JUDGMENT Mukherjea, J. - This Rule is directed against an order of the Munsif, Third Court, Burdwan, dismissing the Petitioner's application for a fresh writ of delivery of possession, in connection with the enforcement of an award u/s 37A(8) of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. 2. The material facts are not in controversy and may be shortly stated as follows. On July 27, 1918, the father of the Petitioner, whose name was Krishna Chandra, Basu, borrowed a sum of Rs. 775 from the opposite party No. 1 on mortgage of three items of property, one of which is a residential house situated in the town of Kalna within the District of Burdwan. In 1934, when Krishna Chandra Basu was dead, opposite party No. 1 instituted a suit for enforcement of the mortgage and the present Petitioner, who was then a minor, was represented in that suit by his brother-in-law as guardian. The suit was not contested and culminated in an ex parte decree for Rs. 1,849 and odd on December 21, 1934. In execution of the decree, the mortgaged properties were sold and purchased by the mortgagee decree-holder for a sum of Rs. 200 only. Possession was delivered to the auction-purchaser on April 24, 1936. Some time after that, one Manik Chandra Nandi, who was landlord in respect of lot No. 1 (house property at Kalna), instituted a suit for recovery of the sum of Rs. 11 and odd alleged to be due as rent in respect of the said property and the suit was brought against the Petitioner alone without making opposite party No. 1 the auction-purchaser a party Defendant. An ex parte decree was passed in that suit on August 25, 1936, and in execution of that decree, the two-storied house at Kalna was sold and purchased by opposite party No. 2, son of opposite party No. 1, for a sum of Rs. 23 and odd only. The rent-sale was confirmed on May 27, 1939. It is admitted that the auction-purchaser never took delivery of possession through Court. 3. On December 9, 1942, the present Petitioner applied to the Kalna Special Debt Settlement Board u/s 37A of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act for restoration of possession of all the three items of property which were sold in execution of the mortgage-decree and purchased by opposite party No. 1. 3. On December 9, 1942, the present Petitioner applied to the Kalna Special Debt Settlement Board u/s 37A of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act for restoration of possession of all the three items of property which were sold in execution of the mortgage-decree and purchased by opposite party No. 1. Opposite party No. 2, Debabrata Banerji, was not made a party to the proceeding, but he, it seems, appeared before the Board and adduced evidence in support of his father's case that he and not his father was in possession of property No. 1 all along, since the rent-sale purchase. The Debt Settlement Board held, on evidence, that all the three items of property were in possession of opposite party No. 1 and opposite party No. 2 was never in possession of any one of them. The Board further held that opposite party No. 2 was a mere benamdar of his father, the opposite party No. 1 Against this decision there were appeals taken to the Appellate Officer both by opposite Party No. 1 as well as by opposite party No. 2 and the Appellate Officer affirmed the decision of the Debt Settlement Board. There were revision petitions filed before the District Judge u/s 40A of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act and the learned District Judge affirmed the order of the Debt Settlement Board subject to this that the finding that opposite party No. 2 was benamdar of his father was held to be outside the competency of the Debt Settle ment Board to decide. 4. Thereafter, the case went back to the Debt Settlement Board and the Board, on June 27, 1945, made its award under the provision of Section 37A of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. The Petitioner was directed to be restored to possession of all the three items of property and the debt was determined at Rs. 1,645 and odd. The Petitioner then started proceeding for enforcement of the award in the manner contemplated by Section 37A(8) of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act and on December 16, 1945, an application was made before the Munsif, Third Court, Burdwan, for delivery of possession of all the three items of mortgaged property. On December 20, 1945, the Munsif made an order setting aside the mortgage sale and directed writ of possession to issue with regard to the three items of property. On December 20, 1945, the Munsif made an order setting aside the mortgage sale and directed writ of possession to issue with regard to the three items of property. On January 6, 1946, opposite party No. 2 resisted delivery of possession by the serving peon in respect of the dwelling house at Kalna, which was lot No. 1 in the schedule and the peon could not effectively deliver possession with regard to this property, because of the resistance of opposite party No. 2. With regard to the other items of property delivery of possession was found to have been given. On January 22, 1940, the Court recorded an order to the effect that possession was delivered properly by the serving peon, of properties Nos. 2 and 3 and with regard to property No. 1, the process could not be served on account of the resistance of opposite party No. 2. 5. On February 5, 1946, the Petitioner filed an application for fresh delivery of possession by evicting opposite party No. 2 and this application was made not before the Third Munsif of Burdwan, but before the Second Munsif,--the Petitioner or his legal advisers being under the impression that the Third Munsif had no pecuniary jurisdiction over the subject matter of dispute. On May 2, 1946, the Second Munsif held that the application should have been made before the Third Munsif and the records were, accordingly, returned to Third Munsif and on May 6, 1946, the application for possession was filed in that Court as continuation of the previous application. It was alleged in this petition that opposite party No. 2 was obstructing delivery of possession on behalf of his father whose benamdar he was and consequently, the Court was invited to direct the nazir to deliver possession of the property with police help, if necessary. Opposite party No. 1 preferred objection to this petition u/s 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The matter was heard by the learned Munsif and he came to the conclusion that, so far as opposite party No. 1 was concerned, he had no grievance whatsoever and his objection u/s 47 of the CPC was altogether misconceived and untenable. Opposite party No. 1 preferred objection to this petition u/s 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The matter was heard by the learned Munsif and he came to the conclusion that, so far as opposite party No. 1 was concerned, he had no grievance whatsoever and his objection u/s 47 of the CPC was altogether misconceived and untenable. The Munsif, however, held that as there was obstruction by opposite party No. 2, who was not a party to the award, the proper remedy of the Petitioner was to make an application for enquiry under Order XXI, Rule 97 of the CPC and that application, should have been filed within thirty days from the date when resistance was offered by opposite party No. 2. In view of the case, this application was dismissed. It is against this order that the present Rule has been obtained. The first thing for our consideration is as to what is the procedure to be followed if there is obstruction to the delivery of possession directed u/s 37A(8) of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. The section is undoubtedly very generally worded and empowers a civil Court before whom the award is filed to restore possession of the property of the judgment-debtor, or any other person who was in possession of that property as under-raiyat under him at the date when delivery of possession was taken by the decree-holder. It further provides that any person other than an under-raiyat of the judgment-debtor could be evicted from the property for the purpose of giving possession to the debtor. If this section is to be construed literally and if it is taken to imply that any person other than an under-raiyat of the debtor could be evicted from the land in exercise of these powers u/s 37A(8) of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, very serious consequences will ensue and we are unable to hold that it was the intention of the legislature that all persons who might not be parties to the award at all could be turned out of the land without giving them an opportunity to say what they had to say in support of their claim to retain possession of the property. To hold that their remedy would be by way of a title suit would lead, we think, to worse injustice. To hold that their remedy would be by way of a title suit would lead, we think, to worse injustice. In our opinion, therefore, in circumstances like these, the provisions of Order XXI, Rules 97 to 100 of the CPC should be followed. The Court below was, therefore, quite right in holding that it was open to the Petitioner, when he was resisted in taking' possession of lot. No. 1 by opposite party No. 2, to make a proper application under Order XXI, Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We think, however, that having regard to the circumstances of this case, the application that was actually filed before the Munsif on May 6, 1946, might itself be treated as an application under Order XXI, Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The allegations contained in the petition are perfectly clear and complain of resistance being offered to the delivery of possession by opposite party No. 2, who prima facie is not bound by the award, though he did attempt to prove his possession before the Debt Settlement Board and failed in that attempt. The question of limitation, we think, does not realty stand in the way of the Petitioner because this application might be treated as a continuation of the earlier one filed before the Second Munsif, which was perfectly in time. 6. The result, therefore, is that we make this Rule absolute. We set aside the judgment of the Munsif and send the case back and direct him to treat the application filed by the Petitioner on February 5, 1946, as a complaint against resistance to possession made by opposite party No. 2 in the course of delivery of possession of lot No. 1 in the schedule. The Court will treat the application to be in time and will make enquiry as directed by Order XXI, Rule 98 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the Court finds on evidence that resistance by opposite party No. 2 has been offered, either at the instance of or on behalf of his father, the opposite party No. 1, it will direct the Petitioner to be restored to possession of lot No. 1 property. If the Court finds on evidence that resistance by opposite party No. 2 has been offered, either at the instance of or on behalf of his father, the opposite party No. 1, it will direct the Petitioner to be restored to possession of lot No. 1 property. If, on the other hand, it finds that the resistance has been offered in his own right and that he was in possession of the property at the time when delivery of possession was attempted to be taken, the Petitioner will have his remedy by a title suit as laid down in Order XXI, r. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It goes without saying that in following the procedure laid down in Order XXI, Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court will summon opposite party No. 2 to appear and say what he has got to say. 7. We make no order as to costs in this Court. Subsequent costs will abide the result. Ormond, J. 8. I agree