Judgement Appeal (No. 74 of 1945) from an order of the High Court (July 19, 1944). The following facts are taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. On June 9, 1944, His Excellency the Governor of Bengal, purporting to act under the powers conferred on him by r. 51F of the defence of India Rules, made an order superseding Law Rep. 74 Ind. App. 120 ( 1946- 1947) Moulvi Hamid Hassan Nomani V. Banwarilal Roy 79 the Commissioners of the Howrah Municipality for a period of one year, with effect from June 9, 1944, and directing that the appellant should exercise and perform all the powers and duties which might be exercised, or performed, by or on behalf of the Chairman and the Commissioners during the period of supersession. On June 14, 1944, the High Court, on the application of the respondents, issued a rule nisi calling on the appellant to show cause why an information in the nature of quo warranto should not be exhibited against him as to by what authority he is " exercising and performing or claiming to exercise or perform the powers and duties which may be performed or exercised " by the Chairman and the Commissioners of the Howrah " Municipality.” By the said order of July 19, 1944, the High Court made absolute the rule nisi. On December 14, 1944, the High Court ordered that the appellants appeal to His Majesty in Council against the said Order of July 19, 1944, be admitted. 1947. Jan. 21, 22, 29. Sir Walter Monckton K.C. and B. MacKenna for the appellant. The main point is whether the High Court has special jurisdiction in the case of Government servants transcending the local limits of the High Courts ordinary original civil jurisdiction. The High Court has held that it does possess this special jurisdiction as a legacy from the Supreme Court of Calcutta which was abolished in 1861. The submission resisting the order absolute was that the municipality of Howrah was outside the local limits of the High Courts jurisdiction, that the appellant, a deputy magistrate, was not resident within those limits, and that therefore the High Court was without jurisdiction. The submission resisting the order absolute was that the municipality of Howrah was outside the local limits of the High Courts jurisdiction, that the appellant, a deputy magistrate, was not resident within those limits, and that therefore the High Court was without jurisdiction. The High Court said that the old Supreme Court had a special personal jurisdiction transcending the limits of its local jurisdiction in the case of servants of the East India Company; that the High Court had succeeded to that special personal jurisdiction, and that servants of the Government were for the purposes of this jurisdiction to. be treated as if they were servants of the old company. Finally, it was said that this jurisdiction enabled the High Court to issue the writ of quo warranto in the case of an office outside its local limits on the ground that the claimant to the office was a servant of Government. It is submitted, first, that the High Court has no special personal jurisdiction in the case of Government servants, and secondly, that the old Supreme Court would not have had jurisdiction to do what the High Court has done in this case—to issue the writ of quo warranto in the case of an office outside the local limits of the High Court even where the claimant had been a servant of the old company. The High Court inherited the jurisdiction from the old Supreme Court of Calcutta under the Indian High Courts Act, 1861, ss. 8, 9, 11. After 1861 there was a reduction, not an increase, in the jurisdiction. The questions are, first, what powers did the Supreme Court possess in respect of the issue of the writ, and secondly, are there any provisions in the letters patent granted under the Act of 1861 which restrict the jurisdiction of the High Court within narrower limits than that of the Supreme Court. As to the first point, the Supreme Courts charter of 1774 was granted under the provisions of the Regulating Act of 1773 ss. 13, 14 and 15; so far as the Supreme Court had power to issue writs of quo warranto or habeas corpus it came from cl. 4 of the charter and nowhere else. That clause was the same as cl. 13, 14 and 15; so far as the Supreme Court had power to issue writs of quo warranto or habeas corpus it came from cl. 4 of the charter and nowhere else. That clause was the same as cl. 8 of the Madras Supreme Court Charter, which was considered in Ryots of Garabandho v. Zemindar of Parlakimedi (1), and it is submitted that the writ can only be issued when the office which it is sought to protect is within the local limits. The Act of Settlement of 1781 curtailed the powers of the Supreme Court; it was obviously intended to cut down the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in relation to the specified persons, and the question is to what extent it has done so it is submitted that the view in Parlakimedis case (( 1943) L. R. 70 I.A. 129.) is right, and that (a) the Supreme Court could never have issued the writ in respect of an office outside its local limits, and (b), based on s. 10 of the Act of 1781, that the Supreme Court could not have issued the writ to a servant of the Crown who was not resident within the local limits. By s. 10 of the Act of 1781 its civil jurisdiction is limited to actions for wrongs and trespass. Further, if the jurisdiction to Law Rep. 74 Ind. App. 120 ( 1946- 1947) Moulvi Hamid Hassan Nomani V. Banwarilal Roy 80 issue the writ outside its local limits, assuming such jurisdiction existed under the charter in the case of servants of the Company, which is denied, was not taken away by s. 10 of the Act of 1781, it was not extended to servants of the Crown by s. 64 of the Government of India Act, 1858, or, if it was, the extension was limited to servants of the Crown appointed under that authority of the Act of 1858 and did not reach persons such as the appellant who was not appointed under that authority. On the second main question—whether there are any provisions in the letters patent granted under the Act of 1861 which restrict the jurisdiction of the High Court within narrower limits than that of the Supreme Court—it is submitted, assuming against the appellant that the right to issue the writ in such a case as this existed in the Supreme Court by reason of the personal position, that the High Courts jurisdiction has been restricted because the letters patent in fact abolished the old personal jurisdiction Letters Patent of 1865, cls.11, 12, 13, 22 and 23. Reliance is placed on cls. 11 and 12 to show that although they do not mention prerogative writs, the High Courts jurisdiction in respect of them is not the same as the Supreme Courts In re the Justices of the Supreme Court of Judicature at Bombay ((1829) 1 Knapp 1, 58.); the Parlakimedi case (2). The High Court cannot have the power to issue the prerogative writs in the exercise of any personal jurisdiction because it has no personal jurisdiction; so, if it was the law that the Supreme Court could issue a writ of quo warranto outside its local limits, it is no longer within the power of the High Court. If it be right that the letters patent no longer retain the personal element, all the jurisdiction depends on the locality in which it is exercised; it could not then be said that because the appellant can be regarded as a servant of the Crown jurisdiction is attracted by that fact. [Substantially the whole of the judgment in Parlakimedi’s case (( 1943) L. R. 70 I. A. 129.) was read.] The Bombay Justices case (1) makes very clear the distinction between local limits and the personal jurisdiction. In In re Corkhill (( 1895) I. L. R. 22 C. 717, 726.), Sale J., although he did not do it, said that there was authority to issue a writ of quo warranto. In re National Carbon Company, Incorporated (( 1934) I. L. R. 61 C. 450, 459.) is a case of prohibition, and is no authority against the appellant here. [Reference was also made to In re Nataraja Iyer (( 1912) I. L. R. 36 M. 72, 80.). The present case is really on all fours with, and is concluded by, Parlakimedi’s case (( 1943) L. R. 70 I. A. 129.). [Reference was also made to In re Nataraja Iyer (( 1912) I. L. R. 36 M. 72, 80.). The present case is really on all fours with, and is concluded by, Parlakimedi’s case (( 1943) L. R. 70 I. A. 129.). In that case the fact that the person to whom the writ would issue was a resident within the local limits was not enough to attract jurisdiction; the substantial matter was that the court to be controlled was outside those limits. So, here, the substantial matter is the protection of the office, which is outside the local limits, and the fortuitous circumstance, which is assumed for this argument, that the appellant is to be treated as though a servant of the Company, is not enough to attract jurisdiction. In line with that argument it should be noted that the writ of quo warranto will only issue when the office in question is held under the Crown or was created by the Crown or by statute, and until 1858 no office of that kind could have existed except in Calcutta itself. If the Act of 1858 did not enlarge the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, then this is not an office in respect of which it would ever have been possible to issue a writ of quo warranto. The High Court had no jurisdiction to issue the writ of quo warranto or process in the nature of that writ, outside the limits of its ordinary original jurisdiction. Khambatta K.C., L. M. Minty and B. Sen for the respondents. Parlakimedis case (( 1943) L. R. 70 I. A. 129.) covers the present case in favour of the respondents. It was held there that the writ of certiorari issued out of the Supreme Court to an inferior court within the local limits of the Supreme Courts jurisdiction. Here, the writ of quo warranto issues out of the Supreme Court to the person. It makes no difference that the subject of the writ is the claim to an office which is outside the local limits of the High Court. The writ of quo warranto issued to a person even where there was no office to protect, the office having fallen into disuse, and the court would then impose a fine against the person for the past usurpation Rex v. Speyer ([ 1916] 1 Law Rep. 74 Ind. App. The writ of quo warranto issued to a person even where there was no office to protect, the office having fallen into disuse, and the court would then impose a fine against the person for the past usurpation Rex v. Speyer ([ 1916] 1 Law Rep. 74 Ind. App. 120 ( 1946- 1947) Moulvi Hamid Hassan Nomani V. Banwarilal Roy 81 K. B. 595, 608-11.); Rex v. Aldermen of New Radnor ((1759) 2 Kenyon 498.). The writ of quo warranto would issue to an official of a court in the Mofussil if he was claiming an office of a public nature as long as such office was outside his judicial capacity - the Bombay Justices case ((1829) 1 Knapp 1, 58.). The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to issue a prerogative writ in the Mofussil, provided that it was addressed to a British subject or a specified servant, has been inherited by the High Court under s. 9 of the High Courts Act, 1861, and not by reason of any of the provisions of the Letters Patent. Section 9, on its proper construction, confers on the High Court all the powers of the Supreme Court save those which are taken away by the Letters Patent, and the Letters Patent of 1865 do not touch the question of the inherited powers. Prerogative writs did not issue out of the Supreme Court in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction In re Ameer Khan (( 1870) 6 Ben. L. R. 392, 436, 441-47.); The Queen v. Rajah Rajnarain Roy (( 1840) Fulton 372 (note (a)).); Navivahoo v. Narotamdas Candas (( 1882) I. L. R. 7B. 5, 12-13.). Surajmull Brijlal v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bihar and Orissa ((1788) 2 Term Rep. 484.) refers to a writ of mandamus. The High Court has powers, derived from its predecessor court, to issue and make absolute a writ of information of quo warranto in the circumstances of this case. L. M. Minty followed and referred to Rex v. Francis (( 1930) I. L. R. 10 Pat. 218, 222) and Matthen v. District Magistrate, Trivandrum (( 1939) L. R. 66 I. A. 222, 236-7). No reply was required. March 5. L. M. Minty followed and referred to Rex v. Francis (( 1930) I. L. R. 10 Pat. 218, 222) and Matthen v. District Magistrate, Trivandrum (( 1939) L. R. 66 I. A. 222, 236-7). No reply was required. March 5. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR JOHN BEAUMONT, who stated the facts set out above, and continued The appellant in his case raised two questions (1.) whether the High Court had jurisdiction to make the order of July 19, 1944, and if so (2.) whether there was any evidence before the High Court which justified the making of that order. In argument, however, the appellant, mindful of the fact that the period of supersession of the Howrah Municipality had expired, confined his case entirely to the first question, namely, that of jurisdiction. Their Lordships, therefore, find it unnecessary to express any opinion on the merits- of the dispute leading to the said appointment of the appellant, and they confine themselves in this judgment entirely to the question of the jurisdiction of the High Court to make the order under appeal. An information in the nature of quo warranto is. the modern procedure replacing the obsolete high prerogative writ of quo warranto. It is used to try the civil right to a public office. For the purpose of this appeal it is conceded by the appellant (1.) That, by virtue of the order of the Governor of Bengal, made on June 9, 1944, the appellant took possession of an office of a nature for which the information might be granted;. (2) that the municipality of Howrah is outside the territorial limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the said High Court, though within the Presidency of Bengal, and (3.) that the appellant resides outside the limits of such jurisdiction, but is a servant of Government, being a Deputy Magistrate. The leading judgment in the High Court was given by Das J., Ameer Ali A.C.J. concurring in a less detailed judgment. Das J. dealt fully with the origin and extent of the original civil jurisdiction of the High Court of Calcutta and its predecessor, the Supreme Court of Calcutta, in relation to the power to issue high prerogative writs. This subject had been discussed in many of its aspects in the recent decision of this Board in Parlakimedis case (( 1943) L. R. 70 I. A. 129.). This subject had been discussed in many of its aspects in the recent decision of this Board in Parlakimedis case (( 1943) L. R. 70 I. A. 129.). The conclusions of the High Court may be summarized as follows (i.) By virtue of the Regulating Act of 1773, the Charter of 1774, and the Act of Settlement of 1781, the Supreme Court of Calcutta possessed original civil jurisdiction of a territorial nature over all persons Law Rep. 74 Ind. App. 120 ( 1946- 1947) Moulvi Hamid Hassan Nomani V. Banwarilal Roy 82 within the town of Calcutta, and a personal jurisdiction over certain classes of persons, including British subjects and servants of the East India Company, outside such territorial limits, but within what may be roughly called the Presidency of Bengal, but such personal jurisdiction was confined by the Act of 1781 to actions for wrongs and trespass. (2.) The appellant in taking possession of the office and property of the Howrah municipality under an order which the High Court held to be invalid was guilty of an act of trespass. (3.) After the passing of the Government of India Act, 1858, servants of the East India Company must be taken to mean and include, for the purpose of determining jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, servants of Government. (4.) The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court included the right to grant an information in the nature of quo warranto against persons falling within its territorial or personal jurisdiction. (5.) Under the High Courts Act, 1861, and the amended Letters Patent of 1865, the High Court inherited from the Supreme Court on its abolition its original jurisdiction both territorial and personal over (inter alias) British subjects and servants of Government. (6.) That accordingly the rule should be made absolute against the appellant. Sir Walter Monckton, for the appellant, based his argument on two alternative grounds. On his first ground he contended that the Supreme Court would not have had power to grant the information in this case and the High Court could not therefore have inherited such power. In support of this argument he concentrated his attack on the High Courts judgment mainly on two points. On his first ground he contended that the Supreme Court would not have had power to grant the information in this case and the High Court could not therefore have inherited such power. In support of this argument he concentrated his attack on the High Courts judgment mainly on two points. First, he maintained that the foundation of jurisdiction to issue the writ of quo warranto, or information in the nature of quo warranto, rests on the location of the office to be protected, and not on the place of residence, or the personal status, of the person usurping such office, the writ or information being concerned with the office, and not with the person. Secondly, he contended that the appellant, though a servant of Government, could not be regarded as in the position of a servant of the East India Company in relation to the jurisdiction of the High Court. His second ground was that, assuming that the Supreme Court would have had power to grant the information in the present case, the High Court has no such power because it has not inherited the personal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over classes of persons residing outside the limits of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. This alternative argument was not touched on in the decision of this Board in Parlakimedis case (L. R. 70 I. A. 129.). It is clear that the appeal must succeed if the appellant is right on either of his two alternatives. As the Board has formed a clear opinion that the appellant is right on his second alternative it is unnecessary to discuss the first alternative. Their Lordships, therefore, assume for the purpose of this appeal that the Supreme Court before its abolition in 1861 would have had power to grant the information in this case. In making this assumption, however, their Lordships must not be taken as agreeing with all the views expressed in the judgment of the High Court on this part of the case. In particular, they would keep an open mind on the two matters on which Sir Walter Monckton concentrated his argument on his first ground of appeal as already noted. The question whether the High Court of Calcutta inherited the personal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in its original civil jurisdiction depends primarily on the construction of the High Courts Act, 1861, and the Letters Patent issued thereunder. The question whether the High Court of Calcutta inherited the personal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in its original civil jurisdiction depends primarily on the construction of the High Courts Act, 1861, and the Letters Patent issued thereunder. Before, however, discussing those enactments, it is necessary to notice that by the Government of India Act, 1858, the government of the territories then in the possession, or under the government, of the East India Company, and all powers in respect thereto, ceased to be vested in the company and became vested in the British Crown. Section 58 of the Act provided that all persons who at the time of the commencement of the Act held any offices, employments or commissions under the said company in India should, thenceforward, be deemed to hold such offices, employment and commissions under Her Majesty as if they had been appointed under the Act, and should be paid out of the revenue of India; and s. 64 provided, inter alia, that all Law Rep. 74 Ind. App. 120 ( 1946- 1947) Moulvi Hamid Hassan Nomani V. Banwarilal Roy 83 enactments applicable to the offices and services of the said company in India and to the appointments to office or admissions to service by the said court of directors, should, subject to the provisions of the Act, remain applicable to the offices and services continued and to the officers and servants appointed, or employed, in India, and to appointments to office or admissions to service under the authority of the Act. By the High Court Act, 1861, it was provided in s. 8, that on the establishment of a High Court in the Presidency of Fort William in Bengal, the Supreme Court should be abolished. By the High Court Act, 1861, it was provided in s. 8, that on the establishment of a High Court in the Presidency of Fort William in Bengal, the Supreme Court should be abolished. Section 9 is in the following terms " Each of the High Courts "to be established under this Act shall have and exercise all " such civil, criminal, admiralty, and vice-admiralty, testamentary, intestate, and matrimonial jurisdiction, original " and appellate, and all such powers and authority for, and in "relation to, the administration of justice in the Presidency " for which it is established, as Her Majesty may by such 94 Letters Patent as aforesaid grant and direct, subject, " however, to such directions and limitations as to the exercise " of original, civil and criminal jurisdiction beyond the limits " of the Presidency Towns as may be prescribed thereby; and, " save as by such Letters Patent may be otherwise directed, " and subject and without prejudice to the legislative powers " in relation to the matters aforesaid of the Governor-General 94 of India in Council, the High Court to be established in each " Presidency shall have and exercise all jurisdiction and every " power and authority whatsoever in any manner vested in 94 any of the courts in the same Presidency abolished under this 44 Act at the time of the abolition of such last-mentioned 44 courts.” Under that section the powers of the High Court were to be conferred by Letters Patent, and so far as those powers, or any legislative Acts of the Governor-General of India in Council did not otherwise provide, the High Court was to exercise all jurisdiction and every power and authority which had been vested in the Supreme Court; but the words in the middle of the section "subject, however, to such directions and " limitations as to the exercise of original, civil and criminal " jurisdiction beyond the limits of the Presidency Towns as " may be prescribed thereby " seem to indicate that the limits of the original jurisdiction of the court was to be a matter specially within the ambit of the Letters Patent, Letters Patent were granted under the Act establishing the High Court of Calcutta (under the name of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal) in the year 1862, and amended Letters Patent repealing the former Letters Patent, and re-establishing the said High Court were issued in the year 1865. Those Letters Patent, by virtue of s. 106 of the Government of India Act, 1915, and s.223 of the Government of India Act, 1935, are still in force. Clause 11 of the Letters Patent of 1865 is in these terms " And we do hereby ordain that the " said High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal " shall have and exercise ordinary original civil jurisdiction "within such local limits as may, from time to time, be " declared and prescribed by any law made by competent "legislative authority for India, and until some local limits " shall be so declared and prescribed, within the limits declared " and prescribed by the proclamation fixing the limits of " Calcutta issued by the Governor-General in Council on the " tenth day of September, in the year of Our Lord, one thousand " seven hundred and ninety-four, and the ordinary original " civil jurisdiction of the said High Court shall not extend " beyond the limits for the time being declared and prescribed " as the local limits of such jurisdiction." Clause 12 defines the extent of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Later clauses confer on the High Court appellate and criminal jurisdiction and special jurisdiction in insolvency and in admiralty, testamentary and matrimonial matters and over infants, idiots, and lunatics. Apart from the ordinary original civil and ordinary original criminal jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of the High Court extends beyond the town of Calcutta. It will be noticed that the concluding sentence of cl. 11 provides that the ordinary original civil Law Rep. 74 Ind. App. 120 ( 1946- 1947) Moulvi Hamid Hassan Nomani V. Banwarilal Roy 84 jurisdiction of the High Court shall not extend beyond the limits for the time being declared and prescribed as the local limits of such jurisdiction, which limits admittedly are confined to the town of Calcutta. High prerogative writs are not mentioned in the Letters Patent, and it may be noted in passing that the writ of mandamus has been superseded in India by ss. 45 to 50 of the Specific Relief Act, and the writ of habeas corpus has been superseded by s. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. High prerogative writs are not mentioned in the Letters Patent, and it may be noted in passing that the writ of mandamus has been superseded in India by ss. 45 to 50 of the Specific Relief Act, and the writ of habeas corpus has been superseded by s. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the power to issue the other high prerogative writs falls within the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court their issue outside the local limits of such jurisdiction is expressly barred by cl. u. It cannot be disputed that the issue of such writs is a matter of original jurisdiction. As to its being of a civil nature, it was held as long ago as 1788 in Rex v. Francis ((1788) 2 Term Rep. 484.) that information in the nature of quo warranto is in the nature of a civil proceeding so that a new trial may be ordered. That leaves only the adjective “ordinary," and it was contended, on behalf of the respondent, that the issue of a high prerogative writ could not be regarded as falling within the ordinary original civil jurisdiction; that it, would be an act of extraordinary jurisdiction. But the expression ordinary original civil jurisdiction " appears to be used in the Letters Patent in distinction to the extraordinary original civil jurisdiction conferred by cl. 13. The marginal note to that clause is " extraordinary original civil jurisdiction " and the clause empowers the High Court to remove and to try and determine as a court of extraordinary original jurisdiction any suit being, or falling within the jurisdiction of any court, whether within or without the Bengal Division of the Presidency of Fort William subject to its superintendence when the said High Court shall think proper to do so either on the agreement of the parties to that effect, or for purposes of justice. With cls.11 and 13 must be read cls. 19. and 20. Clause 19 provides that in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction the law or equity to be applied shall be the law or equity which would have been applied by the said High Court to such case if those Letters Patent had not issued. By cl. With cls.11 and 13 must be read cls. 19. and 20. Clause 19 provides that in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction the law or equity to be applied shall be the law or equity which would have been applied by the said High Court to such case if those Letters Patent had not issued. By cl. 20, the marginal note to which is "In the exercise of extraordinary original civil " jurisdiction," it is enacted that with respect to the law or equity and the rule of good conscience to be applied in each case coming before the said High Court of Judicature in Fort William in Bengal in the exercise of its extraordinary original civil jurisdiction, such law or equity and the rule of good conscience shall be the law or equity and the rule of good conscience which would have been applied to such case by any local court having jurisdiction therein. It is plain that in a matter coming before the court on a high prerogative writ there could be no local court having jurisdiction. Any such proceedings clearly do not come within the expression extraordinary original civil jurisdiction which is only used in cls.13 and 20. In their Lordships opinion any original civil jurisdiction possessed by the High Court and not in express terms conferred by the Letters Patent or later enactments falls within the description of ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Their Lordships feel no doubt on the construction of s. 9 of the High Courts Act, 1861, and the Letters Patent oi 1865, that the original civil jurisdiction which the Supreme Court of Calcutta possessed over certain classes of persons outside the territorial limits of that jurisdiction has not been inherited by the High Court, that the power to grant an information in the nature of quo warranto arises in the exercise of "the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court, that such jurisdiction is confined to the town of Calcutta and that, as the appellant does not reside, and the office which he is alleged to have usurped is not situate, within those limits, the court had no power to grant the information in this case. That this restriction on the power which the High Court inherited from the Supreme Court was deliberate is suggested by the omission of the legislature to afford any guidance as to the sense in which expressions, appropriate to that jurisdiction in former times, were to be understood in the altered conditions introduced, in 1858. After the government of British India was assumed by the British Crown it is clear that the meaning to be attached in the future to such expressions as " British subject " and "servants of the company " urgently required clarification if those expressions were to remain in use. Before that date Indians were not British subjects, and a jurisdiction confined to Law Rep. 74 Ind. App. 120 ( 1946- 1947) Moulvi Hamid Hassan Nomani V. Banwarilal Roy 85 British subjects was, in effect, one confined to British nationals. After 1858 all inhabitants of British India became British subjects, and if the old distinction was to continue it would have to be between British subjects who were British nationals and British subjects who were Indian nationals. Again, servants 61 the company ceased to exist after 1858, and whether s. 64 of the Government of India Act, 1858, had the effect, as the High Court thought, of bringing all government servants, however appointed, within the description of servants of the company for the purpose of determining jurisdiction of the High Court would be a question open to debate. The Lordships think that the rational explanation of the omission by the legislature to define terms plainly calling for definition is that in the view of the legislature such terms were no longer to be in force. For these reasons their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal be allowed and that the order of the High Court of Calcutta dated July 19, 1944, be set aside. In accordance with the arrangement made at the hearing of the appeal the appellant must pay the respondents costs of this appeal and there will be no alteration of the orders of the lower court as to costs.