JUDGMENT G.N. Das, J. - These appeals are on behalf of Defendants in suits in ejectment. One Anath Bandhu Guha was the owner of the lands in dispute in these cases. On May 19, 1932, Anath let out the lands for a term of ten years, namely, 1339 to 1348 B.S. The Plaintiff-Respondents have since acquired the interest of Anath in the disputed lands. On the expiry of the term, the Plaintiff Respondents instituted, on June 10, 1942, the present suits for recovery of possession. 2. The material defences in these suits were that, on a proper construction of the leases, the tenants had a right of renewal and the Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession on the expiry of the term of the leases and that there was oral agreement contemporaneous with the leases, allowing the Defendants a right of renewal. 3. These defences were over-ruled by the Courts below and the Plaintiffs' suits have been decreed. The Defendants are the Appellants in these cases. 4. Mr. Das appearing on behalf of the Appellants has contended first that, on a proper construction of the leases, it must be held that there was a right of renewal and the Defendants being ready and willing to exercise the option of renewal, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to possession. In the second place, Mr. Das contends that Assam Act X of 1947 (the Sylhet Non-Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act, 1947), which came into force on May 21, 1947, during the pendency of these appeals, gives the Defendants protection against eviction. 5. As regards the first point, I am clearly of opinion that, on a proper construction of the leases, no right of renewal was conferred on the leases. The lease expressly stated that, on the expiry of the term, the lessees would be regarded as trespassers and liable to pay damage for use and occupation. There is no option given to the lessees to compel the landlords to grant a renewal of the lease. The only provision in the lease, on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Das on behalf of the Appellants, is to the effect that, in case the landlords wish to let out the lands, the tenants would have the right of taking the renewed lease. In my opinion, this provision cannot be construed as conferring on the lessees a right of renewal of the lease. Das on behalf of the Appellants, is to the effect that, in case the landlords wish to let out the lands, the tenants would have the right of taking the renewed lease. In my opinion, this provision cannot be construed as conferring on the lessees a right of renewal of the lease. The first, contention, therefore, fails. 6. The second contention raises a question of the applicability or otherwise of Assam Act X of 1947. Section 3(h) of the Act defines a tenant as follows: " Tenant " means a person who holds land under another person and who is, but for a special contract, liable to pay rent for that land to the latter and includes a person who derives his title from a tenant and a person who continues in possession of any land after termination of his tenancy in respect of that land. 7. Section 3(e) defines an occupancy tenant-- as a tenant who has acquired a permanent, heritable and transferable right of use and occupation in his holding under the provisions of Section 4 of this Act. 8. Section 4 runs as follows: (1) Notwithstanding any contract to the contrary, every person who has possessed any land as a tenant continuously for a period of twelve years, either wholly before, or wholly after, or partly before and partly after, the commencement of this Act, shall be deemed to have acquired at the expiration of that period, a permanent, heritable and transferable right of use and occupation in that land subject to the payment of rent, if any, to his landlord. (2) In computing the period of twelve years, a tenant shall be entitled to tack to the length of his possession any periods during which his predecessors-in-interest ware in possession of the land, provided that there is no break between the periods to be tacked. (3) For the purpose of this section, a person will be deemed to have been in possession of any land during any particular period, if he was legally entitled to possess such land physically, although he may not have actually possessed the same physically during such period. 9. Section 5 reads as follows: A person who has acquired the status of an occupancy tenant under the provision of Section 4 shall not be ejected from his holding except in accordance with the provisions of this Act. 10. 9. Section 5 reads as follows: A person who has acquired the status of an occupancy tenant under the provision of Section 4 shall not be ejected from his holding except in accordance with the provisions of this Act. 10. If the Act applies, the tenant-Defendants who came into possession of the disputed lands in May, 1932, completed continuous possession for twelve years in May, 1944 and would be deemed to have acquired a right of occupancy in the lands and as such would be protected from eviction. 11. The question, however, remains whether the Act would have retrospective operation and would apply to the present appeals which were filed on July 18, 1043. Section 14 is in the following terms: The provisions of this Act shall have effect in respect of all suits or proceedings including proceedings in execution, for ejectment of a person, who would under the provisions of this Act be an occupancy tenant, which are pending at the date of commencement of this Act. 12. The main provision on which Mr. Das relies is Section 14 of the Act. He contends that the words "suits or proceedings, including "proceedings in execution for ejectment" include an appeal. The Assam General Clauses Act (Assam 11 of 1915) does not define the words "suits or proceedings." In their literal sense, the words "suits or proceedings" are inept to an appeal by a tenant in a suit for ejectment, the purpose of such an appeal being to prevent ejectment. 13. We have to consider whether the words "suits or proceedings "including proceedings in execution for ejectment" should be construed according to the intent and not according to the words used. The extent to which a literal interpretation may be subordinated to a beneficial construction has been considered in a large number of cases. It must be borne in mind that a statute consists of two parts the letter and the sense: It is not the words of the law but the internal sense of it that makes the law. The law in all systems of Jurisprudence consists of two parts,--namely, of body and soul ; the letter of the law is the body of the law and the sense and reason of the law is the soul of the law. 14. The law in all systems of Jurisprudence consists of two parts,--namely, of body and soul ; the letter of the law is the body of the law and the sense and reason of the law is the soul of the law. 14. The golden rule for construing all written engagements was thus clearly and accurately stated by Lord Wensleydale in Grey v. Pearson (1857) 6 H.L.C. 61 (106) : 10 E.R. 1216 (1235): I have been long and deeply impressed with the wisdom of the rule, now, I believe, universally adopted,--at least in the Courts of law in Westminister Hall,--that in construing wills and indeed statutes and all written engagements, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance, or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified so as to avoid an absurdity and inconsistency, but no further. 15. In the case of Ram Chandra Marwari v. Keshobati Kumari (1905) 1 C.L.J. 182, Pargiter J. (whose decision was affirmed by Maclean C.J.) at p. 192, quoted with approval the following extract from Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Ch. IX, Section 1: Where the language of a statute in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience, or absurdity, hardship, or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of it. 16. In the present cases the dominant and obvious object of the Assam Act was to protect the tenants, who had been in continuous possession for a term of twelve years or more, from being evicted. 17. Section 14 expressly protects tenants against whom suits or proceedings in execution are pending. Assuming that Section 14 is held not to apply to appeals, an appellate decree passed, in a case where possession is still with the tenant, would be rendered nugatory by an objection taken in execution if the tenant had possessed for twelve years or more during the pendency of the appeal. Assuming that Section 14 is held not to apply to appeals, an appellate decree passed, in a case where possession is still with the tenant, would be rendered nugatory by an objection taken in execution if the tenant had possessed for twelve years or more during the pendency of the appeal. The only exceptional case which may be outside the section is the case where, pending an appeal and before the coming into operation of the Act, a tenant who had completed twelve years continuous occupation is ejected in execution of the decree of the trial Court. It is manifestly absurd and unjust to hold that the legislature did not intend to protect such a tenant. The word "proceeding" in the Assam Act, in my opinion, is wide enough to include an appeal. The Sylhet Tenancy Act (Assam XI of 1936) does not contemplate any proceeding in ejectment other than a suit. Proceeding in execution is expressly mentioned in Section 14 of the Act. The word "proceeding" which is used in that section must necessarily refer to some proceeding other than a suit or a proceeding in execution. In my view, the word "proceeding" may very well be construed as including an appeal either by the tenant or by the landlord. It would be anomalous to hold that the word "proceeding" includes only a landlord's appeal and not a tenant's appeal. Such an appeal against a decree in a suit for ejectment involves the question of the liability of the tenant to be evicted and is a proceeding for ejectment. 18. Mr. Bose, appearing for the Respondents, submitted that the words "every suit and proceeding in any Court for ejectment" used in the Non-Agricultural Tenancy (Temporary) Provisions Act (Ben. IX of 1940) has been construed by this Court not to include an appeal and he argued that similar words used in the Assam Act should be given similar interpretation. He referred to the case of Johur Mia v. Abdul Gaffur (1941) 45 C.W.N. 603; that of Pran Krishna Mukherji v. Jnanada Ray ILR (1941) 2 Cal. 273; that of Bangshidhar Mahesri v. Prohlad Chandra Agarwala (1944) ILR 1 Cal. He referred to the case of Johur Mia v. Abdul Gaffur (1941) 45 C.W.N. 603; that of Pran Krishna Mukherji v. Jnanada Ray ILR (1941) 2 Cal. 273; that of Bangshidhar Mahesri v. Prohlad Chandra Agarwala (1944) ILR 1 Cal. 221; that of Ramcharit Bhakat v. Tetari Kumari Kuor (1942) AIR (Cal.) 136; that of Abdul Hamid Bepari v. Nripendra Kumar Roy (1945) 49 C.W.N. 681 and that of Kaliprosad Saha v. Naihati Jute Mills Company Ltd. (1945) 50 C.W.N. 50, 53. 19. The question, however, remains whether it is permissible to refer to decisions which were pronounced under the Bengal Act IX of 1940 to construe an Act of the Assam Legislature. It is well settled that one is permitted to construe the words of one statute by a reference to decisions had under another statute, provided the two statutes are in pari materia. Statutes are in pari materia which relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things. 20. Per Hosmar J. in United Society v. Eagle Bank (1829) 7 Conn. 457, 470. 21. The rule laid down by twelve Judges in Palmer's case (1784) 1 Leach 352 : 168 E.R. 279 is: Statutes in pari materia are to be takes together as forming one system and as interpreting and enforcing each other. 22. In the present case, the Assam Act emanated from a different legislative body and cannot be said to form one system with the Bengal Act, even though the two Acts may relate to the same thing, namely, the protection against eviction of tenants. This view receives support from the decision in the case of Grand Trunk Railway Company of Canada v. Washington (1899) A.C. 275, 280: As these are enactments emanating from a different legislative body from that which has passed the statute to be interpreted and cannot be said to be in pari materia with that, their Lordships are unable to see that they ought to have any influence upon the question to be decided arising exclusively upon the Dominion Act and relating only to dominion railways. 23. In my opinion, we should not be blinded from looking at the real spirit of the Assam Act by a literal interpretation put upon similar words in a Bengal Act. 24. 23. In my opinion, we should not be blinded from looking at the real spirit of the Assam Act by a literal interpretation put upon similar words in a Bengal Act. 24. Section 3(h), Section 4 and Section 5 of the Assam Act, are intended to quiet titles and to prevent eviction of tenant in continuous occupation for period of twelve years or more. The legislature did not think it fit to discriminate against tenants whose rights were under challenge in a litigation. The substantive rights of the landlords and their accrued causes of action were to be abrogated; respect for pending litigation over long possession cannot be assumed. Section 14 is loosely worded and should be construed to affect pending suits, appeals, proceedings in execution act. 25. It may be pointed out that, in the case of Jagadish Jha v. Aman Khan (1940) F.C.R. 7, it Was held that Section 7 of the Bihar Money-lenders (Regulation of Transactions) Act (VII of 1939), being made applicable in terms to suits instituted before the commencement of the Act, benefit of the section could be claimed for the first time in a Second Appeal during the pendency of which the Act was passed. 26. The result of the above discussion leads me to hold that the Assam Act applies to the facts of the present cases and confers on the Defendants in the different suits immunity against eviction at the instance of the landlords, subject, however, to the payment of rent which has accrued due since expiry of the leases. 27. The result, therefore, is that the judgments and decrees of the Courts below are set aside and these cases are remitted to the trial Court, with a direction that the trial Court would fix a date within which the tenants-Defendants should be called upon to deposit in Court to the credit of the Plaintiff-Respondents the rents which accrued due since the expiry of the lease down to the date to be fixed by the trial Court and on the deposit being made, to pass decrees dismissing the Plaintiffs' suits for ejectment. If, however, such deposits are not made within the time to be fixed by the Courts, the suits shall stand decreed. 28. In the circumstances of these cases, I direct that the parties will bear their costs in all Courts. 29. If, however, such deposits are not made within the time to be fixed by the Courts, the suits shall stand decreed. 28. In the circumstances of these cases, I direct that the parties will bear their costs in all Courts. 29. Leave to appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is refused.