The Chief Justice.-Before the 25th September, 1908, the property in suit was owned by four brothers, who were Indian Christians. On that date they sold the property to the plaintiff’s father who died in the year 1929, being survived by his wife, his son and his five daughters. The son is the plaintiff in the suit out of which this appeal arises and his mother is the third defendant. One of the daughters is the fourth defendant. On the 26th January, 1932, the first defendant purported to buy the property from the heirs of the four persons who had sold it to the plaintiff’s father on the 25th September, 1908. On the 27th January, 1932, four of the daughters released their rights to the plaintiff and the third defendant. On the 14th March, 1932, the third defendant, on behalf of herself and as the guardian of the plaintiff and of the daughter who had not released her rights (the fourth defendant), sued for the recovery of the property from the first defendant. The suit was filed in the Court of the District Munsiff of Tuticorin and numbered as O. S. No. 103 of 1932. It was subsequently transferred to the file of the District Munsiff of Koilpatti and then numbered as O. S. No. 247 of 1934. On the 1st November, 1934, the third defendant allowed the suit to be dismissed for default. On the 28th April, 1937, the third and fourth defendants released their rights to the plaintiff who, on the 13th February, 1939, filed the present suit to recover from the first defendant and his tenant, the second defendant, possession of the entire property conveyed to the first defendant on the 26th January, 1932. The first defendant contended that the sale to the plaintiff’s father on the 25th September, 1908, was really a nominal transaction and that no interest had passed. This plea, was rejected, as was a plea that the first defendant had acquired title by adverse possession. The Court also considered the question whether Order 9, rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure applied and held that it did not. The plaintiff was given a decree for joint possession of one-third of the property. This plea, was rejected, as was a plea that the first defendant had acquired title by adverse possession. The Court also considered the question whether Order 9, rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure applied and held that it did not. The plaintiff was given a decree for joint possession of one-third of the property. This was based on the fact that after his father’s death he became entitled, as an heir, to one-ninth of the property and that he acquired two-ninths under the deed of release of the 27th January, 1932. He was not entitled to the interests of his mother or the fourth defendant as the dismissal of Original Suit No. 247 of 1934 had the effect of barring any claim by them. The decree of the District Munsiff was affirmed by the Subordinate Judge of Tinnevelly and by Rajamannar, J., in second appeal. This appeal has been filed by the first defendant from the judgment of the learned Judge under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The only question which arises in the appeal is whether the plaintiff is affected by the provisions of Order 9, rule 9. It is well-settled rule of law so far as this Court is concerned that a minor is not bound by a decree which has been passed against him as the result of gross negligence on the part of his guardian in the conduct of the suit. The same principle must apply here. On behalf of the appellant Mr. D. Ramaswami Aiyangar has contended that the plaintiff could not maintain the present suit because he failed to apply for an order setting aside the dismissal of the suit. The rule expressly empowers a plaintiff to apply for such an order and if he satisfies the Court that there was sufficient cause for his non-appearance when the suit was called on for hearing, the Court must set aside the order of dismissal. When the dismissal order was passed the plaintiff was still a minor. The suggestion is that as soon as he became a major he should have applied under Order 9, rule 9, for the setting aside of the order dismissing the suit. It is quite clear that he could not have filed an application under Order 9, rule 9 on attaining majority. The suggestion is that as soon as he became a major he should have applied under Order 9, rule 9, for the setting aside of the order dismissing the suit. It is quite clear that he could not have filed an application under Order 9, rule 9 on attaining majority. Article 163 of the Limitation Act fixes the period of limitation at thirty days from the date of the order of dismissal. Section 5 of the Act does not apply to such an application. Therefore the plaintiff could not have made the application because more than thirty days elapsed between the date of the order of dismissal and the attainment of his majority. This being the position it would be monstrous to hold that the plaintiff was affected by the order of dismissal and we hold that he is entitled to ignore it. It was found by all the Courts that his mother was grossly negligent in allowing the suit to be dismissed and this is the governing fact. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. We may add that before Rajamannar, J., M. R. Ramaswami Aiyangar wished to raise a new point. The learned Judge rightly refused him leave. V.S. ----- Appeal dismissed.