JUDGMENT Sinha, J. - This and the connected Appeal NO. 368 of 1942 arise out of the same set of facts. Suit NO. 74 of 1937 was instituted on 10-11-1937 by Baja Udeya Pratap Singh, Talukdar of Dharampur Katiari in the district of Hardoi, now represented by the Deputy Commissioner, Hardoi, in charge of the Court of Wards, against Mt. Munna prostitute, alias Ram Kumari alias Shiv Kumari. Suit NO. 12 of 1938 was instituted on 20-1-1938, by Mt. Shiv Kumari Devi alias Munnaji against Raja Udeya Pratap Singh. 2. The earlier suit was brought by the Raja for possession of the 'Dan Villa,' bungalow in the city of Cawnpore and also for recovery of RS. 300 on account of mesne profits. The allegations in the plaint are briefly these: Raja Bahadur Raja Rukmangad Singh, the father of the plaintiff was the owner of the bungalow, The defendant was a prostitute in the keeping of the deceased. She was allowed to occupy the house in connection with the marriage of a brother in January 1933 and, in spite of a registered notice sent by the plaintiff who succeeded his father on his death, on 19-1-1937, she did not vacate it. Instead, she claimed its ownership. The defence, in the main, was that she was an 'Auarudh Stree' of the late Raja Bahadur and was treated by him with affection and marked consideration and was so treated by his relations including the plaintiff. In accordance with the family practice and custom the late Raja Bahadur (a) provided the defendant with suitable residence; (b) paid the defendant a monthly allowance of Rs. 300 per annum (sic) as her pocket money; (c) paid other expenses of food, raiment, conveyance, medical attendance, establishment etc., over and above the said pocket money; (d) placed at her disposal several cars for her personal use, the last one being a Plymouth 1935 model No. 6349 L.W., U.P. which remained in the defendant's exclusive possession till 28-1-1937, in her own right and title of maintenance; and (e) gave her plenty of money by way of gift and presented to her many other valuables, from time to time. She was maintained as an 'Auarudh Stree' whether she lived at Katyari or Cawnpore or Lucknow and the pocket money used to be paid to her as it used to be paid to the other members of the family. She was maintained as an 'Auarudh Stree' whether she lived at Katyari or Cawnpore or Lucknow and the pocket money used to be paid to her as it used to be paid to the other members of the family. The Baja Bahadur gave her Rs. 19,000 for the purchase of the bungalow in dispute, which stood on the banks of the Granges, because she was religiously inclined and wanted a house so situated. It was purchased by her on 410-1934, but in the name of, the Raja out of respect for his memory. She has been, she goes on to say, in exclusive possession of the house since its purchase on 4-10-1934. 3. The plaint of the suit NO. 12 of 1938 was practically a rehearsal of the written statement of the earlier suit and the written statement was a repetition of the allegations in the plaint. In this suit she prayed for a declaration that she was the owner of the 'Dan Villa; and was entitled to remain in its possession. She claimed a sum of Rs. 6000 on account of maintenance and wanted it to be created a charge on the property mentioned in Sch.A' 4. The learned Civil Judge framed the following issues in Suit No. 74 of 1937: (1) Was the sale-deed dated 4-10-1934, in favour of Raja Bahadur Raja Rukmangad Singh a benami sale ? Was Shrimati Sheo Kumari the real vendee ? (2) Was Shrimati Shiva Kumari an 'Avarudh Stree' of the late Raja Bahadur Rukmangad Singh ? If so, has she a right of residence for life in the house in suit ? (3) Is the plaintiff entitled to mesne profits ? (4) Is the plaintiff owner of the bungalow in suit or he is only a benamidar ? 5. In Suit No. 12 of 1938 he settled the following issues; (1) Has the Court no jurisdiction to try the suit ? (2) Is the suit bad for multifariousness? (3) Is the court-fee paid insufficient ? (4) Is the plaintiff 'Avarudh Stree' of the late Raja Bahadur Raja Rukmangad Singh? (5) Is the plaintiff entitled to maintenance? (6) In case the plaintiff is 'Avarudh Stree' of the late Raja is she entitled to maintenance out of the estate left by the said Raja in the hands of the defendant ? (4) Is the plaintiff 'Avarudh Stree' of the late Raja Bahadur Raja Rukmangad Singh? (5) Is the plaintiff entitled to maintenance? (6) In case the plaintiff is 'Avarudh Stree' of the late Raja is she entitled to maintenance out of the estate left by the said Raja in the hands of the defendant ? (7) Is the plaintiff the real owner of the bungalow No. 11/13 and the saledeed in favour of the late Raja was only benami ? (8) Has the plaintiff the right of residence in the said bungalow by reason of her being an Avarudh Stree of the late Raja Bahadur ? (9) To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ? 6. The learned Civil Judge found that Mt. Shiv Kumari Devi was in permanent keeping of the late Raja Bahadur from 1932 up to his death which took place in 1937 and that she was his Avarudh Stree in the eye of the law, He also found that the estate of the late Raja Bahadur belonged to three classes. Part of it was governed by the Oudh Estates Act; another part by the Oudh Settled Estates Act and the rest was non-talukdari property. He held that it was not open to the late Raja Bahadur, in view of Ss. 15 and 22 of the Oudh Settled Estates Act, to create a charge on that portion beyond his lifetime. As regards the portion covered by the Oudh Estates Act, he came to the conclusion that it was only certain named classes that could claim its benefits but not the plaintiff. With regard to the rest of the property he was of opinion that the Raja of Katiari was included in List II of the Oudh Estates Act and his estate is governed by the family custom of impartiality and it descends to a single heir. The rights, therefore, fall to be determined according to custom and not by the general principles of Hindu law. As no custom was pleaded by Mt. Shiva Kumari, she was not entitled to any maintenance. He came to the conclusion that the Raja purchased the house for himself and with his own money. In the result he dismissed the suit. 7. Mt. Shiv Kumari has come to this Court in appeal. She has preferred appeals in both the suits. As no custom was pleaded by Mt. Shiva Kumari, she was not entitled to any maintenance. He came to the conclusion that the Raja purchased the house for himself and with his own money. In the result he dismissed the suit. 7. Mt. Shiv Kumari has come to this Court in appeal. She has preferred appeals in both the suits. She claims that she is the owner of the 'Dan Villa' and, at all events, she is entitled to remain in possession of it as 'Avarudh Stree' and claims maintenance as such. Her contention, in effect, is that she is entitled to claim a charge in lieu of her maintenance on the estate of the Raja. On behalf of Raja Udeya Pratap Singh this position is challenged. It is contended that the finding of the learned Civil Judge that she was an 'Avarudh Stree' is not warranted by the materials on the record. 8. The points that have emerged for consiration are: (1) Whether Mt. Shiv Kumari has established her ownership of the 'Dan Villa' and her status as 'Avarudh Stree' of the late Raja Rukmangad Singh? (2) In case she has, is she entitled to claim maintenance as a charge on any portion of the estate or a right of residence in the house ? 9. The first question, therefore, which con-fronts us, is whether she has established her status as an 'Avarudh Stree. The law on this point was laid down by Lord Darling in the well known case in (26) 24 A.L.J. 729 l3 AIR 1926 P.C. 73 : 53 I.A. 153 : 50 Bom. 604 : 96 I.C. 20 (P.C.) his Lordship says as follows: The question now to be decided upon this evidence is whether the appellant is entitled to maintenance out of the estate of the deceased, and this, as appears from the judgments delivered in the Court of appeal, depends upon whether, upon the facts proved, she was in a strict sense, according to the Hindu law, as prevailing in Bombay, the 'permanent concubine' of deceased. This word concubine has long had a definite meaning, whether expressed in the language of India or of Europe. The persons denoted by it had, and have still where it remains applicable, a recognised status below that of wife and above that of harlot. This word concubine has long had a definite meaning, whether expressed in the language of India or of Europe. The persons denoted by it had, and have still where it remains applicable, a recognised status below that of wife and above that of harlot. In the Glossory of Ducange, under the title Concubina, we read that Pellex honestior est quam amica, ut quae accidat properties ad uxoris naturam: and this, it would seem, is because uxor nomen est dignitatis non valuptatia. Almost a wife, according to ancient authorities, the distinction of concubine from harlots was due to a modified chastity, in that she was affected to one man only, although in an irregular union merely. So Bracton is quoted by Ducange as writing, eadem etiam concubina legitima dicitur ad discrimen ejus Quae quaestum facit. Harlots solicited to immorality; concubines were, reserved by one man. 10. In other words she is an 'Avarudh Stree' provided the concubinage is permanent, until the death of the paramour and sexual fidelity be reserved to him. She is entitled to maintenance even though she be not kept in the family house of the deceased. Residence in the family house was not considered an essential reason for the right to have maintenance from the goods of the deceased paramour, but rather a means to ensure qualified chastity of the mistress. There is no evidence before us that she did not observe fidelity to the deceased. The question still remains whether she has established her status as an "Avarudh Stree." 11. She has not the same status as that of a wife, but that status is very akin to it. If one thing emerges clearly from the judgment of Lord Darling, it is that the law recognises a clear and well defined line between a harlot and an 'Avarudh Stree' She may be a concubine but she may, by her fidelity to her paramour, win a position of dignity and respect in his family. Fidelity to him or to his memory is an essential condition. It is difficult to bring out the meaning in its full force in English, but it appears to be clear that she is a wife though not in the orthodox sense. As a wife she has a distinctive position, she is admitted in the bosom of the family, though she may not be living in the house occupied by the family. As a wife she has a distinctive position, she is admitted in the bosom of the family, though she may not be living in the house occupied by the family. She may not be the mistress of the house and yet she commands the affection of her paramour and the respect due and ordinarily shown to a wife. 12. Treveleyan in his Hindu Law, Edn. 3, p. 91, has thus summed up the result of the authorities culminating in the decision in Nagubai's case: (26) 24 A. L. J. 729 l3 A. I. R. 1926 P.C. 73 : 53 I.A. 153 : 50 Bom. 604 : 96 I.C. 20 (P.C.),Naghubai v. Mongbibai. A concubine, who has been kept by a Hindu continuously to the time of his death, practically as a member of the family, is entitled to maintenance from the property (whether ancestral or self acquired) of her deceased paramour, whether she have children or not, but loses right on incontinence. The italics are ours. Did Mt. Shiv Kumari ever acquire such a position? Was she ever treated practically as a member of the family? The evidence on the record no doubt proves that the Raja was greatly fond of her and very much devoted to her, but, here again, a distinction must be made between what is mere infatuation and the love which a husband bears towards his wife. (Their Lordships considered the evidence and proceeded.) Taking into consideration all the circumstances, it is impossible to say that she was a woman permanently in the keeping of the late Raja Bahadur, practically a member of the family who had attained the status of an 'Avarudh Stree'. 13. The next question is whether the appellant has succeeded in establishing that the 'Dan Villa' purchased from Mrs. Stone was really purchased for her. 13. The next question is whether the appellant has succeeded in establishing that the 'Dan Villa' purchased from Mrs. Stone was really purchased for her. The law is well settled that even if the purchase had been made in her name but with the funds of the Raja, it would have been for her to establish that it was made for her, because the doctrine of advancement does not apply to this country, ('25) AIR 1925 181 (Privy Council) A purchase in India by a native of India of a property in India in the name of his wife unexplained by either proved or admitted facts is to be regarded as a benami transaction by which the beneficial interest in the property is in the husband although the ostensible title is in the wife. Here the purchase stands in the name of the Raja himself. It lies, therefore, on the appellant to satisfy the Court, by cogent evidence, that the Raja was only an ostensible and not the real purchaser or that he made in her favour a gift of the money with which the purchase was made. (Their Lordships after considering the evidence affirmed the finding of the Civil Judge that the house belonged to the Raja who purchased it with his own money and for himself; the appellant was not its owner or beneficiary and proceeded:) On the finding that the appellant was not an 'Avarudh Stree' of the Raja and that she was not the true owner of the house, her claim must fail and the appeal must stand dismissed, but as we have differed from the learned Civil Judge in his finding on the status of the appellant, we propose to address ourselves to the questions of law. 14. The Katiari estate consists of property of three classespart of it is governed by the Oudh Settled Estates Act-another part by the Oudh Estates Act and a portion is non-talukdari property. Mr. Shambhu Nath Seth, the learned counsel for the appellant, conceded that he can lay no claim to the property governed by the Oudh Settled Estates Act. It 'is also conceded that the five villages mentioned in Sch. A of her plaint and over which a charge is sought for the amount due to her on account of the arrears of maintenance, are all governed by the Oudh Settled Estates Act. It 'is also conceded that the five villages mentioned in Sch. A of her plaint and over which a charge is sought for the amount due to her on account of the arrears of maintenance, are all governed by the Oudh Settled Estates Act. If it is so, her claim must fail on this ground alone. But the learned counsel contends that this does not preclude us, in case we accept her case otherwise, from declaring a charge on property other than that governed by the Oudh Settled Estates Act. We, therefore, propose to consider whether she is entitled to claim a charge on other classes of property, although we should not be understood to accede to this contention. 15. The Oudh Estates Act deals with the proprietary rights in diverse estates in the province of Oudh conferred upon talukdars and defines the rights of the said talukdars and others in such estates and as to the course of succession thereto. It also attempts to regulate such course and provide for such other matters connected therewith as are hereinafter mentioned. The expression "such other matters" connected therewith is somewhat vague. It is clear that the matters mentioned are not exhaustive and are only illustrative. Sections 22 to 28 are the material sections. 16. Section 22 provides with special rules and S. 23 with general rules of succession to intestate talukdars and grantees. Section 24 says : When any talukdar or grantee, or his heir or legatee, dies leaving him surviving such relatives as are hereinafter mentioned, the person for the time being in the possession of his estate or the rents and profits thereof shall be liable to pay to each of such relatives during his or her life .... Provided that such relative was at the date of the death of the deceased living with him : Provided also that such relative is and continues to be without any other adequate means of maintenance. Section 25 speaks of grand-parents, and senior widows of the deceased and also provides for the junior widows. Section 26 speaks of brothers, nephews and minor sons of the deceased. Section 27 says that "in the case of unmarried daughters of the deceased, widows of his SODS or brothers and his widows not of his ahl-i-bradari....." We are not concerned with s. 28. 17. Section 26 speaks of brothers, nephews and minor sons of the deceased. Section 27 says that "in the case of unmarried daughters of the deceased, widows of his SODS or brothers and his widows not of his ahl-i-bradari....." We are not concerned with s. 28. 17. The learned counsel for the appellant founded no argument on the provision made for "widows not of his ahl-i-bradari." All he contends is that the list furnished by Ss. 24,25,26, 21 and 28 does not exhaust the list of persons entitled to maintenance. If the Hindu law gives the appellant a right of maintenance as an 'Avarudh Stree' that right is not taken away by the Oudh Estates Act. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contends that no one outside the list furnished by these sections, is entitled to maintenance and this special piece of legislation must, on the well known principle of law, generalia specialibus non derogant, override the general Hindu law. The principle of law to which an appeal has been made by the learned counsel for the respondent does not, in our opinion, assist him. It must be borne in mind that this Act is an enabling Act i.e., it is a statute which makes it lawful to do something which will not otherwise be lawful: Oraise on Statute Law (4th Edn., p. 62). In other words certain rights not recognised by the general law find recognition as a result of this statute, or certain persons having no rights or having restricted rights are given rights either for the first time or larger or more amplified rights. But the statute does not curtail the existing rights. This is the true purpose of an enabling Act. If the appellant possesses certain rights under a different system of law or under the general law of the land, that right is not taken away by the Oudh Estates Act. 18. We have to construe this Act in the above light. Besides, the general scheme of the Act also supports the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. The preamble of the Act, if reference to it is permissible, seeks "to provide for such other matters connected therewith as are hereinafter mentioned." It is true, that the matters are those which are to be 'herein.) after mentioned,' but the expression 'such other matters' is an elastic expression. The preamble of the Act, if reference to it is permissible, seeks "to provide for such other matters connected therewith as are hereinafter mentioned." It is true, that the matters are those which are to be 'herein.) after mentioned,' but the expression 'such other matters' is an elastic expression. It is, in its connotation, always illustrative and not exhaustive. We are, therefore, of opinion that the appellant would, if her title is otherwise made out, be entitled to a charge on the property covered by the Oudh Estates Act. What we have said about the Oudh Estates Act applies to non-talukdari property also. Her claim must, in view of what has been said above, fail even as regards it. 19. We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the appellant has failed to establish that she is an Avarudh Stree'. She has also failed to establish that the Raja was not the real purchaser of the 'Dan Villa' and that she was its real owner. Her claim must fail. It must also fail on the ground that the five villages mentioned in Sch, A of her plaint, in respect of which a charge was sought to be created, fell within the ambit of the Oudh Estates Act. We, therefore, dismiss both the appeals with costs.