JUDGMENT Mathur, J. - This is an application in revision by one Mr. Vishnu Sahai who was appointed by the learned District Judge of Allahabad to audit the accounts of a ward under the Guardians and Wards Act. The accounts related to the period between 22nd February 1942 and 31st March 1944. After auditing the accounts the applicant presented an application for the payment of his charges and claimed Rs. 3950-120 The guardian of the ward objected to this amount as being excessive and the learned District Judge by an order dated 15th May 1945 fixed the amount at Rs. 290. It is against this order that the present revision has been filed. 2. It was contended by the opposite party that as the order of the District Judge was an administrative one no revision lay under S. 115, Civil P.C. It was further contended that even if S. 115, Civil P.C., applied there was no 'case decided' within the meaning of that section nor was there any material irregularity or illegality in the exercise of his jurisdiction by the District Judge. 3. Section 34A, Guardians and Wards Act, provides for the appointment of an auditor to audit the accounts and further provides that the Court may direct the remuneration for the work to be paid out of the income of the property. Section 50 of the same Act confers powers upon the High Court to make rules as to the audit of accounts under s. 34A, the class of persons to be appointed to audit accounts and the scale of remuneration to be granted to them. It was in pursuance of this section that the High Court framed rules which are contained in chap. 20 of the General Rules (Civil). Rule 23A, cl. (3) as it stood when the learned District Judge passed his order was : The remuneration of the person so appointed to audit the aforesaid accounts shall be 2 per cent, upto the gross income of RS. 2,000 and 1 per cent, above that amount. The whole controversy ranges round the words "gross income". The contention on behalf of the applicant was that "gross income" means the just gains of all kinds and it included the receipts of all kinds. On the other hand, it was contended by the opposite party that it only meant the income that remained after paying the expenditure of every kind. The contention on behalf of the applicant was that "gross income" means the just gains of all kinds and it included the receipts of all kinds. On the other hand, it was contended by the opposite party that it only meant the income that remained after paying the expenditure of every kind. The learned District Judge distinguished the words "gross income" from "gross profits", and came to the conclusion that the gross income during the relevant period amounted to Rs. 26,639-3-9 and on that income assessed a sum of Rs. 290 as payable to the auditor. 4. The learned counsel for the applicant has referred to a number of decisions in order to show that orders like these have always been treated as judicial orders. I do not think it possible on the strength of these rulings to hold that the order under revision is a judicial order. 5. On a perusal of the record relating to the amendment of R. 23A (3), General Rules (Civil), Vol. I in the year 1945 I find that the applicant made an application to the District Judge on 28th July 1945 requesting him to refer the matter to the High Court for interpretation of the said rule, and the learned District Judge forwarded the application with a covering letter dated 10th August 1945 making a reference to this Court on the administrative side. 6. This Court amended the rule and sent a copy of the notification to the District Judge in reply to his letter indicating thereby that "gross income" meant "gross receipts". From this it becomes clear that the learned District Judge put an erroneous construction on R. 23A (3) of the General Rules (Civil). In the peculiar circumstances of the case I do not propose to be technical and to hold that the order was not a case decided and that it did not come within the mischief of S. 115, Civil P.C. Under the powers of supervision vested in the Court I propose that the case be sent back to the District Judge for reconsideration of his order dated 15th May 1945, in the light of the amendment of the rule made by this Court. 7. To this extent I would allow the revision. Costs to abide the result. Sinha J. 8. 7. To this extent I would allow the revision. Costs to abide the result. Sinha J. 8. I agree with my learned brother that this application in revision should be dismissed, but, as I do not agree with him in all his legal conclusions, I propose to add a few remarks of my own, 9. The facts have been set forth in sufficient detail by my learned brother and it is not necessary to recapitulate them. 10. A preliminary objection has been taken to the hearing of this application, on the ground that the order of the learned District Judge is not a judicial order, it does not amount to a 'case decided' and, in any case, the Court below did not act with any illegality or material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction, within the meaning of cl. (c) of S. 115, Civil P. C, 11. The learned counsel for the applicant con-tends that it is a judicial order and relies upon Baburao Prahlad Badve Vs. Hariharrao Kashinathrao Khasgiwale, AIR 1939 Bom 279 It is argued, on the strength of this case, that, if the learned Judge passed the order as a Court, and, not as a persona designata, the order must be treated as a judicial order. 12. It is not necessary to say anything about this authority or pursue this line of argument, inasmuch as it is possible to conceive of orders passed by a Court, as distinguished from the individual, which are not judicial orders. 13. The learned counsel for the opposite party, however, contends that the true test of a judicial order is -- does it determine the rights or interest of the contending parties ? If it does, it is a judicial order, otherwise not. In the case before us, the minor is the only party concerned. There is none to compete his title; not certainly the auditor. He is appointed only to assist in the administration of the minor's estate. There his duty ends. 14. In my opinion, an answer to this argument is furnished by the Guardians and Wards Act itself and it can also be answered by certain analogies. 15. Section 47, Guardians and Wards Act, mentions the orders which are appealable. He is appointed only to assist in the administration of the minor's estate. There his duty ends. 14. In my opinion, an answer to this argument is furnished by the Guardians and Wards Act itself and it can also be answered by certain analogies. 15. Section 47, Guardians and Wards Act, mentions the orders which are appealable. If the test suggested by the learned counsel for the opposite party is the true test, several, if not most, of the orders mentioned in that section should be unappealable. The point is dearly brought out by cl. (i). Clauses (a) to (h) and (j) may have a direct or remote bearing upon the minor or the ward, but cl. (i) refers inter alia to "settling a matter in difference between joint guardians." Such a dispute is hardly of any interest to the minor and yet the order has been made appealable. 16. The analogy furnished by a receiver or a commissioner is also of great assistance. A receiver is an officer of the Court. His appointment does not determine or affect the rights of the contending parties and yet an order appointing or refusing to appoint a Receiver has been made appealable under O. 40, R. 1, Civil P.C. 17. I, therefore, feel it difficult to say that the| order in question is not a judicial order. 18. The question whether the order amounts to a 'case decided' is also not free from difficulty. We are aware of the parallel currents of authority, at least in this Court. In some cases it has been held that, if the chapter is finally closed, at least for the time being, the order will amount to a 'case decided' in others, the view has been expressed that, even though the chapter may, for the time being, finally close, nevertheless if the suit itself continues, the order does not amount to a 'case decided'. In the case before as this difficulty does not exist. 19. The learned counsel for the applicant has, however, relied upon AIR 1942 64 (Nagpur) and Kr. Bhagwant Singh Vs. Bhao Singh and Another, AIR 1932 All 337 in support of his contention that the order amounts to a 'case decided' and that this Court has jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the Court below. 20. In Kr. Bhagwant Singh Vs. Bhagwant Singh Vs. Bhao Singh and Another, AIR 1932 All 337 in support of his contention that the order amounts to a 'case decided' and that this Court has jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the Court below. 20. In Kr. Bhagwant Singh Vs. Bhao Singh and Another, AIR 1932 All 337 this Court disagreed with the Court below in its interpretation of R. 1 of Chap. 21, General Rules (civil), framed by this Court for subordinate Courts and held that a revision lay. There is no discussion of the law. The learned Judges assumed that they had jurisdiction. Indeed, they did something more. They were prepared to treat the application for amendment, presented before the District Judge, as one presented to this Court, when it was pointed out to them that no application could be made to him, because his order had merged in an order passed by this Court. 21. The same criticism holds good in AIR 1942 64 (Nagpur) The learned Judges assumed jurisdiction find so the matter ended. 22. Mina Mal v. Hardhian Singh, 48 P.R. 1901, is the only case where the point appears to have received some consideration. But a close examination of even this case shows that the point did not emerge for consideration so pointedly as it does in the case before us. It was contended on behalf of the opposite party in that case that the revisional section, S. 622, Civil P.C., of 1882, had no application in view of S. 6, Punjab Courts Act, (Act NO. 25 of 1899). The learned Judge held that the effect of S. 6 of that Act was: To repeal and re-enact with modifications S. 622, Civil P.C. Once he Game to the conclusion that S. 622 still held the field, he assumed jurisdiction and interfered with the order of the Court below. There is nothing in the judgment to show that, after the assumption of such jurisdiction, he ever addressed himself to the question whether a case for interference had been made out within the meaning of that section. 23. The learned counsel for the applicant seeks to draw a distinction between a mistake made in the application of the law of procedure and one made in applying the substantive law. 23. The learned counsel for the applicant seeks to draw a distinction between a mistake made in the application of the law of procedure and one made in applying the substantive law. The learned counsel for the opposite party has on the strength of Nivath Singh v. Bhikki Singh, 7 ALL 649 (FB) contended that the mistake attributed to the Court below was not a mistake, of procedure and, at all events, was not one which amounts to an irregularity or illegality in the exercise of jurisdiction. 24. We do not think it is possible to base our decision on this case. It was not a case of a revision but of a second appeal. Section 100 in its scope and application differs widely from S. 116, Civil P.C. 25. The expression 'case' has never been successfully defined. As observed by Lindsay J. in Ram Sarup Vs. Gaya Prasad It would be unprofitable to discuss the various rulings concerning the meaning of the word 'case' as used in S. 115. No definition of the word is to be found in the CPC and probably no exhaustive definition of the word could be given. (The Italics are mine.) 26. With the above I respectfully agree and I feel that it is otiose on my part to attempt a definition. I expressed the same view in K.B. Mohammad Maqsood Ali Khan Vs. B. Hoshiar Singh and Others, AIR 1945 All 377 It will thus appear that the term is so elastic that their Lordships felt themselves unable either to find a definition or to attempt one themselves. 27. In the case mentioned above at p. 190 I also observed : The tendency of this Court has not been to narrow the scope of S. 115, Civil P.C., but to invoke its aid to meet the ends of justice. The case of the British India Corporation Ltd. Vs. Shanti Narain, AIR 1935 All 310 is perhaps an extreme case. It was doubtful if the order of the District Judge of Cawnpore, which was sought to be revised, was made in a judicial capacity at all--at least this was the contention. The case of the British India Corporation Ltd. Vs. Shanti Narain, AIR 1935 All 310 is perhaps an extreme case. It was doubtful if the order of the District Judge of Cawnpore, which was sought to be revised, was made in a judicial capacity at all--at least this was the contention. Their Lordships held that: All that is necessary to bring into play the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under S. 115, Civil P.C., is that (i) there be a case decided, (ii) the decision be of a Court subordinate to this Court, and (iii) the decision be not appealable. If these conditions are satisfied this Court has undoubtedly the revisional jurisdiction conferred on it by S. 115, Civil P.C., and is vested with the discretion to exercise that jurisdiction provided the case falls within Cl, (a) or (b) or (c) of S. 115, Civil P.C. 28. We have, therefore, to see whether these conditions have been fulfilled. The chapter is closed before the learned Judge, He is subordinate to this Court. The order is not appealable. Unless there is something in the Act either expressly or impliedly ousting its jurisdiction, this Court has a right to revise the order of the learned District Judge, We also feel that to hold that we have no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the learned Judge is to deprive us of the power, which the Legislature has allowed us to redress an obvious wrong in certain cases. It is possible that an auditor or a receiver or a commissioner is entitled to a very small sum and the Court has mistakenly allowed a sum as his fee, out of all proportions to his work. Similarly, it is possible that he has sanctioned a very small amount, here again, out of all proportions to the quantity and quality of the work. It would amount to a negation of justice to hold that this Court has no right to correct an obvious wrong. 29. I am, therefore, of opinion that this application in revision be allowed. 30. We allow the application in revision, set aside the order of the Court below and send the case back to that Court for a decision in the light of the judgment of Mathur J. Costs will abide the result.