JUDGMENT Mitter, J. - One purna Chandra santra died on October 2, 1939. He left him surviving a brother of the name of Mohanlal, a brother's son of the name of Nanigopal, a widow Simantini Santra and a daughter named Karunamayee by a predeceased wife. The daughter is married. On May 17 1940, Nanigopal propounded a will said to have been executed by Purna on August 22, 1935. The will purports to appoint Nanigopal as the executor. Reasons for totally disinheriting-the widow Simantini are recited in the will. The daughter is-given some benefit under the will, but she is not to get the benefit of the estate for twenty years. 2. The application for probate contained only those particulars which are required to be stated under the provisions of Section 276 of the Indian Succession Act. No mention was made in that application of the relations of the testator who had survived him. If there had been no will, the widow Simantini would have been the heir to succeed to the estate, but even her name was not mentioned. The will was proved in common form and probate was granted to Nanigopal on June 7, 1940. Thereafter, Nanigopal has mortgaged one of the properties claimed by him to be the testator's property, viz., premises No. 29, Durga Charan Doctor Road. There was a tenant in that premises. The executor instituted a suit for ejectment against the said tenant in December, 1942 and obtained a decree in that suit on April 21, 1943. It is admitted that Simantini is living in that house. Admittedly she has been living there since the tenant left the house; but whether she was living there from before that time is a point on which there is dispute between the parties. On June 18, 1946, she applied for revocation of the probate. The grounds on which she wanted revocation are (i) that the proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substance and (ii) that the will was a forged will. This application for revocation came for hearing before our learned brother Latifur Rahman J. and was dismissed. Simantini Santra has preferred this appeal against the said order of Latifur Rahman J. 3. A number of affidavits has been put in in this case. Two affidavits have been put in by Simantini in support of her application--one being by way of reply. Simantini Santra has preferred this appeal against the said order of Latifur Rahman J. 3. A number of affidavits has been put in in this case. Two affidavits have been put in by Simantini in support of her application--one being by way of reply. Two affidavits have been put in in opposition--one by Nanigopal and the other by two of the alleged attesting witnesses. It is admitted in the affidavit of Nanigopal filed in opposition that no special citation was issued on the widow. There is nothing in the affidavit in opposition to indicate that she knew of the probate proceedings when pending. The affidavit in opposition states that she knew that probate had been granted--a fact which she denies in her affidavit. Assuming that she had knowledge that probate had been granted, the position stands thus: that she was not admittedly cited, she had no knowledge of the probate proceedings, but may have had knowledge after the termination of those proceedings, after probate had been granted to Nanigopal. There is nothing definite in the affidavits to indicate the precise time when she is said to have acquired knowledge of the fact that probate had already been issued, nor anything in the affidavits to show that she knew the terms of the will. In these circumstances, we are to decide whether she has made out a just cause for revocation of the grant of probate. As she has been disinherited, completely cut off by the will that has been propounded, she was vitally interested in the probate proceedings. Inasmuch as there was no indication given by the propounder of the will in his application for probate that the testator had left a widow, no special citation u/s 283 was issued on her. The law on the subject has been laid down, after a review of the leading authorities bearing upon the point, in the case of Dinabandhu Roy Braja Raj Shaha v. Sarala Sundari Dasi ILR (1940) 1 Cal. 33. The decision of this Court in that case was affirmed by the Judicial Committee in Sarala Sundari Dassya v. Dinabandhu Roy Brajaraj Saha (1944) L.R. 71 IndAp 1. But as it was affirmed by the Judicial Committee on other grounds, it was not necessary for the Judicial Committee to express any opinion on this point at issue. 33. The decision of this Court in that case was affirmed by the Judicial Committee in Sarala Sundari Dassya v. Dinabandhu Roy Brajaraj Saha (1944) L.R. 71 IndAp 1. But as it was affirmed by the Judicial Committee on other grounds, it was not necessary for the Judicial Committee to express any opinion on this point at issue. But that fact does not, in our judgment, detract from its authority or the authority of the cases on the point which were considered in the case by this Court. At p. 47 of the report the law was laid down in the following terms: As I understand the decisions, a special citation issued in the court's discretion u/s 283 must be served. If it is not served on the party, the proceedings are defective and the grant must be revoked at his instance. Absence or non-service of special citation on a person who ought to be cited is itself a good ground for revocation at his instance in the absence of other circumstances on which the court may refuse revocation on account of the discretion vested in it by Section 263. It would be a defect but the defect would not be of substance, if for instance the non-cited party had knowledge of the probate proceedings. If those special circumstances do not exist the grant must be revoked. It is not possible or desirable to enumerate rehaustively what those special circumstances may be. Delay in applying for exvocation which amounts to waiver or acquiescence, would be one. 4. There cannot be any doubt in our mind that, having regard to the terms of the will, special citation ought to have been issued to the widow and inasmuch as admittedly no such citation was issued, the grant will have to be revoked, unless the Respondent, viz., the propounder, can prove special circumstances of the nature indicated in this passage which would induce us not to exercise the discretion given u/s 263 in favour of the Applicant for revocation. 5. We have already stated that it is not alleged that the widow had knowledge of the probate proceedings; at most it can be said on the affidavits that she may have had some vague information about the probate at some time after the probate had already been granted. 5. We have already stated that it is not alleged that the widow had knowledge of the probate proceedings; at most it can be said on the affidavits that she may have had some vague information about the probate at some time after the probate had already been granted. Further, we do not find any materials on the record which would justify us to come to the conclusion that the delay in applying for revocation amounts to waiver or acquiescene on her part. 6. In these circumstances, we set aside the grant which has been made in favour of Nanigopal and direct him to deliver the probate in court. As we are revoking the grant on the ground mentioned in Clause (a) of Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act, the position would be this: As has been indicated by Lord Sinha in the case of Ramanandi Kuer v. Kalawati Kuer ILR (1928) Pat. 221 : L.R. 55 IndAp 18 the propounder must prove the will in solemn form in the presence of Simantini. It would be for the propounder, if he so desires, to amend his application for probate by mentioning the names of the surviving relations of Purna and it would be for him, if he so thinks, to move the court for the purpose of issuing special citation on such other persons, viz., the daughter Karunamayee and other relatives, which may be named by him, but it would be for the probate court to consider, in view of the discretion given in Section 283 of the Indian Succession Act, whether special citations are to be issued on Karunamayee and others. 7. After the conclusion of our judgment, which we have just delivered, the learned Counsel appearing for the propounder asks for leave to amend his application for probate. The normal procedure would have been to make the application for amendment before the probate Court, but as Mr. 7. After the conclusion of our judgment, which we have just delivered, the learned Counsel appearing for the propounder asks for leave to amend his application for probate. The normal procedure would have been to make the application for amendment before the probate Court, but as Mr. Hitter, appearing on behalf of the widow, does not object to the leave being given by us, we allow the prayer for amendment by the addition of a para, as 2(a), wherein will be mentioned the names of the persons who have survived the testator, liberty being given to the attorney for the Respondent to supply the names of such persona and their addresses to the office when the order is drawn up so that they may be inserted in the new para. 2(a). 8. The Appellant must have the costs of the application for revocation and the costs of the appeal. 9. If the propounder succeeds in establishing the will, his costs for opposing the application for revocation and the costs of the appeal will come out of the estate, otherwise he bears his own costs. 10. Mr. Mitter appearing on behalf of Simantini Santra waives service of special citation. Akram J. 11. I agree.