Courts below. The sale deed in favor of the Plaintiff is not on the file ana we cannot, therefore, say in what actual form it had been drafted. Secondly, I an of opinion that Revenue Court is to accept the entries in the village papers about a person being a co-sharer entitled to profits. Lastly, I am of opinion that the transfer of property to the idol is not bad if it is not covered by Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act. Such a transfer of property will not, therefore, be subject to the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. Lastly, I am of opinion that the transfer of property to the idol is not bad if it is not covered by Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act. Such a transfer of property will not, therefore, be subject to the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. The case referred to shows that a gift to god is not a gift to a living person and that, therefore, such a gift does not require registration. The case does not hold that a gift to god is invalid. 11. I am, therefore, of opinion that this appeal has no force. I accordingly dismiss it with costs.