JUDGMENT Akram, J. - This appeal by the Plaintiff arises out of a suit under Or. 21, r. 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Briefly, the facts may be stated as follows: The Defendant who happens to be the landlord of a certain tenure brought two successive rent suits against his tenants, namely, Rent Suits Nos. 1249 of 1927 and 1410 of 1931 and obtained decrees therein. The decree in Rent Suit No. 1410 of 1931, however, came to be executed first and in Rent Execution Case No. 1265 of 1932, the property in suit was put up to auction sale and purchased by the Plaintiff who obtained delivery of possession on the 28th August, 1934. Subsequently, in execution of the decree in the other suit, Rent Execution Case No. 571 of 1937, the self-same property was again sold and purchased by the Defendant on the 14th August, 1938. The Defendant then sought to obtain delivery of possession but was resisted by the Plaintiff. The Defendant thereupon started a proceeding under Or. 21, r. 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Miscellaneous Case No. 227 of 1937, and on getting an order made in his favour on the 25th March, 1939, dispossessed the Plaintiff on the 6th May, 1939. The Plaintiff thereafter instituted the present suit on the 21st March, 1940, for recovery of possession and for setting aside the summary order aforesaid. Various issues were framed in the suit, some of which were decided in favour of the Plaintiff and some in favour of the Defendant. The suit itself was, however, dismissed on the ground of defect of party, on the decision given upon Issue No. 2, "Is it (suit) bad for defect of party?" Against the dismissal the Plaintiff preferred an appeal but was unsuccessful as the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the trial Court in respect of Issue No. 2. He then preferred the present appeal. 2. The question regarding defect of party arose in the case as it appeared that the Defendant on the 5th March, 1940, by Ext. M, had leased out the property in suit to one Nakul Roy who was in possession but had not been impleaded in the suit. It is now contended on behalf of the Appellant that on the analogy of a suit under Or. M, had leased out the property in suit to one Nakul Roy who was in possession but had not been impleaded in the suit. It is now contended on behalf of the Appellant that on the analogy of a suit under Or. 21, r. 63 relating to a decision under r. 58, the present suit under r. 103 should be treated as a continuation of the proceeding under r. 97 and that consequently the lease to Nakul Roy would be affected by the doctrine of lis pendens and subject to the result of the decree passed in the suit. Reference in this connection was made to ax number of decisions including the decisions in the cases of Krishnappa Chetty v. Abdul Kader Sahib I. L. R. (1913) Mad. 535., Mussaminat Bas Kuer v. The Gaya Municipality I. L. R. (1938) Pat. 588. and Bonomali Rai v. Prosunna Narain Choudhury I. L.R. (1895) Cal. 829. 4.It is next contended that the failure to implead the lessee could not hinder the determination of the controversy relating to the interest of the lessor, and be regarded as a defect fatal to the suit; that the Plaintiff may not succeed in getting khas possession in such a suit and may have asked for more than he was entitled to but the suit itself in its entirety could not be thrown out on those grounds; that the expression " right which he claims to the present possession " in Or. 21, r. 103 is not limited to khas possession only but includes constructive possession also. On the other hand, it is contended on behalf of the Respondent that Nakul Roy being in possession, no effective decree for khas possession in his absence could be passed in the suit. Reliance in this connection was placed upon the decision in the case of Protap Chandra Gope v. Sarat Chandra Gangopadhyaya (1920) 25 C. W. N. 544. 5. It seems to me that the cases cited on either side are not of much help in deciding the present question, vis., whether the. lessee is a necessary party to the present suit. The rulings referred to above, all relate to suits under Or. 21, r. 63 but a suit under Or. 21, r. 63 does not appear to me to be precisely of the same nature as a suit under Or. 21. lessee is a necessary party to the present suit. The rulings referred to above, all relate to suits under Or. 21, r. 63 but a suit under Or. 21, r. 63 does not appear to me to be precisely of the same nature as a suit under Or. 21. r. 103 in which no question in respect of any attachment arises. I do not think, therefore, that the principles underlying decisions in suits under Or. 21. r. 63 are applicable for decisions in suits under Or. 21, r. 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the case of Protap Chandra Gope v. Sarat Chandra Gangopadhyaya (1920) 25 C.W. N. 544. relied upon by the Respondent, no point as to the maintainability of the suit as against the lessors in the absence of the lessee was raised. In fact the lessee was made a party but after the period of limitation was over and their Lordships, therefore, dismissed the suit as against him on the ground of limitation, but they did not dismiss the suit as against the lessors for any non-joinder of parties. On the contrary, the appeal by the lessors was allowed by their Lordships and the case was remanded for reconsideration. Hut, as I have already observed, the decisions cited do not seem to me to be authority for the contentions on either side and are not of much help in deciding the pre sent case. 6. I think, however, that there is substance in the second contention put forward by the Appellant. I do not see why the Plaintiff cannot establish his title as against the Defendant in the absence of his lessee. The Plaintiff may rest content with getting merely symbolical possession. The words of Or. 21, r. 103 do not appear to me to be restricted to actual possession only. I am of opinion, therefore, that the Courts below were in error in dismissing the suit on the ground of defect of party. 7. I accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the decision on Issue No. 2 and send back the case to the lower Appellate Court so that it may be re-heard and re-considered in accordance with law in respect of the remaining matters which have not been already disposed of by the said Court. Costs will abide the result. Lodge, J. I agree.