JUDGMENT Chakravartti, J. - The question referred to a Full Bench in the present case is the following : Whether in case of a transfer which occurred before the commencement of the amended Bengal Tenancy Act of 1938, an immediate land-lord who acquired a right to apply for pre-emption u/s 26 F of the old Act, could make an application under that Section after the new Act came into force ?. 2. The facts which have given rise to the reference are simple and may be briefly stated. Up to the early part of the year 1929, transfers of occupancy raiyati holdings in Bengal were not, apart from local custom or usage, binding on landlords, unless made with their consent. By certain sections in Act 4 [iv] of 1928, which amended the Bengal Tenancy Act and which, as regards those sections, came into force on 2nd April 1929, a right of transfer at will was given to tenants, but, at the same time, certain rights of a compensatory character were created in favour of landlords. Section 26C introduced by the amending Act, required a notice of transfer to be served on the land-lord and a transfer fee to be paid to him in the case of voluntary transfers and like provision was made in section 26E with regard to execution sales. A right, more important for our present purpose, was the right created by S. 26F which, in sub-s. (1), provided that except in the case of certain specified kinds of transfer which are not here material: The immediate landlord of the holding or the transferred portion or share may, within two months of the service of notice issued u/s 26C or 26E, apply to the Court that the holding or portion or share thereof shall be transferred to himself 3. The remaining sub-sections dealt with the further course of an application, when made, and of them reference need only be made to sub-Ss. 4 (a) and 6 (i). The first of them provided that where the initial application Was made by a co-sharer landlord, the remaining co-sharers might apply to join in the application as co-applicants and by the second it was laid down that from the date of the order allowing the application, title in the holding or portion or share concerned would vest in those applicants whose application had been allowed. In 1938, the Bengal Tenancy Act was further amended and, besides other changes made, the right of pre-emption was taken away from the landlord and bestowed on co-sharer tenants. In that year, the Legislature passed Act 6[VI] of 1938, S. 6 of which opened as follows : "For S. 26F of the said Act the following shall be substituted, namely." Then Followed the text of a new section, also numbered 26E, sub-s. (1) of which provided that in cases other than those of certain excepted transfers which again, are not material. One or more co-sharer tenants of the holding a portion or share of which is transferred, may within four months of the service of notice u/s 26C, apply to the Court for the said portion or share to be transferred to himself or themselves. 4. The reference to S.26C is to a new section bearing that number which provides for a notice of transfer to be given to co-sharer tenants, just as its predecessor provided for such notice to be given to the landlord. It will be noticed that the new S. 26F cannot, by reason of its own terms, apply to a case where the entire holding is transferred, nor to a case where, although a portion or share is transferred, the transferor is the sole tenant of the holding. In such cases, where as the landlord would have a right of pre-emption under the old section, there is, it would seem, no right of pre-emption in any-one under the section of 1938. Act 6 [VI] of 1986 did not become law quite in the usual course. The Amendment Bill, as originally passed by the Legislature, contained a provision in cl. 2 (i) to the effect that it would come into force on such date, not later than 31st May 1938, as the Provincial Government might appoint No Bill passed by a Provincial Legislature can, however, become an Act till it has been assented to by the Governor and, in the present case, since the Governor found himself unable to give his assent before 31st May 1938, he returned the Bill to the Legislature with the recommendation that cl. 2 (i) might be omitted and the commencement of the Act left to the operation of S. 6, Bengal General Clauses Act. 2 (i) might be omitted and the commencement of the Act left to the operation of S. 6, Bengal General Clauses Act. At the same time, in order to cover the interval between the last date originally fixed for the commencement of the Act and the date on which it might actually come into force, the Governor promulgated an Ordinance with effect from 31st May 1938. It provided that the period, during which the Ordinance would remain in force, would be excluded in computing the period of limitation for the registration of instruments of transfer relating to occupancy holdings and that during the currency of the Ordinance, no Court must make a penal order under S. 26C (4) or S. 26E (3) on the ground of failure to deposit the landlord's transfer fee or to file notices of transfer in the prescribed form. As regards the Bill, in accordance with the recommendation of the Governor, the Legislature deleted cl. 2 (i) from its provisions and the Act, on receiving the assent of the Governor came into force on 8th August 1938. 5. The Ordinance expired on 8th September following. It is necessary to refer to one other provision of law. It is S. 8, Bengal General Clauses Act, which, to quote only the relevant part, provides that unless a contrary intention appears, the repeal of an enactment shall not * * * * * (o) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or * * * * * [9a] (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy, in respect of any such right, privilege or obligation.... as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced....... as if the repealing Act had not been passed. 6. Against this legislative background,it will now be convenient to set out the facts of the present litigation and the points canvassed by the parties. They are as follows. One Anupama Debya held an occupancy raiyati holding under three brothers, Jatindra Nath De, Surendra Nath De and Sarat Chandra De. By a registered deed dated the 20th May 1938, she transferred a portion of the holding to four persons and by a second deed of the same date, she transferred the remainder to fifth. They are as follows. One Anupama Debya held an occupancy raiyati holding under three brothers, Jatindra Nath De, Surendra Nath De and Sarat Chandra De. By a registered deed dated the 20th May 1938, she transferred a portion of the holding to four persons and by a second deed of the same date, she transferred the remainder to fifth. Jatindra received the statutory notice of the transfers on 12th August 1938, but did not apply for pre-emption till 26th October following, which was after the new section had come into force. On the latter date, he made two applications for pre-emption with respect to the two transfers and by them claimed to pre-empt the entire holding. As the applications were made on the day the Civil Courts reopened after the Puja Vacation, they were in time. Subsequently, both Surendra and Sarat applied to join in Jatindra's applications as co-applicants, but the application of the former was rejected as time-barred, while that of the latter was ultimately refused on the ground that at its date he had no subsisting interest as a landlord. It appears that on 27th September 1938, which was after the transfers by Anupama but before the applications by Jatindra, the landlords partitioned their properties among themselves and the tenure to which Anupama's holding appertained, was allotted to Jatindra and Surendra in equal shares, to the exclusion of Sarat. Accordingly, at the date of the transfers, Jatindra's share in the superior tenure was one-third, but at the date of his applications, it was one-half. The applications of Jatindra were opposed by the purchasers who contended that they were not maintainable. The learned Munsif upheld the contention in the view that although Jatindra had acquired a vested right to exercise his right of pre-emption under the old law before the amending Act came into force, there was nothing in the new section which saved that right and that, in any event, there being no machinery available now for enforcing the right, it must be deemed to have abated. Accordingly, he dismissed the applications. Thereupon Jatindra moved this Court and obtained two rules which came to be heard by Mukherjea and Akram. JJ. Accordingly, he dismissed the applications. Thereupon Jatindra moved this Court and obtained two rules which came to be heard by Mukherjea and Akram. JJ. Their Lordships were of opinion that in spite of the amending Act having come into force before the applications were made, they were maintainable, but inasmuch as there was a decision of a Division Bench in 43 C. W. N. 1172 Profulla Chandra Gangopadhaya Vs. Raj Mohan Das, AIR 1940 Cal 81 to the opposite effect, it was necessary to refer the question to a Full Bench. It may be stated that the decision, referred to, did not pronounce on the question as to whether, in cases like the present, the right of pre-emption under the old section survived its repeal, but proceeded on the sole ground that the procedure of an application "had been abrogated". 7. The ground upon which the learned Judges of the Division Bench based their opinion was that before the new section came into force, Jatindra had already acquired a right of pre-emption under the old section, or at least a right to apply for pre-emption, either of which was vested right, and by reason of the provisions of S. 8, cl. (c), Bengal General Clauses Act, that right survived. Their further opinion was that by cl. (e) of S. 8, the procedure of an application was also saved. No contrary intention, they thought, was to be found in the new section and the principle that there is no vested right in procedure applied, they held, only to cases where the new law merely altered procedure, but did not apply where both right and procedure were dealt with together and altered, as in the present case. 8. The purchasers contend, as they did before the Division Bench, that this view is not correct. They argue that under the Bengal Tenancy Act, as it stood before the Amendment of 1938, no right of pre-emption could accrue to a landlord till an application was made and where, as in the present case, none had been made before the new S. 26F replaced the old, no right of pre-emption bad accrued before the amending Act supervened. Accordingly, so it is argued, there was, at the date of the amendment, no accrued right on which S. 8 (c), Bengal General Clauses Act, could operate and there was nothing for that section to save. Accordingly, so it is argued, there was, at the date of the amendment, no accrued right on which S. 8 (c), Bengal General Clauses Act, could operate and there was nothing for that section to save. The landlord, having acquired no right of pre-emption before the amending Act came into operation, had none to enforce after the Act. If he could be said to have any right under the old section at all when it was repealed, it was only a right to apply for pre-emption, but such a right, being a mere right to take advantage of a statute, is not within the contemplation of the Bengal General Clauses Act. The purchasers contend in the next place that assuming a right of pre-emption had accrued under the old section, the intention of the Legislature is clear that it should not subsist after the repeal. Lastly, they contend that in any event, assuming the right survived, the landlord could not, after the amending Act, proceed by way of an application. 9. The amending Act of 1938 did not free purchasers of occupancy holding from the liability to pre-emption, but only transferred the right to pre-empt from the immediate landlord to co-sharer tenants. It is clear from the terms of new S. 26F that it cannot apply to transfers made before the amending Act. If the extreme contention of the purchasers in the present case be accepted, it must be held that while purchasers of occupancy holdings were liable to pre-emption under the old section and are equally liable now, though by different parties, yet in the case of transfers which were effected but in respect of which no application for pre-emption was made before the amending Act, they were altogether immune. In other words, the Legislature made a gift of complete immunity to a limited class of purchasers and while not giving the right of pre-emption to co-sharer tenants, took it away from the landlord in cases over which the ends of the old and new sections met. A contention which leads to that result must be closely scrutinised. It is clear that no question of retrospective operation arises, either of the new S. 26F or of S. 6 of the amending Act, in so far as it substitutes the new section. A contention which leads to that result must be closely scrutinised. It is clear that no question of retrospective operation arises, either of the new S. 26F or of S. 6 of the amending Act, in so far as it substitutes the new section. The former is addressed only to transfers made after its date and does not purport to operate on those made before; and the latter, which came into force on 18th August 1938, does not purport to substitute the new S. 26F with effect from any earlier date. Particularly is the present case outside the ambit of the new section, because the whole holding was transferred and the transferor tenant had no co-sharers. The purchasers do not contend that the new section would apply, but only urge that even under the old section, no right of pre-emption had accrued, adding that if it had accrued, the Legislature has expressed an intention that it should cease. Accordingly, the first question is the true construction of the Bengal Tenancy Act, as it stood before the amendment of 1938, particularly of S. 26F therein. 10. The purchasers point to the provisions of the Act and contend that it did not contain, either in S. 26F or elsewhere, any provision of a general character which gave a right of pre-emption to the landlord, arising from the mere transfer of an occupancy holding and independent of an application made by him. It is not the scheme of the Act, so it is said, that it first gave a right of pre-emption to the landlord and then provided for an application as the procedure by which the right was to be enforced. The sole provision in that regard is contained in S. 26F where the words are that on receipt of the notice of transfer, the landlord "may apply to the Court that the holding or portion or share thereof shall be transferred to himself." Under those words the right of pre-emption and the right to apply therefor are interlinked, the former depending upon an exercise of the latter, and, accordingly, a right of pre-emption could arise in an individual case on the making of an application, but not till one was made. Before an application was made, the only right under the Act was a right to make an application which is not a kind of right with which the saving statute is concerned. 11. For support to this contention, the purchasers rely almost entirely on the decision of the Privy Council in (1898) A. C. 425 Abbott, v. Minister for Lands (1895) 1896 A. C. 425 : 64 L. J. P. C. 167 : 72 L. T. 402. In that case, their Lordships had to consider the provisions of the Crown Lands Alienation Act, 1861, and those of the Crown Land Act, 1884, which repealed it, while re-enacting certain of its provisions. Section 13 of the earlier Act enacted that any person might tender an application for a conditional purchase of Crown lands, subject to a minimum of 40 acres and a maximum of 820, and if no other application was made at the same time, he would be declared the conditional purchaser. In the case of more applications than one, the choice would be made by lot. By S. 18 it was enacted that a grant in fee-simple in respect of Crown lands could be obtained only on the completion of three years' residence by the original purchaser or his alienee or alienees. Section 21 enacted that a person who had made a conditional purchase of not more than 280 acres under S. 13, might make a selection of additional adjoining lands so as to complete 820 acres and such selection would be subject to all the conditions of the original purchase, except that the condition of residence would not attach. By S. 22, exactly similar provision was made in favour of holders of fee-simple grants. The Act of 1884, while repealing the Act of 1861 in whole and prescribing certain altered conditional purchases, made provision for additional conditional purchasers in S. 42, but no provision for holders of grants in fee-simple. The result was that S. 21 of the Act of 1861 had a counterpart in the Act of 1884, while S. 22 had none, but the later Act contained a saving provision, substantially in the same terms as S. 8(c), Bengal General Clauses Act, preserving "rights accrued". 12. The result was that S. 21 of the Act of 1861 had a counterpart in the Act of 1884, while S. 22 had none, but the later Act contained a saving provision, substantially in the same terms as S. 8(c), Bengal General Clauses Act, preserving "rights accrued". 12. The appellant before the Privy Council had, in 1871, purchased some Crown lands and obtained a grant in fee simple and in 1872 he had made a conditional purchase of some adjoining lands. In 1892, he tendered an application for an additional purchase of some further adjoining lands and claimed to be entitled to do so under S. 42 of the new Act as a person who was already a conditional purchaser. That claim being repelled, on the ground that he did not come within the terms of the section, he invoked S. 22 of the repealed Act and contended that as a holder of a grant in fee- simple, he had, under that section, an accrued right to make additional conditional purchase which had been preserved to him by the new Act. Their Lordships pointed out that since S.13 of the repealed Act gave a right to make conditional purchases to "any person", the right to make conditional purchases was not given, in the case of holders of fee-simple grants, by S. 22, but by S. 13, the effect of S.22 being merely to relieve them of the condition of residence as respects additional purchases; and that, therefore, the contention of the appellant could not be accepted without holding that any person entitled to make a conditional purchase under S. 13 (which meant every person), had an accrued right reserved to him by the saving proviso. This they considered impossible and observed that when a repealing statute saved accrued rights the effect was not to leave it open to any one, who could have taken advantage of any of the repealed enactments, still to take advantage of them. Their Lordships observed further as follows: They think that the mere right (assuming it to be properly so-called) existing in the members of the community or any class of them to take advantage of an enactment, without an act done by an individual towards availing himself of that right, cannot properly be deemed a "right accrued" within the meaning of the enactment. 13. 13. It is contended that just as it was held in (1895) A. C. 425 Abbott, v. Minister for Lands (1895) 1896 A. C. 425 : 64 L. J. P. C. 167 : 72 L. T. 402 that the Act of 1861 created no right of purchase, but only gave a right to make an application for a purchase, so it must be held in the present case that the Bengal Tenancy Act, as it stood between 1928 and 1938, created no right of pre-emption, but only gave a right to apply for pre-emption; that just as it was held in (1895) A. C. 425 Abbott, v. Minister for Lands (1895) 1896 A. C. 425 : 64 L. J. P. C. 167 : 72 L. T. 402 that without some act done by an individual, no right as to purchases of Crown lands could accrue to him under the Act of 1861, so it must be held here that no right of pre-emption could accrue to a landlord without an application being made by him; and that a mere right to apply must be held to be not a "right accrued" within the meaning of the saving statute, on the principle laid down by the Privy Council. This contention, ingenious as it is, cannot, in our view, be accepted as correct and (1895) A. C. 425 Abbott, v. Minister for Lands (1895) 1896 A. C. 425 : 64 L. J. P. C. 167 : 72 L. T. 402 which has been distinguished in every subsequent case in which it has been considered, can be distinguished in the present case as well. The distinction is clear. It is important to remember that the decision of the Privy Council is really a decision on the right conferred by S. 13 of the Act of 1861 and the effect of the repeal of that section, for their Lordships held that holders of fee-simple grants had no special right to make conditional purchases given to them by S. 22 and whatever right they had was to be sought for in S. 13. In the Act of 1861, S. 13 stands at the threshold of the sections dealing with conditional and additional conditional purchases and it is addressed to the first stage at which the statute starts by declaring every person in the world to be eligible for making applications for conditional purchases of Crown lands. Till an application under the section is made, the statute does not begin to operate on Crown lands at all in the matter of their purchase by anyone. It is with regard to such a section that the Privy Council said that it merely gave a right, if right it was, to take advantage of a statute. With regard to S. 26F of 1928, the position is far different. It occurs in the middle of a series of connected sections, dealing with transfers of occupancy holdings and is addressed to an intermediate stage, to provide for an exercise, at that stage, of a right which is consequent upon certain actings under the statute which have already taken place. It is impossible to say of such a right that it is a mere right to take advantage of a statute. In a sense, all rights conferred by a statute are but rights to take advantage of the statute, for, till they are availed of and appropriated, they are, for all practical purposes, non-existent. But when the Privy Council used the expression, they, in our view, had in mind cases of which S. 13 of 1861 was an apt example, where the statute requires some initial step to be taken in order to attract it at all and, but for the taking of that step, one would remain outside the statute altogether. 14. In the present case, it is true that as a matter of language, S. 26F does not, nor does any other section in the Act, provide in so many words that immediately on the transfer of an occupancy holding, a right of pre-emption shall accrue to the landlord. But the inter-connection of the provisions, from S. 26A to S. 26F, makes it clear to our mind that the Act contemplates the right of pre-emption as arising from the transfer and has not merely given a right to the landlord to create it for himself by making an application. But the inter-connection of the provisions, from S. 26A to S. 26F, makes it clear to our mind that the Act contemplates the right of pre-emption as arising from the transfer and has not merely given a right to the landlord to create it for himself by making an application. It is true that it has expressed itself in the form that the landlord "may apply", but if language alone is to be regarded, account must also be taken of sub-s. 4 (a) which, speaking of landlords who have not applied on their own account or applied to join in a co-Sharer's application, says that they "shall not have any further power of purchase under this section." Reference may also be made to S. 26 (j) (3) which, dealing with occupancy holdings not so described in deeds of transfer, provides that the landlord shall be entitled to "exercise his rights of purchase" under S. 26F within a certain time. Again, when the purchaser is a co-sharer landlord, he himself is given the right to apply to join in an application under S.26F (1) made by another co-sharer and this, it seems clear, he can only do on the basis of a right of purchase, arising to all the landlords including himself, from the transfer itself, independently of an application under S. 26F(1),for there could be no question of his applying under that sub-section. But the conclusive circumstance is the inter-connection of S. 26C and S. 26F, the former of which requires the transfer-fee to be deposited and the notice of transfer to be filed simultaneously and the latter of which fixes a time-limit for the application for pre-emption by reference to the receipt of the notice of transfer and the scheme of the two sections suggests that the right to receive a transfer fee and the right of pre-emption are alternative rights, the latter arising out of the transfer itself as much as the former. The true construction of the Act, in our view, is that under it a right of pre-emption accrued immediately on the transfer and the application is not the source of the right, but the means of enforcing it. 15. The true construction of the Act, in our view, is that under it a right of pre-emption accrued immediately on the transfer and the application is not the source of the right, but the means of enforcing it. 15. This reading of the Act disposes of the whole argument constructed on (1895) A. C. 425 Abbott, v. Minister for Lands (1895) 1896 A. C. 425 : 64 L. J. P. C. 167 : 72 L. T. 402, but the matter may also be put in another way. In the case before the Privy Council, nothing whatever had taken place under the Act of 1861 before it was repealed and the only facts existing at the date of the repeal were that there was S. 13 in the statute book and there was Abbott, eligible, like any one else in the world, for making an application for a conditional purchase thereunder. Their Lordships held that merely from those two facts no right could accrue or had accrued. In the present case, however, before the sections of 1928 were repealed, a transfer had already taken place, the old Act had started to operate on a particular holding and the rights and liabilities, generally declared by the Act to be accruable on the taking place of a transfer, had come to be annexed to particular persons and a particular property, although their appropriation had not been completed. The repealing Act intervened in the middle of the process between the transfer of a holding and its ultimate vesting in the transferee or the pre-emptor. In that state of the facts, the case seems rather to fall within the principle of the decision in (1922) 2 K.B. 422 Hamilton Gell v. White (1922) 2 K. B. 422 : 91 L. J. K. B. 875 : 127 L. T. 728, viz., where by reason of certain actings under an Act, rights created thereby in general terms have come to be specified and attached to a particular subject-matter, they have accrued and repeal of the Act at that stage will not affect their completion. It is true that in the case cited all acts necessary to complete the right had been done before the repeal, but the judgments ignore the last of the acts and proceed on the basis that it remained to be performed. 16. It is true that in the case cited all acts necessary to complete the right had been done before the repeal, but the judgments ignore the last of the acts and proceed on the basis that it remained to be performed. 16. If, in the present case, no transfer had taken place before the repealing Act and the landlord applied for pre-emption in connection with a transfer after the Act on the basis that the old section gave him, as the landlord, a general right of pre-emption as respects all transfers, as and when they might take place, and that that was the accrued right which had not been affected, his position would have been similar to that of the applicant in (1896) A. C. 425 Hamilton Gell v. White (1922) 2 K. B. 422 : 91 L. J. K. B. 875 : 127 L. T. 728. If, again, the Privy Council had decided that S. 22 gave a special right to holders of fee-simple grants and that although Abbott had made a purchase and obtained a grant under the repealed Act, yet the consequential right accrued to him under S. 22 was affected by the repeal, the purchasers might derive support for their argument from that decision. The position, however, is different. 17. Reliance was also placed on two other decisions of the Privy Council, (1896) A. C. 240 Reynolds v. Attorney-General for Nova Scotia (1896) 1896 A. C. 240 : 65 L. J. P. C. 16 : 74 L. T., 108 and 13 M. I. A. 317 Khajah Assanoolah v. Obhoy Chunder Roy ('69-'70) 13 M. I. A. 317 : 2 Sar 535 : 2 Suther 306 (P. C.). They do not call for extended examination. In the first case a provision in a statute, enacting that a licence shall be extended on payment of certain fees, was construed as conferring only a privilege which could give rise to no accrued right before a renewal was applied for and the repealing Act, which abolished licence and substituted leases, was construed as intending that the system of licences should cease. In second case, it was observed that the Government not having annulled a tenure under the provisions of Reg. 11 [XI] of 1822 when it was in force, could not do so after it had been repealed. In second case, it was observed that the Government not having annulled a tenure under the provisions of Reg. 11 [XI] of 1822 when it was in force, could not do so after it had been repealed. The observation is an obiter dictum, since their Lordships held on the facts that the Government had recognised the tenure and waived their right to annul it. Besides, as no reasons are given, it is not possible to say on what ground their Lordships made the observation or that they did not proceed on the view that the repealing Act showed a clear intention to extinguish accrued rights or that the previous law being a Regulation, the General Clauses Act would not apply. It is impossible to regard the dictum as authority for a general proposition that on the repeal of an Act, all rights conferred thereby and accrued, if not already exercised, automatically cease. It may be conceded, however, that a mere right to make an application under the general provisions of an Act, when that right has not arisen as a result of certain actings or events specified by the Act as giving rise to the right, is not a right contemplated by the General Clauses Act or saving provisions of that character. Such provisions contemplate not rights in the air, but rights which have become matters of active assertion or actual enjoyment. The right to make an application under the old S. 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act is, however, not a right of the former type, but of the latter. 18. But even if a right of pre-emption had accrued before the repeal, the Legislature, it is contended, has expressed an intention that it should cease and the intention, it is said, is to be found in the Bengal Tenancy Ordinance, 1988. As regards this contention, it is enough to say that the Ordinance which came into force with effect from 31st May 1938, cannot cover the present case where the registration was effected on the 20th and if any intention can be gathered at all, it is an intention to leave transfers completed before the 31st of May unaffected. It is also significant that while the Ordinance stays the operation of Ss. 26C (4) and 26E (3), it leaves alone Ss. It is also significant that while the Ordinance stays the operation of Ss. 26C (4) and 26E (3), it leaves alone Ss. 26 (2) and 26F and, again, if any intention can be gathered, it is that accrued rights of pre- emption are not to be interfered with. There is the further circumstance that the Ordinance does not forbid registration of documents during the interval. A last and a fundamental objection to the argument is that although an Ordinance has the same force and effect as an Act of the Legislature, the ordinance-making authority is not the Legislature but another party and the intention of the Legislature in enacting the repealing Act cannot be sought for in the Ordinance. But, in any event, it is lastly contended, the application is not maintainable, since the section of 1928 which provided for an application is no longer in force, and the right, assuming it survives, can only be enforced by a suit. The argument is that although it may be that the General Clauses Act, when it saves rights accrued under a repealed statute, saves the procedure as well, the Act applies only to cases of mere repeal, but does not apply to cases where there is a repeal, coupled with new provisions of an affirmative character. In such cases, it is contended, the general rules of construction must be applied and those rule are only two in number, viz., (i) retrospective effect is not ordinarily to be given to a statute so as to affect substantive rights and (ii) there is no vested right in procedure. There is no third rule that when rights and procedure are dealt with by a new Act together, the old procedure is preserved, if the old rights are. Reliance for this contention is placed upon the Full Bench decision of this Court in 16 cal. 267 Deb Narain Dutt v. Narendra Krishna ('89) 16 Cal. 267 (FB). 19. Observations in the sense of the above contention are undoubtedly to be found in the case cited and if they were the basis of the decision, we would be bound to follow them, unless we thought it necessary to refer the question to a Special Bench. The observations are made with reference to the Indian General Clauses Act of 1868 but that makes no difference, since the material language is similar. The observations are made with reference to the Indian General Clauses Act of 1868 but that makes no difference, since the material language is similar. But the observations are in the nature of obiter dicta, for, the case before the Full Bench was a case of mere repeal. They also appear to be opposed to what has been held in England in connection with the Interpretation Act and to the daily practice of the Courts. It is not easy to see why the Bengal General Clauses Act, which deals with the case where that Act or any other Bengal Act "repeals any enactment" should not apply when an existing provision is wholly replaced by a new enactment, so that in effect there is a repeal. It cannot be disputed and it was not sought to be argued before us, that a case of substitution is not a case of repeal. But it is not necessary to pursue this matter further since, even assuming that the observations made by the Full Bench are correct, we see no reason to hold that the third rule is not included among the general rules of interpretation. The rule accords with commonsense and is not such an artificial rule as cannot exist without statutory sanction. 20. In the Order of Reference, the rule is perhaps too strongly stated. The quotation made there from Maxwell seems to contain a clerical error, for, what the learned author states is not that where rights and procedure are dealt with together, the intention of the legislature will be that the old rights are to be determined by the old procedure, but that the intention "may well be" so. Again, the reference to the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1928, as creating both a right and a procedure for its enforcement, is perhaps not in accordance with the rule, for, under the rule the material statute is the repealing Act which, in the preset case, would be the Amendment Act of 1938. In (1920) 2 ch. 377 In re Hale's Patent (1920) 2Ch. 377: 90 L. J. Ch. In (1920) 2 ch. 377 In re Hale's Patent (1920) 2Ch. 377: 90 L. J. Ch. 35 :124 L. T. 261, Sargant, J. referred to the repealing Act of 1919 and derived the intention of the Legislature from the language of the new section itself", although he also stated generally that in such cases "the intention of the Legislature would seem fairly clear." If rights and procedure are both altered by an amending or repealing statute, then, if the rights accrued under the previous enactment are saved, it would seem to be consequential that the old procedure is saved as well, unless the new Act makes the new procedure applicable to old rights. If such be not the case, the right would seem to be saved to no purpose, for if a suit be brought under the general law, it is likely to be met, and met successfully, by the plea that a special right created by a statute can only be enforced by the special procedure prescribed. 21A. The Legislature cannot be regarded as having contemplated such a result It must therefore be one of the general rules of construction that if rights and procedure are both altered but rights accrued under the repealed enactment are saved, then, in the absence of an intention to the contrary expressed or necessarily implied in the new statute, it will be proper to interpret the intention of the Legislature to be that the old procedure will subsist for the enforcement of the saved rights. There is no question of any vested right in procedure. The position simply is that the accrued rights having been saved and the new Act not having abrogated the old procedure as respects those rights, nor made the new procedure applicable to them, the old procedure is consequentially saved, as the only possible machinery for enforcing those rights. 22. The position in the present case is simple. There is no conflict here as in (1920) 2 ch. 377 In re Hale's Patent (1920) 2Ch. 377: 90 L. J. Ch. 35 :124 L. T. 261 where there was one forum under the old law and another under the new. Here, there is simply nothing in the new enactment, for nothing in the new S. 26F, which deals with other rights, can possibly apply. 377 In re Hale's Patent (1920) 2Ch. 377: 90 L. J. Ch. 35 :124 L. T. 261 where there was one forum under the old law and another under the new. Here, there is simply nothing in the new enactment, for nothing in the new S. 26F, which deals with other rights, can possibly apply. Nor has the procedure of an application been abrogated in the sense of it being declared that it will not apply. And there is no difficulty about the Court being competent to deal with an application, if an application lies. In the circumstances, there can be no reason to hold that even if the accrued rights have been saved, the old procedure of an application is no longer available. Indeed, if the rights have been saved, they have been saved through the old S, 26F remaining operative in respect of those rights. In that section, on the argument of the purchasers themselves, the rights and the procedure are blended together in the provision that the landlord "may apply," so that if that provision has been saved, the right of application has been necessarily saved. The above are all the contentions urged to establish that the landlord in the present case was not entitled to maintain an application. In our opinion, he was and the contentions to the contrary are not valid. A right of pre-emption accrued to him under the old Act as soon as the transfer was made and there being nothing in amending Act to take that right away, it survived by virtue of S. 8 (c), Bengal General Clauses Act, together with the remedy of an application which survived both by virtue of S. 8 (e) of that Act and the general principles of construction. The answer to the question referred must, therefore, be in the affirmative, it being understood, however, that registration must have been completed before the amending Act. 23. But since, under the rules, the whole case has been referred to a Full Bench, the purchasers have urged two further contentions on the merits. They may be briefly disposed of. The answer to the question referred must, therefore, be in the affirmative, it being understood, however, that registration must have been completed before the amending Act. 23. But since, under the rules, the whole case has been referred to a Full Bench, the purchasers have urged two further contentions on the merits. They may be briefly disposed of. It is contended in the first place that even if an application be maintainable after the amending Act, it must be an application by all the co-sharer landlords, since cl (i) of S. 188 (1), which permitted one or more co-sharer landlords to make an application under S. 26F, is no longer in the statute. This argument is based on as obvious misconception. Clause (i) of S. 188 (1) embodied a part of the procedure prescribed for the enforcement of the right under S. 26F and if that procedure has been saved, the whole of it has been saved. The deletion of the clause was consequential upon the repeal of the old S. 26F and since the substituted section, bearing the same number, deals with the rights of tenants, no reference to it in S. 188 could possibly be retained. The deletion of cl. (1) from S. 188 (i) is not an independent amendment of that section and it can on no principle be said that the amended section will govern applications under the old S. 26F. This contention must therefore be rejected. 24. It is contended in the second place that although, under the old S. 26F, one of the co-sharer landlords could make an application for pre-emption, he had nevertheless to apply for a transfer of the holding to all the co-sharers. If any right of pre-emption vested in him immediately on the transfer of an occupancy holding, it was only a right to the extent of his own share and he could become entitled to pre-empt the entire holding, if at all, at a later stage, if no other co-sharer applied or if their applications were rejected. It is contended accordingly that assuming the repeal could not and did not affect accrued rights, what had accrued to Jatindra before the repeal, when all that had happened was that a transfer had taken place, was a right of pre-emption to the extent of an one-third share which was all the interest in the superior tenure he held at the time. No right to pre-empt the rest of the holding had accrued to him before the repeal, none could accrue thereafter and, accordingly his claim must be limited to one-third share. This contention, again, is fallacious. It is not too clear, either that the right of pre-emption which, under the old S. 26F, accrued to a co-sharer landlord on the transfer of a holding was a right limited to his share or that he had to apply for a transfer of the holding to all the co-sharer landlords. But assuming the position was as contended, it cannot be correct to say that even if the operation of the old S. 26F was saved in respect of a particular transfer, only a part of it was saved. Section 26B, which stood before the amendment as it stands now, provided that an occupancy holding "shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be capable of being transferred". When, therefore, the holding in the present case was transferred, it was transferred, subject to the provisions of the old section 26F, which must mean all the provisions. If the operation of the section on this holding remained unaffected by the repeal, all the clauses remained free to take effect in due course. Since the co-sharers of Jatindra applied, but their applications were rejected, Jatindra became entitled to have the whole holding transferred to him under sub-s. (6) of the repealed section. 25. In the result the question referred must be answered in the affirmative and the Rules made absolute, but having regard to the circumstances of the case, each party will bear his own costs both in this Court and the Court below. Although we are overruling the contentions of the purchasers, we desire to place on record our appreciation of the great ability with which Mr. Mukherjee put their case before us. Biswas, J. 26. I agree. Blank, J. 27. I agree.