JUDGMENT Sinha, J. - This is an appeal by the Defendant. The facts are somewhat novel and are briefly these: One Umrao Singh executed a sale deed in favour of one Pandit Ram Bhadra Prasad on the 26th of February 1940. Pr. Ram Bhadra Prasad, in his turn, sold the property to Debidutt on the 18th of February 1941. the application for mutation moved by Debidutt in the Revenue Court was resisted by Pt Ram Bhadra Prasad on the ground that the land being the protected land within the meaning of Section 12 of the U. P. Regulation of Agricultural Credit Act (XIV of 1940), Debidutt was not entitled to mutation or possession. 2. The present suit was instituted in 1943 by Debidutt for a declaration and possession and, In the alternative, for pre-emption. His case was that Umrao Singh executed the sale deed in favour of Pt, Ram Bhadra Prasad. He wanted to pre-empt the sale For fear of such a suit, Pt. Ram Bhadra Prasad executed the Rale-deed in his favour on the 18th of February 1941. In effect, therefore, the plaint proceeded, the sale of the 26th of February 1940, was a sale in favour of Debidutt himself and it was no open to Rim Bhadra to raise a plea b3sed upon Section 12 of Act XIV of 1940. In the alternative, it was pleaded that, if such a relief was not possible, he was entitled to preempt the sale of the 26th of February 1940, inasmuch as time was extended by reason of the fraud practised upon him by Ram Bhadra. 3. The defence, in substance, was that there was do fraud and that the suit for pre-emption was barred by limitation. It was also pleaded that the Plaintiff was, on the allegation made by him, not entitled to the relief either of declaration or of possession. 4. The learned Munsif held that there was a custom of pre-emption. He also held that the sale of 1940 - evindently he means tha sale of 1941 was made in the Plaintiff's favour, as be threatened to preempt the earlier sale of 1940 He treated the sale by Ram Bhadra, not as a sale of his own property, but of property belonging to someone else. It is difficult to follow what precisely he means. It is difficult to follow what precisely he means. He means perhaps, to bold that the land virtually belonged to the Plaintiff, because he could pre-empt it. and even the first sale deed of the 26 th February 1940 was a sale not in favour of Ram Bhadra, but in favour of the Plaintiff birrself. In this view of the case, he held that no question of Section 12 or Section 25 of Act XIV of 1940 arose. This judgment was affirmed, on appeal, by the learned Civil Judge of Fatehpur. The Defendant has come before me in second appeal. 5. It is contended that every step in the reasoning of the Courts below is fallacious. I think the learned Counsel is right. 6. It may be that the Plaintiff had a right of pre-emption. It may as well be that second sale-deed was executed in his favour for fear of pre-emption. But it is a very different thing to say that, because he had such a right, therefore, the sale of the 26th of February 1940, should be treated virtually as a sale in bis favour or the sale of the 18tb of February 1941, should not be treated what it ostensibly was, namely, a sale by Ram Bhadra in favour of Debidutt. A right of pre-emption only means that the pre-emptor has preference over the vendee. It also means that be is entitled, should be bring a properly constituted suit and be willing to pay the consideration, to secure the properly and be substituted in place of the vendee. A right of preemption is, therefore, an incident of the property. In othter words, the sale is subject to a certain right. But till such a suit it instituted, a decree obtained, the money deposited and possession taken, the transaction of sale it a good transaction and the title passes to the vendee. It is only when all the steps mentioned above are taken that the right of the vendee comes to an end and the pre-emptor is substituted in his place. But to say that there was no transfer by the vendor in favour of the vendee by reason of such a right is to say something unknown to the law. 7. I am, therefore, of opinion that the sale of the 26th of February 1940 was a good sale, but only subject to the right of pre-emption. But to say that there was no transfer by the vendor in favour of the vendee by reason of such a right is to say something unknown to the law. 7. I am, therefore, of opinion that the sale of the 26th of February 1940 was a good sale, but only subject to the right of pre-emption. In that view of the case, the sale by Ram Bhadra of the 18th of February 1941 was also a good sale subject to the limitations imposed by Sections 12 and 25 of Act XIV of 1940. If the two transactions are good, it is open to Ram Bhadra to take his stand upon Act XIV of 1940. 8. On the question of pre-emption I am again at one with the learned Counsel for the Appellant that the suit was obviously barred by limitation. The right of preemption was available up to the 26th of February 1941. The suit was instituted in 1943. The plea of fraud raised by the Plaintiff was negatived by the learned Munsif and nothing has been shown to me to induce me to come to a conclusion different from that arrived at by him. He has also found that the Plaintiff had been aware of the time position longer than a year before the suit. 9. I have come to the conclusion that the Plaintiff was not entitled to the declaration which be claimed, because the two sales of 1940 and 1941 were good sales the former being only subject to the right of pre-emption and that the relief for pre-emption was barred by limitation. 10. I, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the decrees of the Courts below and dismiss the Plaintiffs suit. It is, however, a fit ca?e in which the parties should bear their own costs throughout. 11. Leave to appeal under the Letters Patent is granted.