Judgement Appeal (No. 82 of 1946) by special leave, from a judgment of the High Court (January 29, 1946) which had allowed an appeal by the Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, Bengal, from the acquittal of the appellant by the Police Magistrate of Sealdah (June 22, 1945) on a charge of accepting a bribe brought under s. 161 of the Indian Penal Code. The High Court set aside the order of acquittal, convicted the appellant and sentenced him to one years rigorous imprisonment. The following facts are taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The main ground of appeal was that there had been contraventions of s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that the High Courts judgment relied on the testimony of a witness, Mr. Roy, who had given a signed statement to the police in breach of the section and had, also in breach of the section, had it before him and made substantial use of it while he was giving evidence. It was also made a ground of appeal that the police officers engaged on the investigation had failed to keep a diary in contravention of s, 172, sub-s. 1. The appellant was employed from June till August 24, 1944, by the East Indian Railway as a grain depot officer at Howrah station. His chief duty was to receive from contractors articles for which orders were placed by the head office of the company, to compare them with approved samples and subsequently to distribute them. On August 22, 1944, a contractor named Bhattacharjee reported to Deputy Superintendent Dutt of the Calcutta Police that the appellant had solicited from him a bribe of 400 rupees to pass a sale of 80 maunds of mustard oil, and that he proposed to make that payment next day. Bhattacharjee subsequently gave evidence at the trial that the appellant had made that demand, but that evidence was not corroborated by any other witness. A police trap was laid for the appellant on August 23, but its only result was that Bhattacharjee reported that the appellant was now refusing to take 400 rupees and was demanding that 800 rupees should be paid to him on August 24 at his residence at Park Circus. Another police trap was therefore prepared for the appellant, and on August 24, Police Superintendent Dutt, Mr. Another police trap was therefore prepared for the appellant, and on August 24, Police Superintendent Dutt, Mr. Roy, a magistrate whose services as a witness had been obtained, Police Inspector Lahiri and Bhattacharjee went in a taxi driven by one Yasin to the block of flats in Park Circus where the appellant and his brother Nazimuddin lived. It was then after 8 p.m., the black-out was in force, and it was raining heavily. It was decided that Bhattacharjee should stay in the taxi with Mr. Roy, while Mr. Dutt and Inspector Lahiri stood by a lorry which was stranded on the pavement between the taxi and the flats. One of the parties then called the doorkeeper, Ram Surdar and sent him with a message to the appellant that someone had come by taxi to see him but was prevented by an injured leg from going up to the appellants flat. From that point the controversy of fact between the parties became acute. Bhattacharjee depended that the accused came out of the block of flats, entered the taxi, took the seat beside the driver and, after asking who Mr. Roy was, and whether Bhattacharjee had brought the money with him, received from Bhattacharjee marked notes to the value of Rs. 800. Bhattacharjee further said that after some more talk the accused left the taxi, that he, Bhattacharjee, then gave a pre-arranged signal by flashing his torchlight, and that he saw the appellant being seized by the police witnesses. The police witnesses testified that they saw the accused come down from his flat and enter the taxi, that after seeing the signal made by the torchlight they arrested him as he was about to re-enter the block of flats, and that as they did so he flung away a bundle of notes, which they later found on the mudguard of the stranded lorry and identified as the notes previously marked. Mr. Roy gave evidence which corroborated Bhattacharjees evidence about the passing of the marked notes from Bhattacharjee to the appellant, and the flashing of the torch; and which corroborated also the police evidence about the finding of the notes after the arrest of the appellant. Though Mr. Mr. Roy gave evidence which corroborated Bhattacharjees evidence about the passing of the marked notes from Bhattacharjee to the appellant, and the flashing of the torch; and which corroborated also the police evidence about the finding of the notes after the arrest of the appellant. Though Mr. Roy identified in court the appellants brother as the man who had taken the notes in the taxi, he identified the man who was arrested, and who was undoubtedly the appellant, with the man who received the notes. His identification of the brother in court might therefore have been a mistake. What was more important was that the magistrate had entered on the record at the end of Mr. Roys examination-in-chief this note “He refreshed his memory, from time to time, by consulting his written statement to the police during investigation." The magistrate called as court witnesses under s. 540 of the Criminal Procedure Code the doorkeeper of the block of flats, Ram Surdar, and the taxi-driver, Yasin, and they gave evidence that it was not the appellant but his brother who was in the taxi at the material time. The police magistrate in his judgment, after expressing his complete distrust of Bhattacharjee and commenting adversely on the police evidence, spoke of Mr. Roys defect of memory as evidenced by his free use of the written statement while he was deponing. The statement was made to the police three months after the events with which it dealt, it was signed by him and it was made to the police in the course of their investigation of the alleged offence,. The magistrate held that when a police officer during the investigation of an offence obtained a signed statement from a witness in contravention of s. 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code the evidence of the witness at the trial must be rejected. The record did not disclose how it came about that the magistrate did not stop Mr. Roy at the beginning of his evidence from using the statement, and their Lordships of the Board were not disposed to seek information about that from sources outside the record. They assumed that the magistrate intervened, as was his duty, as soon as he became aware of the irregularity. Roy at the beginning of his evidence from using the statement, and their Lordships of the Board were not disposed to seek information about that from sources outside the record. They assumed that the magistrate intervened, as was his duty, as soon as he became aware of the irregularity. The learned judges of the High Court (Roxburgh and Ellis JJ.) held " that breaches of the provisions of s. 162 of the " Code of Criminal Procedure are not in themselves necessarily fatal to the proceedings and may in appropriate circumstances " be cured, as the expression is, under the terms of s. 537 of the " Code of Criminal Procedure." In their opinion there was no substantial reason for thinking that Mr. Roys evidence without the use of the statement to refresh his memory would have been in any material particular different from the evidence which he actually gave. For that reason they held Mr. Roys evidence to be admissible, and they greatly relied on it in reaching the conclusion that the appeal from the magistrates order should be allowed and that the appellant should be convicted. Section 162, sub-s.1, and s.172, sub-s.1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure provided as follows—" Section 162, sub-s.1. No statement made by any person to a police-officer " in the course of an investigation under this chapter shall, if reduced into writing, be signed by the person making it; " nor shall any such statement or any record thereof, whether " in a police-diary or otherwise, or any part of such statement "or record, be used for any purpose (save as hereinafter " provided) at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was " made " "Section 172, sub-s.1. Every police-officer making an invstigation under this chapter shall day by day enter his proceedings in the investigation in a diary, setting forth the]time at which the information reached him, the time at which " he began and closed his investigation, the place or places " visited by him, and a statement of the circumstances ascertained through his investigation.” 1947. Jan. 15, 16. Casswell K.C. and Pullan for the appellant. The main ground of appeal is that the High Court have convicted the appellant in reliance on the evidence of a witness—Mr. Jan. 15, 16. Casswell K.C. and Pullan for the appellant. The main ground of appeal is that the High Court have convicted the appellant in reliance on the evidence of a witness—Mr. Roy—made from a signed statement given by him to the police in contravention of s. 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code, on the erroneous assumption that this was an irregularity curable by s. 537 of the Code. Statements made by witnesses to the police in writing and signed by them are forbidden by law, as also is the use by the witnesses of those statements, signed or unsigned, in court s. 162, sub-s.1 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The making and misuse of such statements is not cured by the terms of s. 537 of the Code, and the trial has been vitiated by the violation of the provisions of s. 162. It is contended, alternatively, that because of the breach of s. 162 Mr. Roys evidence must be disregarded. Section 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code prevents, in proper cases, the reversal or alteration of a finding or order but does not authorize the reversal or alteration of a finding or order so as to prejudice an accused person. Statements made to a police officer by an accused person under s. 162 of the Code are inadmissible in evidence Pakala Narayana Swami v. King-Emperor (( 1939) L. R. 66 I. A. 66, 77.). Further, the appellant has been gravely pre judiced by the failure of the police during investigation to follow the mandatory provisions of s. 172 of the Criminal Procedure Code and to record the statements of witnesses, by which the evidence of those witnesses in court could be checked in cross-examination. It is submitted that if the evidence of Mr. Roy is not taken into consideration there is no evidence at all against the appellant in this case, and the High Court, in setting aside the order of acquittal, has acted contrary to the principles laid down by the Judicial Committee in Sheo Swarup v. King-Emperor (( 1934) L. R. 61 I. A. 398.). B. MacKenna for the Crown. It is conceded that the state ment ought not to have been signed by Mr. Roy or consulted by him when he was giving his evidence. B. MacKenna for the Crown. It is conceded that the state ment ought not to have been signed by Mr. Roy or consulted by him when he was giving his evidence. It is also conceded that s. 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code has nothing to do with the case—that section only applies to appeals against conviction. On those concessions the first question is what effect that has under the Code on the trial of the appellant. An irregularity in respect of the obligation imposed by s. 162— that the statement in writing shall not be signed—does not render inadmissible the evidence of the witness in question. Further, the fact that a witness does improperly refer to documents while he is giving his evidence does not have the effect in law of making that evidence inadmissible. It affects the weight of the evidence; it is a matter of discretion for the court whether they will disregard it, and the High Court here said that they did not think that Mr. Roys evidence ought to be disregarded. There is nothing in the Code which says that if a witness does from time to time refer to a statement made under s. 162 that renders his evidence inadmissible. It cannot be said that the High Court has done something which it was not entitled to do. There is no case in point where a witness has refreshed his memory in reference to a document under s. 162. The effect of an irregularity on the evidence of a witness was considered in Bhuneshwari Pershad v. Emperor (( 1931) A. I. R. (Oudh) 172.), which was referred to by the police magistrate in the present case as his reason for disregarding Mr. Roys evidence. Muhammad Panah v. Emperor (( 1934) A. I. R. (Sind) 78.) gives the right test to be applied to a case where there is a reference by a witness in court to a document at which he ought not to have been allowed to look. The exercise of the magistrates discretion did not bind the High Court; there is nothing in the Criminal Procedure Code which precludes the High Court from exercising its discretion in a different way from the magistrate, and the Board ought not to hold as a matter of fact that it was improperly exercised. The exercise of the magistrates discretion did not bind the High Court; there is nothing in the Criminal Procedure Code which precludes the High Court from exercising its discretion in a different way from the magistrate, and the Board ought not to hold as a matter of fact that it was improperly exercised. Lastly, assuming that the High Court were wrong in having regard to the evidence of Mr. Roy, this Board will not interfere if the evidence of other witnesses is sufficient to sustain the case. There is abundant other evidence to support the conviction, and there has been no miscarriage of justice. Casswell K.C. replied. 1947. Feb. 18. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD NORMAND, who stated the facts set out above and continued The objection to the conviction founded on the failure of the police witnesses to keep a diary as required by s. 172, sub-s. 1, of the Criminal Procedure Code may be conveniently disposed of first. It was contended by learned counsel for the appellant that the evidence of the officers was inadmissible. This contention was not supported by reference to the statute or to authority, nor was it the view taken by the magistrate. In the opinion of their Lordships a contravention of s. 172 lays the evidence of the police officers open to adverse criticism and may diminish its value, but it does not have the effect of making that evidence inadmissible. The next question concerns the effect of s. 162, sub-s. 1, of the Criminal Procedure Code, which provides that no statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation shall, if reduced into writing, be signed by the person making it; nor shall any such statement or any record thereof, whether in a police diary or otherwise, or any part of such statement or record, be used for any purpose (saving certain exceptions not material to the present proceedings) at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made. It was submitted for the appellant that the proceedings were entirely vitiated and, alternatively, that Mr. It was submitted for the appellant that the proceedings were entirely vitiated and, alternatively, that Mr. Roys evidence was rendered inadmissible, for either of two reasons first, because he had previously given a signed statement to the police, and, second, because in giving his evidence he made use of the signed statement to prompt his memory. On the other hand, it was argued for the respondent that a contravention of s. 162, sub-s. 1, merely affected the value of the evidence, and that the High Court had taken the correct view of its effect in the present case. It appears to their Lordships that the effect of a contravention of the section depends on the prohibition which has been contravened. If the contravention consists in the signing of a statement made to the police and reduced into writing, the evidence of the witness who signed it does not become inadmissible. There are no words either in the section or elsewhere in the statute which express or imply such a consequence. Still less can it be said that the statute has the effect of vitiating the whole proceedings when evidence is given by a witness who has signed such a statement. But the value of his evidence may be seriously impaired as a consequence of the contravention of this statutory safeguard against improper practices. The use by a witness while he is giving evidence of a statement made by him to the police raises different considerations. The categorical prohibition of such use would be merely disregarded if reliance were to be placed on the evidence of a witness who had made material use of the statement when he was giving evidence at the trial. When, therefore, the magistrate or presiding judge discovers that a witness has made material use of such a statement it is his duty under the section to disregard the evidence of that witness as inadmissible. In the present case there is in the note at the end of Mr. Roys examination-in-chief and in the judgment of the magistrate what amounts to a finding of fact that Mr. Roy while giving his evidence made substantial and material use of the signed statement given by him to the police, and the magistrate was accordingly bound to disregard his evidence. The magistrates reason for doing so is too broadly stated, for it is not the mere fact that Mr. Roy while giving his evidence made substantial and material use of the signed statement given by him to the police, and the magistrate was accordingly bound to disregard his evidence. The magistrates reason for doing so is too broadly stated, for it is not the mere fact that Mr. Roy had signed the statement but the fact that he had it before him and consulted it in the witness box that renders his evidence incompetent. It follows that in the opinion of their Lordships the learned judges of the High Court erred in law when they treated Mr. Roys evidence as admissible. Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to which they made reference, requires a Court of Appeal, subject to the earlier provisions of the statute, to affirm, an order of a court of competent jurisdiction where there has been an irregularity in the proceedings unless the irregularity has in fact occasioned a failure of justice. The section cannot apply to a case like the present, in which the magistrate has refused to overlook an irregularity and has acquitted. The further observations of the learned judges that there was no substantial reason to think that Mr. Roys evidence unaided by the written statement would have been in any material point different from the evidence which he gave, and that no real prejudice was caused to the appellant by the use of the statement, are in the opinion of their Lordships unfortunate and ill-founded. It is impossible to say what Mr. Roys evidence would have been if he had not used the statement to aid his memory; and it is also impossible to say that prejudice may not have been suffered by the appellant. But the conclusive answer to the reasoning of the judgment is that the language of the statute clearly prohibits any such use of the statement, and it must receive effect. It was argued for the respondent that even without Mr. Roys evidence there was a sufficiency of other evidence accepted as trustworthy by the learned judges of the High Court to justify the conviction. While it is true that the police evidence taken along with the evidence of Bhattacharjee is relevant to infer the guilt of the appellant, that evidence is contradicted by other witnesses, and it has been the subject of adverse comment by the magistrate. While it is true that the police evidence taken along with the evidence of Bhattacharjee is relevant to infer the guilt of the appellant, that evidence is contradicted by other witnesses, and it has been the subject of adverse comment by the magistrate. It is possible, also, that the High Court would have treated the evidence of the police and Bhattacharjee with less respect if it had not had Mr. Roys evidence before it. The judgment of the High Court largely depends on his evidence. It could therefore be neither logical nor fair to affirm the order of the High Court, while holding that the court erred in taking Mr. Roys evidence into consideration. On the other hand, the submission for the appellant that the acquittal by the magistrate should at this stage be finally re-affirmed would have been appropriate if the irregularity which has taken place had had the effect of vitiating the whole proceedings, but it is too favourable to the appellant on the opinion which their Lordships have expressed on the effect of s. 162. The appellants complaint that the High Court had failed to have due regard to the principles laid down in Sheo Swarup v. King-Emperor (( 1934) L. R.6l I. A. 398) would have had greater force if the High Court had not believed itself entitled to rely on the evidence of Mr. Roy, and without that evidence these principles will manifestly have a special relevance to the circumstances of the case. Their Lordships consider that the fair course is to allow the appeal to the effect of setting aside the order of the High Court, and to remit to the High Court to re-hear and determine the appeal on the evidence in the case subject to a direction to exclude from consideration the evidence of Mr. Roy and to deny it all effect. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly.