JUDGMENT Chakravartti, J. - This appeal was preferred by Defendant No 22 and, on her death, all but one of her heirs got themselves substituted as Appellants. The remaining heir who was on active service at the time could only be impleaded as a pro forma Respondent, but he has since entered appearance and, before us, supported the case of his co-heirs. The subject-matter of the suit out of which this appeal arises was premises No. 40, Dilkhosa Street, situated in the Bally-gunge section of the suburbs of Calcutta. It belonged originally to one Ajijunnessa who had two brothers, named Anwar Ali and Rajjab Ali. At the relevant time, Anwar was dead, and his heirs were his widow, Shamsunnessa who is Defendant No. 1 in the suit, a minor son, named Reajuddin alias Bhakoo by the said Shamsunnessa, and two daughters, Hamidannessa and Samirannessa, by another wife, previously deceased. On the 19th February, 1922, Ajijunnessa executed a heba-bil-ewaz with respect to the property in favour of Bhakoo who was then a minor about nine or ten years old. Ajijunnessa died on the 22nd February, 1922, only three days after executing the heba-bil-ewaz, and the document was presented for registration by Shamsunnessa as the guardian of Bhakoo who also admitted its execution. The registration took place at the Sub-registry office at Alipore. 2. It appears that soon after Ajijunnessa's death, her other brother, Rajjab Ali, appeared on the scene and began to intermeddle with the property in his own interest in the guise of looking after the interests of Bhakoo. The house was in occupation of one Abdul Sayed, holding as a tenant under Ajijunnessa since her time, and the first act of Rajjab Ali was to relet the house to Abdul Sayed on the footing that he had become its owner. On the 12th July. 1923, he applied to the Corporation of Calcutta for the mutation of his name as the owner of the house and an order was made in his favour on the 5th September following. A more drastic step was taken on the 6th February, 1924, when he purported to sell the house to Abdul Sayed, and on the 17th March, 1925, the heirs of Abdul Sayed, who are defendants Nos. 3 to 5 in the suit, got their names mutated. Then began a series of transactions by Defendants Nos. A more drastic step was taken on the 6th February, 1924, when he purported to sell the house to Abdul Sayed, and on the 17th March, 1925, the heirs of Abdul Sayed, who are defendants Nos. 3 to 5 in the suit, got their names mutated. Then began a series of transactions by Defendants Nos. 3 to 5, which it is not necessary to recount in detail, and it will be sufficient to say that they mortgaged the house successively to three different parties, -once on the 30th July, 1928, next on the 19th February, 1934. and lastly on the 14th December, 1934. The mortgagee of the last mortgage obtained a decree on the 29th July, 1936, and at the sale held in execution of that decree, the house was purchased by Defendant No. 6 on the 28th January, 1937. Within barely a month, Defendant No. 6 sold the house to Defendant No. 7 on the 6th March, 1937, and Defendant No. 7, in his turn, quickly disposed of it in favour of Defendant No. 22, who is the Appellant before us, on the 7th May, 1937. 3. To return to Bhakoo, he died in 1929 without attaining majority and leaving as his heirs his mother Shamsunnessa and his step-sisters, Hamidannessa and Samirannessa. Six years later, the two sisters sold their shares in the house to the Plaintiff, within two months of each other,-Hamidannessa on the 12th June, 1935, and Samirannessa on the 6th August, 1935-Sham-sunnessa's share remained undisposed of. 4. The present suit was brought by the Plaintiff for a declaration of her title to a five-sixths share in the house, founded upon her purchases from the sisters of Bhakoo, and for recovery of joint possession with Shamsunnessa. She alleged that she had only recently come to know of the fraudulent dealings with the property by Rajjab Ali and subsequently by Defenders Nos. 3 to 5, and that those dealings had cast a cloud upon her title. 5. Quite a host of persons were impleaded as Defendants in the suit of which only 15 filed written statements and of them only three contested the suit at the hearing. It is not necessary to refer to any of the defences other than the defence of the Defendant No. 22. 5. Quite a host of persons were impleaded as Defendants in the suit of which only 15 filed written statements and of them only three contested the suit at the hearing. It is not necessary to refer to any of the defences other than the defence of the Defendant No. 22. Her case,-to quote only the material portion,-was that the heba-bil-ewaz in favour of Bhakoo was a fraudulent and collusive document; that the herbal had not passed any title, since it had not been validly registered, having been registered at Alipore whereas it ought to have been registered at Sealdah, and for the further reason that the document had been presented for registration by Shamsunnessa who could not be a representative of Bhakoo within the meaning of sec. 32 of the Registration Act; that as the document was inoperative, the property had devolved under the law of succession on Rajjab Ali who had acted within his rights, in dealing with it, and the Plaintiff had acquired no title by her purchases from the step-sisters of Bhakoo; and, lastly, that any title accruing to Bhakoo and passing from him to his sisters had been extinguished by the adverse possession of Rajjab Ali and his assigns. Both the Courts below have decreed the Plaintiff's suit on identical findings. They have found that the heba-bil-ewaz was a genuine document; that its registration by the District Registrar at Alipore was valid, although the property was situated within the jurisdiction of the Sealdah Registry Office and although the special fee prescribed by sec. 30 of the Registration Act had not been levied; that the presentation of the document by Shamsunnessa and admission of its registration by her were valid, inasmuch as she was the de facto guardian of Bhakoo, as the learned Subordinate Judge held, and also at one time his natural guardian, as the learned District Judge thought and that since the property was originally in the possession of Abdul Saved holding as a tenant under Ajijunnessa, and had continued to be in the possession of Abdul Sayed's heirs till 1937, who never surrendered the tenancy, nor repudiated openly the title of Bhakoo, there could be no question of adverse possession. It was, however, held that no rent had ever been paid either to Bhakoo or his heirs. 6. Mr. It was, however, held that no rent had ever been paid either to Bhakoo or his heirs. 6. Mr. Das who appeared before us in support of the appeal, urged only the second branch of the point about registration. In his opening, he intimated that he would take the point about adverse possession as well, hut subsequently he conceded, that having regard to the character of the original possession of Abdul Sayed and of the dates of the various transactions, he could not very well press the point. He also abandoned the objection to the jurisdiction of the Registrar at Alipore to register the deed in view of the discovery of a notificatian by which the required jurisdiction had been conferred. The only ground which Mr. Das urged was that the mother of Bhakoo, even though she might be his de facto guardian, was not competent to present for registration the heba-bil-ewaz executed in his favour, nor to admit its execution before the Registrar at the Registry Office. 7. It was admitted before us that unless the property had been diverted by the heba-bli-ewaz, it had devolved upon Rajjab Ali and the Plaintiff had acquired no title by her purchases from the step-sisters of Bhakoo. 8. The question about registration falls to be decided by a reference to the provisions of secs. 32 and 35 of the Registration Act. The document was not presented by Bhakoo himself, who was the person claiming under it,-nor was it presented by any agent, representative or assign of Bhakoo, duly authorised by a power-of-attorney. The only relevant clause of sec. 32 is, therefore, cl. (c), under which the document must be presented by a representative or assign of the person claiming under the same. Shamsunnessa was not an assign of Bhakoo, and accordingly the only question under sec. 32 is whether, as a representative of Bhakoo, she was competent to present the document before the Registrar for registration. 9. Again, the execution of the document was not admitted by Ajijunnessa who was the executant, nor by Ajijunnesssa appearing through any representative, assign or agent, but what happened was that after Ajijunnessa's death, execution was admitted by the de facto guardian of the minor donee under the instrument. The only relevant clause of sec. 35 (I) is, therefore, cl. 9. Again, the execution of the document was not admitted by Ajijunnessa who was the executant, nor by Ajijunnesssa appearing through any representative, assign or agent, but what happened was that after Ajijunnessa's death, execution was admitted by the de facto guardian of the minor donee under the instrument. The only relevant clause of sec. 35 (I) is, therefore, cl. (c) under which, if the executant is dead, execution may be admitted by his representative or assign. Shamsunnessa was not an assign of Ajijunnessa, and the only question is whether Bhakoo was an assign and Shamsunnessa could act as his guardian or whether Shamsunnessa who was a brother's widow to Ajijunnessa, could herself be her representative. 10. Mr. Das contended that only the proper legal guardian of a minor could represent him in proceedings relating to the registration of a document with which the minor was concerned. Shamsunnessa not being such guardian of Bhakoo, but only his de facto guardian, was not competent to act for him, and registration of the heba-bil-ewaz on presentation and admission of execution by her was utterly void. He relied upon the decisions of the Privy Council in Imambandi v. Mutsaddi L. R. 45 I. A. 73: (1917) 23 C. W. N. 50. Amba alias Padmavathi v. Srinivasa Kamathi (1921) 26 C. W. N. 369. Ma Shwe Mya v. Maung Ho Hnaung L. R. 49 I. A. 395: (1922) 27 C, W. N. 533. and Ma Pwa May v. S. R. M. M. A. Chettyar Firm L. R. 56 I. A. 379: (1929) 34 C. W. N. 6. as also upon Athiappa Narayana Reddy v. Audilakshmi Animal I. L. R. (1928) Mad. 462. 11. On behalf of the Respondents, it was contended that the Registration Act did not provide that a minor could only be represented by his guardian, nor that if a guardian acted for a minor, he must be his legal guardian. In support of this contention reliance was placed on the language of sec. 2 (10) of the Registration Act which defines the word " representative. In support of this contention reliance was placed on the language of sec. 2 (10) of the Registration Act which defines the word " representative. It was contended further that in matters of registration, a minor could act for himself and if he could, it was obvious that in relation to matters of registration, he was not a person under a disability and consequently, there was no reason to insist that if he acted through a representative, such representative must be his legal guardian. For the first part of the contention, reliance was placed upon a decision of a single Judge of this Court in Hemanta Kumar Das Vs. Alliantz Und Stuttgarter Life Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1938 Cal 120 . 12. The learned Judge held in favour of the competence of Shamsunnessa by referring to her status which, according to him, was first, that of a natural guardian and then, at the relevant time, that of a guardian de facto. He seems to have thought that nothing further was required to qualify her for acting on behalf of Bhakoo in the matter of presenting the document. As regards the admission of execution, he held on the authority of a decision of this Court in Akahoy Chandra Majhi v. Manmatha Nath Chatterjee (1916) 20 C. W. N. 13 45. that Bhakoo was an assign of Ajijunnessa and then held on the authority of a decision of the Bombay High Court in Dattatraya Keshav Naik Vs. Gangabai Nakayan Naik, AIR 1926 Bom 137 . that Shamsunnessa could act as Bhakoo's representative. He clinched his argument by saying that even if Shamsunnessa was not competent to admit execution of the document, the act of the Registrar, in accepting an admission from her was only an irregularity cured by sec. 87 of the Act. 13. In holding that Shamsunnessa was ever the natural guardian of Bhakoo, the learned Judge was clearly in error. As was pointed out by the Privy Council in Imambandi v. Mutsaddi L. R. 45 I. A. 73: (1917) 23 C. W.N. 50. It is perfectly clear that under the Mahomedan law; the mother is entitled only to the custody of the person of her minor child up to a certain age according to the sex of the child. As was pointed out by the Privy Council in Imambandi v. Mutsaddi L. R. 45 I. A. 73: (1917) 23 C. W.N. 50. It is perfectly clear that under the Mahomedan law; the mother is entitled only to the custody of the person of her minor child up to a certain age according to the sex of the child. But she is not the natural guardian, the father alone, or, if he be dead, his executor (under the Sunni law) is the legal guardian. 14. Besides, at the relevant time, Shamsunnessa was not even entitled to the custody of Bhakoo who was about nine or ten years old. She was undoubtedly the de facto guardian, and as far as can be gathered from the record, no legal guardian seems to have existed. But the learned Judge gives no reason as to how she was entitled to present the document for registration as the de facto guardian, unless there be implied in his finding the popular reason that since the minor, who had no legal guardian, was living with and under the care of his mother, the latter was naturally and necessarily the only person who could act for him and in his interest. 15. As regards admission of execution, speaking for myself, I doubt whether it could be right to hold that Bhakoo was the assign of Ajijunnessa within the meaning of sec. 35 of the Registration Act although the decision in Akahoy Chandri Majhi v. Manmatha Nath Chatterjee (1916) 20 C. W. N. 1345 supports that view. Bhakoo would be the assign on the completion of the gift which would take place only on the registration of the document, but it is difficult to see how in proceedings relating to registration, which were proceedings required to effectuate the deed, he could be treated as having already become an assign. Again, the object of registration is to make a document binding on the executant, and the object of obtaining an admission of execution is to obtain some assurance that the document was, in fact, executed. Such an admission, in my view, can properly come only from the executant himself or some one claiming under him otherwise than under the document to be registered. It seems somewhat illogical to hold that a person claim if he acted through a representative, such representative must be his legal guardian. Such an admission, in my view, can properly come only from the executant himself or some one claiming under him otherwise than under the document to be registered. It seems somewhat illogical to hold that a person claim if he acted through a representative, such representative must be his legal guardian. For the first part of the contention, reliance was placed upon a decision of a single Judge of this Court in Hemanta Kumar Das Vs. Alliantz Und Stuttgarter Life Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1938 Cal 120 . 16. The learned Judge held in favour of the competence of Shamsunnessa by referring to her status which, according to him, was first, that of a natural guardian and then, at the relevant time, that of a guardian de facto. He seems to have thought that nothing further was required to qualify her for acting on behalf of Bhakoo in the matter of presenting the document. As regards the admission of execution, he held on the authority of a decision of this Court in Akahoy Chandra Majhi v. Manmatha Nath Chatterjee (1916) 20 C. W. N. 1345. that Bhakoo was an assign of Ajijunnessa and then held on the authority of a decision of the Bombay High Court in Dattatraya Keshav Naik Vs. Gangabai Nakayan Naik, AIR 1926 Bom 137 . that Shamsunnessa could act as Bhakoo's representative. He clinched his argument by saying that even if Shamsunnessa was not competent to admit execution of the document, the act of the Registrar, in accepting an admission from her was only an irregularity cured by sec. 87 of the Act. 17. In holding that Shamsunnessa was ever the natural guardian of Bhakoo, the learned Judge was clearly in error. As was pointed out by the Privy Council in Imambandi v. Mutsaddi L. R. 45 I. A. 73: (1917) 23 C. W.N. 50. It is perfectly clear that under the Mahomedan law; the mother is entitled only to the custody of the person of her minor child up to a certain age according to the sex of the child. But she is not the natural guardian, the father alone, or, if he be dead, his executor (under the Sunni law) is the legal guardian. 18. Besides, at the relevant time, Shamsunnessa was not even entitled to the custody of Bhakoo who was about nine or ten years old. But she is not the natural guardian, the father alone, or, if he be dead, his executor (under the Sunni law) is the legal guardian. 18. Besides, at the relevant time, Shamsunnessa was not even entitled to the custody of Bhakoo who was about nine or ten years old. She was undoubtedly the de facto guardian, and as far as can be gathered from the record, no legal guardian seems to have existed. But the learned Judge gives no reason as to how she was entitled to present the document for registration as the de facto guardian, unless there be implied in his finding the popular reason that since the minor, who had no legal guardian, was living with and under the care of his mother, the latter was naturally and necessarily the only person who could act for him and in his interest. 19. As regards admission of execution, speaking for myself, I doubt whether it could be right to hold that Bhakoo was the assign of Ajijunnessa within the meaning of sec. 35 of the Registration Act although the decision in Akahoy Chandri Majhi v. Manmatha Nath Chatterjee (1916) 20 C. W. N. 1345 supports that view. Bhakoo would be the assign on the completion of the gift which would take place only on the registration of the document, but it is difficult to see how in proceedings relating to registration, which were proceedings required to effectuate the deed, he could be treated as having already become an assign. Again, the object of registration is to make a document binding on the executant, and the object of obtaining an admission of execution is to obtain some assurance that the document was, in fact, executed. Such an admission, in my view, can properly come only from the executant himself or some one claiming under him otherwise than under the document to be registered. It seems somewhat illogical to hold that a person claim- N. 282 (1914).The learned Judge was, therefore, not right in holding that a deficiency in the competence of the person presenting a document or admitting its execution was a mere irregularity. Although a decision of the Privy Council in an early case, Sah Mukhun Lall Panday v. Sah Koondun Lall L. R. (1875) 2 I. A. 210. might lend some support to that view, the later decisions of the Board completely negative it. 20. Although a decision of the Privy Council in an early case, Sah Mukhun Lall Panday v. Sah Koondun Lall L. R. (1875) 2 I. A. 210. might lend some support to that view, the later decisions of the Board completely negative it. 20. In the present case, the presentation of the document by Shamsunnessa could be a valid presentation only if she could be said to be a representative of Bhakoo within the meaning of sec. 32 (c) of the Registration Act. Representative is defined in sec. 2 (10) of the Act as including a guardian of a minor. Dealing with sec. 3 of the Act of 1877, which was in the same terms, Lord Phillimore, delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in Raja Keesara Venkatappayya v. Raja Nayani Venkata Ranga Row L. R. 56 I. A. 21: (1928) 33 C. W. N. 261, asked whether it would be proper to read the definition as limited to the legally appointed guardian: But what is to happen when a child of tender years, as was the case here, is actually residing with his natural father, and has no appointed guardian ? When one remembers that the definition of 'representative' does not make it equal to guardian, but says that it includes guardian, might it not well be said that in these circumstances and in the absence of any legally appointed guardian, the natural father was the representative? 21. It was, however, found unnecessary to decide this question, as the mirror concerned had been given in adoption in the same family, and the natural father who had presented the document for registration Was, even after the adoption, the nearest male agnate and the proper person to act as the natural guardian in the absence of a judicial appointment. The learned Advocate for the Respondents who drew our attention to this case also pointed out that the definition of " representative " used the word guardian simpliciter, but did not further say that such guardian must be the dejure guardian. On the other hand, in the case of Ma Shwe Mya v. Mating Ho Hnaung L. R. 49 I. A. 395: (1922) 27 C. W. N. 533. their Lordships of the Privy Council, delivering their judgment through Viscount Cave stated that the term " representative" in sec. On the other hand, in the case of Ma Shwe Mya v. Mating Ho Hnaung L. R. 49 I. A. 395: (1922) 27 C. W. N. 533. their Lordships of the Privy Council, delivering their judgment through Viscount Cave stated that the term " representative" in sec. 32 of the Registration Act referred to "the legal personal representative or (by virtue of sec. 2) the guardian or committee of the person described " and did not include a clerk or agent. Chiefly on the basis of this pronouncement, as explained by Reilly, J., of the Madras High Court in Athiappa Narayana Reddy v. Audilakshmi Animal I. L. R. (1928) Mad. 462., the Appellants contended that the only kind of guardian who could present a document for registration on behalf of a minor was either a guardian according to the personal law of the minor concerned or a guardian legally appointed under the Guardians and Wards Act or otherwise; in other words, only a person who could lawfully act for a minor as his guardian could be his representative within the meaning of sec. 32 (c) of the Registration Act. 22. The question is not altogether free from difficulty, but it seems to us by no means clear that the use of the word " includes " in sec. 2 (10) of the Registration Act involves that, in the case of a minor, even a person other than his guardian can be his representative. The doubt expressed by Lord Phillimore in Raja Keesara Venkatappayya v. Rajah Nayani Venkata Ranga Row L. R. 56 I. A. 21: (1928) 33 C. W.N. 261. was not that the definition of representative might cover persons other than the guardian, but that it might cover guardians other than the legally appointed guardian, where no such guardian existed. It is also noticeable that in the case of Amba alias Padmavathi v. Shrinivasa Kamathi (1921) 26 C. W. N. 369. the Judicial Committee held the presentation of a document by the father of a minor married Hindu girl to be totally ineffective, and in spite of the fact that she was living with the father and was claiming under the document against her husband who was her natural guardian, their Lordships did not say that although the father might not be the guardian of the girl, he was nevertheless her representative. It appears to us, particularly from the juxtaposition of the words "Committee or other legal curator of a lunatic or idiot" with the words " guardian of a minor " that the effect of the use of the word " includes " is not to leave room for representatives other than the guardian. The definition seems merely to bring within the ambit of the word " representative" certain persons, other than the principals who might not be regarded as coming clearly within the ordinary connotation of the term, and the effect of the definition, read with the general law relating to minors and persons under a disability, appears to be that in the case of minors, lunatics or idiots, the only representatives qualified to act for them are respectively the guardian and the committee or other legal curator, or, in the words of the Judicial Committee, the legal personal representatives. It is true that the definition does not expressly say that the guardian must be a legal guardian, but the word must obviously mean a guardian who is competent in law to act for the minor, whether he be the natural guardian or a guardian judicially appointed or a guardian de facto. If under a particular system of law, the de facto guardian is not competent to deal with the properties of a minor, he cannot be competent to represent the minor in presenting a document for registration. We are accordingly inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Das that in the case of a minor, the only person competent to represent him in matters relating to the registration of a document is the guardian entitled in law to act for him. but for reasons, presently to be stated, it is not necessary to decide this question finally. 23. The whole argument of Mr. Das was that in the case of Imambandi v. Mutsaddi L. R. 45 I. A. 73: (1917)23 C. W. N. 50. their Lordships of the Judicial Committee had laid down that under the Mahomedan Law, the mother had no power as de facto guardian of her infant children to alienate or charge their immovable property, and that it followed that in dealings relating to immovable property, she could not, as such guardian, represent the minor so as to place him under any obligation in any way. Their Lordships observed at page 85 of the report that if the mother, acting otherwise than the father's executrix or under an appointment by the Court dealt with the property of the minor, her acts were like those of any other person who arrogated to himself an authority which he did not legally possess. Earlier, in the case of Mata Din v. Ahmad Ali L. R. 39 I. A. 49: I. L. R. (1911) All. 213. their Lordships observed that it was difficult to see how the situation of an unauthorised person was bettered by describing him as a de facto guardian. The argument of Mr. Das was that since under the Registration Act, only the legal guardian of a minor could act as his representative, and since under the Mahomedan Law, a mother could not be the legal guardian of the property of a minor child, a mother, even if she might be the dc facto guardian, was not entitled to represent the minor at the registration of a document executed in his favour. 24. To present for registration a deed executed in favour of a minor is not to alienate or charge his property, but it may be said that no valid or workable distinction of that character can be made, inasmuch as a deed executed in favour of a minor may also create obligations. A gift, for example, may be an onerous gift and, as such, may carry a burden too irksome to bear. It appears, however, that the very decision relied upon by Mr. Das lays down a number of exceptions to the disability of a de facto guardian in the case of a minor who has no dejure guardian, and one such exception is " acts which are purely advantageous to the infant, such as accepting presents or gifts." It is observed by their Lordships, by way of paraphrasing this provision extracted from the Hedaya, that a person in charge of a child, although not a dc facto guardian, may validly accept on behalf of his. ward an unburdened bounty, it being an act " purely advantageous " to the child. (See page 87 of the report). In the later case of Mohammad Ejaz Husain v. Mohammad Iftikhar Husain L. R. 59 I. A. 92: (1931) 36 C. W. N. 381. ward an unburdened bounty, it being an act " purely advantageous " to the child. (See page 87 of the report). In the later case of Mohammad Ejaz Husain v. Mohammad Iftikhar Husain L. R. 59 I. A. 92: (1931) 36 C. W. N. 381. where it was held that a Mahommedan mother, as the dc facto guardian of the minor children could not agree to a reference to arbitration, these exceptions were re-affirmed by the Judicial Committee. If a mother can accept a gift on behalf of a minor child, as she undoubtedly can under the exceptions above referred to, there is no reason why she should not be competent to represent the minor in all acts required to effectuate the gift as a valid transaction. The presentation of the document for registration would be a part of the act of acceptance. We are accordingly of opinion that even assuming that only a guardian competent in law to act for a minor can represent him at registration proceedings, the mother and de facto guardian of a Mahomedan minor, being competent to accept an unburdened gift or to do an act purely advantageous to the infant., can represent him at the registration of a deed of gift which creates no such obligations as would take away its advantageous character. 25. It was, however, contended by Mr. Das that the gift in the present case was not an unburdened gift, inasmuch as it was burdened with as many as three conditions. He referred to the schedule to the deed where a list of duties is to be found. It is stated in the first paragraph of the schedule that the donee had agreed that he would continue to tend and nurse the executant and her brother as before so long as they were alive and had also agreed that they would be maintained out of the income of the property gifted. The second paragraph lays upon the donee certain religious duties, while the third, in addition to repeating that the executant would be maintained out of the income of the property so long as she was alive, also requires the donee to make brotherly enquiries about the welfare of his step-sisters. Mr. Das contended that three distinct burdens were laid upon the donee by these conditions and the gift could in no sense be called an unburdened gift. 26. Mr. Das contended that three distinct burdens were laid upon the donee by these conditions and the gift could in no sense be called an unburdened gift. 26. It appears to us, however, that in spite of the presence of these conditions, the acceptance of this gift was as an act purely advantageous to the minor within the meaning of the third exception recognized by the Judicial Committee. The expression " unburdened " is a phrase used by their Lordships themselves, whereas the scriptural text is "an act purely advantageous to the infant." It is noticeable that all that the schedule states is that the donee had agreed that certain things should be done, and that the executant and her brother should be maintained out of the income of the property, but the schedule does not impose any obligation on the donee himself to maintain the executant and her brother. Even if the effect of the condition as to maintenance be to diminish the value of the gift, it still remains a gift purely advantageous to the infant, because whereas a balance might well be left in his favour, there was no risk of his ever being called upon to pay anything toward the maintenance of the executant and her brother out of other properties belonging to him. Again after the death of the executant, which had already taken place at the time of the registration, and that of her brother, the gift would be wholly freed of any charge of any kind. We are accordingly of opinion that the acceptance of this gift was an act purely advantageous to the infant, and Shamsunnessa was competent in law to do everything necessary in furtherance of this act and consequently competent to present the document for registration. 27. As regards the admission of execution, I have already stated the difficulty which I personally feel in accepting the law as laid down in Akahoy Chandra Majhi v. Manmatha Nath Chatterjee (1916) 20 C. W. N. 1345. I am not, however, prepared to make this case an occasion for a difference of opinion, inasmuch as no contention as regards the validity of the admission of execution seems to have been raised, either in the written statement or even before the trial Court. I am not, however, prepared to make this case an occasion for a difference of opinion, inasmuch as no contention as regards the validity of the admission of execution seems to have been raised, either in the written statement or even before the trial Court. Even if Bhakoo was not an assign of the executant, with regard to which I have already stated my doubts, Shamsunnessa- being a brother's widow of the executant, Ajijunnessa might herself be in some way a competent representative of the executant. This question having never been raised, has not been fully investigated, and I am not prepared in second appeal to allow this objection to prevail against a registration which took place so many years ago and has stood unquestioned for such a length of time. 28. In view of the conclusion we have reached, it is unnecessary to consider the second branch of the argument for the Respondent, but we must not be taken to agree without further consideration, that a minor party to a document is competent to present it for registration himself, and that consequently, if he acted through a representative that representative might be anyone, and not necessarily the guardian. The general law relating to minors as also the observation of the Privy Council in the case of Ma Shwe Mya v. Moung Ho Hnauug L. R. 49 I. A. 395: (1922) 27 C. W. N. 533. seems to us to negative the second part of this contention altogether. Their Lordships stated most definitely that the word " representative " did not include an agent. The sole authority cited by the Plaintiff-Respondent in support of her first proposition was the decision of Lort-Williams, J., in the case of Hemanta Kumar Das Vs. Alliantz Und Stuttgarter Life Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1938 Cal 120 and that decision is based solely on certain tentative observations in the case of Hemanta Kumar Das Vs. Alliantz Und Stuttgarter Life Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1938 Cal 120 attributed to Lord Phillimore and Lord Atkin in the report of the argument published in the Madras Law Journal (56 M. L. J. 218, at pages 222 and 224). Alliantz Und Stuttgarter Life Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1938 Cal 120 attributed to Lord Phillimore and Lord Atkin in the report of the argument published in the Madras Law Journal (56 M. L. J. 218, at pages 222 and 224). The authorised reports of the case do not contain those observations, and assuming they were made, they seem to have been no more than debating points made in the course of the argument which find no place in the judgment of the Board. The view taken by Lort-Williams, J., was also taken in Chittoori Chinnammi v. Immanni Venkayamma, AIR [1933] Mad. 407. but that decision also is based upon the supposed observations of Lord Phillimore and Lord Atkin in Hemanta Kumar Das Vs. Alliantz Und Stuttgarter Life Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1938 Cal 120 and do not give any further reason. In our opinion, some better authority or more convincing reason is require to warrant the proposition that a minor himself can present a document to which he is a party for registration, particularly if the document involves dealings with property. In any event, the presentation in the case before us was not by the minor, but through a representative, and the contention that such representative can be someone other than the guardian seems to be completely excluded by the decision of the Privy Council in Ma Shwe Mya p Maung Ho Hnaung L. R. 49 I. A. 395 : (1922) 27 C. W. N. 533. For the reasons given above, the contention urged by Mr. Das must fail and the appeal is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs in this Court. Blank, J. I agree.